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The significance of the margin of appreciation doctrine has been underscored recently with 
the adoption of Protocol No 15 which calls for the inclusion of the terms ‘margin of 
appreciation’ and ‘subsidiarity’ in the Preamble of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. This development reflects the disquiet amongst member States to the Convention 
that the doctrine is not being given enough weight by the European Court of Human Rights 
in the determination of cases before it. One of the interpretive tools that is perceived to be 
having a negative effect on the margin of appreciation is the living instrument doctrine 
which has been blamed for narrowing the margin of appreciation afforded to States. This 
thesis brings an original contribution to the literature in this area by considering the 
interaction between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines in the case 
law of the Court. The contribution is achieved in two ways: (a) methodologically: through 
the methodology adopted which is a combination of the quantitative method of descriptive 
statistics and the qualitative method of doctrinal textual analysis; (b) substantively: through 
the systematic examination of the case law of the Court from January 1979 to December 
2016 in which both the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines are present. 
The lens of the relationship between rights and duties is applied to the case analysis. The 
case analysis is used to draw conclusions on the nature of the relationship and whether living 
instrument arguments are superseding the margin of appreciation doctrine where there is 
conflict. The results of the case analysis also shows distinctions in the interpretive 
approaches of the Court at the admissibility and compliance stages. The overall results of 
the study show that there are a variety of ways in which interaction takes place between both 
doctrines and the nature of both doctrines will continue to require a close interaction 
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This study examines the relationship between the margin of appreciation doctrine 
and living instrument doctrine used by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, the 
Court) in its interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, the 
Convention).1 Although both doctrines are embedded in the jurisprudence of the Court, their 
use by the Court has not been without criticism.2 One of the areas of criticisms is directed at 
the interaction between both doctrines in the Court’s jurisprudence. In particular, the living 
instrument has been criticised for narrowing the width of the margin of appreciation afforded 
to States and thereby resulting in the State being found to be in breach of their obligations 
under the Convention.3 A case in point which shows the strength of the concern about the 
interaction between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines is the 2005 
case of Hirst v United Kingdom.4 In Hirst, the ECtHR ruled that the blanket (legislative) ban 
on prisoners voting in the United Kingdom was a breach of the United Kingdom’s 
obligations under Article 3 of Protocol No 1 to the ECHR. The discontent with this decision 
is evidenced by the fact that 13 years after the judgment, there has still been no 
implementation of the decision by the United Kingdom. A combined reading of the decision 
in Hirst and an analysis of the different criticisms of the decision from the perspective of 
interpretive tools, reveals discontent with the margin of appreciation afforded to the State in 
that case and how it was impacted by the Court interpreting the Convention in the light of 
present-day conditions through the use of consensus.5  
More recently, following the Brighton Declaration, Protocol No 15 has been adopted 
which calls for the inclusion of the terms ‘margin of appreciation’ and ‘subsidiarity’ in the 
Preamble of the Convention. These developments further reinforce the importance of the 
                                                 
1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ETS 5. 
2 Criticisms of both doctrines will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
3 Baroness Hale, ‘Common Law and Convention Law: The Limits to Interpretation’ (2011) EHRLR, 534, 542; 
Françoise Tulkens, Section President of the European Court of Human Rights. Seminar ‘What are the Limits 
to the Evolutive Interpretation of the Convention?’ (Dialogue between Judges 2011) 19. 
4 Hirst v United Kingdom (no 2) App no 74025/01 (ECtHR, 6 October 2005). 
5 For a discussion of the case and the UK’s position, see Ed Bates, ‘The Continued Failure to Implement Hirst 
v United Kingdom’ EJIL Talk! (15 December, 2015) available at < https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-continued-
failure-to-implement-hirst-v-uk/> accessed 20 August 2018; Thomas Kleinlein, ‘Consensus and Contestability: 
the ECtHR and the Combined Potential of European Consensus and Procedural Rationality Control’ (2017) 




margin of appreciation doctrine and the concern that the doctrine is being negatively 
impacted in the jurisprudence of the Court. This research is carried out against this backdrop 
of discontent and focuses on the interaction between the margin of appreciation doctrine and 
the interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument. The purpose of this chapter is to 
introduce the subject matter to the reader. It sets the context and outlines the importance of 
interpretation to the realisation of human rights. It brings under the spot light the two key 
interpretive tools, which form the focus of this study: the margin of appreciation and living 
instrument doctrine of the Court. It also sets out the hypothesis, the objectives, methods, and 
the overall structure of the research project. 
 
1.1. Context 
The ECHR was created in the aftermath of the Second World War and represented 
an attempt to ensure that the atrocities of that period were never repeated.6  It creates an 
obligation on member States7 to secure the rights contained within it to everyone within their 
jurisdiction.8 The enjoyment of the protection provided by the Convention is therefore not 
dependent upon an individual being a citizen of a member State. Since its creation in 1950, 
the Convention has become a catalyst for the advancement of human rights protection in 
Europe. The ECHR has been so successful that it has been described as ‘the most effective 
human rights regime in the world’,9 the “jewel in the crown”10 of the Council of Europe 
human rights regime. It is acknowledged that the success of the Convention has been made 
possible through the work of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, the Court) the 
                                                 
6 For a more detailed account of the history of the establishment of the Council of Europe and the Drafting of 
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, see A H Robertson and J G Merrills, 
Human Rights in Europe: A Study of the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd edn MUP 1993) 1-21; 
Ed Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights: From its Inception to the Creation of 
a Permanent Court of Human Rights (OUP 2010) 4-23. 
7 Within this work ‘State Parties’, ‘Contracting Parties’ will be used interchangeably with ‘member States’ to 
denote the parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
8 Article 1 ECHR. 
9 Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal 
Systems (OUP 2012) 3. 
10 C Lalumière, ‘Human Rights in Europe: Challenges for the Next Millennium’ in R St. J Macdonald and F 





body charged with the interpretation of the provisions of the Convention.11 The Court itself 
has also been recognised as a ‘jewel’,12 and more recently as the ‘conscience of Europe’.13 
From its ‘humble beginnings’ in 1950, the protection system created by the 
Convention has ‘evolved’ in several ways.14 These may be categorised into: geographical 
evolution, structural evolution and content evolution.  Geographical evolution can be seen 
in the increase in the number of member States. From a document ratified by 10 
predominantly Western European States in 1950 to the current 47 member States which 
extends not only to Western European States but also to Central and Eastern European 
States.15 Structural evolution has occurred through changes in the mechanism for 
enforcement of the rights provided for by the Convention. It was initially a two-tier system 
with enforcement shared by the European Commission of Human Rights and the European 
Court of Human Rights. It has now evolved from an optional right of individual petition to 
the European Commission on Human Rights (‘the Commission’) and an optional 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, to the current system where the Commission has been 
abolished and a full time Court has been established with compulsory jurisdiction.16 Content 
evolution is displayed in two ways: an addition of more substantive rights through the 
additional Protocols to the Convention17 and the use of evolutive interpretation as a 
technique of interpretation for the cases brought before the Court.18 This research hones in 
on the impact of the interpretative techniques employed by the Court, in particular, its margin 
                                                 
11 Article 19 ECHR establishes the Court and assigns it the role of ensuring the member State parties comply 
with their obligations under the Convention. This supervisory role is only engaged through contentious 
proceedings and once all domestic remedies have been exhausted - Article 26 ECHR. See Pieter Van Dijk, 
Godefridus JH Van Hoof, AW Heringa, Theory & Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd 
edn, Kluwer Law International 1998) 82. 
12 Kevin Boyle, ‘The European Experience: The European Convention on Human Rights’ (2009 – 2010) 40(1) 
Victoria U Wellington L Rev 167. 
13 Julia Laffranque, ‘ A Look at the European Court of Human Rights Case Law on Moral Issues and Academic 
Freedom’ (2017) 26 Juridica International 34,46. 
14 Evolution is considered here from the perspective of adaptation to change. 
15 This evolution in the number of member States has not been without attendant challenges. For more on this 
see Robert Harmsen, ‘The Transformation of the ECHR Legal Order and the Post Enlargement Challenges 
Facing the European Court of Human Rights’ in Giuseppe Martinico & Oreste Pollicino (eds), The National 
Judicial Treatment of the ECHR and EU Laws: A Comparative Constitutional Perspective’ (Europa Law 
Publishing 2010) 32. 
16 This is as a result of Protocol No 11 of 1998. The effect of the creation of the permanent Court on the volume 
of cases received is shown by the fact that between 1959 and 1998 the Court delivered 837 judgments. 
However, between 1999 and 2012, the Court delivered 15,110. This represents more than 94% of the close to 
16,000 decisions delivered by the Court between 1959 and 2012 - Statistics taken from the Court’s website 
‘ECHR Overview: 1959-2012’ pg. 4 available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592012_ENG.pdf > accessed 7 April 2016. 
17 There are currently 16 protocols to the Convention. Not all the Protocols however add more rights to the 
Convention. Some of them deal with procedural issues. For a full list and text of the Protocols to the 
Convention, see < http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts&c=#n1359128122487_pointer>.  




of appreciation doctrine and evolutive interpretation which is displayed in its living 
instrument doctrine. 
Interpretation plays a key part in the protection of international human rights. This is 
because international human rights treaties are usually drafted in ‘vague’ terms.19 Vagueness 
in international treaties may create a challenge for the attainment of certainty in 
interpretation.  On the other hand, it serves a useful purpose because vague legal provisions 
give a better allowance for interpretative manoeuvres by the relevant adjudicatory body. In 
a similar fashion to other international treaties, the provisions of the Convention have been 
described as being ‘relatively vague’.20 This therefore leaves room for interpretation by the 
Court. In carrying out its role, ‘the Court’ has resorted to a variety of interpretation methods. 
It has endorsed the rules of interpretation of international treaties found in Articles 31-33 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (‘VCLT’)21 and applied them in its 
adjudication of provisions of the Convention.22 The Court has also gone beyond the 
provisions of the VCLT to create other interpretive tools.23 These tools reflect its position as 
an international adjudicatory mechanism with the final say on the effective protection of the 
rights enshrined within the Convention. 24Whilst the need for interpretation of the provisions 
of the ECHR by the Court is not disputed, the tools of interpretation used by the Court have 
been the subject of debate amongst academics and judges. This thesis contributes to this 
ongoing debate by focusing on a systematic analysis of the interaction between two of the 
interpretative tools used by the Court: the margin of appreciation doctrine and the living 
instrument doctrine.  
                                                 
19 The issue of vagueness is one that resonates with other international treaties as well whether or not they are 
for the protection of human rights. For more on the definitions of ‘vague’ legal terms, see TAO Endicott, 
Vagueness in Law (OUP 2000) 31,37. 
20 See e.g. Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Partnering with Strasbourg: Constitutionalisation of the European Court of 
Human Rights, the Accession of Central and East European States to the Council of Europe and the Idea of 
Pilot Judgments’ (2009) 9(3) H R L Rev 397. 
21 1155 UNTS 33. 
22 In Golder v United Kingdom App no 4451/70 (ECtHR, 21 February 1975), the Court confirmed that in 
interpreting Article 6(1) of the Convention it would be guided by Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties 1969 which, although not in force at the time, ‘enunciate in essence generally accepted 
principles of international law to which the Court has already referred on occasion’.  
23 Some of these tools created by the Court include: the living instrument doctrine, the principle of 
proportionality (Where the Court determines that the right of an individual has been infringed, proportionality 
is a test applied by the Court to determine whether such interference by the member State is justified), the 
margin of appreciation doctrine, the principle of autonomous concepts (the principle of autonomous concepts 
implies that the terms used in the Convention are given a separate meaning and do not necessarily have the 
same meaning as that used within the domestic jurisdiction). For more on the interpretative approaches adopted 
by the Court, see D J Harris et all, Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (3rd edn, OUP 2014) 7-21. 
24 The Court is set up as a subsidiary system of enforcement as the Convention expressly assigns the primary 




The margin of appreciation may be defined as a tool that grants some degree of 
flexibility to member States in their interpretation and application of the rights enshrined in 
the Convention.25  It affords the member State ‘room for manoeuvre’ in applying the 
Convention within their jurisdiction. The result of the application of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine to the interpretation of the Convention is that the diversity of the 
member States of the Convention is recognised and the application of the protection from 
the Convention is interpreted in line with the practice of the particular State. This means that 
it is possible for different levels of protection of Convention rights to exist within the 
member States to the Convention. For example, Article 9 of the Convention provides for 
freedom of religion. On the issue of wearing the full-face veil (burqa) as part of a religious 
belief, the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine has led to the upholding of the 
blanket ban of the wearing of the burqa in public places in France. 26  In some other European 
countries such as the United Kingdom for example, the veil can be worn in public. This 
potential for different levels of protection as a result of the application of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine has caused the application of the doctrine by the Court to be 
criticised.27 
In contrast to the margin of appreciation doctrine, the living instrument doctrine 
focuses on an evolutive approach to interpretation rather than an interpretation that considers 
the diversity of member States. In adopting this approach to interpretation, the Court 
describes the Convention as a ‘a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions’28 This means that the Court would be mindful of developments in 
society whilst interpreting the Convention. Therefore, the concepts used within the 
Convention will not be given the meaning they had in 1950 when the Convention was 
drafted, but rather interpreted in the light of their present usage in society. The use of both 
the margin of appreciation (diversity of member States in applying the Convention) and 
living instrument (consideration of contemporary developments in society when applying 
the Convention) doctrines by the Court has not been without criticism.29 One of the areas of 
criticism is that the living instrument doctrine leads to a narrowing of the margin of 
                                                 
25 There are different definitions that have been proffered in relation to the margin of appreciation doctrine, but 
the commonality is the acknowledgement that it provides space to national authorities to interpret the 
Convention. 
26 See the case of S.A.S. v France App no 43835/11 (ECtHR, 1 July 2014).  
27 Criticisms of the margin of appreciation doctrine will be dealt with later on in Chapter 2. 
28 Tyrer v United Kingdom App no 5856/72 (ECtHR, 25 April 1978). 




appreciation afforded to States.30 This suggests a relationship between both doctrines and 
this is the area that this research focuses on. The aim of this thesis is therefore to carry out a 
systematic examination of the case law of the Court to determine how the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines interact with each other and the effect this has 
on the outcome of the cases presented before the Court.   
 
1.2 Research Hypothesis 
The effective protection of the rights contained in the European Convention on 
Human Rights depends on a partnership between the national courts and the European Court 
of Human Rights. This partnership is achieved through the margin of appreciation doctrine 
as a justified response to the position of the Court as a subsidiary means of enforcement. The 
recognition of member States as the primary enforcers of the Convention does not mean that 
the ‘living character’ of the Convention should be frustrated; its ‘livingness’ makes it an 
effective and relevant instrument for the protection of human rights. There should therefore 
be a framework for determining how the margin of appreciation interacts with the 
interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument.  
The Court is in some instances faced with ‘hard cases’31 in which an interpretation 
of the Convention in line with the individual view of the member State would conflict with 
an interpretation that takes into consideration present day circumstances prevailing across 
other member States of the Council of Europe and the wider developments in international 
law. In such situations the member State may be seeking to rely on its margin of appreciation 
as justification for its actions, effectively using the margin of appreciation as a ‘corporate 
veil’ and entreating the Court not to ‘pierce its veil’32 in situations where changes in society 
would suggest that the Court adopts an alternative, evolutive approach. This then creates a 
tension between both doctrines and poses a challenge for the Court as it would be impossible 
to give a judgement that would yield a positive result for both the applicant who is requesting 
protection of human rights under ‘the Convention’ and the respondent member State at the 
same time. A compromise has to be made between the protection of the position of the 
individual member State and the pursuit of the overall goal of protection of individual human 
                                                 
30 Baroness Hale (n 3); Tulkens (n 3). 
31 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977) 85. 
32 ‘Piercing the veil’ or ‘lifting the veil’ is a term from company law which refers to the action of a court to 
hold corporate shareholders personally liable for the debts and liabilities of the company. In this work, it is 
used in the sense of the Court choosing to assess the human rights implications of the actions of a member 




rights across in Europe. The central issue then is the determination of which of the interests 
will ultimately prevail in the decision of the Court. It is this tension between diversity of 
member States, expressed through the margin of appreciation, and effective protection of 
individual rights, expressed through the living instrument doctrine in the interpretation of 
the Convention that this thesis seeks to explore.  
 
1.3 Research Objectives  
The research objectives are expressed in the following research questions: 
1. What is the nature of the interaction between margin of appreciation and 
living instrument arguments in cases brought before the European Court of 
Human Rights? (RQ 1 relationship) 
2. To what extent are living instrument arguments superseding margin of 
appreciation arguments? (RQ 2 conflict) 
3. Which interpretive and theoretical approaches are applied by the Court to 
decide the outcome of cases where the margin of appreciation and living 
instrument arguments conflict?(RQ 3 interpretive and theoretical approaches) 
4. What recommendations can be made for future research and policy 
developments? (RQ 4 recommendations) 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The overall research design is structured around the exploratory and explanatory 
model.33 The first stage is exploration of the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR, the Court) and relevant literature on the margin of appreciation and living 
instrument doctrines. Through an examination of these cases, themes of inquiry will be 
revealed which will be followed through in the explanatory stage. The explanatory stage is 
focused on using the interpretive methods which will be highlighted later on in the work, to 
examine the case law to determine key themes and patterns in the way the ECtHR applied 
the interpretive methods to cases where it had to balance out competing margin of 
appreciation and living instrument claims. This research design of exploratory and 
explanatory stages has influenced the research methods adopted within this work.  
A combination of quantitative and qualitative tools will be adopted. The qualitative 
method of doctrinal research and the quantitative method of descriptive statistical analysis 
                                                 




were adopted for the exploratory stage whilst the qualitative method of doctrinal research 
was adopted for the explanatory stage.  The combination of both methods was intended to 
offer value-added at each stage towards answering the central research questions. The first 
legal research method used in the analysis chapters (five and six) is the quantitative method 
of descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics are tools used to organise and summarise 
data.34 In this work, the tools are applied to organise and summarise the data generated from 
the population of interest, which is the case law of the ECtHR in which both the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines are present from January 1979 to December 
2016.35  Percentages, bar charts and pie charts will be used as descriptive statistical tools 
within this work.36  
The use of descriptive statistics is limited as it does not provide a qualitative analysis 
of the issues that may be raised from the results. Whilst it may provide answers to RQ 2 
(conflict) which examines the extent to which living instrument arguments are superseding 
margin of appreciation arguments from a quantitative point of view, it will not provide any 
qualitative answers to the reason why this is the case.  A further method is therefore 
necessary to strengthen the study. 
In the light of the limitations of the descriptive statistical analysis, the second 
research method applied in this thesis is doctrinal research. Doctrinal research may be 
described as ‘the process used to identify, analyse and synthesise the content of the law’.37 
Doctrinal research relies on sources such as legal rules contained in statutes and case law.38 
The arguments generated as a result of doctrinal research are not only derived from primary 
legal sources39 such as case law and statute but may also arise from secondary legal sources 
such as scholarly publications in the area.40 In this thesis, the primary source of the data is 
the case law of the ECtHR from January 1979 to December 2016 in which both the margin 
of appreciation and living instrument doctrines are present. This case law will be accessed 
via the Human Rights Documentation (HUDOC) database which is found in the official site 
                                                 
34 Zealure C Holcomb, Fundamentals of Descriptive Statistics (Routledge 2017) 2. 
35 A separate section will explain the data source in more detail. 
36 Holcomb (n 34) 9. 
37 Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), 
Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013) 7, 9. 
38 Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research’ in Andrew Knight, Les Ruddock (eds) Advanced Research Methods in 
the Build Environment (Wiley Blackwell, 2008) 28, 29. 
39 The sources of law are usually divided into ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ sources. Primary sources include 
statute/legislation, case law and judicial precedents. Secondary cover a wider remit and include articles by 
scholars in the area, text books and case comment (to mention a few). 
40 Rob van Gestel and Hans-W. Micklitz (2011) Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal Research in Europe: What about 




of the European Court of Human Rights.41 Scholarly writing in this area will also be used 
for the doctrinal analysis. In the context of this thesis, doctrinal research will be applied 
throughout the work as it will aid in providing answers to the four research questions in this 
thesis. Doctrinal research also has its limitations as it takes an ‘insider’s view of the law’.42 
This is because the arguments are generated from a synthesis of the law itself rather than 
from a study of external factors. It ‘takes as its starting point and its main focus of attention 
rules of law, without systematic or regular reference to the context of problems they are 
supposed to resolve, the purposes they were intended to serve or the effects they in fact 
have’.43 Due to the number of examples of case law to be considered, doctrinal research itself 
would be limited in the categorisation of the case law prior to analysis. This deficiency is 
nonetheless ameliorated through the use of the descriptive statistical analysis to first of all 




In order to deal effectively with the questions posed, this thesis is structured into 
seven chapters. This chapter has introduced the subject matter of this research and the 
methodology to be applied to deal with the research questions posed. It has also set out the 
context of this research and the research challenges for the work that follows. Chapter two 
provides the first step in dealing with RQ 1 (relationship). It offers an introduction to the use 
of the margin of appreciation doctrine and the living instrument doctrine in the jurisprudence 
of the Court. It identifies the contexts and rationale for their use within the jurisprudence of 
the Court. It also identifies some of the criticisms that have been levelled against both 
doctrines and the impact on these on the use of the doctrines by the Court. In doing so, the 
chapter addresses RQ 1 by establishing that there is a relationship between both doctrines 
and it provides an initial inquiry into what the existing literature reveals about the 
relationship between both doctrines and their impact on the protection of human rights 
through the Convention. It highlights the role of consensus as a linking factor and the 
attribute of change which both doctrines exhibit. Change is particularly seen in time and 
space, width and function. Chapter two therefore proffers initial answers to RQ 1 
                                                 
41 A detailed consideration of the selection criteria for the case law is provided in Appendix A to this thesis. 
42 Hutchinson (n 37) 7,15. 
43 W Twinning (1976) Taylor Lectures 1975 Academic Law and Legal Development, Lagos: University of 




(relationship) and to RQ 2 (conflict). It also draws attention to areas where there are gaps in 
the literature that will be addressed by this thesis as a contribution to the codification of the 
law in this area. 
Chapter three paves the way for the case analysis which will provide answers to RQ 
1 (relationship), RQ 2 (conflict), and RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches). It 
examines the underpinning for the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines 
through the lens of international rules of interpretation of treaties contained in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT). Chapter three aims to achieve two main 
tasks: (a) Examine the legitimacy in international law of the creation of the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines as tools of interpretation by the Court; and (b) 
Examine the links between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines with 
the theories of interpretation reflected in the international rules on treaty interpretation. It 
argues that although neither doctrine is expressly mentioned within the VCLT, they are still 
legitimate rules of interpretation created by the Court which fit into the framework for 
international adjudication. This thesis provides a contribution to the literature by showing 
the interaction between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines with the 
recognised rules of interpretation in the VCLT. It concludes by showing that both doctrines 
are relevant to the Court’s preferred approach of teleological interpretation. 
A further contribution to the literature in this area will be provided in Chapter four 
which considers an underpinning for the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines through the lens of the relationship between rights and duties. It begins with 
Hohfeld’s theory that for every right, there is a correlative duty, when one speaks of the 
existence of a right, it means a duty has been invaded.44 It however argues that the 
Hohfeldian conception of the correlativity of rights and duties is inadequate to explain the 
use of the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines as tools of interpretation 
in the determination of rights and duties. The alternative theory put forward by Joseph Raz 
of rights as grounds of duties is examined and based on the key challenges in that theory, a 
dynamic restricted correlativity thesis is proposed in this work as a framework for 
underpinning the use of the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines by the 
Court. This thesis seeks to provide an original contribution to the literature by examining the 
use of the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines by the Court through the 
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lens of dynamic restricted correlativity. Chapter four therefore provides some indications for 
RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches) and concludes with a tool to be applied when 
analysing the case law in the subsequent chapters.  
Flowing from the foundations that have been set in the previous chapters, chapter 
five is the first of the case analysis chapters. The methodology adopted in the selection of 
the case law and the research design are detailed in Appendix A to this thesis. It also sets out 
the analytical parameters and limitations of this research. This study seeks to provide an 
original contribution to the literature in this area through the methodology applied which is 
a combination of the quantitative method of descriptive statistics and the qualitative method 
of doctrinal textual research.  Appendix B to this thesis reveals the coding criteria that was 
applied to the case law, whilst Appendix C contains a list of the cases that were analysed. 
The case law to be analysed is restricted to cases from January 1979 to December 2016 in 
which both the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines are present.  
Chapter five will seek to provide initial answers to RQ 1 (relationship), RQ 2 
(conflict), RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches) and RQ 4 (recommendations). It 
focuses on the use of living instrument and margin of appreciation arguments in determining 
the scope ratione materiae of the Convention at the admissibility stage. It will highlight that 
an examination of the use of the living instrument and margin of appreciation doctrines 
distinctly at the admissibility phase is usually overlooked in the literature, but one of the 
areas of criticism levelled against the living instrument doctrine has been that it has expanded 
the coverage of the Convention and in tandem restricted the margin of appreciation afforded 
to States. This study therefore seeks to provide an original contribution to the existing 
literature by examining the use of the living instrument and margin of appreciation 
arguments in relation to arguments on the scope ratione materiae of the Convention. The 
case analysis will begin with a descriptive textual analysis seeking to establish RQ 1 - the 
relationship between the living instrument and margin of appreciation doctrines at this 
admissibility phase. It highlights four models of interaction between the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines in the case law examined. It will also provide 
initial answers to RQ 2 on whether living instrument arguments are superseding margin of 
appreciation arguments. Based on the outcome of the descriptive statistics, doctrinal textual 
analysis will be applied to examine two aspects of the impact of the living instrument 
doctrine on the margin of appreciation doctrine (a) expansion ratione materiae and (b) 
restriction ratione materiae of the scope of the Convention. Both will be examined, and 




(interpretive and theoretical approaches). The case analysis in chapter five will argue that 
although on the face of it, living instrument arguments achieve a higher success rate with 
decisions of compatibility, when they are faced side by side with margin of appreciation 
arguments, the overall effect on the outcome of the case is different. There is therefore scope 
to consider the way in which margin of appreciation arguments are used at the applicability 
stage.  
Chapter six is the second case analysis chapter and seeks to provide an original 
contribution through a consideration of the use of the living instrument and margin of 
appreciation doctrines in determining the nature and scope of duties of States at the merits 
stage. This analysis will be done through a combination of the descriptive statistics and 
doctrinal analysis. Chapter six provides a further layer to answering RQ 1 (relationship), RQ 
2 (conflict) and RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches). It also forms the basis for 
consideration of RQ 4 (recommendations). The first part of the analysis focuses on the issue 
of width of the margin of appreciation as the living instrument doctrine is criticised for 
narrowing the margin of appreciation afforded to States. Through the use of the descriptive 
statistics it will be argued that the living instrument doctrine has not had an explicit impact 
of narrowing the width of the margin of appreciation which suggests the issue is more 
nuanced than the text of the case law. Consequently, it will be argued that the doctrinal 
analysis of the case law should be adopted from the perspective of policing the boundaries 
of the margin of appreciation which is linked to the justification the State has to put forward 
for an interference or for omitting to act, rather than focusing on the designated width of the 
margin of appreciation in the case. It will be argued that a consideration of boundaries would 
yield a better understanding of the relationship between both doctrines. The doctrinal textual 
analysis will consider the impact of the living instrument on the boundaries of the margin of 
appreciation from two perspectives: (a) The boundaries on the nature and scope of duty; and 
(b) The boundaries on the scope of duty. The rights and duties paradigm will be retained 
based on what will be considered in chapter 4. Two case studies will be used to illustrate the 
use of the living instrument to police the boundaries of the margin of appreciation: (a) 
Recognition of post-operative gender identify of transsexuals; and (b) Equality of inheritance 
rights for illegitimate children. From the doctrinal analysis it will be argued that the living 
instrument doctrine does not just lead to a change in time, but also a change in space. It will 
also be argued that whilst the living instrument doctrine may result in the State having a high 
threshold of justification, opportunity for dialogue with the Court can be seen in the case 




The final chapter is chapter seven which will provide a conclusion to this work and 
also makes some recommendations for future research.  
While this thesis was being completed, one thesis was published on the issue of the 
living instrument doctrine.45 This is not surprising due to the importance of this doctrine in 
the decision making of the Court. This thesis focuses on the nature of the interaction between 
the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines, as opposed to a general 
consideration of the presence of the living instrument doctrine in the jurisprudence of the 
Court.
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Overview of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine 
And the Living Instrument Doctrine 
 
2. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the general subject matter and context of this research was 
introduced as well as the key objectives of the project. It highlighted that the main focus of 
this research is on the interaction between the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, the Court). This 
chapter therefore proceeds with an examination of some key issues surrounding the 
application of the margin of appreciation doctrine and the living instrument doctrine by the 
ECtHR, in its role in supervising the implementation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR, the Convention).1 It highlights the origins and evolution in the definition of 
the margin of appreciation doctrine, the contexts in which it has been used, as well as the 
function it plays as a tool of interpretation used by the ECtHR. In the light of the criticisms 
that have been raised against the use of the margin of appreciation doctrine, this chapter 
examines the justifications that have been given for the presence of the doctrine within the 
jurisprudence of the Court and its continued relevance as an interpretive tool. In a similar 
fashion, the origins, definition and function of the living instrument doctrine are considered. 
Due to the criticisms levelled against the use of the living instrument doctrine, the 
justifications for its use and continued presence within the jurisprudence of the Court is also 
examined. This chapter then provides the first steps towards dealing with RQ 1 (relationship) 
by exploring whether a relationship exists between the margin of appreciation and living 
instrument doctrines in their application by the Court. From an examination of existing 
literature in this area, it highlights the basis for this relationship and draws attention to the 
gaps in the literature which this thesis seeks to fill. The chapter concludes by showing that 
there is a need for a systematic analysis of the case law in which both the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines are applied by the Court in order to determine 
the nature of the relationship between them and the interpretive approaches adopted by the 
Court. 
 
                                                 




2.1 Origins of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine 
 In order to address RQ 1 (relationship), it is necessary to begin by first of all 
examining whether there is a relationship between the two doctrines. It is important to 
provide an understanding of both doctrines in the jurisprudence of the Court. It is also 
necessary to lay a foundation on the role of the member States and the role of the Court in 
protecting the rights in the ECHR. Article 1 of the ECHR expressly assigns the primary role 
of application and enforcement of its provisions to the member States, requiring them to 
‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction’ the rights and freedoms contained within the 
Convention.2 This ‘primarity’ means that it is the role of the member State, in the first place, 
to apply the Convention in order to secure the rights and liberties enshrined in it.3 This 
protective role of the member State is, however, accompanied by the supervisory function of 
the ECtHR in monitoring implementation by the State.4 The Court’s supervisory role remains 
subsidiary to the national mechanisms for protecting human rights.5 This subsidiary role is 
further underscored by the provision of Article 35(1) ECHR which states that the Court’s 
supervisory role will only be activated after all domestic remedies have been exhausted. 
The margin of appreciation doctrine reflects the subsidiary nature of the Court’s 
supervisory role. It is the allowance given by the ECtHR to national authorities to interpret 
and apply the provisions of the Convention. It gives room for differences in national contexts 
to be taken into consideration by the member States. The term ‘margin of appreciation’ is 
however neither found within the text of the Convention nor in the preparatory documents 
(Travaux Préparatoires).6 It is however noteworthy that the absence of the margin of 
appreciation in the text of the Convention will soon be changed as a result of the proposals 
                                                 
2 Article 1 ECHR. 
3 Janneke Gerards and Joseph Fleuren (eds), Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and of the Judgments of the ECtHR in National Case Law: A Comparative Analysis (Intersentia 2014) 18. 
4 Article 19 ECHR provides for the establishment of the European Court of Human Rights ‘to ensure the 
observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols 
thereto’. 
5 Handyside v United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976), para 48. 
6 This has been noted by a plethora of academic commentators. E.g. Howard Charles Yourow, The Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of the European Human Rights Jurisprudence (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers 1996) 14; Michael R Hutchinson, “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (1999) ICLQ 638,639; Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the 
Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia 2002) 2-3. Cf Steven Greer, ‘The 
Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights: Universal Principle or Margin of Appreciation?’ 
(2010) 3 UCL Human Rights Review 1 who states that the term ‘margin of appreciation first appeared in 1949 
in the proposals made by the European Movement when considering the creation of transnational human rights 




from the Brighton Declaration of 20127 and the resulting new Protocol No. 15.8 When Article 
1 of Protocol No 15 comes into force, it will add the terms ‘margin of appreciation’ and 
‘subsidiarity’ to the Preamble of the Convention. It requires that the margin of appreciation 
and subsidiarity are to be taken into consideration by the Court in carrying out their 
supervisory role over the implementation of the Convention by the member States. With 44 
ratifications out of the 47 member States to the ECHR, the possibility of Protocol No 15 
coming into force appears to be imminent, thereby reinforcing the significance of the margin 
of appreciation doctrine.9  
Whilst it is agreed that the doctrine owes its origin and development to the case law 
of the (now defunct) European Commission on Human Rights (the Commission) and the 
(continuing) functions of the ECtHR, there have been differences in current literature on the 
point as to when the doctrine was first used by the Commission. 10 Hutchinson traces the 
origins of the margin of appreciation doctrine to the Commission’s report in the 1960 
Lawless v Ireland case that involved derogation under Article 15 as a result of a state of 
emergency in the Republic of Ireland.11 By contrast, other commentators draw attention to 
the fact that the margin of appreciation doctrine was first introduced and adopted by the 
Commission Suo motu12 in its report on the earlier 1958 case of Greece v United Kingdom.13 
                                                 
7 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights (Brighton Declaration, 19-20 
April 2012) available at <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf 
accessed 29 July 2018. 
8 Protocol No 15 Amending the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS 
No. 213. 
9 Current status of ratifications as at 29 July 2018. Available at < https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-
list/-/conventions/treaty/213/signatures?p_auth=xwvJ7TQ3> accessed 29 July 2018. 
10 The Commission and the Court were created by former Article 19 of the Convention and were both charged 
with the obligation of ‘ensuring the observance of the engagement undertaken by the High Contracting Parties’ 
to the Convention. Protocol No 11 of 1998 (Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Entered into Force 1 November 1998) ETS 155) made significant changes 
to this structure: the Commission was abolished and a permanent Court with compulsory jurisdiction replaced 
the Court. For a more in depth examination of the role of the European Commission prior to 1998, see Erik 
Friberg and Mark E Villiger, ‘The European Commission of Human Rights’, in R St J Macdonald, F Matcher 
and H Petzold (eds), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Drodrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1993) 605-620; Pieter Van Dijk, Godefridus JH Van Hoof and  AW Heringa, Theory & Practice of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 1998) 26-31; For an examination 
of the structural amendments to the system of control as a result of Protocol No. 11 of 1998, see Ed Bates, The 
Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights: From its Conception to the Creation of a Permanent 
Court of Human Rights (OUP 2010) 452-467. 
11 Lawless v Ireland (No 3) App no 332/57 (ECtHR, 1 July 1961), para 90; Hutchinson (n 6). 
12 ‘On its own motion’. 
13 Greece v United Kingdom App no 176/56 (Commission Decision, 26 September 1958). See R St J 
Macdonald, ‘The Margin of Appreciation’, in R St J Macdonald, F Matcher, H Petzold (eds), The European 
System for the Protection of Human Rights (Drodrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1993) 83, 85; Yourow (n 6) 15; van 
Dijk and van Hoof (n 10) 84; Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aolán, ‘From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting 
the Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European 




In the Greece case, the United Kingdom had exercised its right under Article 15 to derogate 
from some of its obligations under the Convention as a result of a state of emergency in the 
Island of Cyprus. 14 Whilst deciding on the issue as to whether the measures adopted by the 
UK were justified, the Commission stated that in such a case a certain margin of appreciation 
must be conceded to the government.15 The Commission found that the derogation by the 
UK fell within the margin of appreciation afforded to the government and there was no 
violation of their obligations under the Convention. The Greece case therefore formed the 
birth of the margin of appreciation doctrine. 
In relation to the Court itself, the ‘certain measure of discretion’ alluded to by the 
Commission in the Greece case was relevant to the ECtHR decision in Lawless v Ireland, 
another case that dealt with derogations under Article 15, although as Yourow points out, 
there was no express mention of the margin of appreciation.16 Brems acknowledges this 
implicit recognition of the margin of appreciation by the Court was also seen in several other 
cases,17 but the first express use of the term ‘margin of appreciation’ by the Court was in the 
1971 case of De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v Netherlands, a case dealing with supervision of 
correspondence during detention for vagrancy.18 The Court in that case recognised that the 
Contracting States had a ‘power of appreciation’ under Article 8(2) of the Convention. In 
the examination of the case, the Court decided that in this case the Belgian authorities had 
not gone beyond the limits of that power of appreciation. Judge Spielmann writing extra 
judicially, however points out that this formulation of the doctrine in the De Wilde Ooms 
and Versyp case was ‘a slightly different formulation’ and that the first use of the term 
‘margin of appreciation’ by the Court itself was in the 1976 case of Engel and Others v 
                                                 
14 Derogation is a temporary suspension of compliance with certain human rights obligations. Article 15(1) of 
the ECHR gives member States the right to derogate from certain provisions of the Convention ‘in time of war 
or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation’. The measures undertaken must however be only 
such as are ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’. The measures must also not be inconsistent 
with any other international law obligation of the particular member State. At the time, the United Kingdom 
was responsible for the international relations of the territory of Cyprus. 
15 Greece (n 13). 
16 Lawless (n 11); Howard Charles Yourow, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of 
European Human Rights Jurisprudence’ (1987-1988) 3 Connecticut Journal of International Law 111, 120. 
17 Belgium Linguistics Case – ‘In the case “relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in 
education in Belgium” v Belgium’ App nos 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64 (ECtHR, 
23 July 1998); Wemhoff v Germany (Merits) App no 2122/64 (ECtHR, 27 June 1968); Delcourt v Belgium App 
no 2689/65 (ECtHR, 17 January 1970).  
18 De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v Belgium App nos 2832/66, 2835/66, 2899/66 (ECtHR, 18 June 1971); Eva 
Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, (1996)  
56 Zeitschrift Fur Auslandisches Offentliches Recht Und Volkerrecht 240, 243 available at < 




Netherlands.19 Moving on from its early beginnings in the case law of the Commission, the 
margin of appreciation doctrine has now become embedded within the enforcement system 
of the Court.20 The inclusion of the margin of appreciation doctrine in the text of the 
Preamble of the Convention when Protocol No 15 comes into force will further enhance the 
significance of the doctrine in the jurisprudence of the Court.21 
 
2.2 Evolution in the Definition of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine 
Although it is now entrenched within the case law of the Court, defining the term 
‘margin of appreciation’ is no simple task considering its recognised case-dependent, 
uneven, and largely unpredictable nature.22 However aspects of the margin of appreciation 
can be gleaned from the different definitions proffered by the literature. The definitions also 
show a progression in the understanding of the function of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine. The initial allusion to the margin of appreciation has already been traced to the 
Greece case. In that case, the Commission described the margin of appreciation as a ‘certain 
measure of discretion’ to be given to the member State.23 The Commission in the case 
provided no further definition or justification of the margin of appreciation doctrine. This 
has left room for further examination of the doctrine through the jurisprudence of the Court. 
In the first comprehensive work on the margin of appreciation doctrine in 1996, 
Howard Charles Yourow defined it as: 
 
 The latitude of deference or error which the Strasbourg organs will allow to 
national legislative, executive, administrative and judicial bodies before it is 
prepared to declare a national derogation from the Convention, or restriction or 
                                                 
19 Engel and Others v Netherlands App nos 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; and 5370/72. Dean 
Spielmann, ‘Whither the Margin of Appreciation?’ (UCL – Current Legal Problems (CLP) Lecture, University 
College London, 20 March 2014) 3 available at < 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20140320_London_ENG.pdf> accessed 29 July 2018. 
20 By the end of the 1990s over 700 of the Court’s judgments had endorsed the margin of appreciation doctrine, 
see Editor’s Note, ‘The Doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation under the European Convention on Human 
Rights: It’s Legitimacy in Theory and Application in Practice’ (1998) 19 Human Rights Law Journal 1. Outside 
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be traced to the French Conseil d’Etat in which the term margé d’appréciation is used as well as the 
administrative law in all civil law jurisdictions. For a more detailed discussion on the origins of the margin of 
appreciation and its presence in other civil/continental jurisdictions, see Arai-Takahashi (n 6) 14.  
21 This is particularly so due to the role that the Preamble plays in interpretation of treaties. For more on this 
point see D Spielmann, ‘Allowing the Right Margin: The European Court of Human Rights and the National 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?’ (Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg, 13 December 2013) 8. Available at 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20140113_Heidelberg_ENG.pdf > accessed 29 July 2018. 
22 Greer (n 6) 5. 




limitation upon a right guaranteed by the Convention to constitute a violation of 
one of the Convention’s substantive guarantees.24  
 
From Yourow’s definition the margin of appreciation is a flexible tool because it gives 
some allowance to member States. In relation to the scope of obligations on the State that 
the margin of appreciation may be applied to, Yourow’s definition appears to limit this 
flexibility to the negative obligations on the member State to refrain from interfering with 
individual rights. It does not shed any light on whether the State enjoys a margin of 
appreciation in cases where there is a positive obligation on the member State to fulfil a 
human rights obligation.25 This association by Yourow of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine with negative obligations on the member States may be linked to the fact that the 
margin of appreciation doctrine was first used in the Greece case, which was about 
derogations by the UK under Article 15 of the Convention.26  
The question that arises from Yourow’s definition is whether the margin of 
appreciation doctrine is only relevant when the Court is considering negative obligations of 
member States under the Convention? The definition of the margin of appreciation by Steven 
Greer in 2000 is relevant in answering this question. Greer defined the margin of 
appreciation as ‘The room for manoeuvre the Strasbourg institutions are prepared to accord 
national authorities in fulfilling their obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights’.27 Greer’s definition is similar to Yourow’s, to the extent that it acknowledges the 
flexible nature of the margin of appreciation in relation to the space it gives to national 
authorities but it differs in the area of the scope of obligations the margin of appreciation can 
be applied to.  Greer expands the understanding of the margin of appreciation beyond a 
reference to negative obligations by using the phrase ‘fulfilling their obligations’. This could 
be interpreted to mean that the margin of appreciation provides flexibility to the member 
State in carrying out both positive and negative obligations under the Convention as both 
come under the term ‘fulfilling’.  
Further support for the view that the margin of appreciation is applicable to both 
positive and negative obligations of States can be gleaned from Tümay’s definition of the 
margin of appreciation in 2008 as ‘The discretion given to a government when it evaluates 
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factual situations and applies the provisions enumerated in the Convention’.28 The margin 
of appreciation doctrine is therefore the lens through which the Court supervises the extent 
to which the member State has fulfilled its positive and negative obligations under the 
Convention. This shows an evolution in the understanding of the scope of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine from the first comprehensive work in 1996 to the present day. 
An important part of the nature of the margin of appreciation doctrine is that it affords 
flexibility not only to the member States parties in carrying out their role as the primary 
enforcers of the Convention, but also to the Court itself in carrying out its role as an 
international tribunal that is dealing with sovereign member States.29 This functional aspect 
of the margin of appreciation has been referred to from early publications on the doctrine. 
Macdonald defined the margin of appreciation doctrine in 1993 as ‘the general approach of 
the European Court of Human Rights to the delicate task of balancing sovereignty of 
Contracting Parties with their obligations under the Convention’.30 It is ‘the interpretative 
tool used by the Court which partly “resolves” the definitional quandaries…while at the 
same time attempting to reconcile the sovereignty versus human rights debate’31. Fenwick 
highlights that it gives the Court the flexibility to avoid damaging confrontations between it 
and the member States and to balance the sovereignty of the member States with their 
obligations under the Convention.32  The Court therefore remains mindful that it is an 
international adjudicatory mechanism and owes its existence to the will of the States. The 
sovereignty of the member States empowers them, if they wish, to pull out of the 
Convention.33 The margin of appreciation therefore serves as a useful functional tool for the 
Court. 
From the above definitions it can be seen that the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine 
is used by the Court to achieve more than one function. It is a ‘two pronged’ instrument used 
by the Court to deal with the dual areas of interpretation of individual rights on the one hand 
and sovereignty of member States on the other. The Court has not always clearly shown the 
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particular sense in which the doctrine is used in the case law and this has prompted criticism 
of inconsistency and arbitrariness in its application.34 Letsas attempts to bring some 
coherence to this apparent lack of coherence and transparency in case law by distinguishing 
between a ‘substantive’ and a ‘structural’ use of the margin of appreciation.35 The 
substantive use of the margin of appreciation refers to ‘all the cases where despite the fact 
that there was ‘interference’ with a freedom protected by the ECHR, the interference did not 
amount to a violation of a right’.36 It addresses the relationship between individual rights and 
collective goals.  
In instances where the State’s measures to advance collective goals lead to an 
interference with the freedoms of the individual, the Court would then have to determine 
whether the interference with the individual’s right was ‘proportionate’ to the legitimate aim 
pursued by the member State.37 In cases where a reasonable balance is found, the national 
authorities are considered to be within the margin afforded to them and therefore not in 
breach of their obligation under the Convention. 38 The substantive use of the margin of 
appreciation may be seen in the accommodation clauses in Articles 8-11 of the Convention. 
The Court also adopts tests such as are ‘necessary’ in a democratic society or ‘pressing social 
need’ found in the accommodation clauses in order to assess whether the interference with 
the individual’s freedom amounts to a violation of their rights. The substantive use of the 
margin of appreciation is similar to what Vila and Ungureanu refer to as the ‘rationalized’ 
version of the margin (RDMA) which is where the ‘ECtHR focuses on examining if the 
impugned measure has achieved a fair balance between individual rights and democratic 
values’.39 In this substantive use, the margin of appreciation functions as a tool to define the 
norms within the Convention. 
The structural concept on the other hand, addresses the limits, or intensity of the 
review of the Court as a result of its status as an international tribunal, which has to take into 
consideration the sovereignty of the member States.40 In this context the Court refrains from 
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36 Ibid 710. 
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making a substantive determination on whether the particular action of the member State is 
a breach of the rights of the individual. Essentially, the Court devolves a level of 
responsibility for ensuring protection of human rights to the domestic authorities. 41 The 
relationship here is between the member State and the Court.42 Consequently, the structural 
use of the margin of appreciation is a tool that balances the sovereignty of member States 
with their obligations under the Convention.43 In this way, the margin of appreciation 
functions as a tool of judicial deference because it set limits on judicial review by the Court.  
The structural use of the margin of appreciation is similar to what Shany refers to as ‘norm 
application’ which is where the international Court respects the discretion of the national 
Courts in interpreting their obligations under the Convention in different ways.44 It is also 
what Vila and Ungureanu refer to as the ‘voluntarist’ version of the margin (VDMA) which 
is where ‘European supervision is carried out with a prior strong presumption in favour of 
the state’45 with the result that ‘the ECtHR should be reluctant to engage in an independent 
and detailed proportionality assessment of the impugned measure’.46  
Letsas however raises questions about the utility of the margin of appreciation in 
either the substantive or structural sense in the case law of the Court.47 He has argued that a 
proper analysis of the margin of appreciation shows that the doctrine is ‘at best redundant 
and at worst a danger to the liberal-egalitarian values which underlie human rights’.48 Vila 
and Ungureanu on the other hand argue that the RDMA may be helpful in ‘clarifying both 
what is wrong with an abstract assessment of conventionality, and when a stringent 
proportionality test in the application of the Convention should be rejected’.49 This view is 
linked to the supervisory role of the Court in determining the breadth of the margin of 
appreciation.  
The deference afforded by the margin of appreciation is not unlimited. The Court 
itself has stated that ‘the domestic margin of appreciation goes hand in hand with a European 
supervision’.50 The question that arises is what exactly is covered by this supervision? 
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According to the Court, this supervision covers (a) the aim of the measure challenged (b) its 
necessity; (c) the decision of the Court applying the legislation in question.51 The supervision 
therefore appears to cover substantive as well as procedural issues. Harris et al aptly 
recognised this supervision aspect of the margin of appreciation when they explain that the 
margin of appreciation means that ‘the state is allowed a certain measure of discretion, 
subject to European supervision, when it takes legislative, administrative, or judicial action 
in the area of a Convention right.’52 It is not only a tool that gives space to the national 
authorities but also one that triggers supervision by the Court. The rigour and reach of this 
supervisory role of the Court are, however, not without dispute.53 
The margin of appreciation has evolved from a tool created by the Commission in 
the 1958 Greece case to one expressly adopted by the Court in the Engel case and now 
embedded within the jurisprudence of the Court. It is evident that the margin of appreciation 
doctrine cannot be conscribed and fitted into any particular box. It is a flexible tool applied 
by the Court. The understanding of the margin of appreciation is very much linked to an 
examination of the case law of the Court. This in turn means that as the case law to which 
the margin of appreciation is applied evolves, our understanding of the margin of 
appreciation also changes. Evolution can be seen in the change from the initial restrictive 
definition of the margin of appreciation, which appeared to restrict the usefulness of the 
margin of appreciation to the assessment of the fulfilment of negative obligations on the 
State in regard to their securing of the Convention’s guarantees in their territory. Due to the 
invocation of the margin of appreciation at the time in relation to derogations in Article 15, 
the understanding of its use was limited. The expansion of the use of the margin of 
appreciation in other articles has led to a different understanding of the doctrine as 
encompassing both positive and negative obligations of member States. This case-dependent 
nature of the margin of appreciation forms the basis for focusing this thesis on a case analysis 
as the understanding of the margin of appreciation can only be critically assessed through a 
comprehensive analysis of the case law of the Court.  
An established fact is that the margin of appreciation does not give member States 
an unlimited room in their implementation of the Convention guarantees but is accompanied 
by supervision of the Court. It may however be queried as to why there is a need for the 
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margin of appreciation within ECtHR jurisprudence. A follow-on issue is whether the 
margin of appreciation is applicable to every aspect, or restricted to only certain aspects, of 
the Convention. These questions form the basis for the next section in examining the contexts 
and rationale for the use of the margin of appreciation doctrine.  
 
2.3 Contexts and Rationale for the Invocation of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine 
The key question in relation to the context for the use of the doctrine is whether the 
margin of appreciation is applicable to the entire Convention or only to specific provisions. 
In considering this issue, there is a clear illustration of evolution in the case law of the Court. 
Initially, the margin of appreciation doctrine was applied to situations involving Article 15 
of the Convention addressing derogations in times of public emergency.54 It has since been 
extended to cover other articles such as Articles 14 and paragraph 2 of Articles 8-11 which 
contain the limitation clauses.55  Whilst some academics and judges writing extra judicially 
have adopted a restrictive view that the margin of appreciation doctrine should only be 
applicable to certain Articles in the Convention,56 Macdonald, a former judge of the Court, 
maintains that the Court has not imposed a limit so in theory, there should be none as the 
margin of appreciation doctrine ‘is at the heart of virtually all major cases that come before 
the Court, whether the judgments refer to it explicitly or not.’57 Brems agrees with this view, 
stating that the margin of appreciation has now been extended to all the rights contained 
within the Convention and its additional protocols and that even in cases where the margin 
of appreciation is not expressly mentioned, it is actually applied by the Court in the 
interpretation of those provisions of the Convention.58  
Article 1 of the new Protocol No 15, which calls for the Court to take into 
consideration the margin of appreciation doctrine in adjudicating matters does not specify 
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any restrictions on the Articles of the Convention that the margin of appreciation should be 
applied to. This therefore leaves open the argument that the margin of appreciation could be 
applied to the entire Convention.59 Indeed, one may argue that it is evolving from a pragmatic 
tool, one created as a result of the circumstances of the Greece case, to a tool that is to 
become a convention, a requirement to be followed by the Court.  
Although the margin of appreciation doctrine has become a significant part of the 
Court’s jurisprudence, its incorporation into the jurisprudence of the Court has remained a 
subject of debate. It has received mixed reactions from both academics and judges writing 
both judicially and extra-judicially. Advocates of the doctrine welcome it as an important 
part of the Convention’s machinery,60 a tool used to strike a balance between national views 
of human rights and the uniform (pan-European) application of Convention values.61 It is 
further welcomed as a relevant tool for the member States, and is seen as giving them ‘the 
opportunity to strike a balance between the common good of society and the interests of the 
individual when they restrict rights’.62 It has therefore been described as a pragmatic device 
for the benefit of the Court and member State parties, utilised to reconcile the political, 
social, cultural and economic diversity of member States.63  It is seen in this sense as a 
practical tool to be used by the Court but one could argue it is moving from a pragmatic tool 
to one that is required of the Court.64  
Critics on the other hand disapprove of the margin of appreciation on the basis that 
it introduces an element of relativity into the uniform interpretation of the Convention, 
resulting in differences in scope and emphasis depending on the circumstances of the case.65 
The mixed response to the margin of appreciation therefore generates a need to consider the 
justification for the continued presence of the doctrine in the jurisprudence of the Court. 
Justification for the use of the margin of appreciation doctrine can be gleaned from 
pronouncements of the Court as well as from academic commentary on this issue.  
The Court in the landmark case of Handyside v United Kingdom elucidated the need for 
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the doctrine and the underlying rationale for it. 66 In Handyside the Court was faced with 
deciding to what extent the State could curtail freedom of expression on the basis of 
protection of morals. Whilst acknowledging that the actions of the United Kingdom 
infringed on the applicant’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10, the Court 
invoked the margin of appreciation and upheld the restriction by the United Kingdom to be 
in line with the provisions under Article 10(2). The Court stated that:  
 
The Convention leaves to each Contracting state, in the first place, the task of 
securing the rights and liberties it enshrines…In particular, it is not possible to 
find in the domestic law of the various contracting states a uniform European 
conception of morals. The view taken by their respective laws of the 
requirements of morals varies from time to time and from place to place…By 
reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their 
countries, state authorities are in principle in a better position than the 
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements 
as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ intended to meet them. 
Consequently, Article 10 para.2 leaves to the Contracting states a margin of 
appreciation.67 
 
From the above statement of the Court, three key factors may be deduced as the rationale 
for the margin of appreciation doctrine: subsidiarity, diversity of contracting States and the 
‘better position’ rationale. These three factors form the bedrock of the justification of the use 
of the margin of appreciation doctrine by the Court. Each of these rationales will be examined 




This justification for the margin of appreciation doctrine is a systemic one that goes to 
the very constitutionality of the Court. The Court has been constituted to be a place of last 
resort when remedies at the national level have been exhausted. The member States are the 
primary enforcers of the Convention with the Court performing a subsidiary function of 
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review of the member States’ actions.68 Subsidiarity connotes an understanding that an 
association should empower its members to act and to choose the means of achieving the 
particular commitments they have chosen through their own initiatives.69 Where a smaller 
group can perform a function efficiently, a larger group does not need to assume such 
functions.70 Essentially subsidiarity is poised to enhance the freedom of smaller groupings 
of people to act.71 Applying this line of reasoning to the Convention’s system of enforcement 
then necessitates the requirement for member States, as the smaller groupings, to be the 
primary enforcers of the Convention guarantees. Subsidiarity also gives support to the idea 
of ‘shared responsibility’ between the Court and national courts.72 There should therefore be 
a sharing of judicial functions between the national courts and the ECtHR.73 The issue still 
remains as to where to ‘draw the line’ in this sharing of judicial functions.  
Subsidiarity as the underlying grounding of the margin of appreciation doctrine may 
be seen not just from the express statement in Handyside, but also within the text of the 
Convention itself by virtue of a combined reading of Articles 1, 13, 35 and 53.74 The 
subsidiarity within the Convention has two elements: a substantive element and a procedural 
element.75 The substantive element is based on the assumption that the national authority is 
in a better position to deal with the substance of the Convention complaint and provide 
appropriate relief at the national level76 whilst the procedural aspect of subsidiarity is based 
on Article 35 by virtue of which the supervisory role of ‘the Court’ can only be engaged 
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once all domestic remedies have been exhausted.77 The case for subsidiarity as the 
justification for the employment of the margin of appreciation doctrine by the Court is further 
supported by the new Protocol No 15, which inserts the term subsidiarity into the Preamble 
to the Convention.78  
Moving on from the contents of the Convention itself, academic commentators also 
draw attention to the role of the Convention system as subsidiary to domestic legal systems.79 
Carozza refers to the margin of appreciation as ‘rooted’ in subsidiarity.80 It is a ‘natural 
product’ of the distribution of powers between the Convention’s enforcement mechanisms 
and the domestic authorities.81 Whilst the primary responsibility for enforcement is with the 
member States, the last word is with the Court as it functions as a supervisory mechanism.82 
Judge Spano writing extra judicially has referred to the margin of appreciation as a 
‘functional manifestation of the principle of subsidiarity…the former being the operational 
tool for the realisation of the latter’.83 It can therefore be seen that subsidiarity is advocated 
both by the Court, the Convention, Judges writing extra judicially and academic 
commentators as being a justification for the presence of the margin of appreciation doctrine 
within the jurisprudence of the Court. 
 
2.3.2 The Better Position Rationale 
In addition to subsidiarity, the Court in Handyside referred to State authorities being 
in a ‘better position’. The better position rationale embodies the use of the margin of 
appreciation as a tool for judicial restraint.84 It is used by the Court to refrain from 
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questioning certain actions by the State. This restraint is rooted in the acknowledgement of 
the sovereignty of the member States to the Convention. Brems describes it as being used to 
demarcate the room left for national sovereignty vis-a-vis supranational control.85 Sweeney 
refers to it as the institutionalised dimension of subsidiarity, with the Court exercising 
judicial self-restraint. 86 Mahoney however argues that this connotation of judicial self-
restraint is an abdication by the Court of its supervisory duty and calls for greater scrutiny 
by the Court of decisions of the national courts rather than relying on the margin of 
appreciation doctrine.87 There does not however appear to be a move in that direction as the 
issue of subsidiarity is being strengthened with its inclusion in Protocol No 15.88 
The Court in a variety of cases in which the margin of appreciation has been invoked 
has since used this ‘better position’ rationale. It has featured heavily in derogation cases 
under Article 15. In Ireland v United Kingdom, the Court had to decide on whether the 
derogation by the United Kingdom under Article had infringed the provisions of the 
Convention. The Court in that case confirmed the wide margin of appreciation given to 
member States to decide on the presence of a state of emergency and the scope of the 
derogations necessary to avert it on the basis that they were in a better position than the 
international judge.89  However Gross and Ní Aolán argue that in such cases of emergency 
it is the international Court, rather than the national Court that would be in a better position 
to analyse the issues and come to a rights decision.90 The ‘better position’ rationale is 
therefore not unanimously accepted in all quarters.  
 
2.3.3 Diversity of Contracting States 
The third justification for the margin of appreciation doctrine to be deduced from the 
statement of the Court in Handyside is the diversity of contracting parties. The diverse nature 
of the contracting parties to the Convention is self-evident. Although the initial parties to the 
Convention were predominantly Western European States,91 it was recognised that there was 
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diversity in their cultural, economic and legal traditions.92 This is reflected within the Statute 
of the Council of Europe as on the one hand it refers to the ‘common heritage’ of its 
members, but on the other, it also expresses the need to achieve ‘greater unity’ between 
them.93 Hence diversity was clearly acknowledged even within the initial 10 member States 
of the Council of Europe and the Convention.  Diversity is even more evident in the present 
day as the membership of the Convention has evolved from 10 contracting States in 1950, 
to currently 47 member States. This expansion in the number of member States has also 
meant an expansion in the ideological divide of the State parties. It has moved from a 
document signed by mainly Western European States, to a document now signed by States 
embracing Western, Central and Eastern Europe with the differences in culture, economic 
and legal traditions that go with these areas. 94 
This increased diversity of member States means that there will be an absence of 
consensus amongst member States in certain areas. The Court has recognised this lack of 
uniform European conception on issues such as morals,95 when life begins,96 and the 
requirements of the protection of the rights of others in relation to attacks on their religious 
convictions97 and several other areas. The Court in dealing with these issues has resorted to 
giving a wide margin of appreciation to the member States. The margin of appreciation has 
therefore been embraced as a unique tool to accommodate this diversity of the different State 
parties to the Convention.98 Advocates of the doctrine consider it a justified response to 
sociological, religious, cultural, moral, political and ideological diversity between the 
contracting States.99   
Lester criticises the use of the margin of appreciation on the basis that it promotes 
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cultural relativism in the interpretation of the Convention.100 Eyal Benvenisti echoes this fear 
stating that ‘The margin of appreciation, with its principled recognition of moral relativism 
is at odds with the concept of the universality of human rights’.101 Sweeney counters this 
fear of relativism and argues that universality does not mean uniformity. Therefore local 
variations in the standards of the Convention do not equate to outright relativism.102 It is 
conceded that the result of the application of the margin of appreciation is that whilst 
common values are being upheld, the same set of facts can give rise to different decisions 
depending on the member State involved.103 Uniformity is therefore not achieved through 
the margin of appreciation, but that can be distinguished from universality that can be 
maintained in relation to the core values to be achieved by the provisions of the Convention.  
In addition to the reasons of subsidiarity, diversity and better position Judge Spielmann 
writing extra judicially highlights other reasons in the literature of the use of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine: 
[I]it signals recognition by the Court of the inevitable limits to its institutional 
capacity, i.e. acceptance that it cannot consider every case in every detail; that 
a court, and a fortiori an international court, is not the ideal forum for 
arbitrating difficult choices of socio-economic policy; that the European Court 
is too distant to rule on cases of great sensitivity.104  
These reasons are very much related to the idea of the domestic authorities being in 
a better position than the international Court due to the constraints on the Court as a result 
of its very structure as a supra national Court. This necessitates a need for interaction 
between the ECtHR and the national Courts. In recent literature, the use of the margin of 
appreciation as a tool for interaction between national Courts and the ECtHR has been 
emphasised. The Brighton Declaration of April 2012 drew attention to the shared role 
between the States and the Court in the implementation of the Convention’s guarantees, 
urging the Court to give prominence to the principles of the margin of the margin of 
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appreciation and subsidiarity as a means of achieving this interaction.105 This view of 
interaction via the margin of appreciation doctrine has also been expressed in the Court’s 
case law. In their joint dissenting opinion, Judges Sajó, Lazarova Trajkova and Vučinić in 
Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v Switzerland referred to the margin of appreciation doctrine as 
a ‘valuable tool for the interaction between national authorities and the Convention 
enforcement mechanism’.106 Judge Spielmann, writing extra judicially has also expressed 
similar views, referring to ‘a European review going hand in hand with the domestic 
review’.107 The rationale for the existence of the margin of appreciation is therefore moving 
towards an increased recognition of the role of the member States of the Convention as the 
primary enforcers which necessitates a partnership between the ECtHR and national 
authorities. 
 
2.3.4 Certainty and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine 
Whilst several reasons have been given for the presence of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine within the jurisprudence of the Court, there remains a concern with the issue of 
predictability in the use of the doctrine by the Court. Greer observes that in spite of the 
mountain of jurisprudence on the subject its most striking characteristic remains its 
‘casuistic, uneven, and largely unpredictable nature’.108 Macdonald identifies two issues that 
create unpredictability: the absence of a uniform application process of the doctrine by the 
Court and the absence of a detailed rationale for the use of the margin of appreciation in 
specific cases.109 This criticism is echoed by Letsas.110 It results in the inconsistency in the 
application of the margin as a result of the absence of a detailed rationale for its use by the 
Court.111 The disquiet in relation to the use of the doctrine by the Court is also echoed by 
some of the judges of the Court itself with European Court Judge De Meyer calling for the 
margin of appreciation to be abandoned altogether: 
 
I believe that it is high time for the Court to banish that concept from its 
reasoning…and recanting the relativism it implies … where human rights are 
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107 Spielmann, ‘Whither the Margin of Appreciation?’ (n 19).   
108 Greer (n 6) 5.  
109 R St J Macdonald (n 13) 85. 
110 George Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’ (n 34) 706-707. 




concerned, there is no room for a margin of appreciation which would enable the 
state to decide what is acceptable and what is not … the boundary not to be 
overstepped must be as clear and precise as possible. It is for the Court, not each 
state individually, to decide that issue...112  
 
Whilst some of the literature has been devoted to bringing some clarity in the way the 
Court uses the margin of appreciation,113 others argue that to try to get a general guiding 
principle of how the margin of appreciation works is to misunderstand the doctrine itself as 
it varies depending on the circumstances.114 The Court itself has supported this idea of the 
flexible nature of the margin of appreciation by stating in Rasmussen v. Denmark that ‘The 
scope of the margin of appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the subject-
matter and its background…’115 The consensus then that can be seen from academic opinion 
as well as from the case law of the Court itself is that the margin of appreciation is flexible 
in nature. It would appear that the search for a precise formula on how the margin of 
appreciation works is a futile mission with little if any chance of success. What may however 
be possible is recognising certain patterns from the case law of the Court as to how the 
margin of appreciation is applied. 
The contexts for invocation of the doctrine evolved from the early association with 
the derogation clauses in Article 15 to a general principle relied on by the Court in some 
cases explicitly, whilst in others covertly. The embedding of the margin of appreciation 
within the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has not, however, prevented the question of the 
rationale of its use by the Court. The primary rationale for the use of the margin of 
appreciation by the Court is subsidiarity. This rationale is supported by a combined 
examination of the jurisprudence of the Court, and certain provisions of the Convention116 
as well as academic opinion. In conjunction with the rationale of subsidiarity is the 
acknowledgement by the Court that the State parties are sovereign and that due to their 
proximity to the issues within the States, they are in a better position to deal with the 
application of the guarantees in the Convention. The use of the margin of appreciation in this 
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way is the subject of mixed reactions. Whilst some welcome its use as a form of judicial self-
restraint, others are of the view that its reach is not deep enough and, in some cases, argue it 
is the Court that is in the better position to decide on particular issues as an independent 
observer that is far removed from the particular situation in question.  
A key limitation to the depth of scrutiny that the Court can carry out is linked to 
another justification for the presence of the margin of appreciation in the jurisprudence of 
the Court – the diversity of the contracting States. The State parties to the Convention have 
evolved from predominantly Western European States in the 1950s to a combination of 
Western, Central and Eastern European States. This evolution has brought with it an 
attendant challenge to the notion of a ‘common heritage’, which is reflected, in the Preamble 
to the Convention. It is recognised that there is a diversity of cultural, social and economic 
practices within the current 47 member States to the Convention. This presents a unique 
challenge in the interpretation of the guarantees in the Convention. The margin of 
appreciation therefore functions not only as recognition of subsidiarity and the better 
position of the State parties but also the cultural, economic and social diversity of State 
parties. The absence of consensus on a variety of social issues necessitates a tool to 
accommodate the diversity of the State parties whilst at the same time ensuring that cultural 
relativism does not overtake a universal application of the Convention. Universality does not 
mean uniformity and can still be achieved even with the application of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine and the attendant differences in decisions depending on the member 
State involved. The result of the use of the margin of appreciation in this way is the risk of 
uncertainty.  
It is acknowledged that the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine by the 
Court varies on a case-by-case basis. The Court has also not established a detailed rationale 
for its use in individual cases nor consistently applied it overall. The result is that the margin 
of appreciation is seen as a tool of uncertainty which cannot be predicted.  Nonetheless, this 
uncertainty, which reflects the flexibility in the margin of appreciation doctrine, is the exact 
quality that makes it a useful tool in the hands of the Court. It can be adjusted to fit a variety 
of circumstances. In spite of the criticisms that have been levelled against it, the margin of 
appreciation therefore remains a tool used by the court repeatedly in its interpretative role, 
thereby retaining its place as a significant doctrine in the jurisprudence of the Court. It is a 
unique way of dealing with a myriad of issues that plague the Court. Both its critics and 
advocates acknowledge the element of change within the margin of appreciation. It is this 




tool that is considered within this thesis: the interpretation of the Convention as a living 
instrument.  
 
2.4 Origins and Definition of the Living Instrument Doctrine 
In addition to its subsidiary role, the Court is charged with the task of interpreting a 
human rights treaty. The tension exists between the interpretation of the text based on the 
intention of the parties at the time of the drafting of the Convention (subjective approach) 
and interpreting the text to take into consideration changes in society since the drafting of 
the treaty (objective approach). The tension develops not only in relation to how the intent 
of the original drafters may be inferred from the words of the treaty, but also how to balance 
developments in society in order for the rules to remain relevant in current society. The Court 
has addressed this problem by adopting an evolutive approach and interpreting the 
Convention as a ‘living instrument’. This therefore suggests an objective approach rather 
than a subjective approach to the interpretation of the Convention. 
  In a similar vein to the margin of appreciation doctrine, the ‘living instrument’117 
doctrine neither appears in the text of the Convention nor in the Travaux Préparatoires.118 
It is rather an interpretative tool created by the Court. The genesis of the ‘living instrument’ 
doctrine is usually traced to the seminal case of Tyrer v United Kingdom. 119 In Tyrer the 
Court was faced with the determination of whether judicial corporal punishment of juveniles 
in the form of the judicial birching of a schoolboy amounted to degrading punishment in 
breach of Article 3 of the Convention.120 The Court in finding the punishment to be 
degrading and therefore in breach of Article 3 of the Convention stated that:  
 
The Court must also recall that the Convention is a living instrument which, as 
the Commission rightly stressed, must be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions. In the case now before it the Court cannot but be influenced by the 
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developments and commonly accepted standards in the penal policy of the 
member States of the Council of Europe in this Field.121 
 
The Court determined that in a ‘great majority’ of States of the Council of Europe, 
judicial corporal punishment was no longer used as a form of punishment. The Court did not 
adopt a comparative method to show which States fell within the category of a ‘great 
majority’. It did however note that judicial corporal punishment had been abolished in 
England, Wales and Scotland at the time and that within the Isle of Man, the legislation had 
been under review for many years.122  Beyond considerations of the penal policy of other 
European States, the Court went on to some substantive considerations on the nature of 
judicial corporal punishment noting that ‘…The very nature of judicial corporal punishment 
is that it involves one human being inflicting physical violence on another human being.’ It 
noted the safeguards put in place by the State when the actual birching was being carried out 
but still considered the punishment as a whole to be degrading. It concluded that the birching 
inflicted on the applicant amounted to degrading punishment in breach of Article 3. The 
reference of by the Court to the Convention being a living instrument has become a well-
known dictum repeated by the Court in many other cases.123  
If the living instrument doctrine originated in Tyrer, then it would appear that the 
Convention was not considered as a living instrument until January 1978, twenty eight years 
after it was created and twenty years after the margin of appreciation doctrine was initially 
introduced into the Strasbourg jurisprudence in the Greece case.124  This view is rejected and 
it is reasoned that the ECHR was already considered a living instrument and Tyrer was just 
the first case in which the Court stated this expressly.125 Attention is drawn to the verb 
‘recall’ used prior to describing the Convention as a living instrument in Tyrer. One view 
would be that this was just a word used without any additional meaning attached to it. The 
alternative view proposed here is that meaning is to be given to the word ‘recall’. To ‘recall’ 
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is to ‘bring (a fact, event, or situation) back into one’s mind; remember’.126  This presupposes 
that the event or state of affairs already exists before one can be said to ‘recall’ it. The 
question that arises then is, since this was the first time the Court was using the expression 
‘living instrument’ in its description of the Convention, how could it then be ‘recalling’ it at 
the same time? It must be then that there are other seeds of ‘livingness’ in the interpretation 
of the Convention which can be gleaned from earlier case law. 
It is proposed that the conception of the Convention as a living instrument predates 
the Tyrer case and stands as an overarching principle that governs the interpretation of the 
Convention.  This is not the first time such a suggestion has been made. Letsas acknowledges 
that ‘the idea that the ECHR is a living instrument has figured in Strasbourg’s case law since 
its very early days’.127 Tulkens refers to some early cases that show evolution within the 
Strasbourg system.128 Some of these early cases that display ‘evolution’ or ‘livingness’ in 
the Convention relied on the purposive/teleological method of interpretation established by 
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in which priority is given to 
the object and purpose of treaties.129  
The Court in the 1968 case of Wemhoff v Germany130 expressly declared the 
Convention as a law-making treaty. It therefore rejected a restrictive interpretation of the 
ECHR but rather favoured one that would best lead to the realisation of the aim and object 
of the treaty. A similar consideration of the Convention as a law-making treaty was applied 
by the Court in Golder v United Kingdom131 in finding that a right of access to a court could 
be read into Article 6 of the Convention. In Young, James and Webster v the United 
Kingdom132 the aim and purpose of Article 11 was relied on in accepting that the negative 
aspect of a person’s freedom of association could fall within the ambit of Article 11. It can 
be seen that the Court from its early days has displayed a desire to interpret the Convention 
in an evolutive way in order to give effect to its guarantees. Tyrer added an express 
identification of this evolutive approach to interpretation by reference to the living 
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instrument doctrine which allows the Court to consider changes in society in interpreting the 
provisions of the ECHR.133 
Interpreting the Convention as a living instrument denotes that the standards of the 
Convention are not to be considered as static but should be reflective of social changes.134  
It means that the Convention evolves by virtue of the interpretation of the Court.135 The 
living instrument doctrine means that the Court takes into consideration developments in 
European social and legal concepts as a basis to define terms within the Convention.136 
Letsas however emphasizes that this evolutive method of interpretation does not mean that 
the ECtHR interprets the Convention to keep in line with current consensus within States 
regardless of their content. Rather the use of the living instrument doctrine is ‘with a view 
to understand better the principles that underpin the rights of the Convention, regardless of 
how States themselves apply these principles’.137 Sociological, technological and scientific 
changes, evolving standards in the field of human rights and altering views on morals and 
ethics have to be considered by the Court when applying the Convention. Letsas advocates 
that these evolving standards must not only be different, but also better, ‘towards the truth 
of the substantive protected right’.138  
The implication of the use of the living instrument doctrine by the Court is twofold. 
In the first instance it implies that the ECtHR does not have to interpret the ECHR ‘on the 
basis of the original conditions which were known to the drafters of the Convention, and 
which in the meantime may have drastically changed’.139 Interpreting the convention in this 
way reduces the relevance of the travaux préparatoires of the Convention as a 
supplementary source of interpretation.140 In the second instance, it implies that the ECtHR 
is ‘not obliged to maintain its own case-law in situations where the social, cultural, economic 
substructure which supported a certain finding by the Court no longer exists’.141 Although 
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the Court is not bound by its earlier decisions, it has stated that it would not depart from 
them without good reason in the interest of certainty. The application of the living instrument 
doctrine is one of the occasions where the Court may depart from its earlier decision.142 The 
question that arises is in what contexts can the Court apply the living instrument doctrine 
and what justification can be advanced for the use of the living instrument doctrine by the 
Court. These are the issues addressed below.  
 
2.5 Contexts and Rationale for the Interpretation of the Convention as a Living 
Instrument 
In practice, the Court has applied the living instrument doctrine to a variety of issues 
that have come before it. The initial application of the living instrument approach to 
interpretation involved the Court deciding on an issue that had not been contested before it 
previously. In Tyrer, judicial corporal punishment of juveniles was challenged for the first 
time before the Court. The Court relied on the developments in contracting States in 
concluding that judicial corporal punishment was a violation of the prohibition of inhumane 
treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR. Following on from the Tyrer case, the living 
instrument doctrine has been invoked by the Court to deal with several other substantive 
provisions of the Convention. In Marckx v Belgium it was relied on by the Court in finding 
a violation of Articles 8 and 14 where the Belgian Code did not automatically recognise 
maternal affiliation with a child born out of wedlock to unmarried mothers at the point of 
birth.143  It has also been relied on in finding that that criminalisation of sexual relations 
between consenting homosexual adults amounted to a breach of the right to family life,144 
that the difference in treatment under Russian law between servicemen and servicewomen 
as regards entitlement to parental leave was a breach of the right to family life under Article 
8 and discrimination under Article 14.145  
The living instrument doctrine has also been applied to cover substantive issues that 
it may be argued, were not within the contemplation of the original drafters of the 
Convention. For example, in Sigurdur A Sigurjónsson v Iceland it was decided that the 
Convention was a living instrument and Article 11, which provides for freedom of 
association must also be interpreted to cover a negative right of association. 146 In that case, 
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the Court held that the applicant could not be compelled to be a member of a taxicab 
organisation. Such compulsion was a breach of the applicant’s negative right of association 
under Article 11 of the Convention. The Court made this decision despite the reference by 
the Icelandic authorities to the fact that within the travaux préparatoires there was evidence 
that a general rule that no one may be compelled to belong to an association was omitted 
from the Convention.147 The living instrument doctrine could therefore be seen in this case 
as going beyond the intention of the original drafters by including a right that was expressly 
excluded.  
In Matthews v United Kingdom this point is made even clearer where the Court 
relying on the living instrument doctrine held that Article 3 of Protocol 1 which provides for 
the right to free elections, was applicable to elections to the European Parliament. 148  At the 
time of drafting the Convention the European Parliament did not exist therefore it could not 
have been within the contemplation of the original drafters. This once again shows a very 
objective approach to the interpretation of the Convention. It also shows the flexibility of the 
living instrument doctrine as it has been applied by the Court in the above two cases to make 
the Convention relevant in addressing current issues.   
The Court has extended the use of the living instrument doctrine beyond substantive 
provisions of the Convention to procedural provisions.  In Loizidou v Turkey (preliminary 
objections) the ECtHR, relying on the living instrument principle, held that the declarations 
Turkey made under Articles 25 and 46 which restricted the competence of the former 
commission and original court to actions taking place within the territorial boundaries of 
Turkey was invalid.149 This application of the living instrument doctrine to procedural 
elements of the Convention has been received with a mixed response. Mowbray supports 
this move of the ECtHR to apply evolutive interpretation to the procedural and institutional 
elements of the ECHR on the basis that they are of great importance to victims seeking 
redress in the ECtHR.150 On the other hand, Golsong, a former Registrar of the Court has 
strongly objected to this extension of the living instrument doctrine to the procedural 
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elements of the Convention.151 It is his view that the clear meaning of the words as they were 
understood at the time of drafting should be adhered to and any modification to them should 
be made through the process of amendment of the Convention by a Protocol.152 The 
jurisprudence appears to show that the Court has not adopted the path advocated by Golsong 
but has continued to apply evolutive interpretation to both the substantive and procedural 
aspects of the Convention. The practical difficulties and the length of time it would take to 
get such an amendment done by way of a Protocol may account for the rejection of this 
limitation on the scope of the living instrument doctrine.  
The living instrument doctrine requires the Court to adopt an approach to the 
interpretation of the Convention in which the provisions of the Convention are not 
considered as static but rather reflect evolving standards and contemporary realities. They 
are to reflect changing social practices within the different member States. The scope of the 
living instrument doctrine has evolved from the substantive provision in Article 3 to 
procedural elements of the Convention. In relation to the substantive elements, its scope 
covers not only absolute rights such as the prohibition of torture in Article 3, but also 
qualified rights such as Article 8, which protects family life. Whilst its application to the 
procedural elements of the ECHR has not been without criticism, the Court has retained this 
approach to the interpretation of the procedural elements of the Convention. This researcher 
endorses this approach of the Court as effective protection of individual rights requires the 
application of the living instrument doctrine to both the substantive and procedural aspects 
of the Convention. 
In the light of the criticism of the scope of the living instrument doctrine it is 
necessary to address the issue of the rationale behind the adoption of evolutive interpretation 
in the form of the living instrument doctrine within the jurisprudence of the Court. The Court 
in Tyrer did not proffer any justification for its invocation of the living instrument doctrine. 
As Mowbray highlights, considering the significance of the doctrine in the jurisprudence of 
the Court now, in hindsight it would have been helpful for the Court to offer some 
justification for this decision.153 Although no justification was provided by the Court in 
Tyrer, several sources may be referred to in finding justification for the use of the living 
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instrument doctrine. These range from inferences from the text of the ECHR itself, to 
considerations of the special character of the Convention. 
 
2.5.1 The Text of the Convention  
One of the criticisms of the use of the living instrument doctrine is that it leads to 
interpretation that goes beyond the intention of the drafters of the Convention. In response 
to this academics and judges writing extra judicially have drawn attention to the intention of 
the drafters as expressed in the text of the Convention itself.154 In its Preamble, the 
Convention acknowledges that its parent body – the Council of Europe, is set up to achieve 
greater unity of its members through ‘the maintenance’ and ‘further realisation of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms’.155 Judge Rozakis writing extra judicially on the textual 
interpretation of these words in the Preamble was of the view that: 
 
The drafters invited those applying and interpreting the Convention – State 
parties, judicial organs of the Convention – to broaden the purview of the rights 
provided for by the text, presumably by streamlining its provisions to account 
for the ever-changing realities of life and the demands of progress which are 
typical of every modern society.156 
 
Judge Tulkens writing extra judicially, shares a similar view, opining that whilst 
maintenance requires the Court to ensure that the rights and freedoms enshrined in the 
Convention continue to be effective in changing circumstances, further realisation enables 
the Court to adopt a level of innovation and creativity to extend the reach of the Convention 
guarantees in order to protect the substance of the rights and freedoms.157 Maintenance and 
further realisation encapsulated within the preamble itself therefore provide a basis for 
evolutive interpretation of the convention.158 The text of the Convention provides a counter 
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argument to the critic that the living instrument doctrine does not reflect the intention of the 
drafters of the Convention.  
 
2.5.2 The Special Nature of the Convention  
Another reason that has been given for the use of the living instrument doctrine is 
that the Convention has a special nature which has to be taken into consideration when 
interpreting it. The ECHR is special because it is an organisational treaty that establishes an 
institutional community with organs having specific powers. It is not just a coexistence or 
cooperation treaty but is rather in the category of ‘treaty-law’ rather than ‘treaty-contract’ 
because it establishes a permanent regulatory basis, rather than mutual and sometimes 
transient obligations.159 Merrills points out that the approach of the Court to the 
interpretation of the Convention is a product of two forces: a reflection of the beliefs ‘about 
the proper judicial approach to treaty interpretation’ and secondly, ‘a specific conception of 
the nature of the European Convention and, as a corollary, a particular conception of the 
judicial role in relation to it’.160 Human rights treaties such as the ECHR are special because 
their object and purpose is the protection of the rights of individuals against their own State 
and against other contracting States to the treaty. The special nature of such treaties therefore 
justifies the use of the living instrument doctrine to ensure attainment of the object and 
purpose of the treaty.161 
Whilst not expressly stating its justifications for the use of the living instrument doctrine 
in particular cases,162 the ECtHR itself has referred to the special nature of the ECHR as a 
system for protection of human rights and relied on the principle of effectiveness in adopting 
an evolutive approach to its interpretation.163 Mahoney agrees with this stating that ‘while 
the original meaning may be decisive for some other kinds of treaties, it cannot determine 
human rights treaties, less they would risk becoming progressively ineffective with time’.164 
Wildhaber shares a similar view noting that ‘A failure by the Court to maintain a dynamic 
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and evolutive approach would risk rendering it a bar to reform or improvement’.165 
Therefore, there is an acknowledgement that the nature of human rights requires an attendant 
flexibility and updating of interpretation as any law that does not adapt to human and societal 
changes will face the risk of being ineffective and outdated. The rights contained within the 
Convention, therefore, have to be interpreted in the light of present day circumstances in 
order to make them practical, effective, and connected to the dynamism of modern society.  
 
2.5.3 Certainty and the Limits of the Living Instrument Doctrine  
Drawing on the principle of effective protection of individual human rights, the need for 
the interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument is largely uncontested. The main 
concern centres on the limits of its use.  This may be seen in the form of different strands of 
argument. The first concern is the limits of judicial interpretation. This refers to the 
constitutional role of the Court. The key question is whether it is the role of the ECtHR to 
increase the scope of protection offered under the Convention. It has been argued that the 
living instrument approach is a form of judicial activism with a potential to bind parties to 
obligations they did not intend.166 An example of this happening may be seen in the 
Matthews case where the right to elections in Article 3 of Protocol No 1 was held to be 
applicable to elections to the European Parliament, an organisation that could not have been 
foreseen by the initial drafters of the Convention because it did not exist at the time.  This 
form of activism is rejected as an erosion of the principle of the rule of law and is seen as 
overreaching by the Court. However, others contend that in its use of the living instrument 
doctrine the Court has been able to maintain a balance and has therefore not gone beyond or 
acted ultra vires its powers as interpreters of the Convention.167 
The other aspect of the debate on the limits of evolutive interpretation centres on what 
the Court should use as a yardstick to determine the extent to which it will carry out the 
review. In a case before the court, what principles should curtail its use of evolutive 
interpretation or how can its evolutive interpretation be performed in accordance with 
established principles?168  Dzehtsiarou advocates for the use of a European consensus 
approach to be adopted by the Court as a way of legitimating its decisions when applying 
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evolutive approach of interpretation.169 The reliance on European consensus as a limit to the 
interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument is seen in the early case law of the 
Court on the living instrument.170 Benvenisti however argues that consensus cannot be the 
only basis as human rights do not exist for the protection of the majority only, it is actually 
counter-majoritarian.171 Dzehtsiarou and de Londras offer a three-pronged response to this 
argument: (a) that the Court has actually used European consensus to protect rights of 
marginalities;172(b) that consensus ensures minimum standards and States are free to set 
higher standards; and (c) that consensus is not an automatic or strictly binding concept 
adopted by the Court.173  
Reliance on consensus could also have the negative effect of leading of regression in the 
protection of rights, what Webber refers to as D(evolution) of rights.174 Letsas argues that 
the Court has moved away from limiting the interpretation of the Convention as a living 
instrument on the absence of European consensus. He argues that based on its case law, it 
now looks for ‘common values’ and ‘emerging consensus’ in international law thereby 
raising the human rights standards beyond what is currently available within the member 
States.175 Letsas advocates for a ‘moral’ reading of the Convention which focuses on a 
discovery of what the human rights were meant always meant to protect rather than a reliance 
on consensus as a determining factor for evolutive interpretation.176 The reliance on 
consensus is therefore not one that is welcomed in all quarters. 
A further concern on the limit of evolutive interpretation is the potential for uncertainty 
as a result of the flexibility in interpretation adopted by the Court. The critical issue is 
whether the member States will be able to predict the decision of the Court or the position 
of the Court in relation to a particular issue if the Court could change its position due to 
changes in society. Baroness Hale highlights that certainty enables member States to know 
the extent of their obligations.177 Where certainty is missing in the case law of the Court the 
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result would therefore be confusion on the part of the member States on what their 
obligations are. The Court itself has confirmed that it is not bound by precedent so on the 
one hand, even if it did not adopt evolutive interpretation, it is still free to depart from its 
earlier case law on a particular issue. It has however held that it would not change its 
decisions without compelling reasons, in order to maintain legal certainty and foreseeability 
of rulings.178 There is therefore an acknowledgement by the Court for a degree of coherence 
and predictability in its application of the living instrument doctrine. It is yet to be seen if 
this will be reflected in the case law on the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines. 
In a similar vein to the margin of appreciation doctrine, the presence of the living 
instrument doctrine within the jurisprudence of the Court has been questioned. The rationale 
for the use of the living instrument doctrine by the Court may be gleaned from the text of 
the Convention which in its Preamble, refers to maintenance and further realisation of the 
rights contained within it.  In particular, the requirement for further realisation highlights a 
need for an evolving framework that is sufficiently robust to deal with current issues. A 
further rationale for the living instrument doctrine is seen in the Court’s acknowledgement 
of the special nature of the Convention as system for protection of human rights. This special 
system requires the application of the living instrument doctrine in order to ensure effective 
protection of the rights. The result of the application of the living instrument doctrine is a 
degree of flexibility in the interpretation of the Convention guarantees. Whilst this may be 
seen as a positive from the point of view that it makes the Convention relevant to issues that 
may not have been within the contemplation of the original drafters, it may also be seen as 
a negative.  The Court is criticised for judicial activism by such an expansive interpretation 
of the Convention based on the living instrument doctrine.  
The concern about judicial activism has precipitated the call for limits to the use of the 
doctrine through mechanisms such as European consensus. The call for consensus reflects 
an acknowledgment that there is diversity within the member States to the Convention. The 
living instrument doctrine has the potential then to infringe on this diversity and consensus 
could be a way of keeping it in control. A related doctrine that is orientated at managing the 
diversity of the State parties is the margin of appreciation. In the following section it is 
necessary to consider if a relationship exists between both doctrines and the nature of such 
a relationship in extant literature (RQ 1 relationship). 
                                                 




2.6 Forging a Link between the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the 
Interpretation of the Convention as a Living Instrument 
At face value, the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines appear to 
be unrelated. On the one hand, the rationale for the margin of margin of appreciation is 
rooted in the recognition of the autonomy and diversity of member States as well as the 
subsidiarity of the Court to the national enforcement systems. On the other hand, the living 
instrument doctrine is rooted in the maintenance and further realisation of the rights 
contained in the ECHR to ensure their effectiveness and the harmonisation of the practice 
within the member States. Whilst the substantive use of the margin of appreciation doctrine 
means that the Court allows the member State discretion to decide whether a particular law 
or action of the State infringes on the right of the individual, the living instrument doctrine 
appears to subject the discretion afforded to member States to a higher level of scrutiny 
thereby giving the Court a more active role in the case. It could be seen as a battle between 
‘weak’ (margin of appreciation) as opposed to ‘strong’ (living instrument) scrutiny. 
However, on closer analysis, the question arises as to whether these two doctrines 
that appear to be headed in different directions have some relationship. The crux of the issue 
arises when the court is faced with a ‘hard case’179 or scenario where it could reach two 
different decisions depending on the weight it gives to either the margin of appreciation or 
the living instrument doctrines. Essentially if deference to the member State via the margin 
of appreciation doctrine will lead to a decision in which the Court finds no violation even 
where there have been developments in society to suggest otherwise, there has to be some 
level of evaluation of both doctrines by the Court before coming to its decision. In the 
existing literature, whilst the interaction between the margin of appreciation and living 
instrument doctrines is mentioned in some of the literature, there is room for a detailed 
systematic analysis of the cases in which both the margin of appreciation and living 
instrument doctrines were present. Such an analysis will provide a better understanding of 
the relationship between both doctrines and the interpretive methods applied by the Court 
when dealing with a conflict between both doctrines. This is a gap that this thesis seeks to 
fill in the literature. 
In Tyrer where the Court for the first time expressly referred to the living instrument 
doctrine, in deciding on whether judicial corporal punishment was a requirement for 
                                                 




maintaining law and order in a European country, the Court referred to the practice in 
member States. The Court noted that: 
 
 [T]he Court cannot but be influenced by the developments and commonly 
accepted standards in the penal policy of the member States of the Council of 
Europe in this Field…it is noteworthy that, in the great majority of the member 
States of the Council of Europe, judicial corporal punishment is not, it appears, 
used and, indeed, in some of them, has never existed in modern times; in the Isle 
of Man itself, as already mentioned, the relevant legislation has been under 
review for many years. If nothing else, this casts doubt on whether the 
availability of this penalty is a requirement for the maintenance of law and order 
in a European country180 
 
The Court was therefore influenced by the social developments in the member States and 
interpreted the Convention ‘as a living instrument that goes hand in hand with legal and 
social developments in European countries’.181 
In Handyside where the Court espoused more fully the rationale for the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, in determining whether the UK’s interference with the applicant’s 
rights on the basis of the protection of morals was in line with the provisions of Article 10(2), 
it also referred to the practice in member States. The Court stated that: 
 
In particular, it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various 
contracting states a uniform European conception of morals. The view taken by 
their respective laws of the requirements of morals varies from time to time and 
from place to place which is characterised by a rapid and far-reaching evolution 
of opinions on the subject.182 
 
From the statements of the Court in Tyrer and Handyside, it can be seen that there is a 
link in the factors that affect the application of the margin of appreciation and living 
instrument doctrines. This link lies in the reference to the practice in member States in 
coming to a decision as to whether a particular action by a State is in line with the 
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Convention’s guarantees. The resort to finding consensus amongst the contracting States on 
a particular issue is a feature of both the living instrument doctrine and the margin of 
appreciation doctrines of the Court.183 The effect of the link between the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrine in existing literature will be further explored 
below. 
 
2.6.1 Change in Time and Space 
Brems acknowledges a relationship in the nature of the margin of appreciation and 
living instrument doctrines. According to Brems, the margin of appreciation interacts mainly 
with the rule of autonomous interpretation and evolutive interpretation.184 Autonomous 
interpretation is ‘antithetic’ to the margin of appreciation because there is no room for a 
domestic margin of appreciation, whereas evolutive interpretation is ‘analogous’ to the 
margin of appreciation.185 By considering them to be analogous Brems recognises the margin 
of appreciation and living instrument doctrines as having both similarities and differences. 
Where does the similarity lie between them? Brems goes further to state that ‘where the 
margin of appreciation allows for variations of interpretation in space, evolutive 
interpretation allows for variations in time’.186  One could therefore deduce from this that 
the similarity in both doctrines is the issue of ‘variations’ in essence: ‘change’, ‘not being 
fixed’, ‘fluidity’. The margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines are similar 
because they both lead to changes and cannot be couched in fixed terms. However, they are 
different in relation to the kind of variation or change they bring. Whilst the margin of 
appreciation will lead to variations as a result of the particular country involved (space), the 
living instrument doctrine will lead to variations based on the time in which the decision is 
made. A third dimension of variation, which Brems does not identify, is the variation that 
occurs as a result of the type of issue involved.  
Even though Brems alludes to the relationship between the margin of appreciation 
doctrine and the interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument, she does not provide 
a detailed analysis of the case law to show how this relationship between the margin of 
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appreciation and the living instrument is seen in the case law of the Court. It is also 
questioned whether there is a variation in time that is happening in the margin of appreciation 
doctrine itself. This is an area that will be tested in this thesis whilst considering the nature 
of the relationship (RQ 1) between the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines. 
Essentially, Brems sees both the margin of appreciation and evolutive interpretation 
as related in the sense that they both lead to change and flexibility in the decisions of the 
Court, differing only in the nature of the change they bring. Whilst the use of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine can lead to change as a result of the differing conditions within a 
particular member State, the use of the living instrument/evolutive interpretation can lead to 
a difference of interpretation as a result of the time in which that case has come before the 
Court. What Brems does not deal with is the conflict between interpretation in space and 
time within the same case. How would the court determine which of these would triumph? 
Also, has the margin of appreciation evolved so that it is also leading to variation in time as 
well? These are aspects of the gap in the literature that this piece of research will attempt to 
fill through further analysis carried out in chapters five and six of this thesis.  
 
2.6.2 Change in Width  
Another link between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines 
identified in the literature is seen in the impact the living instrument has on the width of the 
margin of appreciation afforded to States. Tümay highlights that the living instrument is 
linked to the margin of appreciation because it serves as a tool to determine the width of 
appreciation left to the contracting States.187 The width of the margin of appreciation is 
important as it could be vital to the Court’s determination on whether the particular measure 
that is challenged struck a fair balance.188 The question that may be asked is in what way 
does the living instrument doctrine determine the width of the margin of appreciation? One 
of the key factors amongst others that determines the width of the margin of appreciation is 
consensus. de Londras and Dzehtsiarou highlight four types of consensus that may be 
deduced from the practice of the Court: (a) international consensus, which is mainly based 
on consideration of international treaties; (b) European consensus which is mainly based on 
consideration of practice within Contracting States; (c) internal consensus which is based on 
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the prevailing position within the respondent State; and (d) expert consensus, which is the 
consideration of the view of experts when scientific evidence is required by the Court.189 
The Court usually gives a narrow margin to the member State where it finds a European 
consensus on the issue and also where the matter is related to rights fundamental to 
democracy, namely freedom of expression and freedom of association and assembly.190 
What this means in effect is that where there is a lack of European consensus, for example 
where morals are at issue, the ECtHR gives the member State a wide margin of 
appreciation.191 The link between the width of the margin of appreciation and the living 
instrument doctrine therefore arises due to the use of consensus by the ECtHR when applying 
both doctrines.   
The living instrument doctrine is considered to have a negative impact on the width 
of the margin of appreciation. In discussing the limits of evolutive interpretation, Baroness 
Hale noted that one of the ways in which the jurisprudence of the Convention had developed 
beyond the expectation of the drafters was inter alia ‘the narrowing of the margin of 
appreciation permitted to member States’.192 She identified evolutive interpretation as one 
that ‘tends to lead’ to a narrowing of the margin of appreciation.193  The case of Hirst v 
United Kingdom is an example of a situation when there has been an apparent narrowing of 
the margin of appreciation which caused concern.194 Although this point was highlighted, 
Baroness Hale did not proceed to provide a systematic analysis of the case law of the Court 
in which both the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines were present in 
order to determine the extent to which the margin of appreciation of the State had been 
narrowed as a result of evolutive interpretation. This may have been due to the constraints 
of the presentation. It however leaves a gap which this thesis seeks to fill in order to provide 
an original contribution to the literature on this subject.  
Letsas also acknowledges a relationship between the margin of appreciation and 
evolutive interpretation as a result of consensus when he identifies a ‘positive aspect’ and 
‘negative aspect’ of evolutive interpretation.195 Whereas the negative aspect is that what the 
national authorities and the people of the respondent member State believe about the 
applicant’s human rights claim is not decisive for whether the applicant has that right under 
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the Convention, the positive side of it is that commonly held standards in the Council of 
Europe are very weighty considerations for whether the applicant has the right they claim.196 
He therefore identifies the core of evolutive interpretation as ‘the use of present-day 
developments and standards in the Council of Europe as a counterweight to the moral climate 
prevailing on the respondent member State’.197 As a result of this ‘core’ of the living 
instrument doctrine, Letsas, like Brems, links evolutive interpretation to the margin of 
appreciation doctrine.198 In linking the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines Letsas differs from Brems as the former does not directly address the issue of 
variations in space as a result of the margin of appreciation doctrine.  
In Marckx, where the Court held that the Belgian legislation which did not confer 
maternal affiliation by birth in relation to illegitimate children violated Articles 8 and 14 of 
the Convention.199 The Belgian Government, whilst conceding that the legislation in 
question favoured the traditional family, argued that retaining such legislation was for the 
purpose of ensuring the full development of the family as a matter of ‘objective and 
reasonable grounds relating to morals and public order’.200 The Court rejected the view of 
the Belgian Government on the grounds that whilst it may have been regarded as permissible 
to distinguish between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ families at the time the Convention was 
drafted, there was a clear evolution in the law of many of the contracting States and relevant 
international instruments to the full recognition of the maxim ‘mater semper certa est’. The 
Court was therefore using the living instrument doctrine in this case as a counter weight to 
the moral climate in Belgium which resulted in a narrowing of the margin of appreciation 
afforded to the State. In this way, the use of the living instrument doctrine could be seen as 
a tool that limits the margin of appreciation afforded to the State. 
 
2.6.3 Change in Function  
Change in time and space as well as change in width are two areas in which a 
relationship exists between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines (RQ 
1 relationship). A third aspect of the link between them is in the area of change in the nature 
of their relationship and the function of the margin of appreciation doctrine. The issue 
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addressed is the nature of the relationship between the living instrument and margin of 
appreciation doctrines and whether this has changed over time.  In relying on the living 
instrument doctrine, it has already been highlighted that the Court frequently resorts to an 
analysis of whether consensus exists on a particular issue amongst the contracting States. 
Following an analysis of selected case law of the Court on the living instrument doctrine 
through two time periods (1980s - 1990s, and the 1990s onwards),201 Letsas argues that wide 
margins were granted by the Court in the 1980s-1990s in cases where there was no consensus 
amongst the contracting States with the result that States were held to be within their margin 
of appreciation and were therefore not found in violation of the Convention.202  However, 
from the 1990s, the case law of the Court shows greater scrutiny on the member States with 
more violations against the Convention being found by the Court even in cases where 
consensus was not found to exist.203  
This analysis by Letsas suggests evolution in how the Court has dealt with the 
relationship between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines. It can be 
seen that the margin of appreciation appears to have a reduced impact on the outcome in 
cases where the living instrument doctrine is raised hence affecting its function as a ‘room 
for manoeuvre’ for the State. There is still room for concrete analysis on this point to either 
corroborate or refute the view that the margin of appreciation is having a reduced impact in 
such cases. There is also room to examine to what extent a margin of appreciation still exists 
for the States in such cases where the Court finds no consensus on an issue.  The room for 
further analysis arises because Letsas’ analysis is on case law on the living instrument 
doctrine, not necessarily an examination of how the Court deals with cases where there is a 
conflict between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines. The analysis is 
also based on a selected number of cases, but he does not explicitly identify the criteria by 
which the cases analysed had been selected. A systematic examination of the Court’s 
approach in cases where both the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines are 
raised therefore remains a gap which this thesis seeks to fill (RQ 2 conflict). This thesis 
adopts the method of doctrinal analysis combined with the quantitative method of descriptive 
statistical analysis to a systematic analysis of 75 cases of the Court from January 1979 to 
                                                 
201 The latest case cited by Letsas in ‘The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and Legitimacy’ (n 127) 
was in 2011. Lautsi v Italy App no 30814/06 (ECtHR, 18 March 2011). 
202 A wide margin of appreciation was given in cases such as Handyside (n 5); Otto-Preminger-Institute (n 95; 
Rees (n 170); Cossey (n 170); Sheffield and Horsham (n 170). 
203 This is reflected in cases such Goodwin v United Kingdom App no 17488/90 (ECtHR, 27 March 1996) in 
which the Court reversed its previous case law on the positive duty under Article 8 of the Convention to 




December 2016 inclusive, in which both the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines were referred to in order to discover how the Court handles the ‘hard cases’ in 
which the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine intersects with the living 
instrument doctrine.  It will seek to provide a comprehensive analysis of any changes and 
draw from current events in addressing reasons for change. 
The literature examined illustrates that the margin of appreciation and living 
instrument doctrines share a common feature of both being absent in the text of the 
Convention but rather being developed by the Court itself. An apparent link between both 
doctrines is not one that has yet been explored in great detail. The literature shows that they 
may not be as unrelated as might be assumed; one commonality is that they both have an 
impact on the justification of the use of discretion by the member State. On the one hand, 
the margin of appreciation can be seen as giving room for a wide discretion for State parties 
whilst the living instrument doctrine subjects the State to a higher level of scrutiny. There 
are hard cases in which there is a conflict between the margin of appreciation and living 
instrument doctrines. From the literature it can be seen that the connecting point between the 
margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines is in the use of consensus by the Court 
when applying both doctrines. This link manifests in three main areas: change in time and 
space, change in width and change in function. European consensus plays a key role in this 
regard with the presence of consensus leading to a narrow margin whilst the absence of 
consensus generally leads to a wide margin. Consensus is, however, not a determinative 
factor in itself. 
A core aspect of both doctrines is the issue of change. The margin of appreciation is 
not stagnant. The interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument is also not stagnant 
but requires consideration of changes in society. On the question as to whether there has 
been a change in the relationship between the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines, Letsas suggests that the Court has moved from a lower scrutiny to heightened 
scrutiny therefore interpreting the Convention in a more evolutive manner and requiring 
member States to justify their actions. However, as previously stated, the parameters for 
selection is not explicitly provided and the latest case cited was in 2011. There therefore 
remains a gap for analysis of the relationship (RQ 1) between the margin of appreciation and 
living instrument doctrines of the Court through its case law. This forms the focus of this 
research. This thesis adds to the literature by focusing on the case law in which both the 
margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines are present, with a systematic analysis 




conclusions on whether there has been any change in the nature of interaction between the 
margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines. 
 
2.7 Conclusion  
The margin of appreciation doctrine is engrained within the jurisprudence of the 
Court. It has evolved from a doctrine that was initially considered to apply derogation 
cases under Article 15 of the ECHR, to a doctrine that pervades the interpretation of the 
entire Convention and is soon to be included in the text of the Convention itself. There is 
no set limit on the provisions of the Convention to which it can be applied. It achieves 
both a substantive role in determining whether States have achieved the right balance 
when there is a conflict between individual rights and collective goals, and a structural 
function of deference to the national authorities. The Court has however not been very 
clear on which role it is performing in particular cases, nor has there been fixed parameters 
for its application. There are mixed reactions to the use of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine by the Court.  Some have welcomed the presence of the margin of appreciation 
within the case law of the ECtHR on the basis that it is a pragmatic tool to deal with a 
variety of issues that the Court is faced with such as: (a) the diversity of member States; 
(b) the sovereignty of member States and the recognition of the Court as a subsidiary 
means of enforcement. Others have others have criticised the lack of precision in its 
application and lack of a detailed rationale for its presence within the jurisprudence of the 
Court.  It has also been criticised for promoting relativism in the protection of rights, with 
some calling for its total abandonment by the Court.  
Notwithstanding the mixed reactions, the significance of the margin of 
appreciation in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has steadily grown and it has remained a 
tool used by the Court in determining whether a member State has violated its obligations 
under the ECHR. Its presence in the future jurisprudence of the Court will potentially be 
even more visible when Protocol No 15 has been ratified by all State parties to the 
Convention. The margin of appreciation is recognised for the flexibility that it offers both 
the Court and the member States. This is partly linked to the role consensus plays in 
determining the width of the margin of appreciation. This is the very aspect of the margin 
of appreciation doctrine that makes it vulnerable to critics but also the key attribute of the 
doctrine that forges a link with the living instrument doctrine, another interpretative tool 




The interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument would appear quite 
unrelated to the margin of appreciation at face value, but within the case law of the court 
an intersection between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines has 
been identified within extant literature, albeit without any comprehensive analysis 
devoted to just this area. The description of the relationship is not one that is simplistic. 
The use of consensus as a relevant factor when applying the living instrument doctrine 
connects it with the margin of appreciation doctrine. The impact of this connection may 
be seen in the fact that both of these doctrines have the potential to lead to change in the 
interpretation of the Convention. 
The change may be seen in time and space, with the living instrument doctrine 
leading to a change in time whilst the margin of appreciation doctrine leads to a change 
in space. There is however scope to consider whether there could be a change in both time 
and space within the same case. Another aspect of the relationship between the living 
instrument and margin of appreciation doctrines is the determination of the width of the 
margin of appreciation. The living instrument doctrine has been criticised for ‘narrowing’ 
the width of the margin of appreciation, with the result that the State is found to be in 
violation of their obligations under the Convention.  A systematic analysis of the case law 
in which both doctrines are present will be useful in shedding more light on the impact of 
the living instrument on the width of the margin of appreciation and the factors considered 
by the Court in such cases. A third aspect of the relationship between the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines can be seen in the potential for change in 
function. Some of the literature suggests that changes that have occurred over the years 
in jurisprudence with the Court moving away from wide margins in which it allows the 
member States more discretion in their interpretation of the Convention, to a narrow 
margin where the member States are subject to more scrutiny. The depth of research in 
this area is one that still gives room for more research. Whilst existing literature 
acknowledges a change from wide margins to narrow margins over the past decades, the 
selected case law analysed in the available literature leaves room for a more systematic 
analysis to explain the varied situations in which the margin of appreciation doctrine and 
living instrument doctrine have been dealt with by the Court within the same case. This 
is the gap that this thesis seeks to fill.  
The presence of the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines in the 
jurisprudence of the Court would, however, appear disproportionately powerful in 




treaties. The next chapter addresses this issue by engaging in an analysis of the relevance 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) to the interpretation of the ECHR 
and how the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines fit within the theories 
of treaty interpretation. The examination in the next Chapter will seek to provide some 





































The Margin of Appreciation and Living Instrument Doctrines 
Through the Lens of the Rules of Interpretation of International Treaties 
 
3. Introduction 
Chapter two examined the origins and utility of the margin of appreciation and the living 
instrument doctrines in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, 
the Court). Extant literature suggests an affirmative answer to the question of whether there 
is a relationship between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines. This 
was a prelude to dealing with the nature of the relationship (RQ 1) between the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines. One of the similarities between both of these 
doctrines has been their absence within the treaty document itself: the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR, the Convention).1 They are both creations of the ECtHR. The 
previous chapter provided some important indications on the nature of the relationship 
between both doctrines. It was shown that consensus is a significant factor in the application 
of both doctrines. Although both doctrines are instruments of change, the margin of 
appreciation results in differences based on the ‘space’ that the decision relates to, which 
means the relevant country, whilst the living instrument doctrine on the other hand brings a 
variation in time, which means the societal conditions on the date the decision is being made. 
The literature also showed that the application of the living instrument was linked to the 
narrowing of the width of the margin of appreciation granted to States. In cases where more 
weight was given to the living instrument doctrine and it influenced the decision of the Court, 
less weight would be given to the margin of appreciation doctrine and vice versa. Chapter 
two also exposed the gaps in the literature that this thesis seeks to fill through the 
comprehensive analysis of the case law (RQ 2) of the Court, explored further below, in which 
both the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines are mentioned. 
This chapter moves this thesis forward towards an examination of important 
interpretive and theoretical approaches (RQ 3).  To provide a sound framework that should 
be applied to the determination of cases in which there is conflict between the margin of 
appreciation and the living instrument doctrines, these need to be situated within the theories 
of interpretation of treaties. It is necessary to align them with the theories on interpretation 
                                                 
1 Although this position will change once Protocol No 15 Amending the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS No. 213 comes into force as it provides for the inclusion of the 




of treaties as without that analysis, the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines 
may appear as ‘giants on stilts’. Doctrines that have had a significant influence on the case 
law of the Court but having very shaky foundations until placed within a context of their 
roles as tools of interpretation of international treaties. The main purpose of this chapter is 
therefore to provide some underpinning for the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines from the framework and theories for interpretation of treaties in international law. 
The outworking of this main purpose leads to two tasks.   First, to examine the legitimacy in 
international law of the creation of the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines 
as tools of interpretation by the Court. Second, to examine the links between the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines with the theories of interpretation reflected in 
the international rules on treaty interpretation. 
The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT, Vienna Convention)2 
offers a framework to assess the legitimacy of the creation of the margin of appreciation and 
living instrument doctrines by the Court as tools of interpretation. It also offers a theoretical 
framework for assessing their impact on the interpretive approach of the Court. The ECHR 
itself is a treaty, a written international agreement between 47 States3, which is governed by 
international law.4 The VCLT is therefore relevant when considering the interpretation of 
the ECHR. An examination of the rules of interpretation of treaties codified in Articles 31-
33 of the Vienna Convention immediately reveals that they do not contain any reference to 
the terms ‘margin of appreciation’ or ‘living instrument’. The absence of the doctrines in the 
VCLT creates the debate as to whether the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines are valid within this wider framework of treaty interpretation as provided within 
the Vienna Convention and in turn, whether they accord with the recognised rules of 
interpretation of treaties. This chapter engages with that debate and argues that the inclusion 
of the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrine as tools of interpretation by the 
Court is valid even though there is no express mention of both doctrines in the VCLT. It also 
examines how the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines interact with the 
theories of adjudication in the Vienna Convention. The result of this analysis provides the 
                                                 
2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 – opened for signature on 23 April 1969 and 
entered into force on 27 January 1980. 
3 There are currently 47 member States to the ECHR (as at 2 August 2018) see 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/47-members-states accessed 2 August 2018. 





basis for the theoretical framework for examination of the case law of the ECtHR which will 
be detailed in Chapter five.  
 
 
3.1 Rules of Interpretation in the VCLT 
The VCLT offers a theoretical framework to assess which interpretive tools should 
be adopted when interpreting an international treaty. This provides some foundation to assess 
the issue of the legitimacy of the creation of the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines by the Court. The Vienna Convention also provides the foundation for addressing 
central research question number three (RQ 3 interpretive and theoretical approaches).5  The 
VCLT is product of the International Law Commission (“the ILC”), a body created by the 
United Nations General Assembly in 1947,6 and given the task to progressively develop and 
codify international law.7 The significance of the task and the attendant difficulties are seen 
in the fact that it was not until 19 years later, in 1966, that the first final draft article was 
adopted by the ILC and then considered in the UN Conference of 1966.8  On 22 May 1969 
the VCLT was finally adopted and it entered into force on 27 January 1980. The reach of the 
VCLT is wide as it currently encompasses 114 member States,9 thereby making it applicable 
to more than half of the existing member States of the UN.10 The significance of the wide 
reach of the VCLT is further evidenced because it functions as a ‘residual rule’11; it is 
applicable to all treaties between States unless a particular treaty provides otherwise; or the 
parties agree otherwise; or a different intention is otherwise established. It also covers a wide 
                                                 
5 The research questions for this thesis are fully stated in Chapter 1 at section 1.3. 
6 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 174 of 21 November 1947 Available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/174(II) accessed 11 November 2016. 
7 Article 1 Statute of the International Law Commission 1947. Codification is the process through which rules 
of law are committed to written form. The process of codification of international law is however not just a 
process of systematising in written form existing rules of international law as distilled from state practice, but 
is necessarily legislative as well as it involves some level of progressive development of the law in the form of 
bringing uniformity where there are conflicting state practices and also bringing changes to areas where there 
is established consensus in state practice but such practice is unsatisfactory and requires changes. For more on 
the special nature of codification of international law which was not reflected in Article 15 of the Statute of the 
ILC and the justification for this, see H Lauterpacht, ‘Codification and Development of International Law’ 
(1965) 59 American Journal of International Law 16, 23-30. 
8 Resolution 2166 (XXI) of 5 December 1966.  
9 116 states had ratified the VCLT as at 24 July 2018 < 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-
1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en> accessed 24 July 2018. 
10 There are currently 193 member States of the UN (data correct as at 24 July 2018). 
11 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The Practical Working of Treaties’ in Malcolm D Evans (ed), International Law (4th 




scope of issues relating to treaties from the formation to the termination and other relevant 
matters in between.12 
Articles 31-33 of the VCLT enshrine the rules on interpretation of treaties.13  The 
Convention adopts a two-stage approach: in the first stage interpretation is based on the tools 
contained in Article 31 to ascertain the ordinary meaning of the word. The second stage 
process in Article 32 involves resort to supplementary materials for interpretation in order 
to confirm the meaning arrived at or where there is ambiguity or absurdity following 
interpretation based on Article 31.14 One could therefore deduce that the under the VCLT, 
the elements of interpretation in Article 31 are part of the ‘general rules of interpretation’ to 
be applied in all cases whilst those in Article 32 are ‘supplementary means’ to be restricted 
to specific instances.15 The ultimate aim of interpretation is ensuring the performance of the 
treaty. Article 31 provides that: 
 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose.  
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:  
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties 
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;  
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty.  
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context; (a) any 
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions;  
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
                                                 
12 The VCLT does not however cover all aspects of treaty law. For example, it does not deal with the issue of 
succession of treaties, responsibility for the breach of treaties or the effect of the outbreak of hostilities on 
treaties. See Article 73 VCLT. 
13 For an in-depth exposition of Articles 31-33 see Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3rd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2013) 205 – 226. 
14 J G Merrills, ‘Two Approaches to Treaty Interpretation’ (1968-1969) Australian Yearbook of International 
Law 55,56. 




        (c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties.  
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties 
so intended. 
 
The general rule of interpretation in Article 31(1) contains an overarching principle 
as well as three other elements to be applied in interpretation of treaties. The overarching 
principle is that a treaty should be interpreted in good faith.16 The difficulty of identifying 
what good faith means is highlighted by Gardiner who points out that ‘good faith’ ‘is an 
excellent example of a term whose ‘ordinary meaning’ is elusive’.17  In practice however, 
the rule of interpreting a treaty in good faith reflects the principle of pacta sunt servanda, 
contained in Article 26 of the VCLT.  This principle is usually referred to in relation to the 
performance of treaties and as Aust points out, interpretation of treaties is part of the 
performance of treaties.18 It could therefore be concluded that good faith is applied to the 
interpretation of treaties in order to ensure the performance of the treaties. It serves as an 
overarching principle which underpins the different rules of interpretation applied. 
In addition to the principle of good faith it can be deduced that the three key tools of 
interpretation in Article 31(1) are: ‘the text’, ‘the context’ and the ‘object and purpose’.19 
‘These three elements in turn reflect the three main schools of interpretation which preceded 
the VCLT: the textual/objective school, the intention of the parties/subjective school and the 
teleological/purposive school.20 It should be immediately apparent to the reader that Article 
31 does not contain any reference to the terms margin of appreciation or living instrument. 
It is therefore necessary to consider how the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines can be considered to be valid tools of interpretation even though they are not 
expressly mentioned within the text of Article 31. An analysis of this point will be relevant 
for answering RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches). 
                                                 
16 Aust (n 13) 208; A similar view is expressed by Fitzmaurice, ‘The Practical Working of Treaties’ (n 11) 179. 
17 Richard K Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2nd edn, OUP 2015) 170; The ambiguity surrounding the use of 
the term ‘good faith’ was also highlighted earlier in Merrills, ‘Two Approaches to Treaty Interpretation’ (n 
14). 
18 Aust (n 13) 208. 
19 Fitzmaurice, ‘The Practical Working of Treaties’ (n 11) 179. 
20 These schools of interpretation were recognised and distilled from the practice of the International Courts 
prior to the existence of the VCLT. See Oliver Morse, ‘Schools of Approach to the Interpretation of Treaties’ 
(1960) 9 Catholic University Law Review 36,39; For a list of more of the interpretive principles applied by the 
International Court of Justice prior to the VCLT, see Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the 
International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretations and other Treaty Point’ (1957) 33 British 




3.2 Underpinning the Creation of the Margin of Appreciation and Living Instrument 
Doctrines within the VCLT 
In order to address the issue of the legitimacy of the creation of the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines it is necessary to situate them within the 
interpretive rules for international treaties as captured within the VCLT. The first theoretical 
issue to navigate is the relevance of the Vienna Convention to the interpretation of the 
ECHR. The ECtHR was given the role to ‘interpret’ and ‘apply’ the provisions of the 
Convention and its Protocols.21 The ECHR did not however state what rules should guide 
the Court in carrying out its role of interpreting and applying the Convention. The ECHR 
was signed in 1950 and came into force in 1953 whilst the VCLT was signed in 1969 and 
came into force in 1980. At face value therefore, the rules of interpretation in Articles 31-33 
of the VCLT should not be applicable to the ECHR because it clearly states in Article 4 
VCLT that its provisions are not retroactive and only apply to treaties that were concluded 
after its entry into force.22 What then is the basis for the relevance of the provisions of the 
VCLT to the interpretation of the ECHR? The relevance of the Vienna Convention to the 
interpretation of the ECHR lies not in the sequence of their existence but in the link between 
the VCLT and customary international law.23 Customary international law itself is derived 
from a combination of State practice and ‘opinio juris’: the belief in the binding nature of 
that practice.24 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) identified the rules of interpretation 
contained in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT as reflective of customary international law.25  
There are two significant points that arise from the status of Articles 31 and 32 of the 
VCLT as reflective of customary international law. The first implication is that those 
provisions are applicable even in cases where the States before the Court are not parties to 
the VCLT. In a case before the ICJ - Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), neither 
Botswana nor Namibia were parties to the Vienna Convention but they accepted that the 
VCLT was applicable to the interpretation of the treaty in dispute as it reflects customary 
                                                 
21 Article 32 ECHR. 
22 Article 4 VCLT. 
23 Customary international law is one of the sources of international law identified in Article 38(1) of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice 1945. Article 38(1) is considered as a starting point in identifying the 
sources of international law. It identifies treaties, custom, general principles of law, judicial decisions and 
writing of publicists as sources of international law.  
24 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany 
v The Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 3; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, paras 183 and 207. 
25Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) [1994] ICJ Rep 21, para 41; See also Oil Platforms 
(Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Preliminary Objections) [1996] (II) ICJ Rep 812, para 




international law.26 This is as a result of the widely recognised principle that customary 
international law binds all States whether or not they have been party to its creation.27 This 
principle of the binding nature of customary international law is only subject to two 
exceptions: rules of special or local customary law, which are only applicable to a specific 
group of States28 and the ‘persistent objector’ principle.29 The second implication is that the 
provisions of Articles 31 and 32 are applicable to treaties that were concluded prior to the 
entry into force of the VCLT.30 For the purposes of this thesis, the second implication is 
significant because it means that even though the ECHR was in force 23 years before the 
VCLT, the provisions of Articles 31-33 are nevertheless applicable to the interpretation of 
the ECHR.  
The ECtHR itself has confirmed in the case of Golder v United Kingdom that the 
VCLT is applicable to the interpretation of the ECHR and that Articles 31-33 reflect 
customary international law and are applicable to the interpretation of the Convention.31 The 
Court stated: 
 
The Court is prepared to consider…that it should be guided by Articles 31 to 33 
of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law of Treaties. That 
Convention has not yet entered into force and it specifies, at Article 4, that it will 
not be retroactive, but its Articles 31 to 33 enunciate in essence generally 
accepted principles of international law to which the Court has already referred 
on occasion. In this respect, for the interpretation of the European Convention 
account is to be taken of those Articles subject, where appropriate, to "any 
relevant rules of the organization" - the Council of Europe - within which it has 
been adopted….32 
 
                                                 
26 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (n 25). 
27 Hugh Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ in Malcolm Evans (ed), International Law (4th edn, OUP 
2014) 97 
28 For example, in the Asylum Case (Columbia v Peru) [1950] ICJ Reports 266, the practice of diplomatic 
asylum in which certain Latin American States took cognisance of the right of embassies of other states in the 
region to give asylum to political fugitives was held not to be applicable to Peru.  
29 The persistent objector principle applies to a state, which consistently objected to a rule whilst it was not yet 
customary international law. In such a case, the state is seen as a persistent objector and can continue to opt 
out of that application of that rule. For example, the 10-mile rule in relation to base lines was held to be 
inapplicable against Norway as they had consistently objected to its application to the Norwegian coast – Anglo 
Norwegian Fisheries Case (UK v Norway) [1951] ICJ Rep 116. 
30 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (n 25). 





The status of Articles 31-33 as rules of customary international law therefore make 
the rules of interpretation embodied within them, relevant to the interpretation of the ECHR. 
Whilst Golder answers the question as to whether the VCLT is relevant to the 
interpretation of the ECHR, it still leaves open the issue as to how the margin of appreciation 
and living instrument doctrines can be considered as valid tools of interpretation of an 
international treaty when they were not expressly mentioned in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna 
Convention. Put differently, is there room for international courts to create their own rules 
of interpretation? The answer to this question requires an examination of the question as to 
whether the VCLT purport Articles 31-33 to be an exhaustive codification or a selective 
codification of the interpretive principles for international treaties.  An examination of the 
ILC’s Commentary on the VCLT shows that it recognised that there are other principles of 
interpretation that could be applied to the interpretation of treaties and that it was not a good 
idea to attempt to codify all of them in the Vienna Convention. The ILC, had restricted itself 
to ‘trying to isolate and codify the comparatively few general principles which appear to 
constitute general rules for the interpretation of treaties’.33 It was therefore a selective 
process rather than an exhaustive one. The effect of this as Merrills notes, is that the ILC 
does not intend to rule out other helpful principles or maxims that would be useful in 
interpreting treaties.34 This leaves room for an international court to apply rules of 
interpretation that go beyond what is provided for in the VCLT. Indeed, as Letsas points out, 
it is the purpose of the treaty that would determine the particular interpretive rules and 
methods that should be applied by the Court.35  
The understanding that the rule of interpretation in Article 31 of the VCLT is not a 
comprehensive list of the principles that can be applied by an international court is significant 
here. Chapter two had already provided the rationale for the creation of the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines from the perspective of the Court.36 In 
recognition of the status of the ECHR as an international treaty, seeking validation for the 
creation of both doctrines within the Vienna Convention which embodies the law of treaties 
was also essential. The VCLT is relevant to the ECHR because it embodies customary 
                                                 
33 International Law Commission’s Commentary to Articles 27 and 28 of the ILC Draft (ultimately Articles 31 
and 32 of the VCLT) from the ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries 1966’ in Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission (1966) Vol II on Para 5 page 218-9 available at < 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_1_1966.pdf> accessed 17 October 2016. 
34 Merrills, ‘Two Approaches to Treaty Interpretation’ (n 14) 57.  
35 George Letsas, ‘Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer’ (2010) 21(3) EJIL 
509, 533. 




international law in Articles 31-33. From the analysis in this section it follows that although 
it can be clearly seen that the text of Articles 31-33 VCLT do not include the words margin 
of appreciation or living instrument, in the light of the acknowledgement that Article 31 is 
not an exhaustive list of all the rules of interpretation that can be applied by an international 
Court, the creation of additional rules of interpretation by the ECtHR is in keeping with the 
rules of international treaty interpretation. There is therefore a firm basis in line with 
recognised international law principles for the Court to adopt its own rules of interpretation 
in addition to what is provided for within the VCLT.  Underpinning the doctrines in the 
VCLT provides a platform for dealing with RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches) 
which seeks to analyse the framework for cases in which there is conflict between the margin 
of appreciation and living instrument doctrines. Before considering the actual relationship if 
any between the margin of appreciation and the rules in the VCLT it is necessary to give a 
brief overview of the different rules and how they reflect the theories of interpretation of 
international treaties. 
 
3.3 Rules of Interpretation in the VCLT and Theories of Interpretation 
In Golder the ECtHR referred to taking into consideration the principles enshrined in 
Articles 31-32 VCLT.37 The text, context and object and purpose have been identified as the 
three tools of interpretation contained within Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. The 
different elements are, however, not exhaustive as the tools of interpretation that can be 
applied by an international Court. They are three elements of one singular rule of 
interpretation rather than a set of multiple rules of interpretation.38  In this way the VCLT 
incorporates the three main schools of interpretation: the textual/objective, 
internationalist/subjective and purposive/teleological within Article 31(1).  The VCLT 
brings a dynamic approach to the use of the schools/theories of interpretation as each of 
those elements: text, context and object and purpose are to be applied together in order to 
                                                 
37 In this chapter Article 33 will not be discussed as it is mainly concerned with interpretation when there a 
treaty is drafted in more than one language. It does not necessarily focus on the tools of interpretation and 
schools of thought of interpretation which are the relevant areas covered within this chapter. 
38 The ILC’s Commentary on the Draft Article 27 (which turned out to be Article 31) indicates that it embodies 
a singular rule: ‘[A]rticle 27 is entitled "General rule of interpretation" in the singular, not "General rules" in 
the plural, because the Commission desired to emphasize that the process of interpretation is a unity and that 
the provisions of the article form a single, closely integrated rule…’ (Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties (n 
33) 220; Fitzmaurice also highlights that there are three different elements of this singular ‘rule’ of 
interpretation: the text, the context, and the object and purpose. Fitzmaurice, ‘The Practical Working of 




arrive at the interpretation of the relevant treaty provision at issue. They are not standalone 
techniques but should rather be considered as a whole.  
A related question is: does this singular rule of interpretation create a hierarchy amongst 
the different elements that it embodies?  The ILC has stated that Article 31 when read as a 
whole does not lay down a hierarchy of norms for the interpretation of treaties. It was 
considerations of logic and not legal hierarchy that influenced the Commission in arriving at 
the order of the words in the article.39 There is therefore no hierarchy of legal norms within 
Article 31(1), it is rather a logical progression with interpretation beginning with the text, 
and then the context followed by other considerations such as the object and purpose or 
supplementary materials.40 The VCLT does not also give precedence to any of the schools 
of interpretation as the object and purpose of the treaty would determine the approach of the 
relevant international court.41 In this section these three elements are examined to give a 
context to their application before proceeding in the next section to examine their relevance 
to the ECHR. 
 
3.3.1 Ordinary Meaning/Textual School 
The textual approach places emphasis on literal translations.42 For the textual school, 
if the word, clause or phrase of the treaty in dispute is clear, then there is no need to resort 
to any further materials in order to determine its meaning.43 If however the text is unclear or 
ambiguous, the textual school would allow for recourse to supplementary means of 
interpretation such as the travaux préparatoires in order to resolve this.44  The VCLT 
codifies this textual school of interpretation approach in Article 31 where it provides that the 
terms of the treaty are to be interpreted in line with their ordinary meaning. This could be 
interpreted as their ‘natural’ or ‘plain meaning’.45 An example of the textual school in 
operation can be seen in Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia)46 where the ICJ in 
dealing with a boundary dispute, referred to the ordinary meaning of the terms ‘main 
channel’ in the pertinent provision of the 1890 Treaty. Based on this textual approach, it 
concluded that the northern channel of the River Chobe around the disputed Kasikili/Sedudu 
                                                 
39 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties (n 33), para 9, pg. 220. 
40 Aust (n 13) 208. 
41 Letsas (n 35) 514, 533. 
42 Morse (n 20) 41. 
43 Ibid. 
44 The travaux préparatoires are the preparatory documents. See Morse (n 20) 41. 
45 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law (7th edn, OUP 2013) 73. 




Island must be regarded as its main Channel, which informed the conclusion that 
Kasikili/Sedudu was a part of Botswana.47 
How important is the textual approach in the Vienna Convention? It is noted that the 
VCLT gives precedence to the textual approach.48 This precedence reflects the view of the 
ILC that the text ‘must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intention of the 
parties’ and that as a result, ‘the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the 
meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into the intentions of the parties’.49 The 
ordinary meaning of a term can therefore be assumed to most likely reflect what the parties 
intended unless the contrary can be proved.50 
Although words would normally be given their ordinary meanings, parties can assign 
special meanings to terms. Article 31(4) provides that a special meaning will be given to a 
term if it is established that the parties so intended. In such a case, the special meaning will 
be applied notwithstanding the apparent meaning of a term in its context. There is therefore 
a freedom of parties to decide on what meanings they would give to particular terms but 
barring that happening, the ordinary meanings of words would be adopted. 
 A related issue is where treaties are drafted in more than one language. In many cases, 
international treaties are drafted in more than one ‘official’ language.51 A situation may arise 
in which an interpretation of the text as written in the two languages, may lead to different 
conclusions. The issue then is which of the languages should supersede the other? Which 
‘ordinary meaning’ should be adopted? Article 33(1) provides that ‘unless the treaty 
provides, or the parties otherwise agree, that in the case of divergence between the texts a 
particular text shall prevail, the text is equally ‘authoritative’ in each language in which it 
has been authenticated. Where there are two different conclusions that could be arrived at 
because of the different interpretations based on the different languages, the interpretation 
that is in line with the object and purpose of the treaty is the one that should be adopted.52 
It can be seen that the reference to the ‘ordinary meaning’ reflects the textual school 
of interpretation and is the primary rule to be adopted in interpreting treaty provisions in line 
with the VCLT. The textual school places emphasis on the text itself as the objective 
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expression of the intention of the parties which is then relevant to the interpretation of the 
relevant provision. Interpretation is to be restricted to what is expressed in the text by the 
parties. Anything not included in the text should not be adopted. By including the text in the 
general rule, and giving precedence to it, the VCLT leaves room for international 
adjudicatory bodies to adopt the textual school of interpretation which gives primacy to the 
text. It however does not end here but goes to incorporate another recognised school/theory 
of interpretation which is discussed below. 
 
3.3.2 Context/Intentionalist School 
Whilst the textual school places emphasis on relying on the text itself to ascertain the 
intention of the parties to the treaty, the intention of the parties’ school advocates reliance 
not only on the text but on all related conduct with respect to the treaty and its creation in 
order to ascertain the intention of the parties.53 The unifying factor between both approaches 
then is that they both seek to give effect to the intentions of the parties to the treaties. They 
however diverge on the issue of where that intention is to be found. Whilst the textual 
approach looks for the intention within the text itself except where there is ambiguity or 
uncertainty, the intentionalists look for that intention in a variety of documents which would 
include preparatory works and subsequent agreement. Intentionalists doubt that any text can 
be ‘clear’ ‘natural’ or ‘plain’ but rather that words can have any meaning the parties want it 
to have. Therefore, in order to ascertain what the words mean, then all the relevant conduct 
of the parties should be considered. Dixon shares a similar view stating that ‘in the normal 
case, the ‘normal and plain meaning’ of words in a treaty can be understood only in the 
context in which they are used, and it is a mistake to believe that any treaty phrase has one 
‘true’ meaning’.54  
Essentially, the intention of the parties’ school requires that the terms of the treaty 
should be read in context and this is very much in line with what is provided for in Article 
31 of the VCLT which provides that the terms of a treaty be interpreted in their context. This 
context may also include special meanings given to terms as covered in Article 31(4) of the 
VCLT. As McNair opined, the task of interpretation is: ‘The duty of giving effect to the 
expressed intention of the parties, that is, their intention as expressed in the words used by 
them in the light of the surrounding circumstances’.55 Here, ‘circumstances’ can be 
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interpreted to mean ‘context’. Aust shares a similar view on the importance of context stating 
that ‘any term can be fully understood only be considering the context in which it is 
employed’.56 For the intention of parties’ school, the ordinary meaning is therefore not 
something that should be taken separately but is intimately linked with context and should 
be taken in conjunction with all the other relevant elements of the rules of interpretation in 
the VCLT.57  
The question that arises is what factors can be considered in forming the context in 
order to fully give the term its ordinary meaning? The first factor is the text of the treaty 
including its preamble and annexes.58 The second factor that provides context is any 
agreement relating to the treaty that was made between all the parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty.59 Third, any instrument, which was made by one or more parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty.60 By including these different materials as a way to inform 
context, the reference to interpretation in context can be seen to be a qualifier of the ordinary 
meaning of terms used in the treaty. In so doing it aids the selection of the ordinary meaning 
of a term and modifies any over-literal approach to interpretation.61 The ordinary meaning 
of the words is therefore a starting point rather than an end in itself. It may in some instances 
have a determinative role where the context confirms the interpretation arrived at from 
adopting the ordinary meaning and if there were no other factors leading away from that 
conclusion.62  
In addition to the context there are other materials that the VCLT provides that can 
be considered as well when interpreting the treaty. These are subsequent agreements,63 
subsequent practice,64 and any rules of international law applicable between the parties.65 
The reference to rules of international law confirms that a treaty must be interpreted in the 
wider context of international law.66 The rules of international law that may be relied upon 
                                                 
56 Aust (n 13) 210. 
57 Gardiner (n 17) 181. 
58 Article 31(2) VCLT. 
59 Article 31(2)(a) In this instance the agreement does not have to be part of the treaty itself, but it must express 
the clear intention of the parties – Aust (n 13) 211. 
60 Article 31 (2) (b). 
61 Gardiner (n 17) 197. 
62 Gardiner (n 17) 185. 
63 Article 31(3)(a). 
64 Article 31 (3) (b). 
65 Article 31 (3) (c). 
66 See Aust (n 13) 216; the separate opinion of President Higgins in the Oil Platforms (n 25), paras 41-5 points 
to the view that the use of this provision as a ‘peg on which to hang the whole corpus of international law on 




in order to arrive at an interpretation that is consistent with the perceived intention of the 
parties may involve both international law in existence at the time of the treaty’s formation 
and present international law.67 In taking international law rules into account, it opens the 
door for consideration of more up to date views on particular issues that are referred to in 
the relevant treaty. This can open the door to an evolutive interpretation of treaties. 
  
3.3.3 Object and Purpose/Teleological Interpretation 
The third main school of thought with regards to interpretation of treaties is the 
teleological school. Article 31(1) of the VCLT requires that the object and purpose of the 
treaty be considered in the interpretation of the treaty. This means that the ordinary meaning 
of a word is not to be ascertained in the abstract but has to be done in the context of the 
object and purpose of the treaty.68 This reference to the object and purpose brings the 
teleological element into the general rule of interpretation.69 For the teleological school it is 
the purpose of the treaty itself that is the main point and to some extent this purpose is 
considered to be independent of the intentions of the original drafters of the treaty.70 
Teleological interpretation involves ascertaining the general purpose of the treaty and then 
interpreting the relevant provision in the light of it. This would in turn involve taking into 
consideration the general tenor of the treaty, the circumstances in which it was made and its 
position in international law.71  
One of the main criticisms against teleological interpretation is that it involves some 
level of law making.72 It involves using the objects, principles and purposes of the treaty 
which are expressly declared or presumed to supplement interpretation. In the outworking 
of the teleological interpretation gaps could be filled in the interpretation of the treaties. 
Teleological interpretation could therefore involve a legislative function for the court rather 
than a purely judicial or interpretive function.73 This room for law making when the 
teleological approach is applied has been one of the main reasons why it has not been 
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resorted to in great measure in some quarters.74  It has played a lesser role in interpretation 
of treaties than the search for the ordinary meaning of the words in their context.75  
In considering the object and purpose a related question is whether these are fixed in 
time or may change over time. This brings into play the ‘emergent purpose’76 or ‘evolutive’ 
school of thought which requires interpretation not necessarily based on the objects and 
purposes of the treaty at the time it was drafted but in line with what the objects and purposes 
of the treaty appear to be in the present time.77 The treaty is interpreted in the light of the 
role it plays in the current international setting. Fitzmaurice highlights the link between 
teleological interpretation and the principle of ‘effectiveness’, another interpretative 
principle applied by international courts.78 
What is the function of the resort to the object and purpose? Aust argues that the 
regard to the object and purpose is ‘more for the purpose of confirming an interpretation. If 
an interpretation is incompatible with the object and purpose, it may well be wrong’.79 
Gardiner points out there is a link between the context and the object and the purpose of the 
treaty. This link is that they are both elements necessary for finding out the ordinary meaning 
of terms used in the treaty.80 The resort to the context and the object and purpose is therefore 
all in order to identify the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the text. 
The teleological school is similar to the textual approach because it requires reference 
to the text of the treaty itself rather than what may be presumed to have taken place in the 
mind of the drafters.81 It is also similar to the intentionalist approach because although its 
focus is the objects and purpose, ascertaining the objects and purpose could involve 
determining what the drafters intended to be the object and purpose of the treaty even though 
the teleological interpretation may go beyond the drafter’s intention. The intentionalist 
schools is therefore reflected to some extent in teleological interpretation.82 It could therefore 
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be said that teleological interpretation is the intentionalist approach at a different level.83 The 
textual approach brings some form of control to the teleological interpretation by insisting 
that the objects and purpose should not be stretched beyond what is reflected in the text. If 
the object and purpose cannot be achieved by interpreting what has been clearly stated in the 
treaty, then the textualists would advocate for an amending of the treaty rather than an 
interpretation that ‘stretches’ the text.84 This is in keeping with the ILC’s position, which 
indicates that although the object and purpose are referred to in Article 31(1) VCLT, primacy 
is given to the text as the basis for interpretation of a treaty.85 This is however where the 
teleological school differs from the textual and intentionalist schools of interpretation as it 
incorporates an interpretation that ‘fills gaps’ or ‘amends’ the text in order to achieve the 
purpose of the treaty.  The three schools of thought therefore interact to some extent with 
each other. The VCLT itself gives room for either school of interpretation to be used.  
 
3.3.4 Supplementary Means of Interpretation 
It has already been seen that the Vienna Convention embodies the three main schools 
of interpretation. The use of the VCLT by the ICJ and the ILC’s commentaries however 
show that primacy is given to the text of the treaty. The related question is whether the 
ordinary meaning of a term be relied on at all times or if there are instances in which it is 
necessary to depart from the ordinary meaning of a term? By virtue of Article 32(b) where 
the ordinary meaning of a term would lead to a result that is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable, then the parties have to adopt another interpretation. Once again, the VCLT is 
codifying what already existed as an ‘exception’ to the textual rule in which it was 
recognised that where there was ambiguity or uncertainty by virtue of reliance on the text, 
recourse could be had to the preparatory documents.86 The implication is that except in such 
instances where there would be absurdity, the ordinary meaning of the words is to be adopted 
in order to give effect to the intention of the parties. This implies that Article 32 gives a 
subordinate role to supplementary documents such as the travaux.87 The text of the treaty is 
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the main document to be relied on in the interpretation of the treaty and the travaux are only 
to be relied on as a supplementary means.88  
Article 32 VCLT identifies two functions of the travaux. The first function is 
confirmation of the meaning arrived at following interpretation using the tools in Article 31. 
The adjudicatory body would have to, first, interpret the provision according to its ordinary 
meaning in context and in the light of its object and purpose as provided in Article 31 VCLT. 
Only after doing this would the travaux be resorted to in order to confirm the meaning that 
has been elucidated from the process.89  The second function of the travaux is to ‘determine’ 
the meaning of a particular provision. This is only relevant where interpretation according 
to the general rules in in Article 31 produces an interpretation that is either ‘ambiguous or 
obscure’90 or leads to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result.91 In such cases, the travaux 
can be relied on, not to confirm a meaning but rather to ‘determine’ the meaning.92 A reading 
of Article 32 therefore suggests only two functions of the travaux: ‘confirmation’ and 
‘determination’ of meaning, there is no express mention of any other functions.93  
Is the role of the travaux however only restricted to what is clearly spelt out in Article 
32: ‘confirmation’ and ‘determination’ or can it also perform a ‘corrective’ function? For 
example, if, though the text of a treaty was apparently clear, in seeking confirmation in the 
preparatory work and other surrounding circumstances a different meaning came to light, 
what would happen in such a circumstance?94  Essentially, if there is a conflict between the 
clear meaning of a term and the meaning arrived at from the travaux, which will prevail? 
Can the travaux ‘correct’ the meaning arrived at through the Article 31 process? It has been 
advocated that in such a situation, the travaux should prevail.95 In essence, this would 
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allocate a ‘corrective’ function to the travaux, giving it a third function not recognised in the 
VCLT. The difficulty this brings is that if the travaux were to supersede the text, then this 
would upset the hierarchy between the Articles 31 and 32.96 The question as to whether the 
whether the travaux could perform a corrective function was therefore not subjected to a full 
debate and no clear agreement on this point was made in the preparatory stage of the drafting 
of the Vienna Convention. 
In more recent times, Judge Schwebel has argued in favour of the travaux having a 
corrective function.97 His argument, which was based on the principle of good faith and 
Vattel’s dictum that an interpretation which renders an act null should be rejected, is that if 
the travaux is not accorded a corrective role, then its purpose will be constrained to just a 
confirmatory role thereby marginalising the article.98  He therefore argued that it was logical 
that a ‘corrective’ role be accorded to Article 32.99 Merkouris has however criticised this 
argument for a corrective function of Article 32 as having ‘an inherent logical error’.100 He 
argues that even if a corrective role is not assigned to Article 32 it will not make the Article 
redundant because it would still retain the role of ‘determining’ the meaning of terms where 
there is lack of clarity, unreasonableness or absurdity as a result of the application of the 
principles in Article 31.101 Through an examination of case law in which this ‘corrective’ 
function was allegedly used or hinted at, Merkouris concludes that in all those cases it had 
been a ‘determinative’ function played by the travaux. Correcting the meaning is therefore 
just ‘one extreme manifestation of determination, not a separate function’.102 The merits of 
this argument are evident because if the travaux is to retain its place as a ‘supplementary’ 
rule of interpretation, it cannot supersede a ‘clear’ meaning from the text itself. 
 The lack of a corrective function for the travaux in Article 32 does not completely 
rule out any function for the travaux. Whilst they may not have a major role on their own, 
in the right situation of ambiguity or absurdity they are relevant in helping the judge arrive 
at a conclusion that is in line with the intention of the parties and the purpose of the treaty. 
Aust however calls for caution in the use of the travaux because they are ‘by their nature 
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less authentic’ and ‘often incomplete and misleading’.103 Their usefulness is also ‘often 
marginal and very seldom decisive’.104 In practice, interpretation is usually based on the text 
of the treaty with the travaux resorted to as a supplementary means of interpretation to 
confirm the meaning already arrived at or determine the meaning where this is lack of clarity, 
absurdity or unreasonableness.105 
 The VCLT provides a framework for addressing the issue of what rules of 
interpretation should be applied to international treaties. It embodies a singular rule of 
interpretation in which a treaty should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning read 
in context and in the light of its object and purpose. This singular rule however expresses 
itself in three elements: text, context, and object and purpose which reflect the three schools 
of interpretation namely: textualism, intentionalism and teleologicalism. They form the main 
rule of interpretation but there is room for resort to the travaux where there is a need to 
confirm the meaning arrived at or to determine the meaning. There remains a debate as to 
whether the travaux can perform a corrective function. In the next section, the application of 
these rules of interpretation to the ECHR are examined as well as how the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines feature within this framework. 
 
3.4 Application of the Rules of Interpretation in the VCLT to the ECHR 
The approach of the ECtHR to the interpretation of the ECHR may be gleaned from 
its case law. Two forces have driven the Court’s approach to interpretation of the 
Convention. First, its beliefs on the appropriate ‘judicial approach to treaty interpretation’106 
and Second, its ‘conception of the nature of the European Convention’ and the ‘judicial role 
in relation to it’.107 Taking the first force identified by Merrills – ‘the reflection on the proper 
judicial approach to treaty interpretation’108, one needs to consider the relevance of the text, 
context and object and purpose – tools identified in Article 31 and then the travaux in Article 
32 to the interpretation of the ECHR. In Golder, the ECtHR set out a general doctrine of 
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interpretation of the Convention which was to be in line with Articles 31-33 of the VCLT.109 
It also confirmed that the different elements of the rule in Article 31 should be applied as a 
‘unity’, a ‘single combined operation’.110 The application of Articles 31-33 of the VCLT to 
the ECHR is therefore similar to the ILC’s approach that the different elements in Article 31 
form one single rule and that there is no hierarchy between the elements of the single rule of 
interpretation in Article 31. 
 In Golder, the ECtHR had to determine by virtue of interpretation whether access to 
a court was a part of the right to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 6(1) of the Convention. 
Could the ‘right of access to court’ be implied in the requirement to a fair trial laid down in 
Article 6, since that was not expressly stated within the article? Essentially Golder was a 
case of whether the unenumerated right of access to Court could be read into the 
Convention.111 After confirming that it will be guided by Articles 31-33 of the VCLT in 
interpreting the Convention and in particular Article 6(1), the Court then went on to apply 
the rules of interpretation in the Vienna Convention. The Court began by a literal reading of 
the text of Article 6(1) in line with its context.112 It therefore reflected the textual approach 
to interpretation, which is highlighted in Article 31 VCLT. The Court was of the view that 
the terms of Article 6(1) when taken in their context suggest that the right of access to court 
is included in the guarantees it sets forth. In coming to this conclusion, it referred to the 
ordinary meaning of the terms in Article 6 taking into consideration the French and the 
English versions.113  
The Court then went on to consider the context of Article 6(1). To determine the 
context, they resorted to the Preamble, which in line with the VCLT forms an integral part 
of the Context.114 The Preamble is also useful in order to determine ‘object and purpose’ of 
the Convention.115 In considering the preamble, the Court placed great emphasis on the 
reference to the rule of law in the Preamble and considered that in line with the principle of 
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good faith recognised in Article 22 of the VCLT, the principle of the rule of law referred to 
in the Preamble should be considered when interpreting Article 6(1) according to its context 
and in line with the object and purpose of the Convention.116 It concluded that ‘[I]n civil 
matters one can scarcely conceive of the rule of law without there being a possibility of 
access to courts’.117 The Court was therefore adopting a logical progression in taking into 
consideration the different elements in Article 31. 
Next, the Court considered Article 31(3) (c) which provides that together with the 
context, consideration can be taken of ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties’118 of which general principles of law recognized in 
civilised nations was a part.119 It was of the view that the principle that provides that a claim 
should be capable of being submitted to a judge ‘ranks as one of the “universally” recognised 
fundamental principles of law; the same is true of the principle of international law which 
forbids the denial of justice’.120 It took the position that Article 6(1) should be read in the 
light of these principles and came to the conclusion that when this was taken into account 
‘the fair, public and expeditious characteristics of judicial proceedings are of no value at all 
if there are no judicial proceedings’. The court finally concluded that: 
 
Taking all the preceding considerations together, it follows that the right of 
access constitutes an element, which is inherent in the right stated by Article 6 
Para. 1 (art.6-1). This is not an extensive interpretation forcing new obligations 
on the Contracting States: it is based on the very terms of the first sentence of 
Article 6 Para. 1 (art.6-1) read in its context and having regard to the object and 
purpose of the Convention, a law making treaty…and to general principles of 
law.121 
 
After considering the main principles of interpretation in Article 31 of the VCLT an 
applying them to the issue in Golder, the Court went on to recognise Article 32 VCLT of the 
Vienna Convention which provides for supplementary means of interpretation. The Court 
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recognised the travaux as being supplementary means of interpretation even though, in this 
particular instance, it did not see a need to resort to it.122 Following Golder, the ECtHR has 
applied this systematic approach in only a handful of cases.123 
Golder reveals that the ECtHR recognises the rules of interpretation in Articles 31-33 
VCLT as being applicable to the interpretation of the ECHR.124 It shows that the Court sees 
Article 31 VCLT as embodying the primary rule of interpretation with Article 32 only 
relevant as a supplementary means of interpretation when the meaning arrived at by applying 
Article 31 is ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result that is manifestly absurd.125 If the 
meaning arrived at after applying Article 31 is clear, the Court may not need to refer to the 
travaux even to confirm that meaning as envisaged under Article 32 VCLT. In Golder, the 
ECtHR was satisfied with the meaning arrived at using the general rule of interpretation and 
did not need to resort to the travaux. This reflects the subsidiary position of the ECtHR has 
given to the travaux, which has continued to be reflected in other cases. 
Whilst Golder is significant in setting out that Articles 31-33 VCLT are relevant to the 
interpretation of the ECHR, there are two key issues that Golder on its own does not provide 
answers for which are relevant for this thesis. The two pertinent questions are: 
 
 Is there any interaction between the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines to the textual, contextual or object and purpose schools of 
interpretation? 
 What interpretive schools/theories of interpretation should take precedence 
when the Court carries out its interpretive task? 
 
Providing answers to these questions will aid the completion of the second task of this 
chapter which is to examine the links between the margin of appreciation and living 
instrument doctrines with the theories of interpretation reflected in the international rules of 
treaty interpretation. This in turn contributes to answering RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical 
approaches).  
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3.5 Interaction between the Margin of Appreciation and Living Instrument Doctrines 
and the Rules of Interpretation in the VCLT 
The three elements: the text,126 the context127 and the object and purpose128 have been 
applied by the Court whilst interpreting the provisions of the Convention.129 The Court 
therefore adopts the overall approach from the VCLT that a treaty should be ‘interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose’.130 Letsas points out that beyond 
Golder, Articles 31-33 of the VCLT have only been referred to by the Court in very few 
cases and that the VCLT has therefore played a ‘minor role in the interpretation of the 
Convention.131 Whilst it is agreed that the Court has not expressly mentioned the VCLT in 
every case, it is argued here that it has actually had a more significant impact from the 
perspective that it has provided the foundational framework from which the Court has carried 
out its interpretive task. The Court has repeatedly reiterated that interpretation of the 
Convention must be based on the rules set out in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT.132 This 
confirms that even where it may not expressly refer to those rules, they underpin the 
interpretation of the Convention as a whole. 
In line with the understanding that Article 31 VCLT is not an exhaustive codification 
of the rules of interpretation of international treaties,133 the Court has gone beyond the 
provisions of Article 31 and created other rules of interpretation.134 Some of these tools 
created by the Court include: the living instrument doctrine,135 the principle of 
proportionality136, the fourth instance doctrine,137 the principle of effective interpretation138 
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the margin of appreciation doctrine,139 and the principle of autonomous concepts.140 The 
particular focus of this thesis is on the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines 
and the relevant question here is that, in the light of the understanding that the rules of 
interpretation in Article 31 of the VCLT are relevant to the interpretation of the ECHR as a 
whole, is there a link between them the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines and those rules of interpretation in Articles 31 and 32 (RQ 1 relationship; RQ 3 
interpretive and theoretical approaches)? In direct terms, how do the margin of appreciation 
and living instrument doctrines relate to the text, the context and the object and purpose?  
 
3.5.1 Interaction with The Textual School  
The textual school of interpretation requires that weight be given to the ordinary 
meaning of words. Its focus is on ascertaining the intention of the parties as revealed in the 
text of the treaty. As already seen in Golder, the ECtHR has endorsed the textual approach 
by identifying the ordinary meaning of the terms used in provisions of the ECHR.141 This 
same approach has been applied in other cases.142 In Johnston v Ireland,143 one of the 
questions at issue was whether a right to divorce could be derived from Article 12 which 
guarantees the right to marry. The Court referred to Article 31(1) of the VCLT and held that 
in order to determine this it will ‘seek to ascertain the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of this provision in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. It agreed 
with the Commission ‘that the ordinary meaning of the words “right to marry” is clear, in 
the sense that they cover the formation of marital relationships but not their dissolution’.144 
The Court went on to find that Article 12 was inapplicable in this particular case because it 
did not grant a right to divorce. 
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The ECtHR has not given primacy to the textual approach. It has rejected the 
approach that ‘legal interpretation is an inquiry into the linguistic meaning of words’.145 It 
has used the textual approach as a starting point for its reasoning rather than as a decisive 
point. The textuality argument is ‘either presented as decisive or secondary depending on 
whether it can be supported by other considerations based on the “spirit” of the Convention 
and not its “letter”’.146 The Court does not hesitate to jettison the textuality argument if it is 
contradicted by an overriding principle based on the general proposition that fundamental 
individual rights should be protected.147 The textual school is therefore made subject to the 
object and purpose school. This was clearly displayed in Golder where the Court resorted to 
an examination of the object and purpose of the Convention to come to decision that Article 
6 included the right of access to Court.148  
The Court’s rejection of the textual approach in which weight is given to the ordinary 
meaning of words is also seen in its use of autonomous concepts. This arises in instances 
where the Court has gone beyond the ordinary meaning of terms and given them a special 
meaning. The allocation of special meanings can be underpinned by reference to Article 
31(4) of the VCLT, which allows for parties to give special meaning to terms. These terms 
given special meanings by the Court are referred to as autonomous concepts and the process 
of giving special meanings to terms is referred to as autonomous interpretation.149 The Court 
set out its rationale for autonomous interpretation in Engel and others v The Netherlands in 
which it decided that the concept of criminal charge was autonomous.150 It is difficult to 
detach the meanings of terms completely from the national context. Indeed, national laws 
become a reference point for understanding what a concept means. Herein lies the potential 
for interaction with the margin of appreciation doctrine which gives room to national 
authorities to interpret and apply the provisions of the Convention. Where the Court allocates 
an autonomous meaning it takes away the allowance the national authorities have and places 
the responsibility on the Court. The limits of autonomous interpretation therefore remain an 
interesting issue to consider in ascertaining the scope of the margin of appreciation afforded 
to States. The exploration of the relationship between autonomous interpretation and the 
margin of appreciation doctrine is however is however outside of the scope of this thesis so 
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will not be considered further here since this research is focused on the interaction between 
the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrine. 
Autonomous interpretation also interacts with the living instrument doctrine. One of 
the criticisms against autonomous interpretation is that it ventures into legislation. This 
criticism is directed at the use of autonomous concepts to ‘widen’ the protection offered 
under the Convention. In his dissenting judgement in König v Germany, Judge Matscher 
disagreed with the Court’s wide autonomous interpretation of ‘civil rights and obligations’ 
he suggested that the Court’s wide interpretation of the phrase might be regarded as going 
beyond autonomous interpretation and ‘venturing into the field of legislative policy’151 
Merrills agrees that autonomous interpretation is a kind of judicial legislation and has gone 
further to call for a decision as to how far the Court will go.152 The ability of autonomous 
interpretation to ‘expand’ the Convention’s guarantees is very similar to the living 
instrument doctrine. The two doctrines have been criticised for offering increased protection 
of rights beyond what may have been expressly provided for in the Convention.153 It is also 
worth pointing out that, in some cases, relying on an autonomous interpretation can lead to 
a restriction of the protection afforded by the Convention.154 Further consideration of the 
interaction between autonomous interpretation and the living instrument doctrine will 
however not be explored further here since the focus of this thesis is on the interaction 
between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines. 
The Court’s approach to the use of the textual approach gives room for the living 
instrument doctrine as it is possible for the court to be persuaded by arguments that show an 
evolution in the understanding of a concept as a result of its desire to ensure the protection 
of human rights. The use of the living instrument doctrine by the Court usually involves a 
rejection of the textual approach which focuses on the ordinary meaning of the words used 
in the relevant treaty. The living instrument approach involves consideration of changes that 
may have occurred that may challenge the ordinary meaning in the text. The textual school 
is still relevant to the interpretation of the ECHR as a starting point for further analysis rather 
than as a determining factor.  
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3.5.2 Interaction with The Contextual/Intentionalist  
Article 31(1) of the VCLT requires that a provision be read in its context. The reading 
of a treaty in context reflects the intentionalist school which focuses on the intention of the 
parties as revealed from a variety of sources including the preparatory documents. This 
means a ‘systematic interpretation’ should be adopted in the interpretation of treaties.155 In 
interpreting the ECHR, the Court reads the text in context, with the understanding that the 
Convention should be read as a whole.156 The ECtHR uses the textual approach as a starting 
point for its reasoning.157 The context becomes a supporting or negating factor to the 
ordinary meaning of the term. The focus of the Court’s interpretation is on “spirit” of the 
Convention and not its “letter”’.158 The ‘spirit’ of the Convention may be found in 
understanding its context.  
The issue that arises is what determines the context? By virtue of Article 31(2) of the 
VCLT, the context of a treaty for the purpose of interpretation comprises the text including 
its Preamble and annexes, any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all 
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty159 and any instrument which was 
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by 
the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.160 The implication of this provision is 
that there are a wide range of documents that can be resorted to in order to understand the 
context and by implication the ‘spirit’ of a treaty. The unifying factor between the different 
items identified by the VCLT is that they all relate to the intention of the parties as they are 
agreements made in the past by the parties in relation to the treaties. The documents 
highlighted therefore reflect the intentionalist school which gives primacy to the intention of 
the parties as revealed in a variety of documents including preparatory works 
The ECtHR has also resorted to the Preamble of the ECHR in order to inform context, 
but it has done this in a way that favours a teleological rather than an intentionalist approach. 
The statement in the Preamble of the ECHR that the Convention is taking the ‘first steps’ in 
the bid to ensure the collective guarantee of certain rights guaranteed in the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights is relied upon by the Court in informing context. The question 
that arises in this regard is whether this expression in the Preamble of the Convention should 
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be given a restrictive interpretation on the basis that the treaty has been worded in that way 
because it reflects a ‘historical “maximum” beyond which any doubt should be interpreted 
in favour of States’.161 Or should it be seen as a first step, which will ultimately lead to other 
steps so the general rule in interpreting the Convention should be one, which gives full effect 
to the protection of rights? Support for the latter approach may be seen in the Preamble itself, 
which also refers to ‘development’ of human rights as well as their protection. Also, the 
Preamble of the Statute of the Council of Europe, the parent body for the Convention refers 
to the wish to establish progressively the ideal of freedom and the rule of law.162 Whilst 
Fitzmaurice favours the former approach of restrictive interpretation, the Court more 
frequently chooses the latter approach, which favours a more progressive interpretation of 
the Convention. The Court has therefore adopted an approach to viewing the Preamble that 
is also ties in with the idea of evolutive interpretation. 
The Court’s approach to what can be used to inform context is also wider that of the 
VCLT. The overarching view of the Court in relation to what informs context when 
interpreting the Convention may be summed up in its statement in Saadi v United Kingdom 
where it stated that:  
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Court is required to 
ascertain the ordinary meaning to be given to the words in their context and in 
the light of the object and purpose of the provision from which they are drawn… 
The Court must have regard to the fact that the context of the provision is a treaty 
for the effective protection of individual human rights and that the Convention 
must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal 
consistency and harmony between its various provisions…The Court must also 
take into account any relevant rules and principles of international law applicable 
in relations between the Contracting Parties… Recourse may also be had to 
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory works to the 
Convention, either to confirm a meaning determined in accordance with the 
above steps, or to establish the meaning where it would otherwise be ambiguous, 
obscure or manifestly absurd or unreasonable…163 
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The above statement clearly shows that in reading a provision in context, the Court does 
not give primacy to the intentionalist school as reflected in Article 31(2) VCLT. The Court 
rather gives primacy to the following as informing the context of the ECHR: 
 The nature of the ECHR as a treaty for the effective protection of individual human 
rights 
 The reading of the Convention as a whole in a way that promotes internal consistency 
and harmony between the various provisions of the Convention 
The ECtHR also takes into consideration relevant rules and principles of international 
law as provided under Article 31(3)(c) VCLT. It relegates preparatory works such as the 
travaux to supplementary rules to be used only in cases of a need to confirm meanings or 
where there is ambiguity or absurdity, rather than being used as documents to inform the 
context. They do not have a decisive role. The Court’s view of ‘context’ is therefore different 
to what intentionalists would consider as ‘context’ because the focus is not on the intention 
of the parties but rather on the nature of the treaty being interpreted.  
The special nature of the Convention as a treaty for the effective protection of human 
rights has been repeatedly referred to by the Court in determining the meaning of words 
when read in their context.164 This approach to context links in with the use of the living 
instrument doctrine as the Court refers back to effective protection of the rights contained in 
the Convention as a reason for adopting an evolutive interpretation.165 In Bayatyan v 
Armenia the Court stated: 
 
 The Court reiterates in this connection that the Convention is a living instrument 
which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions and of the ideas 
prevailing in democratic States today …Since it is first and foremost a system 
for the protection of human rights, the Court must have regard to the changing 
conditions in Contracting States and respond, for example, to any emerging 
consensus as to the standards to be achieved…166   
 
The reading of the Convention as a whole has also influenced the determination of 
the context for various cases. In Belgian Linguistic, the Court stated that ‘the provisions of 
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the Convention and its Protocols must be examined as a whole’.167 One way of doing this is 
that it interprets a provision by also reading and considering other provisions of the 
Convention and its Protocol.168 In other instances, the Court has determined the context of a 
particular provision by relying on a reading of the full provision of the article in question. 
This approach was adopted in Johnston where the Court found that a full reading of Article 
12 showed that the right to marry was subject to national laws.169 Reading the Convention 
as a whole in Johnston, led to a rejection of the argument for the application of the living 
instrument doctrine in determining the meaning of the provision of a right to marry. Where 
the provision itself has several paragraphs, the Court in some cases has examined the 
different paragraphs of the same article in order to determine the context of the provision.170  
Difficulty arises in the reading of the Convention ‘as a whole’ in cases where the 
Court takes into consideration the Protocols of the Convention that have not been ratified by 
the respondent State. In such a case whilst the applicant would be seeking to find an article 
within the Convention itself and argue that that article in conjunction with the Protocol 
covers the issue, the respondent on the other hand would be arguing that the matter is solely 
covered by the Protocol and they are therefore not bound by it. For example, in Guzzardi v 
Italy the question was the relationship between Article 5(1), which guarantees the right to 
liberty, and Article 2(1) of Protocol No 4 that guarantees freedom of movement. Italy, the 
respondent State, had not ratified Protocol No 4 the case therefore hinged on whether there 
had been a violation of Article 5(1).171 In that case, the Court came to the conclusion that 
although to constitute an infringement of Article 5(1) there must be something over and 
above a mere restriction on liberty of movement, in this particular case, taken cumulatively 
and in combination with the circumstances of the applicant’s confinement were indeed such 
as to deprive him of his right to liberty. The Court concluded that the deprivation of liberty 
could not be justified and was therefore a breach of Article 5(1). Sir Fitzmaurice disagreed 
with this position stating that: 
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If Article 5 (art. 5) of the Convention were to be interpreted so widely as to 
include instances of what was basically restriction on freedom of movement or 
choice of residence, then not only would Article 2 of the Protocol (P4-2) be 
rendered otiose, but an indirect means would be afforded of making 
Governments subject to the obligations of the latter, despite the fact that they had 
not ratified the Protocol. This could not have been intended, but it is a possibility 
that can only be avoided by a strict interpretation of Article 5 (art. 5) that confines 
it to its proper sphere.172 
 
Fitzmaurice’s dissent highlights the issue with considering Protocols of the 
Convention that have not been ratified by the State party since it is a fundamental principle 
of treaty law that a treaty only binds the parties to it and would only create obligations for 
third parties in specific situations.173 The Court however in Guzzardi restricted its decision 
to consideration of the State’s obligation under Article 5(1) rather than strictly under Article 
2(1) of Protocol No 4.   
In addition to the context, the Court has endorsed the reliance on relevant rules and 
principles of law.  To this end, the Court has referred to other international and regional 
human rights treaties and international law instruments.174 This is in line with Article 31(3) 
(c) VCLT which allows the courts to take into consideration ‘any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties’. From his analysis of the 
case law of the Court, Letsas argues that the Vienna Convention is mainly invoked by the 
Court when it takes into consideration other international treaties or general principles of 
international law.175  The idea is that the ECHR is only a part of international law therefore 
in interpreting it, consideration should be given to other parts of international law so that it 
is not interpreted in a vacuum. In Demir and Baykara v Turkey, the Court noted that:  
 
[I]n defining the meaning of terms and notions in the text of the Convention, it 
can and must take into account elements of international law other than the 
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Convention, the interpretation of such elements by competent organs, and the 
practice of European States reflecting their common values.176 
 
The living instrument and margin of appreciation doctrines interact with the issue of 
context where the Court refers to other international Conventions and instruments or general 
principles of law as evidence of subsequent agreement or practice.  The Court has referred 
to the Convention being a ‘living instrument’ in several cases where it has referred to other 
international treaties in order to give content to an ECHR right.177 This in turn has affected 
the margin of appreciation given to States in such cases as the Court has decided the cases 
taking into consideration developments in international law in order to determine the 
meaning of the right in question. Reliance on these rules of international law are, however, 
geared towards the overall purpose of the interpretation of the Convention in the context of 
it being a treaty for the protection of human rights. 
The nature of the Convention as a system to protect individual rights underpins the 
interaction between the issue of context and the use of the living instrument doctrine. Context 
for the Court is not an inquiry into the intention of the drafters at the time of the creation of 
the treaty in 1950, but rather an understanding of the nature of the Convention itself and the 
mechanism created for enforcing it. As Professor Soerensen, a previous President of the 
European Commission and then judge of the Court has stated,  
 
[I]he ‘original meaning of the terms as evidenced by the preparatory works and 
the circumstances of the conclusion of the Convention, according to the logic of 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, should not overrule the meaning which 
results years later from the change in mentalities and practices’.178 
 
 He was in essence endorsing a subjugation of the intentionalist argument to a 
different consideration such as the nature of the treaty in question. The living instrument 
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doctrine ‘flies in the face’ of the intentionalist school where the intention of the drafters at 
the time of drafting is given greater weight.   
In distinction to the use of textual interpretation alone, when the Court examines the 
text in its context – systematically, this is usually a decisive element. However, this is usually 
the case when this systematic interpretation is combined with a consideration of the object 
and purpose of the ECHR.179 The use of the object and purpose/teleological interpretation is 
therefore given a higher weight than a reliance on the intentions of the parties either as 
revealed by the text or by the context of the drafting. The next section discusses the object 
and purpose approach. 
 
3.5.3 Interaction with The Object and Purpose/Teleological School 
Interpreting the text of the Convention in context often goes in tandem with teleological 
interpretation, which seeks to promote the object and purpose of the Convention. The focus 
of teleological interpretation is on the aims that the treaty seeks to achieve rather than on the 
intention on the drafters of the treaty.180 The main object and purpose of the ECHR in the 
words of the Court is to be ‘an instrument for the protection of individual human beings.’181 
The Court sees itself as the mechanism to ensure the effective realisation of that goal. In 
Belgian Linguistic it stated that: 
 
 The Court considers that the general aim set for themselves by the Contracting 
Parties through the medium of the European Convention on Human Rights, was 
to provide effective protection of fundamental human rights, and this, without 
doubt not only because of the historical context in which the Convention was 
concluded, but also of the social and technical developments in our age which 
offer to States considerable possibilities for regulating the exercise of these 
rights. The Convention therefore implies a just balance between the protection 
of the general interest of the Community and the respect due to fundamental 
human rights while attaching particular importance to the latter. 182  
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The Court has favoured the teleological school more than the textual or intention of 
the parties’ school. The case law of the Court shows that it has relied on the object and 
purpose rule to either confirm the meaning already arrived at through a literal 
interpretation183 or in some cases it can override the literal interpretation and lead to another 
meaning.184 It has directly relied on the object and purpose of the Convention in order to 
give content to an ECHR right.185 In such cases this has usually led to an interpretation that 
expands the content of the rights, hence an ‘evolutive’ interpretation. The reliance on the 
object and purpose is therefore one area where the living instrument doctrine is upheld in the 
case law of the Court and where the margin of appreciation doctrine is curtailed.  
Whilst the overall object and purpose of the Convention is the protection of 
individual rights, in particular cases, how should this object and purpose be determined? 
Should it be the object and purpose of the particular article in question or the object and 
purpose of the entire Convention including its Preamble and Protocols? The VCLT does not 
make any express recommendations on this point. The case law of the ECtHR shows that 
the Court has adopted both approaches to ascertaining the object and purpose. In Golder, the 
Court referred to the object and purpose of the Convention as a whole as revealed in its 
Preamble when coming to the conclusion that in accordance with the rule of law and 
democracy, the right to fair trial in Article 6 included a right of access to Court.186 In 
Johnston, the Court adopted the second approach and focused on the object and purpose of 
Article 12 itself when it came to the conclusion that the right to divorce could not be derived 
from Article 12 which provides for the right to marry.187 In Johnston the Court referred to 
the travaux, which expressly stated that the contracting States did not intend to guarantee the 
right to dissolution of marriage within Article 12 but rather only a right to marry.188 The 
Court therefore adopts both the approach of considering the purpose of the Convention as a 
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whole and the more narrow purpose of a particular article of the Convention when applying 
the consideration of the object and purpose in a particular case.  
The object and purpose school interact with the interpretation of the Convention as a 
living instrument. The link exists in the debate on the issue of time. Is the object and purpose 
of the Convention rooted in the past and therefore static or are they abstract aims that could 
change and progress? In other words, should its aims be considered in the light of the past 
or the future? If it is considered in the light of the past, then the focus will be on the intention 
of the parties at the time the Convention was drafted which could be gleaned from materials 
such as the travaux. If it is considered in the light of the future, then the objective is being 
looked at as more of an abstract idea, which has been presented at the time of the drafting of 
the Convention, but one that is capable of changing in the future. The two views here can be 
distilled into historical and future. Once again, the VCLT does not expressly suggest any 
approach to be taken on this issue and both approaches could sit within the Vienna 
Convention framework. 
The ECtHR has adopted the future approach rather than the historical approach even in 
the midst of strong dissenting views by some of the judges. The dissenting view of Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice in Syndicat National De la Police Belge, reflects the historical approach. He 
stated in that case that: 
 
The objectives of a treaty do not exist in the abstract: they derive from the 
intention of the parties as expressed in the terms of the treaty or as evidenced by 
them and are closely related to them as they are their only source (…) They (the 
intentions of the parties) cannot be introduced afterwards in the guise of 
objectives which were not contemplated at the time.189  
 
The ECtHR did not adopt Fitzmaurice’s historical approach in this case and has 
continued to favour an evolutive interpretation which is in line with the futuristic approach. 
It sees the purpose and aims as objectives to be attained which means that they can be 
perfected and extended.190 The Court usually sees the terms of the treaty as the starting point 
rather than the final expression of the aims to be achieved by the Contracting States. The 
textual approach is therefore subjugated to the consideration of the object and purpose of the 
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treaty itself. This approach to the object and purpose aligns with the living instrument 
doctrine in which the Convention is interpreted in the light of present-day circumstances. In 
doing this, the Court takes into consideration the change in ideas within the democratic 
members of the Council of Europe.191 The Court does not however require explicit consensus 
in the member States before it adopts an evolutive interpretation.192 Letsas argues that the 
Court rather adopts a moral reading of the Convention by seeking to ascertain the moral 
value the particular ECHR right serves and the arguments that best support it rather than the 
arguments that are favoured by the majority.193 This lack of focus on explicit consensus has 
not been without criticism as critics see the Court as sometimes preceding the change of 
ideas within the democratic members of the Council of Europe.194 Whilst that may be 
debatable, the key issue is that the historic approach is not favoured by the Court, rather the 
object and purpose is relied upon to ensure an interpretation in line with present day 
circumstances, which reflects the living instrument doctrine.   
The result of the way in which the Court sees the aim and purpose of the Convention 
leads it to a wide interpretation of the rights that are to be protected or at least a rejection of 
a narrow construction of those rights.195 As a result of this wide interpretation of the rights, 
the Courts adopt a narrow interpretation of reservations made by States to provisions of the 
Convention. In Airey v Ireland, the Irish Government sought to justify its omission to provide 
free assistance of a lawyer in a civil proceeding for a petition for judicial separation on the 
grounds, a fortiori that it had made a reservation to Article 6(3), which provides for free 
assistance in criminal cases.196 The Court in that case gave a narrow interpretation to the 
reservation and held that a reservation to Article 6(3) did not have any influence on the 
interpretation of Article 6(1). It held that the applicant had been denied an effective right of 
access to the Court under Article 6(1). 
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A related implication of a wide interpretation of the rights protected is that the Court 
adopts a narrow interpretation of the limitations placed on the rights by contracting States.197 
This brings into view the margin of appreciation doctrine of the Court in which the Court 
affords room for manoeuvre to States before determining that a restriction on Convention 
rights breaches the obligation of the State. The margin of appreciation doctrine recognises 
that the rights in the Convention can be limited but the policing of the margin allowed to the 
State is affected by the wide interpretation of the rights. The use of the margin of appreciation 
is an expression of another object of the Convention, which is that it functions as a subsidiary 
system with the States having the primary role of interpreting and applying its provisions. 
The problem arises where there is a conflict of results that could be achieved if either of the 
objects and purposes were pursued. In other words, what would happen when the object and 
purpose of protecting individual rights which necessitates evolutive interpretation, would 
lead to a result that is at variance with the other purpose of the Convention, which is that it 
is a subsidiary system which should allow States the primary role of interpreting? There is 
still a gap in the analysis of the case law (RQ 2) of the Court on this point and this is the gap 
this thesis seeks to fill.   
 The teleological school is preferred by the Court and this is reflected in its case law. 
The Court would override a literal interpretation if it conflicts with an interpretation that is 
in line with the object and purpose of the Convention. The next section considers the place 
of supplementary rules of interpretation such as the travaux in the Court’s interpretive rules. 
 
3.5.4 Interaction with the Supplementary Means of Interpretation  
Article 32 of the VCLT makes provision for the use of supplementary means of 
interpretation. The recourse to preparatory documents is one of such means of interpretation. 
The use of supplementary means of interpretation is linked to the three theories of 
interpretation and is not a standalone rule of interpretation. It is linked to the textual, context 
and object and purpose schools as it may be used to confirm the meaning arrived at after 
according a provision its ordinary meaning and reading it in context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.198 The travaux could have a determinative effect where the result of 
interpretation arrived at after using the text, context, and object and purpose is manifestly 
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absurd or unreasonable.199 The overall approach of the Court is that preparatory documents 
play a very marginal role in the interpretation of the ECHR. The documents reveal the 
intention of the parties but as previously discussed, the Court does not favour the 
intentionalist school in most of its decisions but rather places emphasis on an interpretation 
that would promote the protection of individual rights. 
From its early case law in which it referred to the rules of interpretation in the VCLT, 
the Court showed its approach to the use of the travaux and their secondary place in the 
interpretation of the rights in the ECHR. In Golder it came to the conclusion that the meaning 
arrived at as a result of the application of Article 31 was clear and it therefore did not need 
to resort to the preparatory documents at all.200 It did not therefore seek to use the preparatory 
documents for their functions of either ‘confirmation’ or ‘determination’ as provided for in 
Article 32.201 This showed a clear statement of the path the Court was to adopt in relation to 
the travaux. The Court’s distinct approach to the travaux is also seen in cases where the 
meaning arrived at by the ECtHR after applying Article 31 is clear in the Court’s view but 
is contradicted by the preparatory documents. In such cases the Court has disregarded the 
preparatory documents even though they clearly indicate the intention of the Contracting 
States. 
 In Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom, the applicants were former employees 
of the British Railways Board ("British Rail"). In 1975, a "closed shop" agreement was 
concluded between British Rail and three trade unions, providing that thenceforth 
membership of one of those unions was a condition of employment. The applicants did not 
satisfy this condition and were dismissed in 1976. They alleged that the treatment to which 
they had been subjected gave rise to violations of their rights under the Convention. 202 In 
that case, the Court refused to rely on the travaux, which had indicated that the right not to 
be compelled to join a trade union had been excluded from the text of the Convention. The 
Court was of the view that the ordinary meaning of the right contained in Article 11 of 
freedom of join a trade union must necessarily include some freedom on how to exercise the 
right which would include a freedom not to join a trade union. Here the applicant had alleged 
that the closed shop legislation in the UK, which provided that only union labour could be 
employed violated their rights. The Court found that there had been a violation of their rights 
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under Article 11. This shows that the Court is not aligning itself with the intention of the 
parties’ school but rather seeks to ensure effective protection of the rights guaranteed within 
the Convention. It will therefore ignore the travaux if resorting to them would give a narrow 
interpretation to the right. 
Although the above analysis shows the Court using the travaux in ways not necessarily 
expressed in Article 32 VCLT, the Court has also in some cases used the travaux for its 
functions of ‘confirmation’ and ‘determination’. In Johnston, the Court referred to 
supplementary rules of interpretation to confirm the interpretation it had arrived at that the 
right to divorce could not be derived from Article 12 which provides for the right to marry.203 
Situations in which the travaux have been used in a decisive manner to determine the content 
of a provision because the meaning elucidated from the text is still controversial are 
extremely rare in the Court’s case law.204 In his comprehensive analysis of the case law of 
the Court, Ost found only one case that ‘resembled that hypothesis’.205  The travaux are 
therefore secondary in the Court’s methodology and this goes beyond what is expected in 
Article 32 of the VCLT.  
The supplementary role of the preparatory documents is aligned to the living instrument 
doctrine. This is because the living instrument doctrine, which involves evolutive 
interpretation, requires that the manifestations of the intention of the Contracting States at 
the time of drafting are not of decisive importance’206 Judge Kutscher in his analysis of the 
case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities came to the conclusion that: 
‘An interpretation based on the situation at the time of inception is totally ill-adapted to 
community law which looks to the future’.207 Decision-making that moves beyond the 
intention of the drafters would give room for interpretation that is not just aligned to changes 
in society but rather to giving full effect to the Convention’s rights. It can be seen that 
dissenting opinions in cases that have put forward more restrictive definitions often do so by 
recourse to the preparatory documents’.208  
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The Court’s approach to the use of preparatory documents is therefore aligned to the 
overarching purpose of the protection of individual human rights which requires an 
interpretation that gives effect to this principle. In doing so, the Court does not focus on the 
intention of the drafters but rather seeks to adopt an interpretation that will give full 
protection to the right. The use of supplementary means of interpretation is therefore 
subsidiary to the object and purpose principle as applied by the Court. As Professor Sorensen 
a Previous President and then judge of the Court put it: ‘original meaning of the terms as 
evidenced by the preparatory works and the circumstances of the conclusion of the 
Convention, according to the logic of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, should not 
overrule the meaning which results years later from the change in mentalities and 
practices’.209 The living instrument doctrine ‘flies in the face’ of the subjective approach to 
interpretation where the intention of the drafters is considered. It is therefore more aligned 
to the teleological school where the words are given their ordinary meaning in their context 
and the in the light of their object and purpose.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide some underpinning for the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines from the theories for interpretation of treaties 
to avoid them appearing as ‘giants on stilts’ within this thesis. To achieve this purpose 
involved two key tasks.  First, an examination of the legitimacy in international law of the 
creation of the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines as tools of 
interpretation by the Court.  Second, an examination of the links between the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines with the theories of interpretation reflected in 
the international rules on treaty interpretation. The results from the above tasks feed in 
directly to providing a structure to address RQ 2 (conflict) and RQ 3 (interpretive and 
theoretical approaches). 
The VCLT provides the framework in international law for underpinning the margin 
of appreciation and living instrument doctrines in the jurisprudence of the Court. Articles 
31-33 of the Vienna Convention provide for rules of interpretation of treaties. These rules 
reflect a two-stage process that involves, applying a general rule, and then applying a 
supplementary rule of interpretation in specific circumstances. The general rule of 
interpretation in Article 31 is that a treaty should be interpreted in good faith and the terms 
                                                 




of the treaty should be given their ordinary meaning in their context and in the light of their 
object and purpose. The preparatory documents are confined to a supplementary means of 
interpretation in Article 32 and are only useful to either confirm an interpretation arrived at 
using the general rule of interpretation or to determine a meaning in instances where applying 
the general rule would lead to a result that is absurd or manifestly unreasonable. The general 
rule in Article 31(1) reflects the three main schools of treaty interpretation: the textual, 
intention of parties and teleological school. The VCLT does not necessarily give weight to 
either of those schools although the practice of the ICJ shows a preference for the textual 
school.  
It is immediately apparent that there is no mention of either the margin of 
appreciation or the living instrument doctrines the VCLT, therefore, their validity as tools of 
interpretation of an international treaty could be debated. This chapter has, however, shown 
that although neither the margin of appreciation nor living instrument doctrines are expressly 
mentioned within Articles 31-33, an examination of the ILC’s commentary on the VCLT 
and existing literature show that Articles 31-33 are a selective rather than an exhaustive 
codification of the rules of interpretation. As a result, international Courts have the liberty 
to apply other principles of interpretation that are relevant to the interpretation of the 
particular treaty they deal with. The rules of interpretation in Articles 31-32 do not also 
follow any hierarchy and can be applied in any order. Another significant point is that 
Articles 31-32 are recognised as customary international law. This makes them relevant even 
to treaties that were created prior to the VCLT, such as the ECHR. A combination of the 
understanding that Articles 31-32 are a selective codification and that the rules reflected in 
those articles are part of customary international law provides the underpinning for the 
legitimacy of the ECtHR to create new rules of interpretation such as the living instrument 
and margin of appreciation doctrines which are not expressly mentioned in the VCLT.  
The ECtHR in Golder confirmed the status of Articles 31-33 of the VCLT as rules 
of customary international law, which are applicable to the interpretation of the ECHR.  In 
applying these rules, the Court has in some cases adopted a systematic process in which it 
begins with an identification of the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty and then 
proceeds to consider the context and then the object and purpose. In other cases, it has 
focused on the object and purpose without resorting to a literal definition of the particular 
terms. The Court has therefore adapted the application of the rules in the VCLT to suit the 
interpretation of the ECHR. What is more, the case law also shows that following Golder, 




however, clearly shows that the Court recognises the applicability of the VCT rules and as a 
result, the recognised schools of interpretation of treaties. Nonetheless, Golder does not 
explain if there is any relationship between the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines with the rules of interpretation already contained in the VCLT. It also does not 
provide a definitive answer on which school of interpretation is preferred in the case law of 
the Court. For this, there has been a need to examine further case law of the Court and 
existing literature. 
The overall approach of the Court reveals a preference for the teleological school of 
interpretation as the Court has given weight to interpretations that are in accord with the 
object and purpose of the Convention. The Court would rarely rely on the textual approach 
alone to decide a case. Rather, the decision arrived at through the textual approach will be 
either weak or strong depending on whether it is corroborated by other elements such as the 
context or the object and purpose. The Court’s approach to the elements that determine 
context is beyond those provided for within the VCLT. It interprets context as taking into 
consideration the special nature of the Convention as a treaty for the protection of the rights 
of individuals rather than a contractual treaty. This in turn has favoured teleological 
interpretation. 
The tools of interpretation of the Convention by the ECtHR goes beyond the VCLT 
with the creation of tools such as the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines. 
Links may be seen between these two doctrines and the textual, intention of the parties and 
the teleological interpretation. The main trend within the Court is a rejection of a textual or 
intentionalist interpretation based on the travaux or perceived intention of the drafters in 
1950 It has rather focused on the aim of the Convention to protect individual rights and this 
necessitates the interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument. Taking into 
consideration the special nature of the role the Court plays as a subsidiary system for this 
enforcement of standards there remains a need for the margin of appreciation doctrine to 
exist side by side with the interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument. The focus 
of the Court on the teleological school may suggest that, where there is a conflict between 
an interpretation that is evolutive and one that is more conservative and hinged on the margin 
of appreciation doctrine, the Court may be more inclined to follow the evolutive 
interpretation.  
 The understanding that the nature of the Convention drives the interpretive choices 
of the Court will be relevant to addressing RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches) as 




have to be measured against the overarching goal of the Convention to protect individual 
rights and at the same time remain a subsidiary system of enforcement. This chapter has 
therefore served as a launch pad for the consideration of the analysis of the case law (RQ 2) 
which will be done in chapter five. Prior to that analysis, chapter four adds a further layer to 
the legitimacy of the use of the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines 







The Margin of Appreciation and Living Instrument Doctrines 
Through the Lens of the Correlativity of Rights and Duties Theory 
 
4. Introduction 
Chapter three examined the underpinning for the use of the margin of appreciation and 
living instrument doctrines through the lens of the theories for interpretation of international 
treaties. It established that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, the 
Convention), being a treaty itself, is subject to the rules of interpretation contained within 
Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT, Vienna 
Convention). The customary international law status of Articles 31-33 of the VCLT makes 
them relevant to the interpretation of the ECHR. These rules of interpretation in the VCLT 
are not exclusive and there is room for international tribunals to create their own rules of 
interpretation to supplement the interpretation of the relevant treaty they are charged with 
interpreting. Chapter three has established that the margin of appreciation and living 
instrument doctrines are aligned with the three main interpretive schools which are reflected 
in Article 31 of the VCLT - the textual, context and object and purpose approach.  There is 
therefore legitimacy for the use of these doctrines as tools of interpretation of an international 
treaty. This gives a foundation for addressing RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches) 
which looks at the interpretive approach applied by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR, the Court) in dealing with cases where there is a margin of appreciation and living 
instrument argument. 
This chapter adds a further layer to this thesis by examining another theoretical question 
that may be directed at the use of the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines. 
It looks at the issue of whether these doctrines are relevant to interpretation of human rights 
treaties as opposed to a generic international law treaty. In other words, the purpose of this 
chapter is to examine whether there is justification for the use of the living instrument and 
margin of appreciation doctrines in dealing with cases where there is an allegation of the 
breach of human rights. Whilst the previous chapter has underpinned their use generically 
for international treaties, as the VCLT is relevant to all treaties, this chapter seeks to examine 
whether their use sits in with an understanding of what rights are and when it can be said 
that a right has been breached. This provides a further layer of analysis before delving into 




To deal with the issue, this chapter examines the basic issue of what a right is and the 
question of the correlativity of rights and duties. It begins with the Hohfeldian analysis of 
‘claim rights’ which shows that at the core of a right is the assigning of a duty. It then goes 
on to examine the arguments against the correlativity theory, in particular, the arguments 
that have been made by Joseph Raz in his somewhat ‘restricted correlativity’ theory which 
adds a further dimension to the argument on the relationship between rights and duties. The 
combination of the Hohfeldian analysis of the correlativity of rights and duties and Raz’s 
criticism forms the basis of what this researcher terms ‘dynamic restricted correlativity’. 
Through the lens of dynamic restricted correlativity, this chapter seeks to locate the position 
of the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines as tools for determining the 
existence of a right and the assigning of the corresponding duty.  It takes the position that, 
when we refer to the use of the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines by 
the Court, we are essentially referring to the determination of whether a right exists and if it 
does, whether there has been a breach of a duty in that instance. Viewed from the framework 
of rights and duties, the living instrument doctrine can be seen as a mechanism to attach 
more duties to States whilst the margin of appreciation could be considered as a tool to 
restrict the extent of the duties imposed on the State.1 The outworking of this position may 
not, however, be a simplistic one of clear divisions between rights and duties and the use of 
the doctrines. Further examination of the interactions will be conducted in the case law 
analysis in chapters five and six. 
 
4.1 The Nature of Rights: A Hohfeldian Perspective 
To examine a theoretical underpinning for the use of the margin of appreciation doctrine 
through the lens of a theory of rights, it is necessary to ‘peel back the layers’ and go to the 
core of the issue in relation to rights. This entails a brief overview of the nature of rights in 
general and human rights in particular. The most in-depth analysis of the conceptual nature 
of rights may be traced back to Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld.2  Indeed the Hohfeldian analysis 
is frequently referred to as a starting point for an analysis of rights.3 A similar path is adopted 
here, with a focus on the exposition of the correlativity of rights and duties as propounded 
by Hohfeld. 
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 Hohfeld provided a conceptual analysis of rights as a whole, not particularly human 
rights. He was concerned that the imprecise use of legal concepts makes it difficult to bring 
effective solutions to legal problems.4 Hohfeld was particularly concerned about the lack of 
precision in the use of the terms ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ in the process of legal analysis. He 
argued that: 
 
 [O]ne of the greatest hindrances to the clear understanding, the incisive 
statement, and the true solution of legal problems frequently arises from: the 
express or tacit assumption that all legal relations may be reduced to ‘rights’ and 
‘duties’, and that these latter categories are therefore adequate for the purpose of 
analysing even the most complex legal interests such as trusts, options, escrows, 
“future” interests, corporate interests, and others.5  
 
This lack of precision in the use of the terms described above led to a situation of lack 
of clarity, what he described as ‘chameleon-hued words’ which ultimately made it difficult 
to deal effectively with legal problems.6 For Hohfeld, this was not an acceptable situation as 
there was more to law than just rights and duties, and legal rules could only be understood 
accurately if we identify the most basic legal conceptions and the relations between them. 
Through the use of examples from the dictum of judges in case law, Hohfeld expounded 
how the word ‘right’ is used to also denote among other things, power, immunity, privilege. 
To further explain this point, he analysed eight jural relations: rights, privilege, power, 
immunity, no-rights, duty, disability and liability. 7 Flowing from this analysis, Hohfeld 
identified four different groups of rights: ‘claim right’, ‘power right’, ‘immunity right’ and 
‘privilege right’.8  He argued that it is only in one of those contexts that the word relates to 
a claim, and in a strict sense, a right.9 Identifying the context in which the word related to a 
right in the strict sense was important for clarifying the use of the term ‘right’. 
 Ratnapali, whilst discussing Hohfeld’s analysis used five practical examples of 
statements which exemplify the different ways in which Hohfeld identified the word ‘right’ 
was used.  
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 I have a right to be paid my wages under the contract of service. 
 I have the right to walk in my yard. 
 I have a right to leave my property to another by will. 
 I have a right not to be arrested without a warrant. 
 I have a right to be respected by my colleagues.10 
 
Although the word ‘right’ is used in each of these sentences, the word has a different 
meaning in each sentence. The first sentence which involves a ‘right’ to be paid wages in 
accordance with a contract is an example of what Hohfeld describes as a claim, a right in the 
strict sense of the word. The second sentence which refers to a right to walk in a person’s 
yard is a privilege or liberty associated with owning or renting a property. The third reference 
to a right to leave property to a beneficiary by will is a power to bestow rights on others. The 
right not to be arrested without a warrant is an immunity, whilst the right to respected by 
one’s colleagues amounts to a moral claim, not a legal claim or right.  
Hohfeld acknowledged that these distinctions have been present in the law but that 
they are neglected in some instances by judges and commentators with the result that there 
is error and confusion of the law. His task was therefore to make the distinction between 
these different uses of the term ‘right’ in order to remove the confusion and ensure that only 
what is actually a right, is treated in that way.  Whilst Hohfeld was not the first to realise that 
these distinctions exist, his analysis has been described by Ratnapali as ‘the most accurate 
and compelling analysis of the fundamental legal conceptions that most clearly expose 
juristic errors.’11 Finnis however points out that whilst Hohfeld’s analysis covers a wide 
range of the use of the term ‘right’ by lawyers, it does not cover all of the uses of the term.12 
This criticism by Finnis notwithstanding, the Hohfeldian analysis provides a good starting 
point in identifying what may be referred to as rights in the strict sense. What Hohfeld’s 
analysis establishes, is that fundamentally, rights are claims. The difference between ‘claim 
rights’ and all other forms of the use of the term rights is that they entail a duty on another. 
This relationship between claim rights and duties is expressed in the principle of correlativity 
of rights and duties which will be explored further in the next section. 
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4.1.2 The Correlativity of Rights and Duties  
From the initial analysis of what rights in the ‘strict sense’ of the word means as 
propounded by Hohfeld, the relevant right in this thesis are the claim rights. The obvious 
question that arises is: what exactly are claim rights? In answer to this question, rather than 
adopting a formal definition of rights, Hohfeld presented a scheme of opposites and 
correlatives. 13 A tabular representation of his analysis is presented below14: 
 
Jural Relation Jural Correlative   Jural Opposite 
Right Duty No-right 
Privilege (Liberty) No-right Duty 
Power Liability Disability 
Immunity Disability Liability 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the jural correlatives are important. In particular since 
this thesis is focused on rights, this section focuses on right and its correlative which is duty. 
The other jural relations in the table above are disregarded for the purposes of this thesis. A 
duty may be described as an obligation to act in a certain way; it is ‘that which one ought or 
ought not to do’.15 A right is a claim which necessitates a duty. Therefore, when one speaks 
of a right being invaded, a duty has been violated.16 In effect, the correlativity of rights and 
duties means that if A has a right, someone else has a duty to allow A to enjoy that right. 
From Hohfeld’s analysis, duty is the correlative of a right which means that when a right is 
invaded, a duty is violated.17 For example, based on the correlativity thesis, ‘If X has a right 
against Y that he shall stay off the former’s land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is 
under a duty toward X to stay off the place.18 Hohfeld was of the view that the word ‘claim’ 
was a synonym for the term ‘right’ in this limited and proper meaning of what a right is.19 
These have become known as ‘claim rights’. As Allan points out, ‘claim-rights are defined 
by reference to their correlative duty on the part of another, rather than the actions of the 
right-holder’.20 The correlativity of rights and duties in this sense means that a right cannot 
exist without identification of the specific duty attached to it.   
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A right in its true sense then, is normative in the sense that someone else has a duty 
to allow me to enjoy the right to which I have a claim. Allan emphasises the normative nature 
of a right by describing it as an ‘others must’ claim.21 If I have a right to freedom of religion, 
then others should allow me to practice my religion. If I have a right to freedom of speech, 
then others should allow me to speak freely. Essentially, a right is linked to a duty. There is 
a correlation between rights and duties.  As Fellemeth put it, ‘Rights always implicate duties, 
because rights justify claims by the right holder to a correlative duty’.22 A duty is described 
as an ‘I must’ claim.23 A right which creates an ‘others must’ claim, has an ‘I must’ correlated 
duty.24 The implication of this definition of a claim right as one to which a duty attaches is 
that it determines when a right exists, thereby making it definitional rather than 
justificatory.25  In the context of duties, the duty that arises from the existence of a right 
could be based on the interest in the right holder or the will of the right holder. The focus 
within this chapter is on the use of the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines 
as tools to determine the existence of rights and duties rather than justification for whether 
rights should exist in the abstract sense, hence the discussion here is restricted to the analysis 
of the correlativity of rights and duties rather than justification for the existence of rights.  
Hohfeld’s proposition of the correlativity of rights and duties has been welcomed by 
many and has formed the basis of the understanding of rights. As expressed by Salmond, 
‘there can be no right without a corresponding duty, or duty without a corresponding right, 
any more than there can be a husband without a wife, or a father without a child.’26 Viewed 
from the perspective of obligations, ‘There can therefore be no duty unless there is someone 
to whom it is due; there can be no right unless there is someone from whom it is claimed’.27 
Allan’s support of the correlativity of rights and duties is seen when he states that ‘Wherever 
there are rights there are correlated duties. You cannot have rights without duties’.28 
Although Allan acknowledges that there might be limited instances where there may be a 
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duty without a right, such as when one considers a duty not to cut down a 2,000-year-old 
tree. Although one could claim that they had a duty not to cut down the tree, there could be 
no corresponding claim from the tree that it had a right not to be cut down.29   
The essential claim of the correlativity thesis is that where a right exists, there is a 
duty that necessarily follows the existence of that right. To say that A has a right to X is the 
same as saying that someone has a duty to secure A in X. This idea of a connection between 
rights and duties has however not been without criticisms. In the following section some of 
the criticisms of the correlativity theory are highlighted.  
 
4.1.3 Criticism of the Correlativity of Rights and Duties Thesis 
Whilst one view is that rights and duties are correlative, the other view is that rights 
and duties are not necessarily correlative. Under this school of thought, duties are divided 
into absolute and relative duties. Relative duties have corresponding rights whilst absolute 
duties have no rights that correspond to them. 30 For this school of thought, it is important 
that a right is vested in a determinate person and that it is enforceable by some form of legal 
process instituted by him. According to this view, duties that are owed towards the public at 
large or to indeterminate parts of the public do not have any correlative rights. An example 
would be the duty to refrain from committing a public nuisance as this is not owed to any 
particular person.31 When one considers the two schools of thought, it would appear the 
connecting point is still that there is agreement that in some cases, rights and duties are 
correlative. 
The position that rights and duties are two sides of the same coin, that one could not 
talk of rights without specifying the duties that they entail, has however been challenged. 
Whilst conceding that there is a context in which rights may be deemed as correlative to 
duties, Lyons has argued that ‘it is at best misleading to say that all rights “correlate” with 
duties.32  Not all rights and duties are correlative as rights relate to obligations in several 
ways.33 Saul highlights three key theoretical challenges to the correlativity doctrine.34 First, 
that there are duties that may not be owed to any particular claimant.35 This criticism may 
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be seen in Hart’s assertion that ‘the duties imposed by the criminal law are not relative duties, 
not duties to any determinate second party’.36 A similar position is taken by Feinberg when 
he points out that ‘duties of status, duties of obedience, and duties of compelling 
appropriateness are not necessarily correlated with other people’s rights’.37 For example, 
duties of charity are not owed to any particular object. In this situation, there are duties 
without any corresponding rights. Second that the duty bearer may not be specified. ‘Not all 
rights are claims against some duty-bearer’.38 If there is no identifiable duty bearer, then this 
makes correlativity incomplete.39 The situation may be that there are multiple duty-bearers 
or that there are different degrees of responsibility or conditions that need to be satisfied 
before the obligation can be discharged. Duties may also be owed in general and would 
therefore not be specifically enforceable.40 Third, that the ‘burden of a particular obligation 
may be unclear’.41 This means that it may not be clear what scope of obligations are required. 
In respect of human rights, is it a negative duty to refrain from interfering with a right or 
does it entail a positive duty to actively ensure and facilitate the fulfilment of that right? 
Correlativity therefore requires ‘specificity and determinacy’.42 A further issue with the 
correlativity thesis which is that there is a great deal of ambiguity that surrounds the 
implication of specific duties from specified rights. This can be seen in international human 
rights treaties where duties are usually not expressly stated. In such instances ‘implying the 
content of duties from express rights is subject to arbitrariness of interpretation according to 
a variety of contextual variables, including culture, social structure, local law and so on’.43 
Saul argues that this is a better state of affairs because ‘While there may be uncertainty 
attached to ‘dynamism’, it is arguably superior to codification of correlative duties, which 
may in-flexibly and a-contextually mummify duties’.44 
Although the correlativity thesis is not without some criticism, there is an agreement that 
rights entail duties even if there is disagreement on the nature of those duties and the extent 
to which a duty may exist. There are however questions that are raised by the correlativity 
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thesis which have not been answered through the examination of the criticisms above. From 
a Hohfeldian perspective, a right would only exist when there is a duty that attaches to it. 
Several questions arise from this position. Is there always a correlative duty to every right? 
Is there always a corresponding right to every duty?  Is there only one duty that attaches to 
a right or could there be multiple duties? Could the duties that attach to a right evolve over 
time? Does the right exist first before the duty or should the duty be articulated in order for 
the right to exist? Whilst it is tempting to critic Hohfeld as formulating a general statement 
on rights, it is worth noting that he considers that ‘[I]n its narrowest sense the word right is 
used as the correlative of duty’.45 Hohfeld therefore acknowledges that this is a limited sense 
of the use of the word ‘right’. The questions highlighted above are, however, pertinent and 
need further examination. A relevant theory that builds on Hohfeld’s formulation and 
provides an alternative conception of the relationship between rights and duties, is the 
somewhat ‘restricted’ correlativity theory of Joseph Raz. This will be examined in the next 
section.   
 
4.2 Rights as Grounds of Duty  
Joseph Raz has formulated one of the most insightful alternatives to the correlativity 
thesis. In his exposition on the nature of rights, Raz states that 'X has a right' if and only if 
X can have rights, and, other things being equal, an aspect of X's well-being (his interest) is 
a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty'.46 Within this 
definition of rights there is emphasis on the interest of the right holder, placing his definition 
within the well-known ‘interest theory’ of human rights.47 From Raz’s explanation of the 
nature of rights, it can be seen that in a similar vein to Hohfeld, Raz does not provide a formal 
definition of what a right is but rather espouses the circumstances in which a right can be 
said to exist in relation to a particular person. His definition is, however, more 
comprehensive as it covers issues of capacity to have rights, the interest to be protected and 
the basis for the duty. This approach is therefore normative rather than conceptual. For the 
purposes of this thesis this normative aspect of the definition of rights is relevant as the thesis 
explores the use of the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines in determining 
the outcomes of cases in which the applicant claims that they have a right that has been 
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violated by the respondent State (RQ 1 relationship; RQ 2 conflict; RQ 3 interpretive and 
theoretical approaches). 
On the issue of correlativity of rights and duties, Raz distinguishes between two types 
of correlativity thesis:  
 ‘that to every duty there is a corresponding right’ and  
 ‘that to every right there is a correlative duty’.48  
 
In relation to the former, Raz argues that there is no conceptual basis for upholding 
the view that ‘to every duty there is a corresponding right’.49 He acknowledges that some 
moral theories may lead to such a correlativity theory based on their moral principles, but he 
rejects such a position.50  In relation to the latter form of the correlativity thesis that to every 
right there is a correlative duty, Raz acknowledges merit in this type of correlativity thesis 
but argues that there have been deficiencies in the way the theory of the correlativity of rights 
and duties has been formulated.51  Raz begins his criticism of the formulation of the 
correlativity thesis using Brandt’s definition as an example: 'X has an absolute right to enjoy, 
have or be secured in Y means the same as 'It is someone's objective overall obligation to 
secure X in, or in the possession of, or in the enjoyment of Y, if X wishes it'.52 Raz sees this 
formulation of correlativity of rights and duties as misleading on three main grounds.  
First, Raz challenges the idea that to every right there corresponds one duty, which 
is to secure the object of the right to the right holder, subject to the right-holder’s desire for 
this.53  Raz argues that this position which places emphasis on the choice of the right holder 
is a mistaken one as there are rights that exist even where an individual has not chosen to 
have that right. He gives an example of the right to education, stating that the right to 
education is a ground to provide educational opportunities to individuals whether they wish 
for that to happen or not.54 His argument is that in such a situation, the choice of the right-
holder is not engaged as the State still has to fulfil its duty even where the right holder has 
not expressed any desire for this to happen. He also argues that there are rights which ground 
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duties that fall short of securing their object and that a right may ground many duties not 
one.55 To support this position, Raz provides the following example: 
 
A right to personal security does not require others to protect a person from all 
accident or injury. The right is, however, the foundation of several duties, such 
as the duty not to assault, rape or imprison the right-holder.56 
 
This position of Raz that there are some rights that are not dependent on the choice of the 
right holder has been the subject of criticism. Allam criticizes Raz on this point stating that 
Raz is confusing rights with goals, thereby greatly expanding the concept of what a right 
is.57 This researcher is however aligned to Raz’s position that a right’s existence should not 
be dependent on the choice of the right holder.  
Second, Raz argues that the right is the ground of the duty. He proffers a somewhat 
restricted correlativity thesis by stating that:  
 
It is wrong to translate statements of rights into statements of ‘corresponding’ 
duties. A right of one person is not a duty on another. It is the ground of a duty, 
which if not counteracted by conflicting considerations, justifies holding the 
other person to have the duty.58 
 
In a more recent article, whilst discussing the truism that the right of one person limits 
the freedom of another, Raz elaborated on his view of rights as a ground of duty as a 
qualification for that truism in this way:  
[R]ights are grounds of duties on others. The bare fact that something is of value 
to me does not endow me with a right to it, because it does not in itself establish 
that other people have a duty to secure me with, or not to interfere with my, 
possession of it. It would appear that we have a right only if the right entails that 
the value of having it, or our need for it, is of a kind sufficient to impose duties 
on some others-more precisely, on at least one other. The value of the right to its 
possessor is its ground. It is that value which justifies holding others to be duty-
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bound to secure or at least not to interfere with the right- holder's enjoyment of 
the right, and it is only when such duties exist that the right exists. It exists 
because it gives rise to such duties.59 
From the above formulations, it can be argued that Raz agrees with the view that there 
is an interaction between rights and duties. He however offers a different view of that 
interaction, by seeing rights as grounds of duties rather than as correlative of duties. The 
imposition of the duty would have to be justified, taking any conflicting considerations into 
account. A statement that A has a right to X is not equivalent to the statement that B has a 
duty to secure A in X. It is rather a ground of a duty on B to secure A in X if there are no 
other contradictory reasons against this. This is in distinction to the Hohfeldian position 
which would be that if A has a right against B to X, then B has a duty to secure A in X. Raz’s 
correlativity is therefore ‘restricted’ or ‘limited’ by the possibility of counteracting factors 
that could limit the imposition of the duty. Raz does not, however, specify what these 
contradictory reasons might be. He however gives an indication of what may influence these 
contradictory reasons: ‘The existence of a right often leads to holding another person to have 
a duty because of the existence of certain facts peculiar to the parties or general to the society 
in which they live.’60 
  Perry has criticised Raz’s formulation of rights as grounds of duties. He argues that 
by conceiving of rights as grounds of duties, Raz fails to draw a distinction between two 
types of rights: rights-claims that are mainly a way of talking about discretionary choices 
and those that are primarily a way of talking about obligations.61  Perry agrees to a certain 
extent with Raz when he argues that ‘Those rights-claims that are primarily a way of talking 
about discretionary choices are a ground of duty in the sense that B ought not to interfere 
with A's choice of X because A's choice of X is discretionary. In that sense, the rights in 
question are prior to the duties they ground’.62 On the other hand when it comes to those 
rights-claims that are primarily a way of talking about obligations (from the view point of 
the beneficiary), Perry adopts a different position from Raz. He argues that those are not a 
ground of duty. ‘If we may interpret Raz as arguing, at least in part, that those rights-claims 
that are primarily a way of talking about obligations are a ground of duty, then we must 
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conclude that Raz is wrong.’63 Furthermore, ‘It would be circular to attempt to justify the 
claim that A ought not to choose X on the basis of B's right that A not choose X, if B's right 
is itself explained in terms of A's duty not to choose X.64 Perry rather agrees with Brandt that 
in such a situation, ‘If one person’s having a right logically entails some other person’s(s’) 
having an obligation, then it is just confusion to cite the right as a reason for the obligation; 
the fact of the right just is, or includes, the fact of the obligation’.65 Perry therefore aligns 
himself with Brandt’s position of the correlativity of rights and duties. Even taking Perry’s 
point into account, he does not altogether jettison Raz’s argument on rights as grounds of 
duties but rather seeks to delimit the situation in which rights may be seen as grounds of 
duties as opposed to situations where he considers there is an obligation and therefore rights 
are not grounds of duties in such duties but necessary entail duties. Perry does not however 
provide any concrete examples to illustrate this position being made.  
In the view of this researcher, Raz’s formulation of rights as grounds as duties does not 
exclude the possibility of the correlativity of rights and duties in certain situations. It 
provides an alternative formulation of the correlativity theory proposed by Hohfeld as it still 
recognises that a duty ensues from a right although it conceives of situations where a duty 
may not necessarily be imposed. To this extent, it can be seen as a ‘restricted correlativity 
theory’. It brings into the picture a possibility of a balancing of conflicting claims to the 
existence of a correlative duty. It gives room for interpretation in order to determine whether 
a duty exists in the particular case after taking into consideration possible conflicting factors. 
The relationship between rights and duties in this sense is therefore not automatic or 
correlative but rather a form of restricted correlativity. 
Third, Raz argues that rights are dynamic as there is no closed list of duties that 
correspond to a right.66 In this area, Raz expands the correlativity theory by asserting that 
more than one duty may attach to a right and that this list is not exhaustive. He asserts that: 
The existence of a right often leads to holding another person to have a duty 
because of the existence of certain facts peculiar to the parties or general to the 
society in which they live. A change of circumstances may lead to the creation 
of new duties based on the old right. The right to political participation is not 
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new, but only in modern states with their enormously complex bureaucracies 
does this right justify, as I think it does, a duty on the government to make public 
its plans and proposals before a decision on them is reached, as well as a duty to 
publish its reasons for a decision once reached (except in special categories of 
cases such as those involving defence secrets). This dynamic aspect of rights, 
their ability to create new duties, is fundamental to any understanding of their 
nature and function in practical thought. Unfortunately, most, if not all 
formulations of the correlativity thesis disregard the dynamic aspect of rights. 
They all assume that a right can be exhaustively stated by stating those duties 
which it has already established This objection to the reduction of rights to duties 
does not rule out the possibility that 'A has a right to X' is reducible to 'There is 
a duty to secure A in X' But since this duty can be based on grounds other than 
A's interest, the two statements are not equivalent.67 
 
Raz is essentially emphasising the dynamic nature of rights, showing that the 
determination of what rights exist is very dependent on the society/context in which the right 
is being interpreted.  The duties that go with a right are therefore not fixed but may change 
as time goes on. Fellmeth suggests that the reverse may also be the case where he states that 
‘Not only can a right correlate to multiple duties: a duty can also correlate to multiple rights. 
This is the normal case of IHRL, where a State owes the same duty to all persons under its 
jurisdiction.’68  
Waldron shares a similar view to Raz on the dynamic nature of rights and that the view 
that a right can ground more than one duty. According to Waldron a right can generate 
‘waves of duties’:  
 
We talk about rights when we think that some interest of an individual has 
sufficient moral importance to justify holding others to be under a duty to serve 
it. But if a given interest has that degree of importance, it is unlikely that it will 
justify the imposition of just one duty. Interests are complicated things. There 
are many ways in which a given interest can be served or disserved, and we 
should not expect to find that only one of those ways is singled out and made the 
subject matter of a duty…Even a particular duty, thought of as associated with a 
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right, itself generates waves of duties that back it up and root it firmly in the 
complex, messy reality of political life.69 
 
Waldron used the example of the right not to be tortured which generates a duty not to 
torture. He however highlights that that duty can be backed by other duties such as ‘a duty 
to instruct people about the wrongfulness of torture; a duty to ameliorate situations in which 
torture might be likely to occur and so on’.70 These are duties that arise in order to prevent 
torture from happening. In situations where torture has taken place, this should generate 
remedial duties like ‘the duty to rescue people from torture, the duty on government officials 
to find out who is doing and authorising the torture, remove them from office and bring them 
to justice, the duty to set up safeguards to prevent reoccurrence of the abuse and so on’.71 A 
further set of duties arise if these remedial duties are not carried out. In such a case, the right 
would generate duties of enforcement and enquiry.72 As to the weight to be given to these 
waves of duty that may arise from one right, Waldron adopts the view that each set of duties 
is equally important, ‘each stage presents itself as a categorical duty that makes immediate 
demands on the relevant actor…’73 Waldron’s example sheds more light on how rights can 
become the ground of more than one set of duties in a human rights context.  
Raz further elucidates on the dynamic nature of rights by stating that ‘A change of 
circumstances may lead to the creation of new duties based on the old right’.74 In an earlier 
article, Raz defined legal rights as legally-protected interests, which are documented and 
binding.75 This may be distinguished from moral rights which may not be protected in a 
document and do not carry binding force. A consequence of legal rights is that they justify 
the existence of other rights and duties and can be legal reasons for legal change.76 They are 
grounds for developing the law in certain directions. He argues that because of this dynamic 
nature of legal rights they cannot be restricted, as some would suggest, to the legal duties 
which they currently justify. To do so would be to overlook the role of legal rights in 
changing and developing the law.77 Raz does not, however, explain why the dynamic aspect 
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of rights is fundamental to any understanding of their nature and function in practical 
thought. 
Raz takes this idea of new duties further, whilst discussing the dynamic nature of 
legal rights, stating that the dynamic nature of rights means that there is an existing duty on 
the Court to impose ‘certain new duties on other people in certain circumstances’.78 
Fellemeth however does not see this flexibility identified by Raz as an advantage in 
international law. He argues that ‘Raz’s interpretive dynamism does not apply in an 
international legal context…The state is understood to be the only first-order duty holder by 
all relevant actors in almost all cases, and the duty cannot easily be shifted elsewhere for 
convenience.’79 This is still an area that is open for examination to see whether there is room 
for allocation of duties to other duty holders apart from the State in international law. 
Although Raz does not include an explanation of why rights should be dynamic, he proffers 
some reasons that could form grounds for the Court’s decision such as general welfare, 
public safety or public order or the rights of the individual in question. He recognises that a 
part of this assessment would be the weight the Court is allowed to attribute to the reason 
for its decision when it conflicts with others.80  
However, Raz introduces a caveat to the idea of dynamic rights by stating that rights 
justify the view that people have duties where there are no conflicting considerations of 
greater weight. He explains that ‘Within certain institutional settings there are weighty 
reasons not so much against allowing rights to generate new duties as against allowing 
official action on the basis of new duties unless they are recognized by the appropriate 
institutions’.81 This could therefore be interpreted as meaning that it is possible to recognise 
that a duty has a potential to arise but either ignore it or delay recognition of that duty until 
there is some validation for going ahead with it, received from other quarters.  
From the criticisms levelled by Raz on the correlativity thesis, three key points stand 
out: (a) A right is a ground of a duty in others, and that duty is only imposed if there are no 
counteracting factors; (b) A right may be the ground of more than one duty; (c) The list of 
duties that may arise from a right are not fixed and could change based on time and 
circumstances. Raz, just like Hohfeld, concedes that his definition of rights does not 
encompass all aspects of the use of the term, but that ‘it aims to encapsulate the common 
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core of all rights, and thus to help to explain their special role in practical thought.82 By 
seeing rights as grounds of duties, Allam asserts that Raz is presenting a justificatory 
definition rather than merely a conceptual definition. This would be putting his definition in 
a different light to that of Hohfeld, which was mainly to define rather than justify. 83 The 
similarity between Raz’s rights as grounds of duties and Hohfeld’s rights as correlative of 
duties, is the retention of a relationship between rights and duties even though the extent to 
which that relationship exists is somewhat different. Rights as grounds of duties includes 
does not exclude a situation of correlativity between rights and duties but also conceives of 
a situation where no duty may be imposed due to counteracting factors. The next section 
provides a thesis that is based on a synthesis of both Hohfeld and Raz’s formulation. 
 
4.3 Dynamic Restricted Correlativity  
From the examination of the interaction between rights and duties displayed in 
Hohfeld’s correlativity thesis and the Raz’s formulation of rights being a ground of a duty, 
the researcher is of the view that several elements can be merged in order to form a theory 
about the relationship between rights and duties. A common factor in both formulations is 
that where rights are involved there are duties to be found. Where they differ is in relation 
to the flexibility of the duty. The combination of elements from Hohfeld’s correlativity thesis 
and Raz’s formulation of a right being a ground of more than one duty, is what this researcher 
refers to as Dynamic Restricted Correlativity (DRC). This encapsulates two key principles. 
First, that a right is a ground of duties which would only be imposed if there are no substantial 
competing arguments which prevent the imposition of the duty. Second, that duties imposed 
by a right are not fixed and can change over the course of a period of time or as a result of 
change of circumstances. DRC will be used as a basis for examining the interaction between 
the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines as tools for determination of 
human rights and human rights obligations on States. 
 
4.3.1 Interaction between the Margin of Appreciation and Living Instrument 
Doctrines and Dynamic Restricted Correlativity  
Whilst Hohfeld and Raz’s formulations on the nature of rights and duties are directed 
at rights in general, inferences can be drawn from them when dealing with human rights and 
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in particular when dealing with the adjudication of cases by the ECtHR. There is agreement 
that there is interaction between rights and duties although the nature of the interaction is 
proposed in different forms.  In adjudicating claims under the ECHR, the ECtHR is 
effectively determining when rights exist and the existence of a duty to fulfil those rights. 
Some of the key questions that could be asked then would be who is the right holder and 
who is the duty bearer? International human rights law is structured with the individuals as 
the rights holders and the States as the duty bearers. Whilst there are some arguments for 
duties to be imposed on a wider range of actors, the general position in international law is 
that States are the duty bearers when it comes to the enforcement of human rights 
obligations.84 
Gleaning from the definition of ‘claim rights’, in the strict sense, rights are linked to 
duties. When the Court adjudicates and finds that a State has interfered with the rights of an 
individual under the Convention, the correlativity thesis espoused by Hohfeld, suggests that 
the Court has also effectively made a finding that the State had a duty to protect that right 
and it has breached its duty and therefore violated the provisions of the Convention. That 
finding in tandem means that the individual had a right that should have been protected. 
However, in practice, when dealing with the qualified rights under Articles 8-11, the finding 
that a State has interfered with a right does not automatically mean that the State has violated 
the Convention. This suggests that there are some issues with the application of the 
correlativity thesis. 
The relevant question here is: in what way does the above analysis of the correlativity 
of rights and duties relate to the doctrines of the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
which are being considered in this thesis (RQ 3 interpretive and theoretical approaches)? 
The margin of appreciation doctrine provides room for manoeuvre to States in their 
application of the ECHR guarantees. The margin of appreciation may be used in a 
substantive way to determine whether an interference by the State is justified or it may be 
used in a structural way as a tool for deference by the Court.85 Essentially, the substantive 
use of the margin of appreciation it determines at what point States will be seen to have 
breached their duties under the Convention in relation to those articles of the ECHR for 
which the margin of appreciation can be invoked. The rights are conferred on individuals 
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whilst the duties are put on the State to give effect to the rights provided for within the 
ECHR. Dynamic Restricted Correlativity draws inspiration from the criticisms of the 
correlativity thesis fielded by Raz, provides a framework for linking the margin of 
appreciation doctrine to the living instrument doctrine.  
The first point from DRC principle which is based on Raz’s objection to the 
correlativity thesis is that rights are grounds of duties, rather than stating that for every right 
there is a corresponding duty. The core of his argument here is hinged on the issue that a 
duty may not always arise. A right is a ground of duties which would only be imposed if 
there are no substantial competing arguments which prevent the imposition of the duty. The 
imposition of a duty therefore becomes contingent on other factors, rather than automatically 
flowing from the assertion of a right.  The imposition of the duty has to be justified. This sits 
very well with the role of the court in the substantive use of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine where the Court determines whether or not the State although it has interfered with 
a certain right, is also in breach of their duty under the Convention (RQ 1 relationship). 
Interference does not automatically mean a breach. A good example of such situations are 
the qualified rights under Articles 8 -11 of the Convention.  The reference by Raz to the 
possibility of conflicting considerations can be seen as an acknowledgment of the reality in 
adjudication of rights. There are situations where there is conflict between determining 
whether a duty exists or not or whether there are counteracting factors that should be 
considered. It is then up to the adjudicator to weigh and determine which side of the scale 
the balance should rest on. This may be considered to be a realistic assessment of one of the 
duties of the Court in adjudication of human rights cases 
The second point that flows from DRC is that a right is not a ground of just one duty. 
Raz states that rights are (part of) the justification of many duties.86 More than one type of 
obligation could therefore arise from the same right. Through the use of the living instrument 
doctrine, the ECtHR has referred to both positive and negative obligations in relation to 
articles such as Articles 2,87 3,88 and 8.89 The assertion that more than one type of duty can 
arise from a right is also relevant to the consideration of the use of the living instrument 
doctrine as it gives scope for new obligations.  
                                                 
86 Raz, The Morality of Freedom (n 46) 172. 
87 The right to life. 
88 Prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. 




The third point is that the list of duties can change over time. Raz asserts that ‘A 
change of circumstances may lead to the creation of new duties based on the old right’.90 
This link between rights and the creation of new duties can be clearly tied in with the living 
instrument doctrine. At its core, the living instrument doctrine ensures that the Convention 
remains relevant as an instrument for the protection of the rights of individuals by taking 
into consideration changes in society when interpreting its guarantees. This had led to the 
criticism that the doctrine is creating rights that the States had not signed up to. This could 
be justified then based on Dynamic Restricted Correlativity which acknowledges that there 
could be new duties created from old rights. This begs the question as to whether the issue 
is that new rights are being created or that new duties are being imposed, and whether the 
case law of the Court demonstrates such patterns (RQ 1 relationship; RQ 2 conflict; RQ 3 
interpretive and theoretical approaches). 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the margin of appreciation and living 
instrument doctrines through the lens of the correlativity of rights and duties. Hohfeld’s 
analysis of claim-rights provided the backdrop for the analysis of the relationship between 
rights and duties. The correlativity thesis as espoused by Hohfeld indicates that for every 
right there is a correlative duty. Rights and duties are seen as two sides of the same coin, in 
Hohfeldian terms, ‘jural correlates’. To say that a right exists in A is the same as saying that 
there is a duty to secure A. Without the identification of the duty and the duty holder, a right 
would not be considered to exist. Whilst Hohfeld’s analysis provides a starting point for an 
understanding of the relationship between rights and duties, the correlativity thesis has 
criticised from a theoretical and practical level. It has been argued that not all rights correlate 
to duties. That there are some duties that are not directed at any specific object. For example, 
duties of charity are not directed at any specified object. It has also been argued that in some 
instances the duty bearer may not be specified. The duties may be owed in general and 
therefore specifying the duty bearer may not be possible. It has also been contended that the 
burden that attaches to a particular duty may be unclear, leaving it then to open to 
interpretation. Another point which is not covered in Hohfeld’s correlativity thesis is that 
there is a dynamic nature to rights which gives room for possible development of more 
duties. Several questions therefore arise which require an alternative conception of the 
                                                 




relationship between rights and duties: Is there always a correlative duty to every right? Is 
there always a corresponding right to every duty?  Is there only one duty that attaches to a 
right or could there be multiple duties? Could the duties that attach to a right evolve over 
time? Does the right exist first before the duty or should the duty be articulated in order for 
the right to exist? Does the duty bearer have to be identified before a right can be said to 
exist? These questions which are not covered by the Hohfeldian conception of the 
correlativity of rights and duties require consideration through other theories that deal with 
the interaction between rights and duties.  
Raz has provided an alternative conception of the correlativity of rights and duties 
with his formulation of a right as a ground of a duty. ‘It is a ground of a duty which if not 
counteracted by conflicting considerations justifies holding the other person to have the 
duty.’91 In his criticism of the correlativity thesis Raz proposes three key points: (a) the idea 
that rights are grounds of duties, the imposition of which is justified only where there are no 
counteracting factors; (b) the idea that a right can have more than one duty attached to it; 
and (c) the idea that rights are dynamic and changes in circumstances could mean that new 
duties can be imposed. The outworking of Raz’s conception of rights as grounds of duties 
still retains a relationship between rights and duties but it does not conceive of them as 
corresponding to one another. It can therefore be seen as a ‘restricted correlativity’ position. 
Under this position, it is possible for a duty not to be imposed if there are insufficient interests 
to ground that duty or counteracting factors. There is also not one fixed duty for every right. 
There could be more than one duty that arises from a right. Waldron’s example of a ‘wave 
of duties’ that may arise when the right not to be tortured is considered, is a good explanation 
of how a right may ground more than one duty. This means that it is possible for a duty not 
to be imposed if there are insufficient reasons for the imposition of the duty. The restricted 
correlativity also gives room for the dynamic conception of rights which means that the 
duties imposed may change over time and depending on the circumstances. Although Raz’s 
position and critic of the correlativity thesis have not been without attendant criticisms, the 
three key points which he highlights, form the basis of the Dynamic Restricted Correlativity 
principle developed in this chapter. They are aligned to the interaction between the margin 
of appreciation and living instrument doctrines. 
Where a State opposes the argument for a certain right before the Court, it is 
essentially arguing against an imposition of a duty upon it. The use of the margin of 
                                                 




appreciation doctrine to determine whether an interference by a State would be considered a 
violation of the Convention also fits with Raz’s definition of rights as grounds of duties 
which will be justified if there is no other counteracting reason. The State is allowed under 
the margin of appreciation doctrine to provide justification for interference with the rights 
of individuals based on the particular circumstances prevailing in the State. This could be a 
counteracting factor and it would therefore come as no surprise that in some cases the 
balance is tilted in favour of the State and the Court does not find a violation of the 
Convention in that case. When it is said that the ECHR is a living instrument, it means the 
rights contained within the document should be interpreted in a dynamic way. The position 
that a right may ground more than one duty means that there is room for both positive and 
negative obligations on States. Through the use of the living instrument doctrine, the Court 
has imposed both positive and negative obligations in relation to certain provisions of the 
Convention. The living instrument doctrine therefore fits in with the dynamic restricted 
correlativity principle which acknowledges that there could be more than one duty attached 
to a right.  
The dynamic restricted correlativity principle also gives room for a further 
manifestation of dynamic interpretation, which is that that new duties may be imposed upon 
States in order for them to fulfil their obligations under the Convention. This researcher is 
aligned to the view that more than one duty can arise from a right and that there should be 
scope for new duties to be imposed as circumstances change. In the view of the researcher, 
correlativity does not mean that to every right there is one fixed corresponding duty, rather, 
to every right there is a potential for corresponding duties.  To the researcher the more 
accurate presentation of the correlativity of rights and duties is that: ‘to every right, there are 
potential corresponding duties’. Dynamic restricted correlativity encapsulates this even 
better by acknowledging that a right is a ground of dynamic duties which if not counteracted 
by conflicting arguments, is a justification for imposing those duties. There is scope for new 
duties to arise from the same right.   
A key question which arises is whether the criticism that the Convention rights have 
been expanded is an accurate reflection of what is happening? Conceptually, has the Court 
been creating new rights or has it been extending the duties on States in order to fulfil the 
existing rights? This ties in to the question of whether it is possible at the time of drafting a 
human rights treaty to agree on all the corresponding duties that arise from a particular right. 
What is clear at this stage though is that there is a conceptual relationship between rights and 




instrument doctrines. The lens of the correlativity of rights and duties in addition to the rules 
of interpretation in Articles 31-33 of the VCLT are therefore both relevant and will form the 
framework for the analysis of case law in chapters five and six (RQ 1 relationship; RQ 2 
conflict; RQ 3 interpretive and theoretical approaches). Chapter five begins the first stage of 





Case Analysis Part I 
Margin of Appreciation and Living Instrument Arguments 
In Determining the Scope of Applicability of the Convention 
 
5. Introduction 
 In chapter four, the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines were 
explored through the lens of the theories on the relationship between rights and duties. It 
established that there were some deficiencies in the correlativity thesis as espoused by 
Hohfeld which needed to be addressed. One of the most insightful alternatives to the 
correlativity thesis is the position taken by Joseph Raz where he proposes that rights are 
grounds of duties. From the critic of the correlativity thesis by Raz, a ‘dynamic restricted 
correlativity’ thesis was proposed. This incorporates three key points highlighted by Raz: (a) 
That a right is a ground of a duty, the imposition of which will only be justified if there are 
no counteracting factors; (b) That a right can be the ground of more than one duty1; and (c) 
That the duties that arise from a right are not fixed and could change over time. Dynamic 
restricted correlativity therefore sees rights as potential grounds of duties, duties that need 
to be justified in order to be imposed and duties that could evolve over time. At the heart of 
a margin of appreciation argument is the determination of whether a duty exists on the part 
of the State. The margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines fit in with dynamic 
restricted correlativity. Where the substantive concept of the margin of appreciation is used 
in relation to the qualified rights such as those under Articles 8-11, it provides a tool to justify 
the imposition of duties. On the other hand, when the living instrument doctrine is applied, 
it has the potential to lead to the imposition of new duties, therefore tying in to the dynamic 
nature of rights and the recognition that new duties can be imposed on old rights. Dynamic 
correlativity of rights and duties is therefore a useful lens with which to examine the 
relationship between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines. 
This chapter is the first of two which present the results of the case analysis. The 
methodology that has been adopted in the selection of the case law is detailed in Appendix 
A to this thesis. The two case analysis chapters explore the case law of the ECtHR from 
January 1979 to December 2016 in which both the margin of appreciation and living 
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instrument arguments have been used within the Court judgment and the resultant impact on 
the allocation of rights and duties. The process of selection of the case law is detailed in 
Appendix A to this thesis whist the full list of cases selected is detailed in Appendix C. This 
examination of the relevant case law feeds directly into the central research questions RQ 1 
(relationship), RQ 2 (conflict) and RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches). It also 
provides a springboard to address RQ 4 (recommendations).  
This chapter is the first case analysis and it focuses on cases in which the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines have been relevant in determining the scope 
ratione materiae of the Convention at the admissibility stage. The following chapter will 
address the use of the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrine at the merits 
stage in relation to compliance with the requirements of the Convention.  These two aspects 
have been chosen because the literature explored in chapter two showed that it is argued that 
the living instrument doctrine impinges on the margin of appreciation of States by expanding 
the coverage of the scope of this Convention. One way this could happen is by extending the 
scope ratione materiae of the Convention. It is therefore important to examine the use of 
both doctrines in dealing with arguments about the scope ratione materiae of the 
Convention. It has also been argued that the living instrument limits the margin of 
appreciation, making States liable for violations in circumstances where they should not be 
liable.2 An examination of the use of both doctrines from the context of the merits and the 
allocation of rights and duties at that stage is therefore also imperative. 
In the existing research on the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines, 
this focus on the distinction between the use of the two doctrines in the admissibility stage 
and the merits stage is one that is usually overlooked. In this thesis, it is considered an 
important distinction to raise due to the impact of admissibility determination on the overall 
direction of the case. The division of the analysis of the case law into the admissibility and 
merits stage therefore not only engages the existing research but adds to it through a 
systematic analysis of the case law to determine the approach of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR, the Court) to the use of these arguments in the cases brought before 
it. This analytical division should generate useful insights toward answering RQ 1 
(relationship), RQ 2 (conflict) and RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches). Following 
the examination of the interaction between the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
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doctrines at the admissibility stage, this chapter will conclude on the impact of these 
doctrines on the scope of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, the 
Convention).   
 
5.1 The Compatibility Question  
The compatibility question, which comes under the broad head of admissibility of a case 
is one that must be addressed by the ECtHR. In practice, the admissibility stage is where the 
majority of the applications before the Court are dismissed.3 Articles 34 and 35 of the ECHR 
specify the different conditions to be satisfied for admissibility of cases before the Court, 
one of which is that the subject matter should not be incompatible with the provisions of the 
Convention.4 The issue of compatibility is one of the arguments that could be raised against 
the hearing of a case by the ECtHR.5 Compatibility as a ground of admissibility relates to 
the competence of the court to hear the claim brought before it.6 These questions of 
competence concern the limits of the ECtHR jurisdiction and are therefore considered by the 
Court on its own motion even if they are not raised by the respondent government. The issue 
of competence falls into four categories: 
(i) Who is competent to bring a case and against whom (ratione personae) 
(ii) The subject matter of the application (ratione materiae) 
(iii) The time of the alleged violation (ratione temporis) 
(iv) The place of the alleged violation (ratione loci) 
Incompatibility ratione materiae is the focus within this chapter. This ground of 
compatibility has been chosen for two key reasons. First, reading through the data 
collected, the area where living instrument and margin of appreciation arguments were 
applied at the admissibility stage was to the issue of compatibility ratione materiae. 
Second, this area has been chosen because the issue of the jurisdiction of the Court has 
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been raised in the literature as one of the areas where there is tension between the margin 
of appreciation and living instrument doctrines. The ECtHR is a court with limited ratione 
materiae jurisdiction. The limitation is twofold: (a) limitations in the type of subject 
matter; and (b) limitation in scope of the subject matter covered. In relation to type of 
subject matter, its jurisdiction is limited to the protection of human rights. The jurisdiction 
of the Court is also limited to the scope of human rights issues that it can deal with. It is 
limited to dealing with human rights that are guaranteed under the provisions of the 
ECHR, which in turn are based on the agreement of the State parties to the Convention.  
Where an argument is made that a particular issue is incompatible ratione materiae 
with the Convention, the implication of this argument is that the Court should not deal with 
the issue in question as its content is not within the scope of issues that the Court can address. 
A successful argument that a particular issue is incompatible ratione materiae with the 
Convention therefore has the effect of excluding that matter from the purview of the Court. 
Where that happens, there is no further decision the Court can make on this case as its hands 
will be effectively ‘tied’. The result will be that there would be no determination of whether 
a right exists in that case or whether a duty has been breached. 
 The general approach of the Court to the interpretation of the rules of admissibility 
is that they should be applied ‘with some degree of flexibility and without excessive 
formality’.7 The Court has also adopted the object and purpose rule (teleological 
interpretation) intimating that the rules of admissibility be interpreted taking into 
consideration their object and purpose.8 The Court has taken note of the general purpose of 
the Convention and its special character as a human rights treaty which must be interpreted 
in a way that makes its provisions practical and effective.9 These two factors of teleological 
interpretation and the reference to the special nature of the Convention are in line with the 
overall approach of the Court to the interpretation of the Convention as discussed in Chapter 
three of this thesis. One could therefore deduce that in interpreting the admissibility 
provisions of the Convention there is not a strict approach to adherence or compliance with 
the text, rather the key factor is the overall purpose of the Convention and how that 
admissibility requirement can be interpreted in a way that fits in with the overall purpose of 
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the Convention. The admissibility requirements are, therefore, there to facilitate the effective 
protection of the guarantees contained in the Convention rather than to impede them.  
The importance of the outcome of an incompatibility argument before the Court is one 
that cannot be ignored in this thesis. It is the view here that the impact of the interaction 
of the margin of appreciation and living instrument arguments lies not only in the final 
outcome of the decision in the particular case on whether there has been a violation of the 
Convention or not, but it is also important to examine whether the scope of the Convention 
ratione materiae has been impacted either by way of expansion or contraction even if a 
violation was not found in the case under consideration.  The finding of compatibility 
precedes a finding of violation or non-violation. Therefore, if we can examine how the 
issue of compatibility is dealt with using the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines it will be the first step in the analysis of whether rights are extended or not. The 
following sections contain the analysis of the case law.  
 
5.2 Descriptive Statistical Analysis of Case Law  
This section covers the analysis of the case law using the quantitative method of 
descriptive statistical analysis.10 Following detailed selection criteria detailed in 
Appendix A, the final sample of cases being subjected to systematic analysis for this thesis 
is 75 cases.11 The 75 cases have been read manually and then coded based on the relevance 
of the margin of appreciation and living instrument arguments to a contention on the issue 
of compatibility of the convention. For the descriptive statistical analysis, four key 
questions were posed:  
1. Is compatibility ratione materiae contested in the case?  
2. Are the margin of appreciation or living instrument doctrine arguments 
referred to in addressing compatibility?  
3. Which of the two arguments is used the most at the compatibility stage?  
4. What is the outcome of compatibility arguments in cases in which there is 
a margin of appreciation or living instrument argument?  
The results from the analysis of each of these questions is presented in the sections that 
follow 
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5.2.1 Is Compatibility Ratione Materiae Contested?   
To address this initial question of whether compatibility was contested, the 75 
cases were examined, and the results of the analysis is presented in the Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 Contest of Compatibility Ratione Materiae 
Compatibility ratione materiae not 
contested 




The results in Table 5.1 show that in the majority of the cases: 40 cases, 
compatibility was not contested. However, in a high percentage of the cases: 35 cases, or 
47% of the case law examined, compatibility was contested. There is, therefore, a high 
occurrence of compatibility arguments in the case law which involves both margin of 
appreciation and living instrument arguments. This is significant as, the determination 
that a particular issue is compatible ratione materiae, is essential for a case to be heard by 
the Court. If an issue is not compatible ratione materiae, the Court will be unable to make 
any further determination of the key issues in the case.  
 
5.2.2 Are the Margin of Appreciation or Living Instrument Doctrine Arguments 
Referred to in Addressing Compatibility?  
To answer this second question, the 35 cases were examined to find out if either 
the margin of appreciation or living instrument doctrines (or both) were referred to either 
by the applicant, respondent or the Court itself in deciding on the issue of applicability. 
The outcome of this analysis was a division of the case law into two groups. Group A 
were cases in which compatibility ratione materiae was contested without a margin of 
appreciation or living instrument argument, whilst Group B consisted of cases where 
compatibility ratione materiae was contested with either the margin of appreciation or 








Table 5.2 Use of Margin of Appreciation and Living Instrument Arguments to 
Contest Compatibility Ratione Materiae 
Group A:  
Compatibility ratione materiae 
contested without a margin of 
appreciation or living instrument 
argument. 
Group B:  
Compatibility ratione materiae 
contested with either the margin of 
appreciation or living instrument 
argument or both. 
21 14 
 
From Table 5.2 it can be seen that in 21 (60%) of the cases, addressing the 
compatibility question did not involve the use of the margin of appreciation or living 
instrument doctrines while in 14 (40%) of the cases the margin of appreciation and/or the 
living instrument doctrine was relevant. This shows that although the compatibility 
question features highly in the overall sample, the use of the two doctrines in this phase 
is not very high. There is, however, still a reasonable level of the use of these doctrines at 
this stage which provides further support for the importance of addressing how these two 
doctrines interact with the compatibility question before going into their use at the merits 
stage. The presence of these two doctrines at the applicability stage also ties in with the 
literature which highlights the scope of the Convention as an area that has been affected 
by the interaction of the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines in the 
jurisprudence of the Court.  
 
5.2.3 Which of the Arguments is Used the Most at the Compatibility Stage?  
Although the analysis in Table 5.2 shows the presence of the doctrines in 14 cases 
at the applicability stage, it does not provide answers to which doctrine is used the most. 
To determine which of the arguments was used the most the 14 cases from Group B in 
Table 5.2 12 were further analysed and coded in order to determine which of these 
doctrines was used in each case.  The result of this analysis is presented in Table 5.3 which 
shows the different ways in which the doctrines were used at the applicability stage and 
which was used the most.  
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Table 5.3 Argument Used the Most at Compatibility Stage 
Group 1: Margin of 
appreciation and living 
instrument doctrines 
Group 2: Living 
instrument doctrine 
only 
Group 3: Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine 
only 
2 11 1 
 
From Table 5.3 it can be seen immediately that living instrument arguments are 
the most frequently used in compatibility arguments. They are present in 11, or 79% of 
the cases in the sample. Margin of appreciation arguments on the other hand are present 
either on their own or in conjunction with the living instrument doctrine, in 3 cases, or 
21% of the sample size. This initial finding confirms the view in the literature that living 
instrument arguments have an impact on the scope ratione materiae of the Convention. 
What it does not answer is in what way it impacts on the scope. Is it widening the scope 
or is it restricting the scope ratione materiae? To determine this, it is necessary to examine 
whether living instrument arguments been successful. The outcome of the argument 
would determine what impact they have had.  
Another point that is highlighted from this descriptive statistic of the case law is 
that cases where both margin of appreciation and living instrument arguments are present 
in the determination of compatibility are relatively low in the sample at 2 cases, or 14% 
of the cases. These cases are the ‘hard cases’ where there is room for conflict between the 
two doctrines, an issue that is the focus of this thesis. On the face of it, this could suggest 
that the situation of conflict between the two doctrines when the issue of compatibility is 
being addressed is at a low level. The approach of the Court in those cases and the 
outcome, are crucial in determining the impact and weight of the living instrument 
argument in those cases where there is also a margin of appreciation argument on the issue 
of compatibility.  
 
5.2.4 What is the Outcome of the Compatibility Arguments in Cases in Which There 
is a Margin of Appreciation or Living Instrument Argument?  
This question feeds into the research question on the relationship (RQ 1) between 
the margin of appreciation and living instrument arguments in cases before the Court. It 
would also show how successful living instrument arguments have been in the cases 




the 14 cases as a whole were analysed. The result of the compatibility arguments is 
presented in the table below: 
 
Table 5.4 Outcome of Compatibility Arguments 
Positive Decision on Compatibility 
ratione materiae 




Table 5.4 shows that in 11 cases, which accounts for 79% of the case law in which 
the living instrument and (or) margin of appreciation arguments were raised on the issue 
of compatibility ratione materiae, the Court came to a decision in favour of compatibility 
ratione materiae. A decision in favour of compatibility ratione materiae could be argued 
to be a decision expanding the scope of the Convention as the question of compatibility 
would not arise if a particular right was clearly included in the text of the Convention or 
had been the subject of an earlier positive decision of the Court. There is however room 
for more discussion on this point which will be explored later in this chapter. 
 A further analysis of the particular doctrine that has been responsible for the 
positive decision of compatibility ratione materiae was carried out as a second part of 
phase 4 analysis. Groups 1,13 214 and 315 from Table 5.3, were analysed in order to narrow 
down the impact of the different arguments on the outcome of the compatibility 
arguments. Whilst it was clear that compatibility arguments were successful, to fulfil the 
aim of this research, it was necessary to break this down even further and consider the 
impact of the different arguments in question. The results of this analysis are presented in 
Chart 5.1. 
 
                                                 
13 Cases with both a margin of appreciation and living instrument argument at the compatibility stage. 
14 Cases with only a living instrument argument at the compatibility stage. 







The outcome of this phase of analysis shows that in the majority of the cases where 
the issue was found to be compatible ratione materiae with the Convention, there was a 
living instrument argument raised which was accepted by the Court. This accounts for 11 
out of the 14 decisions, making up 79% of the case law examined. In relation to Group 1 
where there are both margin of appreciation and living instrument arguments, it can be 
seen that it is a 50% split between cases in which the living instrument argument was 
preferred to the margin of appreciation argument and a positive decision on compatibility 
ratione materiae was reached by the Court, and cases in which there was a living 
instrument and margin of appreciation argument and the margin of appreciation argument 
was preferred to the living instrument argument. These results from Group 1 do not 
therefore on the face of it, reveal any particular doctrine being given preference to the 
other.  
The analysis so far has shown that in most compatibility arguments the outcome was 
positive. The key issue though, is how this impacted on the overall outcome of the case 
as to find that an issue is compatible with the Convention does not automatically mean 
that the State has violated their obligations. It is relevant to find out how the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines have impacted on the final outcome of the 
case. To get some answers to this question, a further study was carried out. The cases were 
analysed on the basis of the interaction between margin of appreciation and living 
instruments from the applicability to the merits stage. There were five possible 













Group 3 Margin of
Appreciation Only
Chart 5.1  Outcome of Compatibility Argument by 
Doctrine




1. Living instrument doctrine applied to applicability argument, only margin of 
appreciation doctrine applied to compliance. (Model 1 LI applicability, MOA 
compliance). 
2. Living instrument doctrine applied to applicability argument, both living instrument 
and margin of appreciation doctrines applied to compliance. (Model 2 LI 
applicability, LI & MOA compliance). 
3. Living instrument and margin of appreciation doctrines applied to both the 
applicability argument and the compliance arguments. (Model 3 LI and MOA 
applicability and compliance). 
4. Margin of appreciation doctrine applied to applicability argument, only living 
instrument doctrine applied to compliance. (Model 4 MOA applicability, LI 
compliance). 
5. Margin of appreciation doctrine applied to applicability argument, both margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines applied to compliance. (Model 5 MOA 
applicability, MOA & LI compliance). 
After reviewing the case law, only Models 1, 2 3 and 4 were found. The results are 
displayed in Chart 5.2 below where ‘MOA’ stands for margin of appreciation and ‘LI’ 
stands for living instrument. 
 
 
It can be seen from Chart 5.2 that Model 1 (LI applicability, MOA compliance) 










Model 1 (LI applicability,
MOA compliance)
Model 2 (LI applicability, LI
and MOA compliance)











make up 50% of the sample. On the other end of the spectrum are cases in Model 4 (MOA 
applicability, LI compliance). There was only one case in that category which accounted 
for just 7% of the sample. The results show that living instrument arguments are used 
mostly for compatibility issues – 13 cases involve the use of living instrument arguments 
in the compatibility stage (Models 1, 2 and 3), as opposed to 7 cases where the living 
instrument was used in the compliance stage (Models 2, 3 and 4). For the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, it is mainly used in the compliance stage - 13 cases (Models 1, 2 
and 3), as opposed to 3 cases in which it was used in the compatibility argument (Models 
2 and 3). This could be interpreted as the living instrument doctrine being used to 
determine whether a right exists whilst the margin of appreciation determines whether the 
State has breached its duty under the Convention.  This interpretation is reinforced when 
it is considered that the results showed no case under Model 5 (MOA applicability, LI & 
MOA compliance). The margin of appreciation may however be raised as a counteracting 
factor where the living instrument doctrine is applied to applicability as can be seen in 
Model 3, (LI and MOA applicability and compliance). Model 3 however accounts for just 
two cases, 14% of the sample. As Model 3 is one where the potential for conflict between 
both doctrines may arise, the low numbers initially suggest that the opportunities for such 
direct conflict in the sense of both doctrines being applied to determine in particular 
compatibility ratione materiae, is at a low level in the case law of the ECtHR.  
The further point to assess is the outcome of the cases where there are these different 
interactions between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines. This 
would give an initial indication of how these doctrines are having an impact on the 
jurisprudence of the Court and on the protection of human rights in Europe generally. It 
would show if there is a correlation between the finding that a particular issue is 
compatible ratione materiae with the Convention and a resultant finding of a breach of a 
duty under the ECtHR to secure the right in question. Chart 5.3 contains the results of this 
analysis of the link between the finding of compatibility and the determination of a breach 
of duty based on the four models of interaction between the margin of appreciation and 







Chart 5.3 shows that highest number of violations in percentage terms by Models, 
was seen in Model 4 (MOA applicability, LI compliance) where there was a 100% result 
of the State being found to be in breach of its duty. There was only one case in the category 
of Model 4 though, so overall, based on case numbers, it account for the least number of 
cases. The highest number of violations based on number of cases was found in cases 
under Model 1 (LI applicability, MOA compliance). In six out of the seven cases in Model 
1, the overall finding of the Court was that the State had breached its duties under the 
Convention.16 This is 85% of the cases in that category. In relation to the four cases in 
Model 2 (LI applicability, LI and MOA compliance), the Court found the State to be in 
violation of its obligations in all four cases, even though in one of the cases, the argument 
for compatibility of one of the articles of the Convention was rejected.17  
With regards to the two cases in Model 3 (LI and MOA applicability and 
compliance), the Court did not find a violation in any of the cases. It is instructive to note 
that of the 14 cases examined, in 12 cases, the Court found at least one violation of the 
Convention. The 2 cases in Model 3 (LI and MOA applicability and compliance) were 
the only ones where the Court did not find a violation. The overall outcome is that in 
                                                 
16 The finding of violation has been coded on the basis of there being at least one successful compatibility 
argument and one finding of a breach of obligation of the State. 
17 In Johnston and others v Ireland App no 9697/82 (ECtHR, 18 December 1986), the Court found that the 
case was not compatible ratione materiae with Article 12 of the Convention. It however found a breach in 
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almost all the cases where the issue was found to be compatible following a successful 
living instrument argument, the State was also found to be in violation of the Convention’s 
guarantees even where a margin of appreciation argument had been used as a defence by 
the State. It was in only two cases that the margin of appreciation argument was sufficient 
to prevent a finding of violation. One could deduce from this that not only is the living 
instrument having an impact on the scope ratione materiae of the Convention, it is also 
indirectly having an impact on the overall outcome of the case. The determination that an 
issue is compatible ratione materiae with the Convention is therefore one that should not 
be overlooked as it sets the basis for the possibility of a finding of violation. 
 
5.2.5 Limitations of the Descriptive Analysis 
The outcome of the descriptive analysis at this stage has shown that living instrument 
and margin of appreciation arguments have both been relevant in addressing the issue of 
compatibility ratione materiae. It has shown that living instrument arguments have 
trumped margin of appreciation arguments in decisions where the compatibility ratione 
materiae of the Convention has been contested. It has also shown that there is a high 
correlation between a finding that an issue is compatible ratione materiae with the 
Convention and an overall finding that there has been a breach by the State of its duty 
under the Convention.  
The use of a quantitative tool of descriptive statistical analysis however suffers some 
limitations. First, the descriptive statistical analysis whilst revealing the outcome of the 
decision on compatibility, does not explain the reason for the decision or the interpretive 
approach applied by the Court in coming to its decision. This is something that needs to 
be examined in order to fully answer RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches). 
Second, the descriptive statistics do not show whether there is an alignment in the 
interpretive technique employed by the Court in coming to its decision, with the principles 
of interpretation discussed in chapter three. This cannot be ascertained using quantitative 
methods alone. Third, the quantitative analysis does not highlight what types of issues 
were before the Court and whether there is any correlation between the decision on 
compatibility and the type of issue before the Court. Fourth, the researcher is conscious 
that the sample being examined is a small fraction of the overall case law of the Court.  
Whilst these represent all the cases that had an express reference to the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines or their variants, they are still a small 




analysis is to provide a systematic overview of a given sample, to identify patterns in the 
data, and to establish points of inference that would benefit from more detailed analysis.  
As a result, a qualitative examination of the case law would enhance the case analysis and 
overall results achieved.  
 
5.3 Doctrinal Textual Analysis of the Case Law 
The limitations of the descriptive statistical analysis highlighted above 
necessitated the use of a textual approach as a second key phase of the analysis.18 The 
descriptive analysis had already revealed that there had been a high incidence of positive 
decisions on compatibility ratione materiae in the data examined. The qualitative analysis 
builds on this initial finding by applying textual analysis to the case law to determine what 
factors contributed to the decision of the Court on compatibility and the overall finding 
of violation.  Two themes that are derived from the case law on the interaction between 
the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines are ‘expansion’ and 
‘restriction’. For the purposes of this textual analysis, the case law will be categorised 
based on their impact on either expanding or restricting the scope of the Convention. A 
negative decision on compatibility will be categorised here as restriction of the scope 
ratione materiae of the Convention whilst a positive decision on compatibility will be 
categorised here are as an expansion of the scope ratione materiae of the Convention. The 
sections that follow provide the results of the textual analysis of the case law under these 
two headings identified. 
 
5.4 Restriction Ratione Materiae of the Scope of the Convention  
One of the areas of interaction between the living instrument and margin of 
appreciation doctrines that has been identified in the literature is the scope of the coverage 
of the Convention. The living instrument doctrine in its interaction with the margin of 
appreciation doctrine has been criticised for expanding the scope of the Convention.19 An 
area that is not usually examined is the restriction of the scope of the Convention. In 
examining the case law here, it was necessary to find out if there were cases where the 
scope was restricted even where there had been a living instrument argument. Restriction 
                                                 
18 The need for both the quantitative method of descriptive statistical analysis and the qualitative method of 
textual doctrinal analysis in this thesis has been fully discussed in Appendix A which deals with the framework 
for the case analysis. 
19 This has been discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.5 ‘Contexts and Rationale for the Interpretation of the 




ratione materiae considers cases where the Court rejects the living instrument argument 
and finds that the issue is not compatible ratione materiae with the Convention. By 
rejecting the argument for compatibility, the ECtHR restricts the scope of the ECHR.  
This restriction is not necessarily a positive or negative thing. It depends upon the 
view adopted. On the one hand it may be argued that the Court is ensuring its legitimacy 
by ‘policing’ the borders of its jurisdiction and ensuring that it only decides on issues that 
are clearly covered by the Convention. This in turn, may enhance the Court’s legitimacy 
and the compliance with its decisions as they may be perceived by the State parties as 
being within the confines of the Court’s mandate. On the other hand, it may be argued 
that the Court is abdicating its responsibility to ensure the maintenance and further 
realisation of the Convention’s guarantees. There could, therefore, be a mixed 
interpretation of the situations in which the Court restricts the scope of the Convention as 
a result of the different roles the Court has to fulfil. From descriptive statistical analysis, 
above, there are two cases in which the Court restricted the scope of the Convention and 
rejected a living instrument argument to extend the scope of the Convention. In Johnston, 
the Court adopted Model 1 (LI applicability, MOA compliance) whilst in VO v France, 
the Court adopted Model 3 (LI & MOA applicability and compliance).20 Since the focus 
of this thesis is on the way in which the Court deals with cases where there is a conflict 
between the living instrument and margin of appreciation doctrines, the case of VO v 
France has been chosen for further discussion below.21  
 
5.4.1 Margin of Appreciation Supersedes Living Instrument Argument 
The case of VO v France is an example of a ‘hard case’ scenario in which there 
was a conflict between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines.22 In 
VO, the Court had to consider whether a foetus fell within the protection of Article 2 such 
that failure to classify the unintentional killing of a foetus of 20-21 weeks as unintentional 
homicide would amount to a violation of the Convention. This raised the compatibility 
argument of whether Article 2 which guarantees the right to life applies to an unborn 
child. The question was therefore related to the scope of applicability of Article 2 as 
opposed to a question about the definition of the term ‘right to life’.  This is an important 
                                                 
20 Johnston (n 17); VO v France App no 53924/00 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004). 
21 The case of Johnston (n 17) has also been discussed to a certain extent in Chapter three when the rules of 
interpretation in the VCLT was considered. 




distinction as the coverage of the Convention can be extended either through an extension 
of its scope of applicability or via extension of the interpretation of the concepts it covers.  
In this case, the ECtHR adopted Model 3 (LI & MOA applicability and compliance). 
The Court was of the view that the compatibility issue was so intrinsically linked to the 
merits of the case and joined them both.23 The applicant urged the Court to consider 
scientific developments in interpreting the text of the Convention, arguing that there was 
current scientific evidence to show that all life began at fertilisation.24 This could be 
considered as a living instrument argument with a focus on expert consensus.25 The 
government on the other hand urged the Court to consider the differences in the legal 
provisions in contracting States where abortion laws exist, arguing that a finding that 
Article 2 extends to the unborn would not be a progressive ‘living instrument’ 
interpretation.26 They pointed to the fact that there were different statutory periods for 
abortion in the contracting States and that this was an area where the States had a margin 
of appreciation.27 There was one third party intervention from the Family Planning 
Association which supported the government’s position that the right to life in Article 2 
should not be interpreted as extending to the unborn child.28 This case is interesting as it 
pitches two types of developments against each other: ‘expert consensus’ as a basis for 
invoking the living instrument doctrine, versus ‘European dissensus’29 as a basis for 
invoking the margin of appreciation doctrine. This is an example of a ‘hard case’ where 
there is a conflict between the living instrument doctrine and the margin of appreciation 
doctrine in determining compatibility ratione materiae. 
In addressing the compatibility argument, the Court began by adopting a textual 
interpretation. It acknowledged that unlike Article 4 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights which expressly refers to the protection of the right to life “in general, from 
the moment of conception”, Article 2 of the ECHR is silent on when the protection of the 
right to life begins.30 The Court did not however make a finding that there was a decision 
to expressly exclude the protection of the unborn child from the text of the ECHR. The 
                                                 
23 VO (n 20), para 44. 
24 VO (n 20), para 47. 
25 The Court itself later refers to the term ‘living instrument’ when giving its judgment. This will be considered 
later on in this chapter. 
26 VO (n 20), paras 52-54. 
27 VO (n 20), para 55. 
28 VO (n 20), paras 67-73. 
29 In this case the dis-census was the lack of uniformity in the laws of the contracting States on access to 
abortion and the conditions on which such access may be granted.  




Court recalled some of its earlier case law where reference to Article 2 had been made in 
the context of abortion, it showed that the Commission and the Court had not concluded 
that the foetus had a right to life under Article 2 but rather had avoided determining that 
issue by finding the existence of the foetus to be intrinsically linked with that of the 
mother.31 The Court considered this case to be different to previous cases32 and couched 
the key issue as whether ‘apart from cases where the mother has requested an abortion, 
harming a foetus should be treated as a criminal offence in the light of Article 2 of the 
Convention, with a view to protecting the foetus under that Article’.33 This necessitated a 
determination of when the right to life begins. 
The Court was persuaded by the lack of consensus that existed amongst the States on 
when the right to life begins and chose not to decide on this issue but rather leave it to the 
margin of appreciation of States. It concluded that: 
 
It follows that the issue of when the right to life begins comes within the margin of 
appreciation which the Court generally considers that States should enjoy in this 
sphere, notwithstanding an evolutive interpretation of the Convention, a “living 
instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions”…The 
reasons for that conclusion are, firstly, that the issue of such protection has not been 
resolved within the majority of the Contracting States themselves, in France in 
particular, where it is the subject of debate… and, secondly, that there is no 
European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the beginning of 
life....34 
 
                                                 
31 VO (n 20) paras 75-78; The Court referred to earlier cases such as X v United Kingdom App no 8416/79 
(Commission decision, 13 May 1980); X v Austria App no 7045/75 (Commission decision, 10 December 
1976); Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany App no 6959/75 (Commission’s report, 12 July 1977) and H v 
Norway App no 17004/90 (Commission decision, 19 May 1992) . The Court also referred to two other instances 
where it had to consider the application of Article 2 to the foetus. In Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v 
Ireland App nos 14234/88; 14235/88 (ECtHR, 29 October 1992) where it had based its decision on Article 
10(2) looking at whether the state’s restriction on access to information on abortion abroad was necessary in a 
democratic society. It had not felt there was a need to directly address the question of whether the right to life 
was applicable to the foetus. It also referred to its decision in Boso v Italy App no 50490/99 (ECtHR, 5 
September 2002). 31 where it had to deal with a case where the woman had terminated the pregnancy without 
the consent of her husband, the Court did not make a decision on whether Article 2 provided protection for the 
foetus, it rather based its decision on the issue of whether a fair balance had been struck between the needs of 
the woman on the one hand and the protection of the foetus on the other. 
32 The previous case law examined had dealt with different contexts of abortion rather than an involuntary 
termination of pregnancy through negligence. 
33 VO (n 20), para 81. 




To show a lack of international consensus as well, the Court referred to three 
international treaties neither of which defined when the right to life begins.35 In the view of 
the Court, there was therefore a lack of internal, European, international and expert 
consensus. The Court relied on the absence of consensus as a determinant to apply the 
margin of appreciation in a structural way here to refrain from actually deciding on the 
issue. The margin of appreciation argument served as a limiting factor and superseded the 
living instrument argument here. The Court concluded that it was ‘neither desirable, nor 
even possible as matters stand, to answer in the abstract the question whether the unborn 
child is a person for the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention’.36 It went further to state 
that: ‘even assuming that Article 2 was applicable in the instant case…there has been no 
violation of Article 2 of the Convention’.37  
By joining the compatibility issue with the merits, the Court avoided a clear decision 
on whether Article 2 is relevant to the protection of the unborn child. For this, the majority 
opinion was criticized even by those who voted in favour of a finding of no violation of 
Article 2.38  In his dissenting opinion, Judge Rees argued that based on Article 31 of the 
VCLT, the ordinary meaning of the term ‘everyone’ taken in context and in the light of the 
object and purpose of the Convention leads to the conclusion that ‘the protection of life also 
extends in principle to the foetus’.39 He gave more weight to the living instrument doctrine, 
referring to the developments in genetic safeguards, he pointed out that in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union which prohibits reproductive cloning of ‘human 
beings’, the protection of life applies to the initial phase of human life.40 It is interesting that 
the Court did not refer to this Charter when discussing international consensus. He argued 
that:  
 
The Convention, which was conceived as a living instrument to be interpreted 
in the light of present-day conditions in society, must take such a development 
                                                 
35 Article 2 of the 1997 Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine that Convention does not define 
the term ‘everyone’, rather the explanatory report to the Convention rather provides that member States should 
decide on this issue. The 1998 Additional Protocol on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings and 2004 
Additional Protocol on Biomedical Research, which do not define the concept ‘human being’ but left it to the 
discretion of States. 
36 VO (n 20), para 85. 
37 Ibid para 95. 
38 VO (n 20) (Separate Opinion of Judge Rozakis joined by Judges Caflisch, Fischbach, Lorenzen and 
Thomassen). 
39 Ibid (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rees), para 4. 
40 Article 3(2) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; VO (n 20) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge 




into account in order to confirm the “ordinary meaning”, in accordance with 
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. Even if it is assumed that the ordinary 
meaning of “human life” in Article 2 of the Convention is not entirely clear and 
can be interpreted in different ways, the obligation to protect human life requires 
more extensive protection, particularly in view of the techniques available for 
genetic manipulation and the unlimited production of embryos for various 
purposes. The manner in which Article 2 is interpreted must evolve in 
accordance with these developments and constraints and confront the real 
dangers now facing human life.41 
 
On the issue of the margin of appreciation Judge Rees made an interesting argument. 
He took the position that that there should be no margin of appreciation applied to the 
issue of the applicability of Article 2, (an absolute right) to the case.42 He was of the view 
that the margin of appreciation should only be applied to the effect of Article 2, to 
determine the measures the States needed to take to discharge its positive obligations 
under Article 2 rather than to restrict the applicability of Article 2.43 For Judge Rees, 
Article 2 applied to human beings even before they were born and he found that there had 
been a violation of this provision by France.44 Judge Rees was therefore arguing for the 
margin of appreciation to be restricted to norm application as discussed in chapter two, 
rather than norm definition.45 
Similarly, in the dissenting opinion of Judge Mularoni, joined by Judge Strážnická, 
he gave greater weight to the living instrument doctrine, arguing that Article 2 was 
applicable and had been violated.46 He acknowledged that the travaux préparatoires of 
the Convention were silent on the scope of the words ‘everyone’ and ‘life’ on the issue of 
whether Article 2 is applicable before birth.47 However, in a similar fashion to Judge Rees, 
he highlighted the significant developments in science, biology and medicine since the 
1950s and that these developments included advances in the prenatal stage. There were 
also moves politically at the national and international level to find suitable means of 
                                                 
41 VO (n 20) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rees), para 5 (emphasis added). 
42 Ibid para 8. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid para 9. 
45 For a discussion on the use of the margin of appreciation in this way, see Chapter 2, section 2.2 ‘Evolution 
in the use of the margin of appreciation doctrine’. 
46 VO (n 20) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rees), para 4. 




protecting ‘even prenatally, human rights and the dignity of the human being against 
certain biological and medical applications.’48 He argued that:  
 
Article 2 must be interpreted in an evolutive manner so that the great dangers 
currently facing human life can be confronted...The Court has…stated that the 
Convention is a living instrument, to be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions…I therefore find that Article 2 of the Convention is applicable in the 
present case and has been violated, as the right to life has not been protected by the 
law of the respondent State.49 
 
The majority was of a different view and the respondent State was not considered to be in 
violation of its obligations. 
The analysis of the restriction ratione materiae of the Convention in this section 
has highlighted several factors. First, although the Court did not expressly refer to the 
VCLT, its influence can be seen in the interpretive approach adopted by the Court. The 
text of the Convention was a starting point in accordance with Article 31(1) VCLT. The 
Court also referred to subsequent agreement and State practice by considering the practice 
in the member States and current international treaties which dealt with similar issues on 
the beginning of life. VO raised the issue of whether scientific developments should be 
used as a counter weight to dissensus in the practice amongst States. The Court could 
either rely on the living instrument to give an evolutive interpretation to the text of the 
Convention based on scientific developments (expert consensus) or adopt a restrictive 
interpretation of the text by giving greater weight to the margin of appreciation afforded 
to the States as a result of European dissensus on the issue. It chose the margin of 
appreciation over evolutive interpretation. The dissenting judgments however raise 
interesting questions on the weight given to scientific developments and how the Court 
determines which international conventions it will rely on in coming to the decision on 
consensus. It is noteworthy that the issue of the protection of the unborn child is a sensitive 
area. This may also have been a contributing factor for the Court. In using the margin of 
appreciation in a structural way in this case, the Court allowed room for State parties to 
define the scope of the right to life, causing the margin of appreciation doctrine to trump 
                                                 





the living instrument doctrine. From the perspective of the relationship between rights and 
duties, the successful use of the margin of appreciation here meant that no rights were 
created for the applicant in this case and therefore no duty ensued for the State. The next 
section looks at case law in which the scope ratione materiae of the Convention was 
extended. 
 
5.5 Expansion Ratione Materiae of the Scope of the Convention  
Expansion ratione materiae in this context refers to the use of the living instrument 
or margin of appreciation arguments in cases where a particular right is not specifically 
enumerated in the Convention, but the Court finds that the Convention covers this issue. 
The allegation of expansion of the scope of the Convention is one of the main criticisms 
levelled against the living instrument approach to interpretation therefore it is an 
important one to address in this thesis.50 In reading through the case law and applying the 
lens of dynamic restricted correlativity of rights and duties, the researcher has recognised 
that two outcomes could be identified:  
 Expansion ratione materiae of the scope of the Convention but no expansion of 
the duty of the State 
 Expansion ratione materiae of the scope of the Convention and expansion of the 
duty on the State.  
These will now be discussed below. 
 
5.5.1 Expansion of the Scope of the Convention, No Expansion of Duty on State  
This section deals with cases where the ECtHR finds that a particular issue is 
compatible with the ECHR but finds that the State has not breached its obligations in that 
case, therefore no expansion of the duty on the State. It is important that these cases are 
looked at in order to discover the limiting factors on the State’s duty even in cases where 
it could be argued that there had been an expansion ratione materiae of the scope of the 
Convention. Without the attendant finding of breach of obligation of the State, the 
importance of a finding of expansion of the scope of the Convention could be seen as 
merely academic with no actual effect.  This point will be discussed within the sections 
below. In this section, two cases are drawn from the patterns identified in the descriptive 
                                                 




statistics analysis above, which depict instances where the Court made a positive decision 
on compatibility but did not find a breach of the obligations on the State. Key themes on 
the interpretive approach of the Court in both cases is discussed below. 
There were two cases in which the Court made a finding that the issue was 
compatible ratione materiae with the Convention but did not find that there had been a 
breach of the duty on the State. The first case is the 2005 case of Leyla Sahin v Turkey.51  
In that case, the applicability issue before the Court was whether Article 2 of Protocol No 
1 (Art 2 PN1) which provides for the right to education, applies to institutions of higher 
education. In dealing with the issue, the Court adopted Model 1 (LI applicability MOA 
compliance). Through a combination of the textual, object and purpose as well as 
evolutive interpretation, the Court found that institutions of higher education came within 
the scope of Art2 PN1 because the right of access to such institutions was an inherent part 
of the right in Art2 PN1.52 The Court however found that based on the margin of 
appreciation afforded to the State, it had not breached its obligations in this particular 
case. The second case is the 2010 case of Schalk and Kopf v Austria.53 In this case, the 
Court adopted Model 3 (LI & MOA applicability and compliance). Since Model 3 is the 
one in which the conflict between the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines is more apparent, this case will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
5.5.1.2 Living Instrument Trumps Margin of Appreciation Argument 
In Schalk and Kopf v Austria, the applicants, who were a same-sex couple living together 
brought the action to the ECtHR complaining that the refusal of the authorities to allow them 
to get married was a violation of Article 12 of the Convention which provided for the right 
to marry.54 They also alleged that they had been subject to discriminatory treatment in breach 
of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. The first applicability question was whether 
Article 12 included the right to marry for persons of the same sex.55 This was the first time 
the Court had the opportunity to decide on a case in which two people of the same sex were 
alleging that they had a right to marry under the Convention. The Court was of the view that 
the complaint raised serious issues that could not be discussed at the admissibility stage, it 
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therefore decided to proceed to deal with the merits of the case and discuss the compatibility 
issue whilst dealing with the merits.56 
In dealing with the applicability issue under Article 12, the Court adopted Model 1 (LI 
applicability, MOA compliance). Although the Court did not expressly refer to the rules of 
interpretation in Articles 31-32 of the VCLT, its initial approach to the issue was based on 
those rules. In line with its approach in Johnston, Court noted that based on the text, the right 
to marry under Article 12 was subject to the contracting laws of the member States.57 It 
however went a step forward by stating that any restrictions imposed should not be such as 
to impair the very essence of the right.58 The Court was of the view that if its recent case law 
on transsexuals was viewed in isolation, it could be that one could interpret that Article 12 
does not exclude marriage between two men or between two women.  However, when the 
text of Article 12 is considered in the light of the way other Articles were drafted, the 
conclusion could be drawn that the drafters had deliberately worded the text with the words 
‘men’ and ‘women’ rather than terms such as ‘everyone’ or ‘no one’ which could be found 
in other articles of the Convention.59 The Court effectively used an intentionalist argument 
to limit the scope of Article 12. It did not however refer to any definitive statement in travaux 
préparatoires that supports this interpretation of the intention of the drafters, unlike in 
Johnston where it was shown that the drafters had omitted the reference to dissolution of 
marriage.60 
The Court went on to consider the context at the time of drafting the Convention. It 
was of the view that when one takes into consideration the time in which the Convention was 
drafted, 1950, marriage at that time was widely considered to be a union between a man and 
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a woman therefore that lent additional credence to interpreting Article 12 as only being 
applicable to a marriage between a man and a woman.61 Another consideration for the Court 
was the link between the right to marry and the founding of a family. This had been an issue 
that had been raised even in previous case law on transsexuals as an argument against 
granting the right to marry same sex couples.62 The argument had been that the object and 
purpose of Article 12 which guaranteed the right to marry was linked to the creation of a 
family, therefore it could only be interpreted as the right of marriage between a man and a 
woman. Following its previous jurisprudence, the Court was of the view that the inability to 
procreate cannot be interpreted to mean that it removes the right to marry. However, the 
Court was of the view that this does not lead to any conclusions in relation to same-sex 
marriage.63  
The Court’s approach to the admissibility question so far, reflects the rules of 
interpretation in Article 31 of the VCLT First, it looked at the text, then the context at the 
time of the drafting of the ECHR and finally, the object and purpose of Article 12. There 
was also a reference here to the ‘intention’ approach, as the Court was drawing conclusions 
based on what it presumed to be the ‘deliberate’ selection of the words ‘men’ and ‘women’. 
Whilst, it has already been established in chapter three that the Court does not rely solely 
only on the intention approach, it could be referred to by the Court in conjunction with other 
considerations before coming to its decision as can be seen in this case. Neither the textual, 
contextual nor object and purpose approach could lead to a conclusion that the right of same 
sex couples to marry could be inferred from Article 12.  
The Court went on to state that in actual fact the applicant had not relied on the textual 
interpretation of Article 12 as the basis of their claim but had rather relied on the living 
instrument approach of the Court. They had contended that ‘Article 12 should, in the light 
of present-day conditions, be read as granting same-sex couples access to marriage or, in 
other words, as obliging member States to provide for such access in their national laws.’64 
The Court acknowledged that there had been major social changes to the institution of 
marriage since 1950 but it also noted a lack of European consensus regarding same-sex 
marriage. This lack of consensus was based on the finding that only six of the forty-seven 
member States allowed same-sex marriage.65 This could be distinguished from the Christine 
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Goodwin case because the Court had seen a convergence of standards in relation to marriage 
of transsexuals in their assigned gender. The issue in that case also involved marriage 
between partners of a different gender.66 At this stage, one can see the Court resorting once 
again to the consensus argument in order to determine whether or not the living instrument 
approach should be applied in this case. The Court could not find European consensus. 
The Court then proceeded to consider international consensus. A comparison had been 
made between the Convention and Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (‘the Charter’) which did not refer to ‘men’ and ‘women’ and the 
accompanying Commentary of the Charter which confirmed that Article 9 was meant to be 
broader in scope than similar Articles in other human rights instruments.67 The Charter 
however, also refers to the fact that there is diversity in the national laws on this issue and 
leaves the decision on whether to allow same-sex marriage to the States.68 Based on Article 
9 of the Charter, the Court decided that: 
 
Regard being had to Article 9 of the Charter, therefore, the Court would no 
longer consider that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 must in all 
circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite sex. 
Consequently, it cannot be said that Article 12 is inapplicable to the applicants’ 
complaint.69  
 
This decision that Article 12 was applicable to same sex couples, on the basis of the 
provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which does not 
actually specify same-sex marriage, is not consistent with the Court’s approach to 
international consensus.  In other cases where it has considered recent international 
agreements between the States, it has concluded that the particular article was not applicable 
as a result of the lack of specification in the recent international agreement considered.70 The 
method of coming to this decision is therefore subject to criticism. 
Following its finding that Article 12 was applicable, the Court did not, however, find a 
violation but rather deferred to the national authorities on the issue of how to regulate same-
same marriage. In the words of the Court, ‘However, as matters stand, the question whether 
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or not to allow same-sex marriage is left to regulation by the national law of the Contracting 
State’.71 The Court based its decision on the basis that that ‘marriage has deep-rooted social 
and cultural connotations which may differ largely from society to society’ and the Court 
should therefore ‘not rush to substitute its own judgment in place of that of the national 
authorities, who are best placed to assess and respond to the needs of the society’.72 It 
concluded that Article 12 does not ‘impose an obligation on the respondent Government to 
grant a same-sex couple such as the applicant’s access to marriage’.73 There had, therefore, 
been no violation of Article 12 of the Convention. This application of the margin of 
appreciation is what Spielmann refers to as a ‘the margin within the margin’.74 This is a 
situation where the State has a discretion to decide on whether to regulate a particular issue 
and the manner in which they do so.  In this case, a discretion to decide whether or not to 
recognise same-sex couples and the status to accord to them. 
This finding of compatibility as criticised in the Concurring opinion of Judge 
Malinverni joined by Judge Kolver is quite instructive. Whilst he agreed and voted with 
the majority that there had been no violation of Article 12, he disagreed with the view the 
Court had taken in relation to the applicability of Article 12.75 Referring to Article 31 of 
the VCLT, he argued that the ordinary meaning to be given to Article 12 could not be 
anything other than recognising that a man and woman, that is persons of opposite sex, 
have the right to marry.76 He also took the position that when Article 12 was read in the 
light of the object and purpose of the ECHR, the same conclusion could be reached. As 
Article 12 associates the right to marry with the right to found a family, he was of the 
view that this this showed that Article 12 referred to marriage between a man and a 
woman. He argued that Article 31 (3) (b) VCLT which allows for subsequent practice to 
be taken into consideration could not be relied on to come to the finding that Article 12 
should now be read in such a way as not to exclude marriage between same-sex couples. 
To support this, he argued that the fact that six States provide the possibility for 
homosexual couples to marry, cannot be regarded as ‘subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty’. He concluded that the literal interpretation prevents the 
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interpretation of Article 12 as conferring the right to marry on persons of the same sex.77 
Furthermore, even if the supplementary rules of interpretation under Article 32 VCLT 
were considered, he would come to the same conclusion.  
On the issue of the application of the living instrument doctrine, Judge Malinverni 
acknowledged that the Convention is a living instrument that should be interpreted in a 
manner that takes into consideration present-conditions. He also acknowledged that there 
have been substantial changes to the institution of marriage since the adoption of the 
Convention. He, however, argued that based on the Court’s existing case law a limitation 
to the evolutive interpretation was that the Court cannot be means of an evolutive 
interpretation derive from it a right that was not included therein at the outset.78 He 
rejected the argument that the Court could rely on Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union to find that Article 12 should now be read to include the 
right to marry for same-sex couples. Whilst there was a difference in the way Article 9 of 
the Charter was framed, he was of the view that no inferences could be drawn from this 
in relation to the interpretation of Article 12 of the Convention. Judge Malinverni’s 
reliance on Article 31-33 of the VCLT and the consensus argument to come to a different 
conclusion to that of the Court on the issue of applicability is quite instructive even though 
the majority did not agree with the outcome he proposed. 
The second applicability argument arose from the allegation of the applicants that 
they had been discriminated against because of their sexual orientation because they were 
denied the right to marry and they did not have any other possibility of their relationship 
being recognised before the entry into force of the Registered Partnership Act. They 
alleged that this amounted to a breach of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8.79 
In relation to this strand of argument, the Court adopted Model 3 (LI and MOA 
applicability & compatibility). This is therefore one of the ‘hard case’ scenarios where 
there was potential for direct conflict between both doctrines. The government agreed 
with the applicants that Article 8 was applicable in this case as the relationship between a 
same-sex couple came within the notion of ‘private life’ provided for within the Article. 
The applicability issue was whether the relationship of a same-sex couple also constitute 
‘family life’ for the purposes of Article 8 of the Convention.80  
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The Court in addressing the issue of whether there had been a violation of Article 
14 in conjunction with Article 8, reiterated its position that Article 14 had no independent 
existence and could only be applied where another Article of the Convention was engaged 
as well.81  The Court reiterated some of its earlier case law which had shown that the 
notion of family was not confined to marriage-based relationships.82 The Court drew 
attention to more recent cases where it recognised a growing tendency in some of the 
European States to recognise stable relationships between homosexual couples but in 
those cases it had come to the conclusion that there was a lack of consensus on that issue 
and as such States could still enjoy a wide margin of appreciation.83 The Court then drew 
attention to the evolution that had taken place in social attitudes towards same-sex couples 
since its previous decision in the Mata Estevez case in 2001. It noted that in ‘a 
considerable number of member States have afforded legal recognition to same-sex 
couples’.84 This could be seen as the Court recognising European consensus. In addition, 
it noted that ‘Certain provisions of European Union law also reflect a growing tendency 
to include same-sex couples in the notion of “family”’85  This could be seen as the Court 
seeking international consensus on the issue as well. The Court concluded that: 
 
In view of this evolution, the Court considers it artificial to maintain the view 
that, in contrast to a different-sex couple, a same-sex couple cannot enjoy 
“family life” for the purposes of Article 8. Consequently, the relationship of the 
applicants, a cohabiting same-sex couple living in a stable de facto partnership, 
falls within the notion of “family life”, just as the relationship of a different-sex 
couple in the same situation would.86 
 
This decision that the facts of the case came within the notion of ‘private life’ as well as 
‘family life’ within the meaning of Article 8 showed that the living instrument doctrine 
trumped the wide margin of appreciation of the States in this area.  
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In regard to the compliance issue as to whether there had been a breach of Article 14 
taken in conjunction with Article 8, once again the Court had to grapple with the 
competing doctrines of the living instrument and margin of appreciation. It first of all 
drew attention to the key principles of Article 14 and the margin of appreciation enjoyed 
by the States in this area:  
 
[I]n order for an issue to arise under Article 14 there must be a difference in 
treatment of persons in relevantly similar situations. Such a difference of 
treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification; in 
other words, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought 
to be realised. The Contracting States enjoy a margin of appreciation in assessing 
whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a 
difference in treatment.87 
 
The Court reiterated its principle that differences based on sex or sexual orientation 
should be justified by very weighty reasons. It acknowledged that the States had a margin of 
appreciation in this area and that the scope of that margin would vary according to 
‘circumstances, the subject-matter and its background’.88 It also referred to the fact that one 
of the factors that may be relevant could be the existence or non-existence of common 
ground between the laws of the contracting states’.89 The Court then addressed the two key 
‘limbs’ of the applicants’ arguments in relation to being discriminated against: first, that as 
a same-sex couple, they did not have access to marriage and second, no alternative means of 
legal recognition was available to them until the entry into force of the Registered 
Partnership Act.90 With regards to the first limb of the argument, the Court was of the view 
that since it had already held earlier that Article 12 does not impose an obligation on States 
to grant access to marriage for same-sex couples, Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 
8 could not be interpreted as imposing that obligation on the States.91 It referred back to its 
principle that the Convention should be read as a whole.92  
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On the second point of whether the respondent State should have provided an alternative 
method of recognition for the applicants, the Court noted that the Registered Partnership Act 
had now come into force. The question to be considered was therefore whether the 
respondent States had a responsibility to provide that recognition earlier than it did.93 The 
Court noted ‘an emerging European consensus towards legal recognition of same-sex 
couples’ but that ‘there is not yet a majority of States providing for legal recognition of same-
sex couples’.94 Based on this lack of consensus, it was an area of ‘evolving rights’, in which 
‘States must also enjoy a margin of appreciation in the timing of the introduction of 
legislative changes’.95 Once again we see the Court adopting a margin within a margin. The 
Austrian Registered Partnership Act which came into force on 1 January 2010 was part of 
that emerging consensus and that the legislators could not be ‘reproached’ for not 
considering this legislation earlier. The Court was also not convinced that some of the 
differences which existed between the registered partnerships on the one hand and the 
institution of marriage on the other, amounted to a discrimination against the applicants. The 
Court was of the view that the States ‘enjoy a certain margin of appreciation as regards the 
exact status conferred by alternative means of recognition’.96 As a result of this finding, it 
held that ‘On the whole, the Court does not see any indication that the respondent State 
exceeded its margin of appreciation in its choice of rights and obligations conferred by 
registered partnership’.97 There had therefore been no violation of Article 14 taken in 
conjunction with Article 8.98 
In the dissenting opinion of Judge Rozakis, Judge Spielmann and Judge Jebens, they 
disagreed with the finding that there had been no violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction 
with Article 8. They were of the view that once the Court found that same-sex relationships 
fell within the ambit of ‘family life’ under Article 8, they should then have required the 
government to advance its reasons for the difference in treatment between same-sex couples 
and heterosexual couples. They were of the view that the margin of appreciation argument 
should only be relevant where the government had adduced its reasons for the difference in 
treatment. Since the government had not done so in this case, they concluded that the Court 
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should have found a violation of the Convention.99 Although these judges dissented on the 
issue of a finding of violation, they agreed with the decision about compatibility and the 
applicability of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, so there was unanimity on 
this point.  
In the two cases that have been discussed under this section of expansion of the scope 
ratione materiae without expansion of the duty on the State, the Court has relied on the 
living instrument doctrine to find the relevant issues to be compatible with the Convention’s 
guarantees. In Sahin, it led to a finding that higher education institutions came within the 
scope of Art 2 PN1 whilst in Schalk and Kopf it led to a finding that Article 12 can no longer 
be interpreted to exclude same sex marriage. It also formed the basis for the decision that the 
relationship between same sex couples was ‘family life’ within the ambit of Article 8 ECHR. 
In Schalk which was discussed in a greater depth, the rules of interpretation in Article 31-32 
of the VCLT were relevant to the Court’s interpretation although it moved beyond those 
tools to consider the living instrument doctrine. The basis for the Court decision that Article 
12 could be applied to same sex couples is however out of sync with its practice in finding 
consensus. It relied on only one international instrument, one that did not even expressly 
provide for marriage between same sex couples, in order to come to its decision. There was 
a clear lack of European consensus in the practice of States on the recognition of same sex 
marriage, but the Court still made a decision that Article 12 was applicable, although it 
stopped short of a finding that there had been a violation under Article 12. 
 In relation to the finding that the relationship between same-sex couples comes within 
the ambit of family life under Article 14, there was a clear contention between the living 
instrument doctrine and the margin of appreciation doctrine. The Court chose the evolving 
consensus in views concerning legal recognition of same-sex couples and its case law to 
decide that the relationship was part of family life, although it once again stopped short of 
finding a violation. The right was therefore seen as a ground of a duty, but the duty was not 
imposed due to counteracting factors. It is interesting to note that in a recent advisory opinion 
delivered by the Inter-American Court, it found that States had a duty to extend some form 
of legal protection to homosexual couples. In relation to Costa Rica which already had civil 
marriage in place, the Court was of the view that to comply with the American Convention 
on Human Rights, Costa Rica did not need to create any new institutions but should rather 
                                                 




extend the existing institutions for marriage to same sex couples.100 This suggests a different 
position to that of the ECtHR in Schalk where a duty to provide access to marriage for same 
sex couples was not recognised. Although, there have been some criticisms of the impact of 
this decision of the Inter-American Court, it would therefore be interesting to see what the 
ECtHR’s position will be on the margin of appreciation enjoyed by a State in this area, if a 
similar case is brought before it in the future.101 
 
5.5.2 Expansion of the Scope of the Convention, And Expansion of Duty on the State  
This section considers cases where the Court found that the particular issue was 
compatible with the Convention after there had been a living instrument debate on the issue 
and the Court also found that the respondent State had been in breach of its obligations under 
the Convention. The highest number of cases from the sample come under this category with 
a total of 9 out of the 14 cases falling within this section. A selection of these cases will be 
discussed below, drawing from the different categories of the use of the living instrument 
and margin of appreciation doctrines within the cases.  
In six out of the nine cases that fall under this section of extension of both scope of 
the Convention and the duty of the States, Model 1 was adopted by the Court (LI 
applicability, MOA compliance).102 In two of the cases, Model 2 was adopted by the Court 
(LI applicability, LI and MOA compliance),103 whilst in one case, Model 4 was adopted by 
the Court (MOA applicability, LI compliance).104 A variety of issues were covered in these 
cases. In Matthews v United Kingdom, the applicability issue was whether Article 3 of 
Protocol No 1 which guaranteed the right to free elections was applicable to elections to the 
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European Parliament.105 In S A Dangeville v France the issue was whether an application 
for refund of VAT paid in error constituted an ‘asset’ and therefore a ‘possession’ within the 
meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No 1.106  In Société Colas Est and Others v France the 
applicability question was whether the provisions of Article 8 applied to juristic persons such 
as the applicants and whether it afforded protection for their business premises.107  
In Berganovic v Croatia, the applicability question was whether the severity of the 
attack against the applicant which was inflicted by other individuals, came within the ambit 
of Article 3.108 In Bayatyan v Armenia, the applicability question was whether the right to 
conscientious objection was protected under Article 9 ECHR. 109 In Magyar Helsinki 
Bizottsag v Hungary, the applicability question was whether Article 10 which provides for 
the right to freedom of information, also includes a right of access to State held 
information.110 In Demir and Baykara v Turkey the applicability question was centred on 
whether a right for municipal servants to form a trade union and engage in collective 
bargaining came within the ambit of Article 11 of the ECHR. It can be seen that the cases in 
this section were not restricted to issues under Articles 8-11, the usual Articles where it is 
assumed the margin of appreciation would be relevant. Instead they have a wider coverage. 
 
5.5.2.1 Living Instrument Doctrine Without a Consensus Factor 
In each of these cases, the Court relying on the living instrument doctrine came to a 
positive decision on applicability of the Convention to the issues raised. Although the living 
instrument doctrine was applied in all of these cases, there were differences in how the Court 
approached the cases. In coming to the decision in Matthews that Article 3 of Protocol No 1 
applied to elections to the European Parliament, the Court relied on the living instrument 
doctrine noting that: 
 
The Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions is firmly rooted in the Court’s case law…The mere fact 
that a body was not envisaged by the drafters of the Convention cannot prevent 
that body from falling within the scope of the Convention. To the extent that 
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Contracting States organise common constitutional or parliamentary structures 
by international treaties, the Court must take these mutually agreed structural 
changes into account in interpreting the Convention and its Protocols.111   
 
The intention of the drafters was therefore not a limiting factor in this context. The Court did 
not however proceed to conduct any comparative analysis in this case. It rather took a textual 
approach to interpret the word legislature.112 On the substantive issue of whether there had 
been a breach of the obligations on the State, the Court affirmed the wide margin of 
appreciation available to the States in the area of elections. 113 However since the applicant 
had been left with no opportunity to express her choice of members of the European 
Parliament, the Court found that the very essence of the applicant’s right to vote as 
guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No 3 had been denied.114  There was therefore a 
violation of that provision by the respondent State.  
 A similar approach to the living instrument doctrine in which the Court did not 
engage in a comparative analysis to determine consensus was also adopted in S A Dangeville 
v France,115 where the living instrument doctrine was relied on in coming to the decision 
that an application for refund of VAT paid in error constituted an ‘asset’ and therefore a 
‘possession’ within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No 1.116 Also in Société Colas Est 
and Others v France the ECtHR did not conduct any inquiry into consensus when it decided 
that the provisions of Article 8 applied to juristic persons and afforded protection for business 
premises.117 A similar approach was also adopted in Berganovic v Croatia, where the Court 
found that the acts of violence that had been alleged by the applicant were severe enough to 
come within the ambit of Article 3 ECHR.118 There was no reference to the existence or non-
existence of consensus in relation to the application of the living instrument doctrine. The 
focus was rather on the need for an ‘increased firmness in assessing breaches of fundamental 
values of democratic societies’.119 Berganovic case was significant in the sense that the Court 
was able to rely on the living instrument doctrine in finding that actions between individuals 
could come under the coverage of Article 3 where they were of a certain severe standard. 
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The margin of appreciation doctrine was acknowledged in relation to the room for States to 
ensure criminal law remedies, but the supervision of that margin led to a finding of a breach 
of obligations on the State where the investigation had not been effective.  
 These cases suggest that the living instrument doctrine goes beyond a consideration 
of the practice within States and a comparative exercise to find the majoritarian approach. 
The living instrument doctrine in these cases was a tool that required the Court to engage in 
a greater scrutiny of the issues in order to ensure a higher level of protection of rights. This 
shows that the living instrument doctrine is not just about consensus. It is about ensuring 
adequate protection of rights whether or not there is consensus in the practice of States. 
 
5.5.2.2 Living Instrument Doctrine with a Consensus Factor 
A different approach to the relevance of consensus is however seen in the case of 
Bayatyan v Armenia where the Court had to determine if the right to conscientious objection 
is within the scope of Article 9 which provides for the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion.120 This case was significant as it was the first time the Court had to 
make a clear pronouncement on this issue.  In considering the issue of applicability of Article 
9, the Court reiterated the jurisprudence from earlier case law of the Commission which had 
restricted the consideration of conscientious objection to Article 4(3) which left it to the 
discretion of contracting parties.121 In deciding whether or not to move away from this 
existing jurisprudence, the Court noted the potential for conflict between legal certainty and 
the relevance of the Convention to present day society. It stated that: 
 
Whilst it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before 
the law that the Court should not depart, without good reason, from precedents 
laid down in previous cases, a failure by the Court to maintain a dynamic and 
evolutive approach would risk rendering it a bar to reform or improvement…It 
is of crucial importance that the Convention is interpreted and applied in a 
manner which renders its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and 
illusory…122 
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The Court was not convinced that the approach of the Commission in the past to this 
issue is approach was in in line with the real purpose and meaning of Article 4(3). It relied 
on the travaux préparatoires in coming to this decision.123 The Court however linked the 
interpretation that the Commission had adopted in earlier cases, to the prevailing attitudes of 
the time.124 This formed the basis for the Court’s reference to the living instrument doctrine 
and the resultant consideration of the changes that had happened in society. The Court found 
that there had been changes which showed consensus at the international,125 European126 and 
national level,127 to recognise conscientious objection. As a result, it could no longer confirm 
the Commission case law. This finding of applicability as a result of consensus in the practice 
of States, resulted in a ‘limited margin of appreciation’ being granted to any State that had 
not introduced alternatives to military service.128 In this case, the Armenian authorities were 
unable to justify the interference and were found to be in breach of their obligations under 
Article 9. 
In the more recent case of Magyar Helsinki Bizottsag v Hungary, the Court had to 
decide whether Article 10 could be interpreted as guaranteeing the applicant NGO a right of 
access to information held by public authorities. In that case, the Court was faced with a 
similar position as that in Bayatyan, where it had earlier jurisprudence on the issue which it 
had to decide to either follow or depart from. It recognised that there were inconsistences in 
its earlier case law and decided it needed to take a broader look at the extent to which the 
right of access to information could be gleaned from Article 10. 129 In a similar fashion to 
Bayatyan, the Court considered the travaux préparatoires 130 and through a comparative 
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approach recognised European131 and international consensus132 on the right of access to 
information. The Court concluded that there was nothing to exclude the interpretation of 
Article 10 as including a right of access to information.133 It decided that by denying access 
to the information in question, there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights 
under Article 10. The applicant’s complaint was therefore compatible ratione materiae with 
the Convention.134 The Court also went on to find that there had been a violation of Article 
10 by the State. It concluded that the interference was not necessary in a democratic society. 
‘Notwithstanding the respondent State’s margin of appreciation, there was not a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the measure complained of and the legitimate aim 
pursued.’ 135 The State had violated its obligations under Article 10(2) of the Convention.  
The case of Demir and Baykara v Turkey was also another one in which the Court 
had to depart from earlier jurisprudence and it adopted a similar approach of conducting a 
comparative study to find out whether there was consensus on the issue.136 In that case the 
applicants complained that, in breach of Article 11 of the Convention, by itself or in 
conjunction with Article 14, the domestic courts had denied them, first, the right to form 
trade unions and, second, the right to engage in collective bargaining and enter into collective 
agreements.137 On the issue of the right of municipal servants to form a trade union, the 
ECtHR drew support for its position that municipal civil servants should not be excluded 
from the right to organise and form trade unions by adopting the living instrument doctrine. 
It examined international consensus,138 and European practice which showed that the right 
of public servants to join trade unions was now recognised in all the Contracting States to 
the Convention.139 Relying on this combination of international and European consensus, 
the Court concluded that ‘members of the administration of the State’ cannot be excluded 
                                                 
131 It referred to the practice of contracting states. In nearly all of the 31-member States of the Council of 
Europe that had been surveyed had enacted legislation on access to information and that there was in existence 
the Convention on Access to Official Documents 2009. 
132 It referred to inter alia the ICCPR and the UDHR as well as decisions of the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights on the right of access to information. Magyar Helsinki Bizottság (n 102), paras 138-
148. 
133 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság (n 102), paras 138-149. 
134 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság (n 102), para 180. 
135 Ibid para 200. 
136 Demir and Baykara (n 103). 
137 Ibid. 
138 It relied on provisions such as Article 8(2) of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights 1966 (ICESCR); Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); 
provisions from the ILO Convention No 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise; 
Article 12 (1) European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights 




from the scope of Article 11 of the Convention.140 The restrictions by the State could not be 
justified as being ‘necessary in a democratic society’ within the meaning of Article 11(2) of 
the Convention.141 The failure to recognise the rights of the applicants as civil servants to 
form a trade union was therefore a violation of Article 11 of the Convention.142  
On the question whether Article 11 included the right to collective bargaining. Taking 
all these developments at the international, regional and national levels into consideration, 
the Court concluded that: 
 
In the light of these developments, the Court considers that its case-law to the effect 
that the right to bargain collectively and to enter into collective agreements does 
not constitute an inherent element of Article 11… should be reconsidered, so as to 
take account of the perceptible evolution in such matters, in both international law 
and domestic legal systems. While it is in the interests of legal certainty, 
foreseeability and equality before the law that the Court should not depart, without 
good reason, from precedents established in previous cases, a failure by the Court 
to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would risk rendering it a bar to 
reform or improvement ...143 
 
As a result of the developments that had been highlighted, the Court concluded that the 
right to bargain collectively had in principle become one of the essential elements of the 
right to form and join trade unions under Article 11. States, however, remain free to organise 
their national system as they see fit and grant special status to representatives of trade unions. 
Civil servants, just like other workers should enjoy the rights under Article 11 subject to 
lawful restrictions.144 In this case, the State had a ‘limited’ margin of appreciation.145 ‘The 
absence of the legislation necessary to give effect to the provisions of the international labour 
conventions already ratified by Turkey, and the Court of Cassation judgment of 6 December 
1995 based on that absence, with the resulting de facto annulment ex tunc of the collective 
agreement in question, constituted interference with the applicants’ trade-union freedom as 
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protected by Article 11 of the Convention’.146 The Court unanimously held that there had 
therefore been a violation of the Convention in respect of the applicants and their trade union. 
Consensus was also important in Glor v Switzerland, where the Court found the 
existence of ‘European and worldwide consensus on the need to protect people with 
disabilities from discriminatory treatment’.147 The Court relied on this consensus in coming 
to the decision that Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 could be applied in relation 
to an allegation of discriminatory treatment on account of disability.148 To evidence the 
consensus, the Court referred to a combination of European and international treaties.149 This 
case is significant because it was the first time the ECtHR was applying Article 14 in relation 
to disability. Similarly, in Siliadin v France consensus was also relevant. The Court had to 
determine whether Article 4 which prohibits slavery, servitude and forced labour, includes 
a positive obligation to provide for criminal and civil remedies to protect individuals from 
these prohibited actions.150 The Court referred to international treaties which provided 
protection from slavery.151 Taking these different international Conventions into account, 
the Court concluded that it would be inconsistent with these provisions to hold that Article 
4 only imposed negative obligations on the State.152 Such a decision would render the 
protection under these instruments ineffective.  
The Court held that in a similar fashion to Article 3, States have a positive obligation 
under Article 4 to adopt criminal-law provisions to penalise the practices prohibited and to 
apply them in practice.153 In relation to whether the applicant was held in slavery or 
servitude, the Court referred to the living instrument doctrine. The Court noted that slavery 
and servitude were not classified as such under French Criminal law.154 It was however of 
the view that the civil remedies which were available to the applicant were not sufficient. It 
concluded that the legislation which was available at the time did not provide the applicant 
with adequate practical and effective protection from the actions of which she was a 
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victim.155 The Court came to a unanimous decision that there had been a violation of the 
positive obligation on the State under Article 4 of the Convention. Consensus was therefore 
an important determinant of the Court’s position on whether Article 4 included positive 
obligations and whether the provision in the French Criminal law to provided adequate 
protection in this area. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to present the first case analysis, with a focus on the use 
of the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines to determine the scope of 
applicability ratione materiae of the ECHR. The question of compatibility ratione materiae 
is important as it determines whether the ECtHR has the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 
Whilst a distinction between the use of the doctrines at the applicability and merits stage is 
largely ignored in the literature, this researcher considers it an important element for this 
thesis and seeks to contribute to the existing knowledge in this area by including an analysis 
of the case law under this heading. An understanding of the interaction between the margin 
of appreciation and living instrument doctrines at the applicability stage is relevant to 
answering RQ 1 (relationship), RQ 2 (conflict) and RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical 
approaches). 
The first analysis conducted in this chapter was with the quantitative method of 
descriptive statistical analysis. Four key questions were explored in that section: (a) Is 
compatibility ratione materiae contested in the case? (b) Are the margin of appreciation or 
living instrument doctrine arguments referred to in addressing compatibility? (c) Which of 
the two arguments is used the most at the compatibility stage? (d) What is the outcome of 
compatibility arguments in cases in which there is a margin of appreciation or living 
instrument argument? The descriptive analysis revealed that the question of compatibility 
ratione materiae featured in 47% of the case sample, hence it was an issue worth considering 
in more detail. In 40% of those cases, either the margin of appreciation or living instrument 
arguments were raised. It also revealed that living instrument arguments were raised in 79% 
of the relevant cases. In terms of the overall outcome of the compatibility ratione materiae 
arguments, the Court found the issue to be compatible with the convention in 79% of the 
cases examined where there was either a margin of appreciation or living instrument 
argument. Furthermore, in almost all the cases where the living instrument doctrine was 
                                                 




raised, the Court found the issue to be compatible ratione materiae with the Convention.156 
This prompted an initial finding on RQ 2 (conflict) which suggested that living instrument 
arguments were superseding margin of appreciation arguments at the applicability stage on 
the issue of compatibility ratione materiae. There was however a need to engage in some 
more analysis of the case law to see what impact this had on the overall outcome of the case. 
To further examine the impact on the final outcome of the case, the descriptive 
statistical analysis provided some answers to RQ 1 (relationship) by revealing four different 
models and ways in which the living instrument and margin of appreciate doctrines 
interacted in the cases examined. The four models were: 
 
1. Living instrument doctrine applied to applicability argument, only margin of 
appreciation doctrine applied to compliance (Model 1 LI applicability, MOA 
compliance) 
2. Living instrument doctrine applied to applicability argument, both living instrument 
and margin of appreciation doctrines applied to compliance. (Model 2 LI 
applicability, LI and MOA compliance) 
3. Living instrument and margin of appreciation doctrines applied to both the 
applicability argument and the compliance arguments. (Model 3 LI and MOA 
applicability & compliance) 
4. Margin of appreciation doctrine applied to applicability argument, only living 
instrument doctrine applied to compliance. (Model 4 MOA applicability, LI 
compliance) 
The most occurring model in the case law was Model 1 (LI applicability, MOA 
compliance). Interestingly, there were only two cases in Model 3 (LI and MOA 
applicability and compliance) which is the Model where there was potential for a clear 
interaction between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines both at the 
applicability and compliances stages. This suggests that the issue of conflict between both 
doctrines in particular on the issue of compatibility ratione materiae was not at a very 
high level in the case law. It also ostensibly suggests that the supposed conflict between 
the two doctrines is not a simple issue of both doctrines appearing within the same part of 
the case. In both cases under Model 3, the Court found that there had been no violation of 
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the Convention. This shows that there was some impact of the margin of appreciation as 
a counteracting factor when the living instrument doctrine was raised to argue for 
compatibility ratione materiae. The descriptive analysis was however limited in terms of 
what it could reveal about the reasoning of the Court in coming to either a positive or 
negative decision on  compatibility ratione materiae, a point that would be relevant for 
answering RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches).  It was also restricted due to 
the limited number of cases that fell within this category for examination. It was therefore 
deemed necessary by the researcher to engage in a doctrinal analysis by way of textual 
analysis. 
The second analysis which was the textual analysis, was based on the findings that 
had been revealed from the descriptive statistical analysis. Two words ‘expansion’ and 
‘restriction’ were relevant in structuring the presentation of the analysis. The examination 
of the interaction between the margin of appreciation and living instrument revealed that 
there was both ‘expansion’ and ‘restriction’ ratione materiae of the scope of the ECHR. 
The Johnston and VO cases were examples of restriction of the scope of the Convention 
even where there had been a living instrument argument. VO was considered in more 
detail because it was a Model 3 (LI and MOA applicability & compliance) case and could 
therefore provide further insights to RQ 2 (conflict). In VO, the margin of appreciation 
trumped the living instrument doctrine due to the Court finding a lack of consensus on the 
issue. This suggested a negative answer to RQ 2 (conflict) as it suggested that living 
instrument arguments were not trumping margin of appreciation arguments when both 
were placed side by side before the Court when dealing with the compatibility ratione 
materiae issue in that case. 
An examination of the case law in relation to the expansion ratione materie of the 
scope of the Convention revealed two outcomes. First, expansion of the scope ratione 
materiae of the Convention without an expansion on the duty on the State. Second, 
expansion ratione materiae of the scope of the Convention plus an expansion of the duty 
on the State. In relation to the former, expansion of the scope ratione materiae without 
expansion of duty, Schalk and Kopf a  Model 3 (LI and MOA, applicability & compliance) 
case, revealed that the living instrument argument trumped the margin of appreciation 
argument even though there was no clear evidence of existing consensus in that area. This 
suggested a positive answer to RQ 2 (conflict) as it showed that living instrument 
argument was trumping the margin of appreciation argument on compatibility when 




The difference in outcomes in VO and Schalk and Kopf at the compatibility stage 
showed that it was not in all cases that the living instrument argument superseded margin 
of appreciation arguments (RQ 2). However, the similarity of the overall decision of the 
Court in both cases that the States were not in breach of their obligations under the 
Convention, suggests that the margin of appreciation doctrine superseded the living 
instrument doctrine at the merits stage which is important. This finding is significant as it 
challenges the view seen in the literature that the living instrument doctrine is negatively 
affecting the margin of appreciation. In these two cases where both doctrines were placed 
side by side, the margin of appreciation doctrine trumped the living instrument doctrine 
at the point that counted – the determination of whether the State was in breach of its 
obligations. 
In relation to the second outcome of expansion of scope ratione materiae and 
expansion of scope of duty, the analysis showed that a higher number of cases were found 
in this category. Cases in Model 1 (LI applicability, MOA compliance) had the highest 
incidence of expansion ratione materiae of both the scope of the Convention and the duty 
on the State. The doctrinal textual analysis showed that consensus was not always 
essential to the case even where the Court raised the living instrument doctrine. This 
suggest that contrary to the understanding of the living instrument doctrine which seems 
to link it with consensus, there is scope for the application of the living instrument doctrine 
even without the Court engaging in a comparative exercise to find out the existence or 
non-existence of consensus. The living instrument doctrine in such cases appears to be 
used as a reason to require a higher standard of protection which is not based on 
majoritarian State practice but based on the nature of the right in issue and the need to 
ensure effective protection. This finding was relevant in answering RQ 3 (interpretive and 
theoretical approaches). 
Other themes revealed by the case analysis in this chapter is that the interaction 
between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines spreads across a 
variety of Articles of the Convention. From Article 3 which would be considered to 
enshrine an absolute right, to Article 10 which is recognised as a qualified right. The living 
instrument doctrine has, therefore, to an extent increased the use of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine in that it is required when dealing with the assessment of positive 
obligations on the State. The doctrinal textual analysis provided further answers to RQ 3 
(interpretive and theoretical approaches) as it showed that the interpretive method adopted 




in most cases. There are, however, some of the cases where strong dissenting opinions 
also relying on the VCLT come to different conclusions. Whilst the VCLT is seen as a 
starting point in most cases, there is not always similarity in the way the Court gives 
weight to certain aspects of the interpretive process. In some cases, where a particular 
issue is found to have been consciously excluded from the Convention, the Court finds 
that the case is not compatible ratione materiae but in others, where such evidence exists, 
the Court has decided that those materials from the travaux préparatoires were not 
decisive. There is therefore to an extent, a lack of consistency in the approach of the Court 
when adopting the rules of interpretation in the VCLT. 
Reflecting on dynamic restricted correlativity which is based on Raz’s critique of 
the correlativity thesis examined in chapter four, it can be seen that in many of the cases 
examined, the finding of compatibility ratione materiae and the existence of a right did 
not automatically mean that a duty ensued on the part of the State. It was a finding of a 
ground of a duty but in some of the cases, using the margin of appreciation doctrine, the 
State was not considered to have a duty, and, in some others, it was not considered to have 
breached its duty in relation to that right. Raz’s idea that a right can be the ground of more 
than one duty is also seen, as in quite a few of the cases examined, the Court was creating 
‘new duties’ on the States, flowing from the finding of applicability of the Convention to 
the issue raised. The dynamic nature of duties is also clearly seen through the cases where 
the Court moved away from earlier jurisprudence such as the Demir and Baykara and the 
Bayatyan cases. From a theoretical perspective, this shows that in the case law, rights are 
not always seen as correlative of duties, but rather grounds of duties. This sheds further 
light on RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches). 
Overall, this chapter has provided some answers to RQ 1 (relationship), RQ 2 
(conflict) and RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches). It has shown that the living 
instrument and margin of appreciation doctrines interact in a variety of ways within the 
case law of the Court. There is no ‘one size fits all’ explanation of the interaction but the 
four models of how they are used in the case law is an addition to the literature and this 
has been achieved through a combination of the quantitative and qualitative analysis 
adopted within this chapter. In the next chapter, the second phase of analysis of the case 
law focuses on those cases where their applicability was not contested or the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines were not raised at the applicability stage. It 




conclusion on the interpretive approach applied by the Court and whether living 







Case Analysis Part II 
Margin of Appreciation and Living Instrument Arguments in Determining the 
Nature and Scope of Duties on States 
 
6. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the focus was on the use of living instrument and margin of 
appreciation arguments in deciding the issue of compatibility ratione materiae. Since the 
question of compatibility ratione materiae goes to the question of the jurisdiction of the Court 
to deal with a particular issue, it was necessary to consider that separately. The case analysis 
showed that living instrument arguments were used more than margin of appreciation 
arguments at the applicability stage. In almost all the cases where the living instrument 
doctrine was relied on, the Court found the issue to be compatible ratione materiae with the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, the Convention).1 There were however 
some cases where the margin of appreciation trumped the living instrument argument on 
compatibility. In assessing the impact of the compatibility argument on the outcome of the 
case, the descriptive statistical analysis of the case law revealed four models of interaction 
between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines in cases where the 
compatibility ratione materiae was contested.2  
Through the use of doctrinal textual analysis of the case law based on the four models 
of interaction, the previous chapter showed that the Court relied in many cases on the 
interpretive rules in Articles 31-32 VCLT even when it did not directly mention those 
Articles in the case. It also showed that it was not in all cases that the use of the living 
instrument argument led to an expansion ratione materiae of the scope of the Convention. 
Furthermore, even in cases where there had been an expansion ratione materiae of the scope 
of the Convention, it was not in all of those cases that the Court ultimately found that the 
State was in breach of its duty under the Convention, essentially still retaining a margin of 
appreciation argument in favour of the State. In such cases, applying the dynamic restricted 
the correlativity thesis, the finding that a particular issue comes within the scope of the 
Convention, provides a ground of the duty but does not automatically mean a duty follows. 
A distinction therefore exists between the finding that a particular issue is within the scope 
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of the Convention, and a finding that a State is in breach of its obligations under the 
Convention. Furthermore, there are instances in which the Court has refrained from an 
expansion of the scope of the Convention and therefore made no expansion in the scope of 
the duties on the State. The analysis from chapter five was therefore relevant to answering 
RQ1 (relationship), RQ 2 (conflict) and RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches). 
The current chapter is the second part of the case analysis. The focus here is on the 
impact of the living instrument in determining the nature and scope of duties of States where 
a margin of appreciation is afforded to the State. This analysis looks at the merits of the case 
itself since the issue of applicability has been considered in the previous chapter. It examines 
the impact the living instrument argument has on the margin of appreciation and the overall 
outcome of the case and the rules of interpretation applied by the Court in coming to its 
conclusion. In order to address this, a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches 
is applied in this chapter. First of all, drawing from the literature in Chapter 2, this chapter 
begins with a discussion on the issue of ‘widths’ of margin of appreciation, the importance 
of this and the extent to which the width of the margin of appreciation is impacted by the 
living instrument doctrine. It then examines the correlation if any, of the width of the margin 
of appreciation afforded and the final decision on whether a State has violated its obligations. 
Following that analysis, the chapter moves on to consider some of the areas where the living 
instrument and margin of appreciation arguments have impacted on the overall outcome of 
the case and how the Court had dealt with those cases. In particular, two case studies are 
examined to show the impact of the living instrument doctrine on the margin of appreciation 
afforded to States in those areas of the Convention. The chapter ends with conclusions that 
are drawn from the different stages of the case analysis conducted. 
 
6.1 Widths of Margin of Appreciation and the Scope of Duty on the State 
One of the areas identified in chapter two in which there is a relationship between the 
margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines, is in relation to the determination of 
the width of the margin of appreciation.3 In a speech at the European Conference of 
Presidents of Parliament, the previous president of the ECtHR, Sir Nicolas Bratza explained 
the process the Court adopts in relation to the application of the margin of appreciation this 
way: 
  
                                                 




In many types of cases, the Court’s approach is first to determine the appropriate 
margin of appreciation. There is no general formula for this – whether the margin 
is broad or narrow depends on a number of variables. The second stage is to 
establish whether or not the national authorities remained within that margin.4 
 
The width of the margin of appreciation afforded to States is therefore a significant 
factor, a preliminary issue to be addressed in cases where a margin of appreciation is relevant. 
From the existing literature, the width of the margin of appreciation afforded to States is 
usually described as either ‘wide’ or ‘narrow’. Where a wide margin of appreciation is 
afforded a State, the Court gives greater deference to the State and would adopt a lower level 
of scrutiny, with the likely outcome that the State is not found to be in violation of its 
obligations.5 On the other hand, where a narrow margin of appreciation is given, the Court 
sets a higher threshold and adopts a higher level of scrutiny, with the likely result that the 
State is found to be in violation of its obligations.6  
Baroness Hale suggests that the application of the living instrument doctrine has the 
unwelcome effect of narrowing the margin of appreciation of the State.7 Grounds for this 
idea can be seen in the case law of the Court itself. In A, B and C v Ireland, the Court whilst 
noting that States have a wide margin of appreciation in the context of abortion rights, went 
on to say ‘however, the question remains whether this wide margin of appreciation is 
narrowed by the existence of a relevant consensus’.8 In this case the ECtHR did not find that 
the margin of appreciation was narrowed by consensus,9 nonetheless it lends support to the 
argument that a wide margin of appreciation can be narrowed where the living instrument 
doctrine is applied and changes in society are relied on based on the consensus approach. 
This chapter tests the use of the living instrument doctrine to alter the width of the margin of 
                                                 
4 Antoine Buyse, ‘Speech of Bratza and Candidates for New Judges’ ECHR Blog, 21 September 2012. 
Available at < http://echrblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/speech-of-bratza-and-candidates-for-new.html> 
accessed 13 August 2018. 
5 An example of this wide margin of appreciation can be seen in the context of protection of ‘morals’ in 
Handyside v United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976), para 48; A wide margin of 
appreciation was also afforded by the Grand Chamber to the State in the context of the protection from 
excessive noise in Hatton v United Kingdom App no 36022/97 (ECtHR, 8 July 2003), paras 123 and 130. 
6 A narrow margin of appreciation is given in relation to difference in treatment based on sexual orientation – 
e.g. Kozak v Poland App no 13101/02 (ECtHR, 2 March 2010), para 92; X and others v Austria App no 
19010/07 (ECtHR, 19 February 2013), para 99. 
7 Baroness Hale, ‘Common Law and Convention Law: The Limits to Interpretation’ (2011) EHRLR, 534, 542. 
8 A, B and C v Ireland App no 25579/05 (ECtHR, 16 December 2010), para 234. 
9 In this case, although there was clear evidence of consensus, the Court did not restrict the margin of 




appreciation and what this means from the paradigm of the correlation between rights and 
duties. In this way, this thesis adds to the literature in this area.  
 
6.2 Descriptive Analytical Statistics on Width of Margin of Appreciation 
The first phase of the analysis is a descriptive statistical analysis of the data which 
contains cases in which both the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines are 
present.10 It examines several key issues: (a) The types of widths of margin of appreciation 
given to States; (b) Whether there is a correlation between the width of the margin of 
appreciation and the overall finding of violation or no violation. (c) Whether the living 
instrument led to a narrowing of the width of the margin of appreciation. 
 
6.2.1 Question 1: What are the Types of Widths of Margin of Appreciation in the 
Case law? 
The data was scrutinised in order to determine the types of widths of margin of 
appreciation the States were deemed to have within the case. This is restricted to the 
categorisation of width explicitly given by the Court to the margin of appreciation.11 The 




Chart 6.1 show that rather than the clear ‘narrow’ and ‘wide’ widths, there are three 
‘widths’ of the MOA that can be detected in the case law: ‘wide’; ‘narrow’; and ‘unspecified’. 
The unspecified width is seen in cases in which the Court refers to terms such as ‘a margin 
                                                 
10 A detailed description of the selection criteria is contained in Appendix A to this thesis. 
11 The designated width by the Court was coded as opposed to the width the applicant argued the margin of 
appreciation should have or the view expressed by the respondent State or in the dissenting judgment. 
Chart 6.1 Widths of Margin of Appreciation




of appreciation’ or ‘a certain margin of appreciation’ without specifying the exact width. In 
the majority, 51% of the cases examined, the Court designated the MOA as being ‘wide’. 12  
Interestingly, in 41% of cases the width of the MOA was unspecified, 13 whilst in just 8% of 
the cases, the Court expressly categorised the MOA as being ‘narrow’.14 There are therefore 
a variety of widths of MOA that the Court can deem a State to have. 
 
6.2.2 Question 2: Is There any Relationship Between the Width of the Margin of 
Appreciation and the Finding of Violation in the Case?  
The purpose of this question was to explore the issue around the correlation between 
the width of the margin of appreciation afforded and the overall outcome of the case. From 
the existing literature, it would appear a wide margin of appreciation should lead to a finding 
of no violation whilst a narrow margin of appreciation would most likely lead to a finding of 
violation. The outcome of cases in which there is an unspecified width of the margin of 
appreciation has not been fully explored in the literature.15 In order to provide an answer to 
this question, some further sub questions were asked: 
First, in how many of the cases from the sample, did the Court make a finding of at 
least one violation of the Convention? 
 
 
                                                 
12  In 38 out of the 75 cases examined, the Court referred to the margin of appreciation afforded to the State to 
be ‘wide’ or ‘broad’. 
13 In 31 out of the 75 cases examined, the Court did not necessarily designate the width of the margin of 
appreciation but referred to ‘certain’ margin of appreciation or just referred to ‘a margin’ of appreciation 
afforded to the State. 
14 6 out of the 75 cases, the Court referred to the margin of appreciation as ‘narrow’ or ‘limited’. 
15 The use of the term ‘certain margin of appreciation’ is discussed by Jan Kratchovil in the context of an 
inflation of the use of the margin of appreciation. In that context reference to it is seen as unhelpful in the actual 
determination of the case, it is seen as a synonym for deference in that context. See Jan Kratchovil, ‘The 
Inflation of the Margin of Appreciation by the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 29(3) Netherland 
Quarterly of Human Rights 324, 340-342. 





  In the majority, 54, out of the 75 cases examined, the Court found at least one 
violation of the Convention. This accounts for 72% of the cases. This is quite a high figure 
considering that the ‘narrow’ margin of appreciation was only seen to have been designated 
by the Court in 8% of the cases. There was a need to further investigate the outcomes of the 





From the results, in 100% of the cases where the margin of appreciation was 
designated to be ‘narrow’, the Court found a violation of the Convention.16 However, as 
pointed out above, the ‘narrow’ margin of appreciation accounts for only 8% of the case 
sample.17 There were, however, violations found in 54 out of the 75 cases, so the finding of 
violations must extend to the other cases where the margin of appreciation was designated 
either as ‘wide’ or ‘unspecified’. In 60% of the cases where the margin of appreciation was 
designated to be ‘wide’, the Court found a violation of the Convention.18  Interestingly, where 
the Court deemed the margin of appreciation afforded to the unspecified, using terms such 
as ‘certain’ or ‘a’ margin of appreciation, the Court found in 84% of those cases that there 
had been a violation of the Convention.19 This figure is even higher than when the margin of 
appreciation is deemed to be wide.  
                                                 
16 6 out of 6 cases where the margin of appreciation was designated as ‘narrow’. 
17 6 out of 75 cases that were subjected to the comprehensive analysis. 
18 22 out of the 37 cases where the margin of appreciation was designated as ‘wide’ 
19 26 out of 31 cases where the margin of appreciation was unspecified. 
Wide MOA Unspecified MOA Narrow MOA
Total Number of cases 38 31 6
Violation 22 26 6










Chart 6.3 Outcome of Cases Based on Width of Margin of 
Appreciation




The chart below puts these findings in the context of the proportion occupied by the 




Overall, the narrow margin of appreciation accounts for 13% of the violations.20 The 
wide margin of appreciation accounts for 39% of the violations21 whilst the unspecified width 
of margin of appreciation accounts for 49% findings of violations. With the unspecified width 
accounting for almost half of the cases where the Court found a violation, this suggests that 
the width of the margin of appreciation, whilst relevant, is not the only factor to be considered 
in determining the outcome. There are other factors that affect the overall outcome 
irrespective of the width of the margin of appreciation.  
 
6.2.3 Question 3: Has the Living Instrument Doctrine Resulted in a Narrowing of the 
Width of the Margin of Appreciation? 
In answering this question, a first sub question was asked: In how many cases was 
there a change to the width of the margin of appreciation due to the living instrument 
doctrine? The result is presented in Chart 6.5 – living instrument also referred to as ‘LI’: 
                                                 
20 7 out of the 54 cases where the Court found a violation. 








Wide MOA Narrow MOA Unspecified MOA
Chart 6.4 Number Violations per Width of Margin of 
Appreciation






The width of the MOA was changed explicitly as a result of the application of the LI 
doctrine in 6 cases which accounts for 8% of the overall sample. Although the Court 
expressly referred to the LI in consideration of the width in 10 cases, it only changed the 
width in 6 out of the 10 cases.22 In 68 cases, which accounts for 91% there was no direct 
change of the width of the MOA. In 1 case, which accounts for 1% there was a change of the 
width of the MOA, but it was not as a result of the direct application of the LI doctrine.23 A 
direct reference to a change of the width of the margin of appreciation as a result of the LI is 
therefore seen in a very minimal number of cases. 
The second question asked, was how did the LI affect the width of the MOA in 
those cases where there had been a change of width? The results are presented in Chart 6.6 
which depicts the different changes to widths that was made as a result of the application of 
the living instrument doctrine. It also highlights the overall finding of the Court on whether 
the State was in violation of its obligations under the Convention. 
 
                                                 
22 The Court expressly considered the effect of the LI on the wide width of the MOA in the following cases: In 
the following cases, although the LI was considered in terms of narrowing the width of the MOA, the Court 
decided that the width remained wide: A, B and C (n 8); S.H. and Others v. Austria App no 57813/00 (ECtHR, 
3 November 2011); Dubská and Krejzová  v The Czech Republic App nos 28859/11 and 28473/12 (ECtHR, 15 
November 2016). The Court expressly considered the effect of the LI on the ‘limited’ MOA in Biao v Denmark 
App no 38590/10 (ECtHR, 24 May 2016) bit it determined that the margin of appreciation would be narrow in 
that case, hence effectively no change was made to the width of the MOA. 
23 In one case, there was a change of the width, but it was not related to the LI doctrine – Oliari and Others v 
Italy App nos 18766/11 and 36030/11 (ECtHR, 21 July 2015). 
Chart 6.5 Relation of Living Instrument to Change of width of 
Margin of Appreciation






The literature suggests that the living instrument doctrine results in a narrowing of 
the margin of appreciation. The results in Chart 6.6 above however show that the living 
instrument doctrine can also lead to either an expansion of the width of the margin of 
appreciation as was seen in three of the cases, or it can lead to the width becoming 
unspecified. It was in only one case that there was an explicit reference by the Court to the 
width of the margin of appreciation being narrowed by the application of the living 
instrument doctrine. The results also show that a finding of violation does not necessarily 
follow a change of width as in some cases no violation was found even when the width was 
changed. Does this mean that the living instrument has not had an impact on the width of the 
margin of appreciation and in particular narrowing of the width? It appears answering that 
question involves more than a quantitative method of descriptive statistical analysis. 
 
6.2.4 Limitations of the Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
The descriptive statistics has been helpful as a first step in providing further answers 
to RQ 2 (conflict). It has shown that in addition to the narrow and wide widths, in some cases, 
the width of the margin of appreciation is not specified by the Court. This would suggest with 
all due respect, that the allocation of the width of the margin of appreciation may be a more 
nuanced point than may be seen in the statement by Sir Nicolas Bratza. The direct words 
used in the case law does not suggest a clear specification of the width in all cases. This raises 
the issue of how the State party would know what it is to do in the particular case since it 
may be unaware of the width of the margin of appreciation it requires.24. The descriptive 
                                                 
24 Kratchovil has expressed similar criticisms about the lack of articulation of the width of the margin of 
appreciation in some cases and the effect that may have on the State in determining what it requires to fulfil its 









Unpecified to Wide MOA Narrow to Unspecified
MOA
Wide to Unspecified MOA Unspecified to Narrow
MOA
Chart 6.6 Type of Change of Width of Margin of Appreciation and 
Outcome of Cases




analysis also showed that a narrow margin of appreciation was directly allocated in only a 
small portion of the cases. The outcome was a finding of violation in all those cases but 
overall the unspecified width of margin of appreciation accounted for the most findings of 
violations, leading to conclusion that a finding of violation goes beyond the size of the width 
of the margin of appreciation. The descriptive statistical analysis is however limited in 
detailing how the living instrument doctrine impacts on the margin of appreciation outside 
of a look at the width of the margin of appreciation.  
The descriptive statistical analysis also added a further step to answering RQ 2 
(conflict) when it revealed that it was only in a small number of cases, 6 that the use of the 
living instrument doctrine directly led to a change in the width of the margin of appreciation. 
The change was also varied, and it was only in one case that it led to a change from an 
unspecified width to a narrow width. This result suggested a different outcome to what had 
been seen in the literature in Chapter two where the link between the margin of appreciation 
and living instrument doctrines was that the living instrument doctrine narrowed the margin 
of appreciation afforded to the State.25 The results strengthened the conclusion of the 
researcher that an examination of the interaction between the living instrument doctrine and 
the margin of appreciation doctrine should go beyond a consideration of changes to the width. 
The descriptive statistical analysis is however limited in terms of the extent to which it can 
reveal the other considerations within the case. In order to discover the impact of living 
instrument arguments on the margin of appreciation and the overall outcome of the case law, 
and to determine the interpretive approaches adopted by the Court, a qualitative analysis of 
the case law is needed.  
 
6.3 Doctrinal Textual Analysis 
 The case analysis so far has revealed that the impact of the living instrument doctrine 
on the margin of appreciation goes beyond narrowing the width of the margin of appreciation 
explicitly when examining the text of the cases. The textual analysis therefore focuses on the 
‘boundaries’ (which includes the width) as opposed to a partial focus on just the term ‘width’ 
of the margin of appreciation. First of all, this section examines the origins of the use of the 
living instrument doctrine to police the boundaries of the margin of appreciation doctrine and 
then proceeds by virtue of two case studies to examine the impact that the living instrument 
doctrine has had on the margin of appreciation of States in those specific areas. 
                                                 




6.3.1 Origins of the Application of the Margin of Living Instrument to Police the 
Boundaries of the Margin of Appreciation Afforded to States 
The early seeds of the use of the living instrument doctrine to ‘police’ the boundaries 
of the margin of appreciation afforded to States may be traced back to the 1979 case of 
Marckx v Belgium.26 Interestingly, Marckx was decided just over a year after the 1978 case 
of Tyrer v United Kingdom in which the Court articulated the living instrument doctrine for 
the first time.27 There was therefore a relationship between the living instrument doctrine and 
the margin of appreciation afforded to States right from the early days of the introduction of 
the living instrument doctrine to the jurisprudence of the Court. In Marckx, the Court was 
faced with a situation where the Belgian Code did not automatically recognise maternal 
affiliation with a child born out of wedlock to unmarried mothers at the point of birth. The 
applicants, an unmarried mother and her daughter, complained about certain aspects of the 
Belgian Civil Code in this matter. The main articles relied on by the applicants were Articles 
8 and 14 although they raised some other points based on other Articles.28 
The ECtHR determined that Article 8 did not provide any distinction between 
‘legitimate’ and illegitimate’ children.29 Furthermore, the requirements of ‘respect’ for 
family life imposed both negative and positive obligations on the State to provide effective 
respect for family life.30 The Court noted that States had a ‘choice of means’ in creating 
safeguards that ensured connection between a child and his family from the moment of 
birth.31 A law that failed this requirement would, however, be a breach of Article 8(1). The 
Court’s referral to a ‘choice of means’ available to the State when deciding on how it would 
establish family ties between an unmarried mother and their children, was effectively a 
recognition that a margin of appreciation was available to the State. However, that margin of 
appreciation was subject to the supervision of the Court on the basis that whatever means 
adopted by the State had to ensure that the relevant parties were able to lead a normal life. 
Whilst the Court does not expressly state what the width of the margin of appreciation is 
here, it is stating that there are some boundaries to that discretion afforded to the State. 
The living instrument doctrine became relevant in this case when determining 
whether there had been a breach of Article 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14 on the issue 
                                                 
26 Marckx v Belgium App no 6833/74 (ECtHR, 13 June 1979).  
27 Tyrer v United Kingdom App no 5856/72 (ECtHR, 25 April 1978). 
28 The applicants also relied on Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the 
Convention. 
29 Marckx (n 26), para 31. 
30 Ibid.  




of the establishment of maternal affiliation between the first and second applicants.32  The 
applicants had alleged that they had been victims of discriminatory treatment because of the 
lack of an automatic recognition of maternal affiliation between an unmarried mother and an 
‘illegitimate’ child when compared with the position of a married mother and her child in 
which case recognition was automatic by mere registration of the birth.33  
The government justified its current law which favoured traditional family structures 
on the basis that ‘the law aims at ensuring that family’s full development and is thereby 
founded on objective and reasonable grounds relating to morals and public order.’34 The 
Court however disagreed with this view, noting that whilst support for the traditional family 
was a legitimate aim, the measures that were employed to achieve this should not lead to 
discriminatory treatment between the ‘illegitimate’ family and members of the ‘legitimate’ 
family as both should be able to fully enjoy their rights under Article 8.35 In response to the 
government’s argument that the question of reforming the current law only arose many years 
after the entry into force of the ECHR in Belgium, the Court referred to the need to interpret 
the Convention as a living instrument.36  
 
It is true that, at the time when the Convention of 4 November 1950 was drafted, 
it was regarded as permissible and normal in many European countries to draw 
a distinction in this area between the "illegitimate" and the "legitimate" family. 
However, the Court recalls that this Convention must be interpreted in the light 
of present-day conditions ... In the instant case, the Court cannot but be struck 
by the fact that the domestic law of the great majority of the member States of 
the Council of Europe has evolved and is continuing to evolve, in company with 
the relevant international instruments, towards full juridical recognition of the 
maxim "mater semper certa est".37 
 
The Court therefore applied the living instrument doctrine in policing the boundaries 
of the ‘choice of means’ available to the State in this case. In doing so, the ECtHR took into 
                                                 
32 The Court had already found that there had been a breach of Article 8 taken on its own in relation to the 
manner of establishing maternal affiliation. 
33 Marckx (n 26), paras 32-35. 
34 Marckx (n 26), para 40. 
35 Ibid. 
36 The ECHR entered into force in Belgium on 14 June 1955. The need for change was attributed to the adoption 
of the Brussels Convention of 12 September 1962 on the Establishment of Affiliation of Natural Children. 
Belgium had signed, but not yet ratified the 1962 Convention 




consideration the Brussels Convention of 196238 and the European Convention of 15 October 
1975 on the Legal Status of Children born out of Wedlock39. The Court therefore relied on 
international consensus here.40 The existence of the two treaties showed ‘a clear measure of 
common ground in this area amongst modern societies’.41 
The ECtHR also noted the developments that were taking place in Belgium to reform 
the laws in relation to maternal affiliation and removing the existing distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate children.42 The internal consensus in Belgium was moving in line 
with international consensus. The Court concluded that the distinction that was created in the 
establishment of maternal affiliation between legitimate and illegitimate children lacked an 
‘objective and reasonable justification’.43 In the particular case, the manner of establishing 
maternal affiliation of the second applicant had violated in respect of both applicants Article 
14 taken in conjunction with Article 8.44   
 In his strong dissenting opinion, Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice however criticised the 
way the Court had used the consideration of the evolution in society, effectively the living 
instrument approach, to determine the boundaries of the margin of appreciation of the State 
in this case.45 He argued that: 
 
[T]he Belgian Government ought not to be condemned for the operation of a law 
which, while some may consider it defective or inequitable, has in fact…much 
that can be urged in favour of it, and in any event lies well within the margin of 
appreciation or discretion that any Government, acting bona fide, ought to be 
accorded. I fail to see how States can possibly be required to have uniform laws 
in matters of this kind. It is I think an exaggeration to say, as was maintained on 
behalf of the applicants, that the old forms of family relationships, and in 
particular the old distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children, are in 
                                                 
38 This had been signed by only eight states and ratified by four. 
39 This had been signed by ten states and ratified only by four members of the Council of Europe. 
40 International consensus refers to situations where the Court relies on international instruments in order to 
show evolving trends on a particular issue. This has been highlighted previously in Chapter 2, in particular the 
discussion on ‘Change in Width’ in section 2.6.2. 
41 Marckx (n 26), para 41. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid para 43. 
44 Ibid.  
45 As had already been mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Court referred to a ‘choice of means’ without an 
express use of the words ‘margin of appreciation’ but in doing so, the Court was effectively referring to the 
margin of appreciation available to the State. Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice’s reference to the margin of 




the process of obliteration. But, in any event, States must be allowed to change 
their attitudes in their own good time, in their own way and by reasonable means, 
- States must be allowed a certain latitude.46 
 
Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice was therefore arguing that the State had not been given 
enough discretion in this case. His core argument on the use of the living instrument doctrine 
here being that it was for the State to decide when it would make its own changes even in 
situations where there has been a shift in the attitudes in society over time. He argued that 
‘breaches of the Convention should be held to exist only when they are clear and not when 
they can only be established by complex and recondite arguments, at best highly 
controversial, as much liable to be wrong as right.47 Fitzmaurice’s dissent highlights the issue 
that persists with the use of the living instrument doctrine to police the boundaries of the 
margin of appreciation – there continues to be a lack of clear determination of how the 
principle works. This may be argued to be the nature of this doctrine. Just like the margin of 
appreciation, there is lack of precision in the living instrument doctrine. 
The Court’s decision showed that whilst it was up to the State to determine the means, 
there was a minimum requirement that the means should ensure a normal family relationship 
and the State had to comply with that now, rather than take its time to catch up with 
developments. This was in spite of the fact that the State was already carrying out some 
internal changes to the relevant law. Notwithstanding the criticism above advanced by Judge 
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and several other judges in their dissenting opinions, Marckx case 
laid the foundations for the use of the living instrument doctrine in policing the boundaries 
of the margin of appreciation.  
Several principles can be extracted from Marckx as to how the Court used the living 
instrument doctrine to police the boundaries of the margin of appreciation afforded to the 
State.  
 International and regional treaties were examined to determine what the trend was in 
relation to the issue of maternal affiliation. This included treaties to which Belgium 
itself was not a party. International consensus continues to be relevant to the 
determination of the boundaries of the margin of appreciation. 
                                                 
46 Marckx (n 26), Dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice para 29. 




 The Court referred to the practice within European States – this was a reference to 
European consensus which continues to be relevant. 
 The Court was also influenced by the changes that were taking place in the domestic 
arena of Belgium – this was a reference to internal consensus, in this case it was in 
sync with the international and European consensus, but this is not always the case.48 
A combination of these considerations influenced the Court in reaching its decision on the 
importance of the issue at stake and on the means that would be sufficient to achieve 
protection of the issue.  
Since Marckx, the use of the living instrument as a tool to police the boundaries of 
the margin of appreciation afforded to States has continued to develop in the Court’s case 
law and has been applied in different cases.49 In the 2008 case of K.U v Finland, the Court, 
whilst referring to the State’s positive obligations to secure respect for private life in the 
horizontal sphere of relations between individuals, stated that: 
 
While the choice of the means to secure compliance with Article 8 in the sphere 
of protection against acts of individuals is, in principle, within the State’s margin 
of appreciation…The limits of the national authorities’ margin of appreciation 
are nonetheless circumscribed by the Convention provisions. In interpreting 
them, since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of 
human rights, the Court must have regard to the changing conditions within 
Contracting States and respond, for example, to any evolving convergence as to 
the standards to be achieved…50 
 
  Whilst Marckx and K.U refer to the use of the living instrument doctrines to police 
the boundaries of the margin of appreciation in cases where there is a positive obligation on 
the State, the living instrument doctrine is also relevant to determine the boundaries of the 
margin of appreciation where the State has the negative obligation to not interfere with a 
particular right. In such cases, the living instrument doctrine is relevant to the issue of 
                                                 
48 For example, in A, B and C (n 8), the restrictive abortion laws in Ireland were out of sync with the abortion 
laws in other contracting States but the Court did not deem this an automatic violation of the Convention.  
49 For example, in Johnston v Ireland the Court referred to the same principles in finding that there had been a 
violation of Article 8 in respect of the rights of the third applicant, the daughter born to an unmarried couple. 
It held that the State had a positive duty to take steps to regulate the legal situation in relation to the 
establishment of family ties between the third applicant and the first and second applicant who were her parents.  
Johnston v Ireland App no 9697/82 (ECtHR, 18 December 1986).  




whether the interference is justified.  In A B C v Ireland, where the Court had to determine 
whether the interference with private life as a result of the restrictions placed on access to 
abortion was justified, the living instrument doctrine was expressly referred to as a 
determinant of the breadth of the margin of appreciation afforded to the State.51 Essentially 
the living instrument doctrine is relevant in determining the threshold of the justification a 
State would need to give in order for an interference in the rights of an individual or a failure 
to perform a particular positive obligation, would be seen as justified before the Court.  
In assessing the use of the living instrument to determine the boundaries of the margin 
of appreciation, one is effectively dealing with the use of the living instrument to raise or 
lower the threshold of justification required of States in order to escape liability for their 
actions. The discussion on the use of the living instrument doctrine to police the boundaries 
of the margin of appreciation therefore also ties in the consideration of the allocation of duties 
to States. 
 
6.4 Boundaries of Margin of Appreciation and the Duty on the State 
The examination of the boundaries of the margin of appreciation is assessed within 
this work in the context of the impact on the outcome of the case. A finding of violation is 
essentially a finding that there is a duty on the State which has been breached whilst a finding 
of no violation could either be a finding that there is no duty on the State, hence none could 
be breached, or that there was a duty on the State, but that duty has not been breached in that 
instance. The analysis of the duty on a State necessitates two key questions. First, what is the 
nature of the duty required (positive or negative obligation)? Second, what is the scope of the 
duty? There may be some cross-over in some cases and blurred lines between the two aspects 
but those form the core points to take into consideration when discussing the duty on the 
State.  
The case law analysis shows the use of the living instrument doctrine to police the 
boundaries of the margin of appreciation in a variety of areas such as the protection of the 
                                                 
51 In this case, although there was clear evidence of consensus, the Court did not restrict the margin of 




rights of illegitimate children,52 transsexuals,53 homosexuals54 and prisoners.55 It has covered 
other areas such as trade unions,56 the right to vote,57 and freedom of expression amongst 
others.58 Two of these areas have been chosen, for reasons given below, for further analysis 
in the sections that follow. The textual analysis will be divided into two categories:  
 The use of the living instrument doctrine to determine the nature and scope of duty  
 The use of the living instrument doctrine to determine the scope of the duty 
In the course of the analysis, the themes of change in time and space, change in width and 
change in function which were highlighted in chapter two when discussing the link between 
the living instrument and margin of appreciation doctrines will be highlighted where 
relevant.59 
 
6.5 Interaction between the Living Instrument and Margin of Appreciation Doctrines 
in Determining the Nature and Scope of State Duty  
 The issue of recognition of the post-operative identity of transsexuals is used as a case 
study to illustrate the impact of the living instrument doctrine on the margin of appreciation 
in determining the nature and scope of the duty on the State. This area has been chosen for a 
number of reasons. First, from the case law examined, 12% dealt with issues surrounding 
transgender rights.60 Second, the issue of gender identity is one that is such a private area of 
life, therefore any regulation of that area or interference in that area by the State is worthy of 
consideration. Third, it is a good example of change in time and space.61 The width of the 
                                                 
52 E.g. Inze v Austria App no 8695/79 (ECtHR, 28 October 1987); X v Latvia App no 27853/09 (ECtHR, 26 
November 2013). 
53 E.g. Rees v United Kingdom App no 9532/81 (ECtHR, 17 October 1986); Christine Goodwin v United 
Kingdom App no 28957/95 (ECtHR, 11 July 2002); Y.Y v Turkey App no 14793/08 (ECtHR, 10 March 2015). 
54 E.g. Frette v France App no 36515/97 (ECtHR, 26 February 2002); Schalk and Kopf v Austria App no 
30141/04 (ECtHR, 24 June 2010); Vallianatos and Others v Greece App nos 29381/09 and 32684/09 (ECtHR, 
7 November 2013). 
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margin of appreciation in these cases was either ‘wide’62 or ‘unspecified’.63 Interestingly, the 
Court found a violation in 5 out of the 9 cases, some of which included ‘wide’ margins. This 
reinforces the point that a designation of a wide margin does not necessarily lead to an 
outcome that the State has not violated its obligations.  
 
6.5.1 Change in Nature and Scope of Duty: Recognition of Post-operative Identity of 
Transsexuals 
In Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom, the Court departed from its earlier decisions 
concerning the boundaries of the margin of margin of appreciation afforded to States in 
relation to the recognition of post-operative gender identity for transsexuals.64 Before 
considering Goodwin, it is necessary to provide some context from the earlier case law of the 
Court on this subject in order to identify the Court’s earlier position and how this was changed 
in Goodwin. It is striking that the earlier cases were all from the same jurisdiction – the United 
Kingdom. This is therefore a good example of the interaction between the living instrument 
and margin of appreciation doctrines leading to a change in time within the same space.65 
After Goodwin, there are examples of extension to other jurisdictions, showing a change in 
both time and space. 
The first case in which the Court dealt on the merits with the issue of recognition of 
the post-operative identity of a transsexual was in the 1986 case of Rees v United Kingdom.66 
In that case, the applicant, a female to male post-operative transsexual, brought the 
application before the Court alleging that the failure of the United Kingdom to effect a change 
in the birth register to recognise his post-operative sexual identity was a breach of his rights 
under Article 8 which provides for a right to private and family life, and Article 12 which 
provides for the right to marry.67 The Court reiterated that Article 8 imposed both positive 
and negative obligations on the State and that the positive obligations that may be inherent 
in the effective respect of private life was subject to the margin of appreciation of the State.68 
In coming to a decision concerning whether a positive obligation existed in this case, the 
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Court looked to see if there was consensus in the practice of member States in this area. It 
noted that there were divergent practices within the member States with some allowing for 
recognition of the new gender identity, and others not providing any options for that. The 
Court therefore concluded that there was a lack of common ground, which gave the State a 
wide margin of appreciation in this area.69  
In assessing whether there had been a fair balance struck between the needs of the 
individual and that of others in society, the Court referred to the margin of appreciation of 
the State. It was of the view that ‘The governing authorities in the United Kingdom are fully 
entitled, in the exercise of their margin of appreciation, to take account of the requirements 
of the situation pertaining there in determining what measures to adopt’.70 The Court 
concluded that having regard to the wide margin of appreciation to be afforded the State in 
this area of dealing with transsexuals and the consideration of striking a balance between the 
interests of the individual and that other others in society, the positive obligations that arise 
from Article 8 could not be extended to require the State to make alterations in the birth 
register which would recognise the new gender of the applicant. In essence, the Court came 
to a finding that the nature of obligation on the State in this case was not a positive obligation 
to make changes to the birth register. Following this finding, there was no need then to 
consider the issue of scope of the obligation since an obligation did not exist in the view of 
the Court. 
The Court, however, referred to the living instrument doctrine as a form of directive 
to the State to keep the situation under review. In the words of the Court, 
 
[I]t must for the time being be left to the respondent State to determine to what 
extent it can meet the remaining demands of transsexuals. However, the Court is 
conscious of the seriousness of the problems affecting these persons and the 
distress they suffer. The Convention has always to be interpreted and applied in 
the light of current circumstances... The need for appropriate legal measures 
should therefore be kept under review having regard particularly to scientific and 
societal developments.71 
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The above statement showed that the Court recognised that the boundaries of the 
margin of appreciation afforded to the State in the area of the nature and scope of obligations 
could be affected by adopting the living instrument doctrine and taking into consideration the 
evolution in practices in the Contracting States. It was, however, not convinced in this case 
that there was a consensus which required a decision that there was in existence a positive 
obligation on the State to recognise the new gender identity of post-operative transsexuals. 
Therefore, although the living instrument doctrine was considered by the Court, it did not 
have a direct effect of lifting the threshold of justification required on the State by virtue of 
their margin of appreciation. It was restricted to an invitation to the State to keep in mind 
developments and make relevant changes. Essentially, an invitation for dialogue between the 
Court and the domestic authorities. 
Four years later, in Cossey v United Kingdom which was also a case on the recognition  
of the post-operative identity of a transsexual, the applicant argued that the failure to register 
her new identity amounted to an interference with her rights under Article 8, thereby framing 
it as an issue of a negative obligation.72 The Court did not subscribe to this view, reiterating 
that as it had held in the Rees case, the relevant issue was whether a positive obligation existed 
on the State to make the alterations to the birth register in order to ensure in effective respect 
for the rights of the applicant under Article 8.73 It was of the view that there had not been 
significant developments since Rees to warrant a change in its position.74 In a similar vein to 
the Rees case, the Court referred to the need to interpret the Convention in the light of current 
circumstances and urged the State to keep the need for relevant measures in this area under 
review.75 This invitation did not however yield any favourable results. 
Nine years later, in the case of Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom, the Court 
was once again faced with a situation of the respect for private life of post-operative 
transsexuals.76 The applicants were both post-operative male to female transsexuals. In a 
similar vein to Rees case and Cossey, they alleged that the refusal of the government to grant 
legal recognition of their post-operative gender amounted to a breach of their rights under 
Article 8 taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14.77 Their argument was therefore 
framed slightly wider than that in the Rees and Cossey cases which required recognition by 
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virtue of an alteration in the birth register.78 The Court was still not convinced there were 
significant developments sufficient enough to lead to a change in its position on the issue.79 
The Court did however call on the State to keep its legislation under review.80   
 Four years later, in Goodwin, the opportunity came for the Court to reconsider its 
position.81 In that case, the application was brought by a male to female post-operative 
transsexual.  The applicant alleged that the failure of the respondent State to recognise her 
post-operative gender identity was a breach of her rights under Article 8 and had exposed her 
to discriminatory treatment contrary to Article 14 of the Convention. The Court noted that 
although it is not bound to follow its previous judgments it normally would not depart from 
them in the interest of legal certainty.82 However, the changing situation in the member States 
required it to consider the issue afresh in the light of the developments that had occurred. In 
the words of the Court: 
 
However, since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection 
of human rights, the Court must have regard to the changing conditions within 
the respondent State and within Contracting States generally and respond, for 
example, to any evolving convergence as to the standards to be achieved…A 
failure by the Court to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would indeed 
risk rendering it a bar to reform or improvement… The Court proposes therefore 
to look at the situation within and outside the Contracting State to assess “in the 
light of present-day conditions” what is now the appropriate interpretation and 
application of the Convention…83 
 
The Court once again examined medical and scientific considerations, concluding it 
was not persuaded that they provided any determining arguments about the legal recognition 
of transsexuals.84 The Court then went on to consider the state of any European consensus on 
the issue. It noted the States had a wide margin of appreciation in the area of legal recognition 
of post-operative transsexuals and therefore there would be different approaches. As a result 
of this, it was of the view that:  
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The Court accordingly attaches less importance to the lack of evidence of a 
common European approach to the resolution of the legal and practical problems 
posed, than to the clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international 
trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of 
legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals. 85 
 
European consensus was therefore not required, rather a ‘continuing international trend’ was 
sufficient.  
On the core question of whether the appropriate balance had been struck in this case 
between the individual and the general needs of society, it noted that nothing had been 
effectively done by the government to review proposals to deal with the issues facing 
transsexuals. The Court concluded that: 
 
[T]he Court finds that the respondent Government can no longer claim that the 
matter falls within their margin of appreciation, save as regards the appropriate 
means of achieving recognition of the right protected under the Convention…it 
reaches the conclusion that the fair balance that is inherent in the Convention 
now tilts decisively in favour of the applicant. There has, accordingly, been a 
failure to respect her right to private life in breach of Article 8 of the 
Convention.86 
 
The Court also found the State to be in violation of Article 12 which provides for the 
right to marry. Rejecting the argument of the government that this should be left to the margin 
of appreciation of the State, the Court concluded that the margin of appreciation could not 
extend that far. Whilst it was up to the State to determine the choice of means, there was no 
reason to bar transsexuals from enjoying the right to marry.87 The living instrument doctrine 
in this case altered the nature of the margin of appreciation afforded to the State, thereby 
leading to a departure from previous decisions of the Court on this subject in two respects. 
First, the Court found that there existed a positive obligation on the State to recognise the 
post-operative identity of transsexuals as part of the right to private life under Article 8 and 
a right to marry was recognised under Article 12. The State no longer had a margin of 
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appreciation to decide whether or not it had a duty to recognise the post-operative status of 
transsexuals. That margin of appreciation in deciding whether or not there was a duty was 
therefore eroded completely. Second, the Court found that the State had breached its positive 
obligations by not striking a fair balance. The scope of the duty on the State was therefore 
also affected as the State was unable to demonstrate that it had met the threshold required to 
show a fair balance. The effect of the judgment was, therefore, to restrict the margin of 
appreciation to the way in which the duty was to be executed rather than the decision as to 
whether a duty existed.  This is similar to a restriction of the margin of appreciation to norm 
application as opposed to norm definition.88  
Following this landmark decision in Goodwin, the Court has found a breach where 
States fail to make provision for recognising the post-operative identity of transsexuals. In 
the case of I v United Kingdom which had similar facts to those in the Goodwin case, the 
Court also found a violation of Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention respectively.89 The 
finding of a positive obligation on the State to ensure legal recognition of post-operative 
transsexuals was applied in the context of pension rights of a post-operative male to female 
transsexual in the case of Grant v United Kingdom.90 Although at the time the United 
Kingdom government had effected legislation in response to the Court’s judgment in the 
Goodwin case, the Court still found a violation of Article 8 for failure by the State to accord 
the applicant pension rights applicable to women of biological origin.91  The Court was of 
the view that the applicant’s status as a victim of such a breach began from the date of the 
Goodwin decision in 2002 and only came to an end when the Gender Recognition Act came 
into force in 2004.92  
 
6.5.2 Extension of Scope of Duty: Access to Gender Reassignment Surgery 
Goodwin brought about a change in the case law of the ECtHR and established that 
there was a positive obligation to recognise the post-operative gender of a transsexual. The 
scope of that positive obligation has now been extended to police the boundaries of the 
margin of appreciation in relation to regulating the conditions for gender reassignment 
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surgery. In L v Lithuania93 the positive obligation to recognise the post-operative status of a 
transsexual was extended to cover a situation in which the domestic law did not provide any 
regulation of gender reassignment surgery. The Court reiterated the principles of the margin 
of appreciation doctrine and its boundaries being determined by virtue of the interpretation 
of the Convention as a living instrument.94 The Court decided in this case that this was a gap 
in the law that had to be remedied. The Court found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.  
In the more recent case of Y.Y v Turkey, the obligation was examined in the context 
of access to gender reassignment surgery and the compatibility of the conditions that could 
be imposed prior to the surgery with the duty of the State under the Convention. 95  In that 
case, the applicant alleged that the failure of the Turkish authorities to approve his request 
for gender reassignment surgery on the basis that he had not shown he was ‘permanently 
unable to procreate’, was a violation of his right to respect for private and family life under 
Article 8 of the Convention.96 In making a decision on whether an obligation existed and the 
nature of the obligation, the Court was of the view that although Article 8 could not be 
interpreted as guaranteeing an unconditional right to gender reassignment surgery, it had held 
in the earlier case of Goodwin, that transgenderism was recognised internationally as a 
medical condition that required treatment to assist those concerned. It noted that the health 
services of most of the Contracting States recognised the condition and provide or permit 
treatment, including irreversible gender reassignment.97 The Court was of the view that the 
refusal by the State authorities to grant permission to the applicant to have gender 
reassignment surgery had ‘repercussions on his right to gender identity and to personal 
development, a fundamental aspect of the right to respect for private life.’98 The failure of 
the State to allow access to the applicant for gender reassignment surgery was therefore an 
interference with his rights under Article 8. The interpretation of the Convention in the light 
of present-day conditions was therefore relevant in determining the issue of the existence and 
nature of obligation on the State. The Court chose to address the case based on a negative 
obligation as opposed to a positive obligation, which was the approach in the previous cases.  
The next question was whether the interference was justified. The legal basis of the 
interference was not contested, and the Court found that it had been prescribed by law.99 The 
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Court also found that the interference pursued the legitimate aim of health-protection in the 
public interest.100 The next issue to examine was whether the interference was necessary. In 
order for an interference to be considered as ‘necessary in a democratic society’, it had to 
meet a ‘pressing social need’, be proportionate to the legal aim pursued and the reasons given 
by the national authorities to justify it must be ‘relevant and sufficient’.101 Once again, the 
margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines were relevant on this point of the 
determination of whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society. 
The Court pointed out that the State has a margin of appreciation in the determination 
of whether a particular interference was necessary, but that determination was subject to 
review by the Court. The issue in this case was also important as it was in relation to the 
applicant’s freedom to define his gender identity, which was ‘one of the most basic essentials 
of self-determination’.102 The Court underscored the importance of a dynamic interpretation 
of the Convention stating that: 
 
A failure by the Convention institutions to maintain a dynamic and evolutive 
approach would risk rendering it a bar to reform or improvement…In the context 
of the present case, the Court therefore considers it appropriate to take account 
of the development of international and European law, and of law and practice 
in the various Council of Europe member States, in order to assess the 
circumstances of the present case “in the light of present-day conditions”103  
 
In this instance, although the Court had alluded to a margin of appreciation available 
to the State, the living instrument doctrine was directly relevant to the determination of the 
boundaries of the margin of appreciation and the final decision of whether the State had 
breached its duties under the Convention. It was relevant to the determination of the scope of 
the obligation on the State. 
The Court took into consideration the practice in many European countries which 
allowed for gender reassignment treatment and recognition of the new gender identity. It also 
noted that the different regulations in a number of countries where gender reassignment is 
recognised, make that recognition of the new gender contingent ‘either implicitly or 
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explicitly, on gender reassignment surgery and/or on the inability to procreate’.104 The Court 
reiterated that the contracting States were given a wide margin of appreciation on the issue 
of the legal recognition of post-operative gender status and that such a margin would exist in 
relation to the ‘legal requirements governing access to medical or surgical procedures for 
transgender persons wishing to undergo the physical changes associated with gender 
reassignment’.105  
On the pre-operative requirements for gender reassignment, the Court applied the living 
instrument doctrine to the determination of the boundaries of the margin of appreciation of 
the State by taking into consideration legislative developments in the Council of Europe and 
developments within member States which showed a move towards removing barriers to 
access to gender reassignment surgery.106  The domestic courts justified their initial refusal 
to grant permission to the applicant to under gender reassignment treatment on the basis of 
the applicant’s ability to procreate. The Court disagreed with this position, concluding that 
the requirement of ‘inability to procreate’ was wholly unnecessary to justify the regulation 
of gender reassignment surgery. Therefore, the interference with the applicant’s private life 
as a result of the rejection of his request for the gender reassignment surgery could not be 
considered ‘necessary’ in a democratic society’.107 
The Court drew further support for its position from the fact that the domestic Court 
had changed its initial decision and had authorised the applicant after the present proceedings 
had been initiated in the Court, to undergo gender reassignment surgery even though he was 
not permanently unable to procreate.108 The Court held unanimously, that in denying the 
applicant the possibility of undergoing gender reassignment surgery, the State had breached 
his right to respect for private life and there was therefore a breach of Article 8 of the 
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Convention. The combination of international consensus, European consensus and the 
change in internal consensus as evidenced by the subsequent authorisation of the gender 
reassignment surgery, underpinned the use of the living instrument doctrine to restrict the 
boundary of the margin of appreciation.  
The interaction between the living instrument doctrine and the margin of appreciation 
doctrine has been shown through these cases concerning the rights of transsexuals examined 
under this section in relation to the determination of the nature and scope of duty on States. 
The application of the living instrument doctrine resulted in a move from a position where 
no positive obligation to recognise the post-operative identity was held to exist in Rees, to a 
position where a positive obligation was held to exist in Goodwin and even further, an 
obligation to ensure the right conditions for access to gender reassignment surgery are 
available in L and Y .Y. The boundaries of the margin of appreciation moved from 
determining whether an obligation existed, to being restricted to determining the way in 
which the obligation would be achieved. The progress was shown in relation to negative 
obligations as well, thereby encompassing the full nature of duties on States.   
The progression of events in relation to the recognition of the post-operative status of 
transsexuals is a clear example of a change being achieved in both time and space. It also 
shows the Court inviting dialogue with the national Court in making its decision. There was 
scope from 1986, for the United Kingdom, to adjust its national laws without there being 
interference by the Court. Failure to make any adjustments even in the light of developments 
at the international and regional levels, resulted in the issue being brought back to the Court 
in different cases and the margin of appreciation of the State shifting to just the practical 
issues of the recognition rather than to the issue of deciding whether or not to recognise the 
new gender identity. One could argue that had the State chosen to make its own adjustments 
earlier on, they may have been no need for the Court to make the decisions on those issues. 
 
6.5.3 Restriction of Scope of Duty: No Recognition of a Right to Same-Sex Marriage 
This trend in the recognition of the post-operative identity of transsexuals could give 
the impression that the application of the living instrument doctrine in this area post Goodwin, 
always leads to a decision of violation. This is however not the case as the Court has restricted 
this approach where the outcome would be to recognise a right to same-sex marriage.  In 




child.109 Subsequently, the applicant was diagnosed as transgender and underwent gender 
reassignment surgery to become female. The applicant sought to have full recognition of her 
change of gender by virtue of a change in her identity number from a male to a female one. 
However, one of the requirements of the domestic law for registration of post-operative 
identity was that if the applicant was married, the consent of the spouse was to be given in 
order for the change to be made and the marriage would be converted automatically into a 
registered civil partnership. The applicant objected to this requirement stating that she wanted 
to retain her marriage and at the same time gain full legal recognition of her new identity. At 
the domestic level, the Supreme Administrative Court had dismissed the applicant’s case, 
stating that the ECHR did not require the State to create laws permitting same sex marriage. 
The State was therefore within its margin of appreciation.   
  In dealing with this issue, the Court chose to address this under the umbrella of 
positive obligations as opposed to considering it as an interference with the applicant’s rights. 
This could be considered in keeping with its earlier jurisprudence on the recognition of the 
post-operative gender identity of transsexuals.110 The Court framed the question as follows 
‘whether the respect for family life entails a positive obligation on the State to provide an 
effective and accessible procedure allowing the applicant to have her new gender legally 
recognised while remaining married’.111  
As to the margin of appreciation doctrine, the Court reiterated that States enjoy ‘a 
certain’ margin of appreciation when implementing their positive obligations under Article 
8. Factors to be taken into consideration when determining the breadth of the margin of 
appreciation include the importance of the issue at stake – with a restricted margin of 
appreciation in areas to do with identity, the place of consensus on either the importance of 
the issue at stake or the means of protecting it with a wider margin of appreciation where 
sensitive moral and ethical issues are involved.112 In applying the principles to the case, the 
Court was of the view that based on its case law, Article 8 cannot be interpreted as imposing 
a positive obligation on member States to grant same-sex couples access to marriage. A civil 
partnership was an adequate option.113 
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As a result of recognising that this was an area which was subject to constant 
developments, the Court proceeded to examine the practice in other Council of Europe States 
in respect of the issues in this case to see if there had been any changes. The Court’s 
comparative study showed revealed that there was diversity in the practice of member 
States.114 The Court concluded that there was, therefore, an absence of any European 
consensus on allowing same-sex marriage and also lack of consensus on how to deal with 
gender recognition in the case of a pre-existing marriages.115 The Court did not therefore find 
that any significant changes in practice to warrant a change in its position on the issue.116 In 
line with previous practice, as a result of the lack of consensus and the sensitive moral and 
ethical issues raised, the Court determined that the margin of appreciation to be afforded to 
the State was a wide one.117  
 
This margin must in principle extend both to the State’s decision whether or not 
to enact legislation concerning the legal recognition of the new gender of post-
operative transsexuals and, having intervened, to the rules it lays down in order 
to achieve a balance between the competing public and private interests.118 
 
This is the sort of situation that Spielmann refers to as ‘the margin within the 
margin’.119 The first part of the Court’s finding as to the scope of the margin of appreciation 
appears to contradict its earlier jurisprudence in the Goodwin case where it held that ‘the 
Court finds that the respondent Government can no longer claim that the matter falls within 
their margin of appreciation, save as regards the appropriate means of achieving recognition 
of the right protected under the Convention’.120  One would have expected that enacting 
legislation would be a crucial step in protecting the right. The margin of appreciation should, 
therefore, have been restricted to the rules that could be laid down by the State in order for 
the new identity to be recognised, but here the Court seems to suggest that the State can 
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decide whether or not to have legislation that recognises the post-operative identity in the 
first place and then how it balances the interests. After considering the operation of the 
Finnish legislation in this case, the Court concluded that the requirement that the applicant’s 
marriage be converted to a civil partnership was not disproportionate. It did not also find any 
significant differences between the civil partnership and marriage.121  Proportionality, as 
opposed to necessity was therefore the deciding factor in this case.122 
  In the more recent case of Aldeguer Tomás v Spain, the Court has once again 
confirmed its position established in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria and followed in Hämäläinen, 
that there is no obligation on the States to provide for same-sex marriage.123 The Tomás case 
was slightly different though as the Court did not find that there was any discrimination, 
therefore there could be no violation of the Convention.124 In the recent Advisory Opinion of 
the Inter American Court of Human rights, it was decided that a State had a duty under the 
American Convention on Human Rights to provide legal protection for same sex couples 
such as extending the existing institutions of marriage to same sex couples. 125  The Court of 
Justice of the European Union recently held that under the European Union freedom of 
movement laws, married gay couples have the same residency rights as heterosexual couples 
even if same sex marriage is not recognised in the country they move to.126 Considering the 
impact that international consensus has on the application of the living instrument doctrine 
to the scope of the margin of appreciation, it would appear that is a matter of time therefore 
before the ECtHR also finds that States should provide access to same sex marriage. 
 
6.6 Interaction Between the Living Instrument and Margin of Appreciation Doctrines 
in Determining the Scope of State Duty 
This section examines the application of the living instrument doctrine to the 
boundaries of the margin of appreciation in order to determine the scope of the duty on the 
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State. One area in which the Court has applied the living instrument to determine the scope 
of the duty of the State is in relation to the protection of the rights of illegitimate children.127 
This has ranged from the issue of equality of inheritance rights of ‘legitimate’ and 
‘illegitimate’ children,128 inheritance rights of adopted children,129 citizenship and residence 
rights of illegitimate children,130 and parental access to children born out of wedlock.131 This 
area of protection of the rights of illegitimate children has been chosen as a case study here 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, 11 out of the 75 cases in the data were about illegitimate 
children. This was a large number, accounting for about 15% of the cases. This shows that 
this is an issue of importance as it keeps reoccurring in the case law of the Court. Secondly, 
the ECHR is not expressly a child rights Convention unlike the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child which is expressly created to protect children’s rights.132 The ECHR itself only 
mentions children twice. It was therefore interesting to examine the interaction between the 
living instrument and margin of appreciation doctrine in providing protection for a group of 
people that the Convention was not expressly created to address.133 Thirdly, this provides a 
good example of change in time within different spaces as the case law is drawn from 
different contracting States. This is an area that was identified earlier in chapter two as an 
area to be explored. 
In relation to the width of the margin of appreciation, of the 11 cases examined, only 
two of the widths of margin of appreciation were present: ‘wide’134 and ‘unspecified’.135 The 
unspecified width accounting for the majority of the cases.136 Notably, in all 11 cases, the 
Court found that there had been a violation of at least one provision of the Convention. This 
further strengthens the argument made earlier that the width of the margin of appreciation 
afforded to the State is not as important since the lack of a designated ‘narrow’ margin of 
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appreciation in these cases did not eliminate the finding of a violation in all cases. What is 
more important is the threshold the Court sets which must be overcome by the State party 
when providing justification for its interference with the rights of individuals.  The use of the 
living instrument doctrine particularly in the area of inheritance rights for children born in 
and outside of wedlock is further used to illustrate this point. 
 
6.6.1 Equality of Inheritance Rights of Children Born out of Wedlock 
The articulation of positive obligations under Article 8 in relation to respect for 
private and family life in the Marckx and Belgium case created the foundations for the 
application of the living instrument doctrine to determine the boundaries of the margin of 
appreciation in cases dealing with children born out of wedlock.137 Whilst the issue of the 
establishment of maternal affiliation was part of the issue dealt with in the Marckx case, a 
related issue was the inheritance rights of children born out of wedlock and that is the aspect 
of the case considered in this section.  In that case, the applicants had complained that the 
restrictions that were put by the Belgian Civil Code on the inheritance rights of a child born 
out of wedlock on intestacy over her mother’s estate or dispositions inter vivos, or by will, 
were a breach of their rights when compared to the lack of restrictions put on a married 
woman to dispose of her property. They particularly argued a breach of their rights under 
Article 8 on its own and taken in conjunction with Article 14, and Article 1 of Protocol No 1 
taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14.138  
On the question whether there had been a breach of the rights of the daughter, under 
Article 1 of Protocol No 1, the Court found that Article as not applicable to her situation.  It 
reiterated that Article 1 of Protocol No 1 enshrined the right to peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions, therefore presupposing the existence of those possessions already. It did not 
guarantee the right to acquire possessions either on intestacy or through inter vivos 
dispositions.139 The Court was therefore of the view that Article 1 of Protocol No 1 did not 
apply to the daughter, since in this case there had not been any dispositions made to her.  
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However, in relation to the consideration of the issue under Article 14 taken in 
conjunction with Article 8, the Court took the position that the right to inheritance was an 
integral part of the respect for family life. States were, however, allowed ‘the choice of the 
means calculated to allow everyone to lead a normal family life.’140 The restrictions which 
the Belgian Civil Code placed on the applicant’s inheritance rights on intestacy and via 
voluntary dispositions were therefore not in themselves in conflict with the Convention as 
the State had a margin of appreciation in this area. The Court had to examine the reasons 
underlying the restrictions put in by the State in order to establish if there had been a violation.  
In this particular case, however, the Court was of the view that the distinction that had been 
made between "illegitimate" and "legitimate" children raised an issue under Articles 14 and 
8 when taken in conjunction.141  To support this position, the Court referred to the living 
instrument doctrine, drawing attention to the change in societal views in relation to children 
born out of wedlock over time.  
 
The European Court of Human Rights interprets the Convention in the light of 
present-day conditions but it is not unaware that differences of treatment 
between "illegitimate" and "legitimate" children, for example in the matter of 
patrimonial rights, were for many years regarded as permissible and normal in a 
large number of Contracting States... Evolution towards equality has been slow 
and reliance on the Convention to accelerate this evolution was apparently 
contemplated at a rather late stage…’142 
 
The Court concluded that in relation to Alexandra Marckx, there had been a breach of 
Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 in relation to ‘her capacity to receive property 
from her mother and of her total lack of inheritance rights on intestacy over the estates of her 
near relatives on her mother’s side.’143 The Marckx case therefore set a standard of policing 
the boundaries of the margin of appreciation in relation to the inheritance rights of children 
born out of wedlock, using the living instrument doctrine to determine the scope of the duty 
involved and whether there had been a violation of the Convention by the State as a result of 
the restrictions imposed. It established that inheritance rights were a part of family life and 
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that although the States had a margin of appreciation in determining what restrictions could 
be imposed in relation to inheritance matters, as a result of the interpretation of the 
Convention as a living instrument, a restriction which has the effect of creating a distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate children in the area of inheritance rights was a violation 
of the Convention, a breach of the State’s duty. The Marckx decision was relied on by the 
Court in the case of Johnston v Ireland where it held that the absence of an appropriate legal 
regime to reflect the natural family ties between a child born out of wedlock and her parents, 
who were unmarried due to the restrictive divorce laws in Ireland, was a failure to respect 
her family life under Article 8.144   
Although the Court did not find a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 in Marckx, an 
opportunity for the Court to consider the rights of illegitimate children in this area arose eight 
years later in the case of Inze v Austria.145 In that case, the applicant complained that he had 
been discriminated against in the enjoyment of his property rights relating to inheritance of 
his mother’s farm on account of his illegitimate birth. The ECtHR first of all had to determine 
whether issues relating to hereditary farms came within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No 
1. The government had argued that this matter fell outside of the scope of that Article, relying 
on the Court’s earlier decision in Marckx.146 The Court distinguished the particular facts here 
from those in Marckx.147 In this case, the applicant was considered to be an heir and following 
the rules of intestacy was entitled to a portion of his deceased mother’s estate.148 The Court 
concluded that the applicant was not challenging the system of hereditary farms but rather 
challenging the criteria applicable to determining the choice of the principal heir.149 
Consequently, the facts came within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 and Article 14 
taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No 1 was applicable. This was significant as 
that created the basis for the further consideration of whether the State had violated its 
obligations. 
In relation to the issue of compliance, the Court stated the principles in relation to when 
a difference in treatment is discriminatory for the purposes of Article 14 of the Convention: 
‘A difference of treatment is discriminatory if it “has no objective and reasonable 
justification”, that is, if it does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there is not a “reasonable 
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relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
realised”…’150 This statement means that although on the face of it, it could be that there has 
been an interference with the right of an individual or a failure to protect the right of an 
individual, that does not automatically mean that the State in question has breached its 
obligations under the Convention. This is an example of dynamic restricted correlativity 
which is built on Raz’s concept of a right being a ground of a duty. The State can be 
exonerated from this duty if it is able to provide justification for its non-compliance with the 
duty. 
This justification comes through the use of the margin of appreciation doctrine. The 
Court alludes to this by stating that:  
 
[T]he contracting states enjoy a margin of appreciation in assessing whether and 
to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different 
treatment in law; the scope of this margin will vary according to the 
circumstances, the subject-matter and its background’…In this respect, the Court 
recalls that the Convention is a living instrument, to be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions…151  
 
The Court clearly states that the States have a margin of appreciation when determining issues 
concerning difference of treatment, if their justification is acceptable, then they would not be 
seen to have been in breach of their duties. However, the Court directly attaches the living 
instrument doctrine to the scrutiny of the margin of appreciation that the State has in these 
matters. Whatever justification the State gives, has to be in line with present-day conditions. 
It cannot be a justification that is archaic and out of sync with present society. The living 
instrument was therefore applied to determine the scope of the obligation on the State. 
The particular issue here was a justification for a difference in treatment between 
legitimate and illegitimate children in the area of inheritance. How far would the State need 
to go in justifying its position? The Court went on to state that ‘The question of equality 
between children born in and children born out of wedlock as regards their civil rights is 
today given importance in member States of the Council of Europe’.152 In support of this 
statement, the Court referred to the 1975 European Convention on the Legal Status of 
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Children born out of Wedlock. The Convention was in force at time in nine of the member 
States of the Council of Europe, including Austria who had ratified the Convention on 28 
May 1980 with a reservation which the Court deemed not relevant to the case. The result of 
using the living instrument doctrine as a yardstick for determining the level of justification 
that the State would have to give in order to be within its margin of appreciation was that the 
Court came to the conclusion that due to this importance today of equality between children 
born in and out of wedlock, ‘Very weighty reasons would accordingly have to be advanced 
before a difference of treatment on the ground of birth out of wedlock could be regarded as 
compatible with the Convention’.153 The threshold for the justification that the State had to 
give was therefore very high. 
The government gave several reasons for the difference in treatment.154 The Court 
was not convinced by the reasons put forward by the government and did not find them 
weighty enough to justify the difference in treatment. In particular, the Court challenged the 
general nature of the reasons such as the ‘deceased’s intentions, the place where legitimate 
children are brought up and the surviving spouse’s relations with his or her legitimate 
children’155 which in some cases, such as the one in question, may not represent the actual 
situation. In relation to the argument that the convictions of the rural population merely 
reflected the traditional outlook, the Court drew attention to the developments in society and 
the fact that the government themselves had recognised these developments because they had 
prepared a Bill which provides that the attribution of a hereditary farm would be based on 
objective circumstances such as training for running farms and being brought up on the 
particular property.156 It was of the view that those amendments show that the legitimate aim 
that was being pursued by the legislation could be achieved by ‘applying other criteria other 
than that based on birth in or out of wedlock’.157 The Court came to the unanimous decision 
that there had been a breach of Article 14 of the Convention, taken together with Article 1 of 
Protocol No 1. 
Although the Court did not expressly refer to any ‘width’ of the margin of 
appreciation, the application of the living instrument doctrine resulted in a high threshold of 
justification to be provided by the State in order for its to be within its margin of appreciation. 
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This, it could be argued, made the margin of appreciation ‘narrow’. The reliance on 
traditional beliefs which were not consistent with present-day developments as evidenced, in 
this instance by ‘international consensus’ and was not sufficient to satisfy this requirement.158 
Although significantly, the Court did not evidence a comparative study either of international 
instruments or State practice, hence no reference to European consensus per se, it built on its 
jurisprudence on the removal of distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children 
which had already begun to be developed in Marckx.159   
The Court applied its jurisprudence from Inze in the 2009 case of Brauer v Germany 
which involved a difference of treatment between children born out of wedlock based on the 
time of their birth.160 Once again, the Court referred to developments in society and in 
particular the 1975 European Convention on the Legal Status of Children born out of 
Wedlock which at the time was in force in twenty-one of the member States. Notably, 
Germany had not ratified the Convention.161 In relation to the legitimacy of the aim pursued, 
the Court was of the view that as a result of the evolution in the European context and the 
dynamic interpretation of the Convention, the aim of protecting the legitimate expectation of 
the deceased and their families should be subordinate to the requirement of equal treatment 
between children born outside and within marriage.162 The living instrument doctrine was 
therefore relevant to the determination of the justification of the aim pursued. The Court was 
of the view that there was no ground on which discrimination based on birth outside of 
wedlock could be justified today. The Court did not also find the measures taken to be 
proportionate. It held unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 14 taken in 
conjunction with Article 8. The lack of a legitimate aim coupled with absence of 
proportionality were therefore key factors in the decision in Brauer. 
In the 2000 case of Mazurek v France, the Court extended the principles it had 
elucidated in the Inze case on the scope of the State obligations in relation to inheritance 
rights of children born out of wedlock, to the determination of inheritance rights of a child 
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born out of an adulterous relationship.163 The Court in this case, relied on the principles it 
had elucidated in Inze on the need for equality between children born in and out of wedlock 
and the requirement that differences in treatment should be justified by weighty reasons.164 
It also referred to the 1975 European Convention on the Legal Status of Children born out of 
Wedlock which had been ratified by France. The threshold here was therefore set high for 
the State as a result of the reliance on the living instrument doctrine. 
The Court agreed that the government’s aim of protection of the traditional family 
could arguably be considered to be a legitimate one, this was different to Brauer where the 
Court found that the aim should have been subordinate to the protection of equality.165 The 
living instrument doctrine was relevant to the determination of proportionality.166 The 
ECtHR noted that the concept of family had evolved over time. It referred to several legal 
developments at the international,167 European168 and national levels169 that that showed a 
trend towards abolishing discrimination against adulterine children in inheritance matters. It 
noted that it had to take this tendency into account in its dynamic interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of the Convention.170 The Court concluded that in the instant case, it did not find 
any ground to justify discrimination based on birth out of wedlock. There was no reasonable 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued.171 The Court held 
unanimously, that there was therefore a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 taken in 
conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.  
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6.6.2 Extension of Scope of Duty to the Private Domain 
The use of the living instrument doctrine to determine the scope of the duty on the 
State in the equal treatment of children born in and out of wedlock has been extended to even 
the private domain. In the 2004 case of Pla and Puncernau v Andorra the issue was a 
difference of treatment between biological children and adoptive children. In this case, unlike 
that of Inze v Austria where intestate succession was involved and the interference had been 
created by the domestic legislation itself, this case involved a situation where the testatrix 
had made a will, so it was in the private sphere.172 The issue to be determined by the Court 
was whether interpretation of that will, which was drafted in 1939 and executed in 1995, by 
the Andorran High Court of Justice which had the effect of excluding the applicant from 
inheritance under the will, was a breach of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. 
The Court adopted a similar approach of requiring weighty reasons for a difference of 
treatment in the context of the interpretation of a testamentary disposition.173  
Whilst noting that it was not the Court’s role to deal with disputes that were of a 
private nature, the Court took the position that it could not remain passive where the 
interpretation of a legal provision by a national Court is unreasonable, arbitrary or 
inconsistent with the principles of the Convention. This would be the case even where it was 
a private matter.174  The Court then went on to reiterate the key principles concerning when 
a difference in treatment will be seen to be discriminatory which is when ‘it has no objective 
and reasonable justification, that is if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a 
‘reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought 
to be realised’.175 It was of the view that it could not ‘discern any legitimate aim pursued by 
the decision in question or any objective and reasonable justification on which the distinction 
made by the domestic court might be based’.176 In the Court’s view, an adopted child is in 
the same legal situation as a biological child of his or parents in all respects which include 
the family life and resulting property rights.177   
The Court also reiterated that ‘the Convention, which is a dynamic text and entails 
positive obligations for States, is a living instrument, to be interpreted in the light of present-
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day conditions and that great importance is attached today in the member States of the 
Council of Europe to the question of equality between children born in and out of wedlock 
as regards their civil rights’.178 The Court went further to state that even if the will in question 
required interpretation by the national courts it should not have been done exclusively in the 
light of the social conditions that existed in 1939 and 1949 especially because of the changes 
that had occurred in society since then. 179 This appears to suggest that the Court requires the 
national Courts to be dynamic in their interpretation as well. The Court concluded that there 
had been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. Once again, the living 
instrument doctrine had been applied to determine the boundaries of the margin of 
appreciation and in turn, the scope of the duty that could be imposed on the State in this 
instance.  
This move of the Court to areas that may be deemed as ‘private’ was strongly 
criticised by Judge Sir Nicolas Bratza in his partly dissenting opinion. He stressed that there 
was a distinction between this case and earlier cases where there had been difference in 
treatment because this case was in the private sphere as opposed to some of the earlier cases 
such as Marckx and Inze where the interference had come from government legislation.180 
He disagreed inter alia with the Court’s position that the interpretation of the will should 
have taken into account the social, economic and legal changes that had taken place since the 
document was created. He was of the view that it was open to the domestic court to interpret 
the clause in the light of the legal conditions that prevailed when the will was drafted rather 
than when it was examined181.  
It is clear that despite these strong disagreements, the majority were of the view that 
there had been an interference with the rights of the applicant under the Convention. The 
State therefore was seen as having a positive duty to avert this effect of discrimination. One 
could argue that the existence of discrimination only arose because of the interpretation given 
by the State, therefore it had interfered with the rights as the testatrix had not made a clear 
statement excluding adopted children. Once again, the State’s margin of appreciation was 
very narrow here and the Court did not see the reason given by the State even when it was 
that it was giving effect to the intention of a private individual, to be sufficient to justify 
difference of treatment between children. 
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 The Court has applied its principles on equality of treatment for inheritance purposes 
of legitimate and illegitimate children to monitor States’ compliance with its judgment. 
Following the Court’s earlier decision in Mazurek, the French authorities reformed the rules 
of inheritance by repealing all the discriminatory provisions relating to children ‘born of 
adultery’ and creating new legislation in 2001 thereby bringing the Country’s legislation in 
line with the Court’s principle of non-discrimination. This could be commended as an 
example of good dialogue between the Court and the State party. However, thirteen years 
later, in the case of Fabris v France, the Court once again veered into the private area when 
it found a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No 1 of the 
Convention in spite of the changes made.182 The Court found a violation in a case where the 
applicant had been excluded from sharing in the division of his mother’s estate due to his 
adulterine birth. Unlike the situation in Mazurek, the applicant in Fabris, had been excluded 
from the inheritance as a result of the inter vivos disposition of the property by his mother. 
Although the Mazurek decision was made before the applicant’s case was decided and the 
domestic legislation had been changed the transition provisions that had been included in the 
new law restricted the retroactive effect of the 2001 Law to successions that were already 
open on the date of the publication of the Law and that had not given rise to division by that 
date.183 In this case, the domestic Court determined that the estate had already been 
transferred to the beneficiaries, hence the applicant’s claim fell outside the scope of the new 
legislation.  
The living instrument doctrine was directly relevant in deciding the boundaries of the 
margin of appreciation in this case, as it had been in the previous cases to do with the 
inheritance rights of illegitimate children. In line with the living instrument approach, the 
Court referred to the developments in Europe that showed common ground between the 
member States of the Council of Europe on equality and eliminating of distinctions between 
legitimate and illegitimate children.184 The Court once again affirmed as it did in Pla v and 
Puncernau v Andorra that although this case dealt with a disposition in the private sphere 
there were conditions under which the Court’s supervisory role could still be engaged.185  
Following on from this elucidation of the general principles, the Court proceeded to 
determine whether there had been an interference with the rights of the applicant and whether 
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this interference was justified. It was agreed that there was an interference with the 
applicant’s right and that the aim of legal certainty pursued was legitimate.186 Such an 
interference however had to be proportionate to the aim pursued.  In assessing the 
proportionality of the measure, the Court had to deal with the balance to be made between 
the protection of the legitimate expectation of the deceased and the beneficiaries since the 
property had already passed to the beneficiaries. The Court was of the view that the challenge 
of the disposition by the applicant should have been foreseeable by the beneficiaries.187 The 
combination of the European case law and the legislative reforms within the State showed a 
clear trend towards eliminating all discrimination in relation to the inheritance rights of 
children born outside marriage. The protection of the legitimate expectation of the deceased 
and the beneficiaries should therefore be subordinate to the principle of equal treatment 
between children born within and outside of marriage.188 
It was shown in the case that a legitimate child who had been wilfully excluded or 
born at a later date, could also have filed for abatement and that would not be held 
inadmissible. The Court did not approve of this distinction which was seen in the domestic 
court’s decision in 2007, which was years after the Marckx and Mazurek judgments, ‘to apply 
the principle of protection of legal certainty differently according to whether it was asserted 
against a legitimate child or a child ‘born of adultery’.  Essentially, there was still 
discrimination even with the new legislation that was in place from 2001. The Court held 
unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 1 
of Protocol No 1. 
Although not clearly articulated in the judgment itself, the decision of the Court that 
found the transition measures that had been imposed by the domestic authorities to be in 
breach of the Convention’s guarantees raised the question of the temporal effect of the 
Court’s case law and the extent to which the Court can monitor compliance with its own 
decisions. These points were identified in the Concurring opinion of Judge Pinto De 
                                                 
186 Fabris (n 135), para 65. 
187 In support of this position, the Court drew attention to particular aspects of domestic legislation and practice 
which should have made the beneficiaries aware that their right to the property could be challenged by the 
applicant. The Court also considered the fact that the applicant’s challenge of the disposition had been filed at 
the time of the Court’s judgment in Mazurek where the Court had decided that difference in treatment in 
inheritance matters based on grounds of birth was incompatible with the Convention. Other factors that the 
Court took into consideration was the domestic change in the law in 2001 as well as the fact that the existence 
of the applicant was known to the beneficiaries. These points taken together, should have raised doubts as to 
whether title to the estate had passed to the beneficiaries at the time of the death of their mother. Fabris (n 
135), para 68. 




Albuquerque who pointed out that ‘In addition to the question of the principle of equality 
before the law, the case deals with two other questions of cardinal importance for the system 
of protection of human rights in Europe, namely, the retroactive effect of the Court’s 
judgments and the Court’s competence to control the execution of its own judgments by the 
national authorities.’189 Fabris was creating a legacy which ‘reaffirms the constitutional force 
of the Court’s judgments and the Court’s jurisdiction to verify whether a State Party has 
complied with the obligations imposed on it by one of the Court’s judgments.’190 The State 
should have complied with earlier judgments such as Marckx which had already established 
that distinctions made between legitimate and illegitimate children was incompatible with 
the Convention’s guarantees.191  
The case law on the protection of the rights of illegitimate children illustrates the 
strength of the use of the living instrument doctrine to police the boundaries of the State and 
to require weighty reasons for the difference in treatment. In all the cases that were examined, 
the State was unable to justify its difference in treatment between legitimate and illegitimate 
children and this led to the findings of violation. This is different to the situation with regards 
to the rights of transsexuals where there have been some cases in which the Court has not 
found a violation of the Convention even after the Goodwin case. 
  
6.7 Conclusion  
The focus of this chapter has been on the interaction between the living instrument 
and margin of appreciation doctrines in determining the nature and scope of duties on States 
in cases where the applicability of the Convention was not in issue or where neither of those 
doctrines was relevant to the determination of applicability. This examination was important 
in shedding further light on RQ 1 (relationship), RQ 2 (conflict) and RQ 3 (interpretive and 
theoretical approaches). It was also relevant for RQ 4 (conclusion and recommendations). 
The descriptive statistical analysis of the case law focused on the widths of the margin of 
appreciation and whether there was a correlation between the width given and the finding of 
violation. It showed that there were three rather than two types of widths of margin of 
appreciation in the case law: wide, narrow and unspecified with the wide width accounting 
for the majority of cases and the unspecified width following closely. The descriptive 
statistics also showed that apart from the very few cases where the margin of appreciation 
                                                 






had been clearly stated to be narrow by the Court, the width of the margin of appreciation 
did not have a direct bearing on the finding of violation. Even in cases where the Court had 
stated that the State had a wide margin of appreciation, through the use of the living 
instrument doctrine, the State could be held to a high threshold of justification for its actions 
with the result that the Court finds a violation of the Convention in the particular case. The 
living instrument had also had very minimal effect on an express re-categorisation of the 
width of the margin of appreciation. This result suggested that to provide further insight on 
RQ 1 (relationship) and RQ 2 (conflict), the focus of the qualitative analysis should not be 
on ‘widths’ per se but more on the use of the living instrument doctrine to police the borders 
of the margin of appreciation irrespective of the width ascribed to the margin of appreciation. 
It was shown that the use of the living instrument doctrine to police the borders of the 
margin of appreciation can be traced as far back as the 1979 case of Marckx. The Court has 
used the living instrument doctrine as a yardstick for setting the threshold of justification the 
State has to advance for interference with the rights of individuals. It has also been used as a 
threshold for determining whether a particular obligation exists. The relationship (RQ 1) 
between the living instrument and margin of appreciation doctrine is therefore varied and 
relevant to both determination of rights and allocation of duties. The doctrinal textual analysis 
of the case law focused on the use of the living instrument to determine the boundaries of the 
margin of appreciation in relation to the nature and scope of duty. From the case study on the 
recognition of the post-operative status of transsexuals, the use of the living instrument 
doctrine was applied to both the existence and nature of the duty as well as the scope of the 
duty on the State. Evolution was shown from the earlier case of Rees where the Court used 
the living instrument as an admonition to the State to keep its practice up to date, to the case 
of Goodwin where the living instrument doctrine was used to determine that no margin of 
appreciation existed on the question of whether or not to recognise the post-operative status 
of transsexuals, but rather the margin of appreciation was restricted to the means of achieving 
this recognition. The conflict (RQ 2) that had existed between both doctrines from Rees was 
therefore resolved in favour of the living instrument doctrine in Goodwin. There was, 
however, room for dialogue between the State and the Court and if this had happened, 
changes could have happened earlier on at the domestic level without the Court needing to 
make the decision at the international level.  
The case of Hämäläinen seemed a step back in this area with the Court now assigning 
the margin of appreciation to both the decision on whether to enact legislation to recognise 




registration. This suggests a lack of consistency in this area of the case law on transsexuals 
but when one brings in the Court’s jurisprudence on same-sex marriage which was 
particularly relevant to that case, it would appear that the decision in Hämäläinen was 
consistent with the jurisprudence of the Court on the issue of same-sex marriage. Other 
decisions like Aldeguer Tomás show that the area of same-sex marriage is one where the 
Court still accords the State a wide margin of appreciation to determine whether or not to 
provide legal recognition of same-sex marriage. The living instrument doctrine has not 
resulted in a high threshold for justification of the margin of appreciation. The Court’s 
statement in Schalk and Kopf that Article 12 need not be read in a way that excludes the 
possibility of people of the same sex getting married could be seen as seeds for future change 
of direction of the Court. Time will still tell what impact if any Hämäläinen may have on 
States that do not recognise the post-operative gender status of transsexuals. The issue of 
same-sex marriage is an example of where conflict (RQ 2) between both doctrines has been 
resolved in favour of the margin of appreciation. It shows that the relationship (RQ 1) 
between both doctrines is diverse and there is not always one doctrine that takes precedence 
in the Court’s judgments. The interpretive approach of the Court (RQ 3) in this case relies to 
a great extent on the existence or no existence of European consensus as a means of 
legitimising a reliance of Article 31(3) VCLT which allows for consideration of subsequent 
agreements and practice of States in the interpretation of treaty obligations. 
The second case study focused on the scope of duties on States. It examined the 
protection of the rights of children born out of wedlock over a 35-year period.192 Although 
the Court had found in the Marckx case that a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
children was a violation of the Convention and in Inze, clearly found that difference in 
treatment with regards to inheritance rights was a violation of the Convention, further cases 
that involved distinctions between children on the basis of their birth still came to the Court. 
The Court extended its decision in this area to cover children born out of adulterous 
relationships as well as adopted children. The Court also monitored the efficacy of measures 
that had been taken by the State to give effect to its judgments, in the Fabris case. The Court’s 
decision in the area of protection of rights of illegitimate children was consistent with a 
finding of at least one violation in all the cases irrespective of the width of margin of 
appreciation afforded. The living instrument appears to have had a very strong impact on the 
threshold for justification of interference in order for a State to take advantage of their margin 
                                                 




of appreciation in this area. In this area of protection of rights of children born out of wedlock, 
conflict (RQ 2) appears to have been resolved in favour of the living instrument doctrine. In 
relation to these cases, the Court’s interpretive approach (RQ 3) seems to have been 
consistent based on the cases examined with a focus not so much on European consensus as 
evidence of subsequent practice, but rather on international trends that show a need for 
protection of rights of children born out of wedlock. 
The combination of the quantitative and qualitative approach in this chapter has 
shown that overall, living instrument and margin of appreciation arguments are vital in the 
determination of the rights and duties of the States under the Convention. It addresses RQ 2 
(conflict) as the analysis shows that where living instrument arguments are applied to 
determine the borders of the margin of appreciation, they appear to be superseding margin of 
appreciation arguments with the Court finding at least one violation of the Convention in 
such cases. However, there are limitations as there are instances where the margin of 
appreciation trumps the living instrument doctrine and the Court refrains from extending 
allocation of duties to States in certain areas such as the provision of same-sex marriage. This 
shows that there is no simplistic answer to RQ 2 (conflict) as sometimes the living instrument 
supersedes and sometimes it does not. The results show that the relationship (RQ 1) between 
the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines is varied. The case analysis 
however shows that the application of the living instrument doctrine provides an opportunity 
for dialogue between the Court and the State through incremental increase in the nature and 
scope of obligations on the State. The reliance on developments within international and 
regional law as well as the practice in European States is an avenue for States to engage with 
the Court by carrying out such comparative work at the domestic level in order to keep its 
practices in line with the jurisprudence of the Court. There is, however, room for more clarity 
in the interpretive approach of the Court (RQ 3) to the policing of the borders of the margin 
of appreciation.  
The next chapter provides the conclusion to this thesis. Within that chapter key points 
that have been established in different parts of this thesis will be highlighted and discussed. 
Conclusions will be drawn from the analysis that has been conducted on the case law within 
this work. The concluding chapter will end with recommendations on further areas of 





Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
This study examined the nature of the relationship between the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines used by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR, the Court) in the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR, Convention). Both doctrines, interpretive tools created by the Court, have also been 
the basis for criticism of the Court. The Court has been criticised for not affording enough 
margin of appreciation to States in certain cases, and the living instrument doctrine has been 
pinpointed as one of the reasons for this.1 It is alleged that the living instrument doctrine has 
led to the narrowing of the margin of appreciation afforded to States with the result that 
States are found to be in violation of obligations they did not subscribe to under the 
Convention or new obligations based on the rights they had subscribed to under the 
Convention in what may be perceived to more instances than they should be.2 These 
criticisms suggest a conflict between both doctrines and this study was aimed at examining 
that conflict and how it is dealt with in the case law of the Court. At a time when the entry 
into force of Protocol No 15 which calls for the inclusion of the term ‘margin of appreciation’ 
and ‘subsidiarity’ in the Preamble of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, 
the Convention) is appearing to be more of a reality, the examination of any tension between 
the living instrument doctrine and the margin of appreciation doctrine is necessary.3 
To address the relationship between the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines in the case law of the ECtHR, the following central research questions (RQs) were 
posed in this thesis: 
1. What is the nature of the interaction between margin of appreciation and living 
instrument arguments in cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights? 
(RQ 1 relationship) 
                                                 
1 A case in point is Hirst v United Kingdom (no 2) App no 74025/01 (ECtHR, 6 October 2005). 
2 Baroness Hale, ‘Common Law and Convention Law: The Limits to Interpretation’ (2011) EHRLR, 534, 
542.; Françoise Tulkens, Section President of the European Court of Human Rights. Seminar ‘What are the 
Limits to the evolutive interpretation of the Convention?’ (Dialogue between Judges 2011) 19. 
3 There are currently 44 out of the 47 member States of the Council of Europe that have ratified Protocol No 
15. Current status of ratifications as at 29 July 2018. Available at < 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/213/signatures?p_auth=xwvJ7TQ3> 




2. To what extent are living instrument arguments superseding margin of appreciation 
arguments? (RQ 2 conflict) 
3. Which interpretive and theoretical approaches are applied by the Court to decide the 
outcome of cases where the margin of appreciation and living instrument arguments 
conflict? (RQ 3 interpretive and theoretical approaches) 
4. What recommendations can be made for future research and policy developments? 
(RQ 4 recommendations) 
In order to deal with RQ 1 (relationship), the first stage was to provide an overview 
of the margin of appreciation doctrines and their use by the ECtHR. In Chapter two, the 
origins of both doctrines in the jurisprudence of the Court was examined. It revealed that 
both doctrines were interpretive tools created by the Court in its adjudicatory role. The 
margin of appreciation doctrine although initially referred to by the European Commission 
on Human Rights in Greece v United Kingdom, was first applied fully by the Court in Engel 
and Others v Netherlands.4 The margin of appreciation is a ‘two pronged’ instrument, 
applied by the Court to both the substantive issue of determining whether there had been a 
proper balance struck between competing interests, and to the structural issue of whether it 
should be the Court or the State which is in a better position to deal with an issue.5 The lack 
of clarity in the way it has been used has prompted criticism of the doctrine.6 The Court in 
Handyside v United Kingdom underpinned the need for the doctrine in its jurisprudence on 
three key themes: subsidiarity, better position rationale and diversity of State parties.7 This 
research has examined how these elements reflect the key justifications but still leave room 
for criticism. 
The flexibility afforded by the margin of appreciation doctrine, although a source of 
criticism, provides a link to the living instrument doctrine. This study showed that although 
the living instrument doctrine was expressly referred to by the Court for the first time in 
Tyrer v United Kingdom,8 the evolutive interpretation of the Convention was already 
                                                 
4 Greece v United Kingdom App no 176/56 (Commission Decision, 26 September 1958); Engel and Others v 
Netherlands App nos 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; and 5370/72. 
5 George Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’ (2006) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 705, 
706. 
6 For example, Z v Finland App no 22009/93 (ECtHR, 25 February 1997), Partly dissenting opinion of De 
Meyer J; Letsas, (n 5) 705. 
7 Handyside v United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976), para 48. 




embedded in the Court’s jurisprudence.9 The living instrument doctrine, like the margin of 
appreciation doctrine has been subject to criticisms for lack of justification in its use by the 
Court.10 Several reasons such as the text of the Convention which refers to ‘maintenance and 
further realisation’, and the special nature of the Convention itself as a human rights treaty, 
have been advanced to justify the continued use of the living instrument doctrine by the 
Court.11  
Following on from a consideration of the origins and the justification for the use of 
both doctrines in the jurisprudence of the Court, Chapter two established that a relationship 
exists between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines. Whilst the margin 
of appreciation is rooted in subsidiarity, the living instrument doctrine is rooted in the need 
to ensure effective protection of the rights guaranteed under the ECHR. Consequently, on 
face value, there does not appear to be a relationship between both doctrines. However, the 
effect of the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine could promote diversity of 
the State parties, whilst the living instrument has the potential to lead to harmony/uniformity 
between the parties. This therefore reveals a potential for tension between both doctrines. It 
was established that right from the early cases of both doctrines, reliance on consensus in 
the practice of States was a linking factor for both the margin of appreciation and living 
instrument doctrines.12 Four types of consensus could be relied on by the Court either on 
their own or in conjunction with each other: international consensus13, European 
consensus14, internal consensus15 and expert consensus.16 Another linking factor between 
both of them is the issue of change. Brems identified that ‘where the margin of appreciation 
allows for variations of interpretation in space, evolutive interpretation allows for variations 
in time’.17 Through an examination of change in time and space, width and function, chapter 
                                                 
9 Early cases such as Wemhoff v Germany App no 2122/64 27 (ECtHR, 27 June 1968); Golder v United 
Kingdom App no 4451/70 (ECtHR, 21 February 1975); Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom App nos 
7601/76 and 7806/77 (ECtHR, 13 August 1981). 
10 L Hoffmann, ‘The Universality of Human Rights’ (2009) 125 LQR 416, 428; Alastair Mowbray, ‘The 
Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) HRL Rev 57,60. 
11 The justification for the living instrument doctrine was discussed in chapter two, particularly section 2.5 
‘Contexts and rationale for the interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument’. 
12 In Tyrer (n 8) where the Court espoused the living instrument doctrine and Handyside (n 7) where the Court 
espoused more fully the rationale for the margin of appreciation doctrine, there was reference to reliance on 
the practice of States. 
13 Consideration of international treaties. 
14 Consideration of the practice of member States. 
15 Consideration of the climate within the respondent State. 
16 Consideration of medical and scientific evidence. Fiona de Londras and Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Great 
Debates on the European Convention on Human Rights (Palgrave 2018) 79-80. 
17 Eva Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
(1996)  56 Zeitschrift Fur Auslandisches Offentliches Recht Und Volkerrecht 240, 243 available at < 




two showed that there was an indication of a link between both doctrines but there was also 
scope for a systematic analysis of the case law in which both doctrines were used by the 
Court in order to make some conclusions about the interactions between both doctrines. 
Chapter two therefore set the scene for the examination of the different research questions 
and the ways in which originality would be achieved in this work. 
To pave the way for the case analysis which would provide answers to RQ 1 
(relationship), RQ 2 (conflict), and RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches), one of 
the issues that was apparent was a need to provide grounding for the use of the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines. Hence, Chapter three examined the use of the 
margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines through the lens of the rules of 
interpretation of treaties contained in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (VCLT).18 It achieved two key tasks: (a) It examined the legitimacy in 
international law of the creation of the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines 
as tools of interpretation by the Court; and (b) It examined the links between the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines with the theories of interpretation reflected in 
the international rules on treaty interpretation. 
On the question of legitimacy, it showed that although the ECHR came into force 
before the VCLT, Articles 31-32 of the VCLT are considered to be part of customary 
international law, therefore these are relevant to the interpretation of the ECHR.19 It also 
established that the International Law Commission, in drafting the tools of interpretation in 
the VCLT had restricted themselves to ‘trying to isolate and codify the comparatively few 
general principles which appear to constitute general rules for the interpretation of treaties’.20 
Consequently, international Courts are free to create other rules of interpretation that enable 
them to interpret the treaty they are tasked with interpreting. The ECtHR is therefore within 
its remit under international law to create rules of interpretation such as the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines in interpreting the ECHR. 
                                                 
18 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 – opened for signature on 23 April 1969 and 
entered into force on 27 January 1980. 
19 Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) [1994] ICJ Rep 21, para 41; See also Oil Platforms 
(Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Preliminary Objections) [1996] (II) ICJ Rep 812, para 
23; Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) [1999] ICJ Rep 1045, para 18; Golder v United Kingdom App 
no 4451/70 (ECtHR, 21 February 1975). 
20 International Law Commission’s Commentary to Articles 27 and 28 of the ILC Draft (ultimately Articles 31 
and 32 of the VCLT) from the ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries 1966’ in Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission (1966) Vol II on Para 5 page 218-9 available at < 




To answer the question on the links between the margin of appreciation doctrine and 
living instrument doctrine with the theories of interpretation reflected in the international 
rules on treaty interpretation, chapter three examined the interaction between the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines and the textual, intentionalist and object and 
purpose schools. This thesis has contributed to the literature in this area by showing that both 
doctrines interact at different levels with these schools of interpretation. Whilst the Court 
would normally use the textual approach as a starting point, it is not limited by the text and 
considers interpretation that fits in with present day society, hence adopting a living 
instrument approach to textual interpretation. The Court has also not been limited by the 
intention of the parties as revealed by the travaux préparatoires, rather, it has emphasised 
the nature of the ECHR as a treaty for the effective protection of human rights.21 It is open 
to considering the overall intention of the Convention to maintain and further realise human 
rights and is guided by this progressive rule of interpretation in looking at context. The use 
of the living instrument and margin of appreciation doctrines are even more related to the 
Court’s reliance on Article 31(3) of the VCLT which requires consideration of subsequent 
agreement and subsequent practice of States in interpretation of the text of treaties. In this 
area of interpretation, both doctrines are linked as subsequent practice could lead to either a 
wide or narrow margin of appreciation afforded to States in a particular area. Subsequent 
practice could also be the basis for invocation of the living instrument doctrine. The 
interpretation of the Convention taking into consideration its context and nature as a human 
rights treaty underpins the connection with the use of the living instrument doctrine in the 
interpretation of the Convention. 
Chapter three also showed that the object and purpose/teleological approach to 
interpretation is the one most aligned with the use of the living instrument doctrine and is 
the area where there is most opportunity for conflict between relying on the living instrument 
doctrine and relying on the margin of appreciation doctrine. The teleological interpretation 
requires consideration of the object and purpose of the treaty and the Court has frequently 
relied on this in its interpretation of the Convention.22 The reliance on the object and purpose 
links in to the living instrument doctrine when the question is asked as to how the object and 
purpose of the Convention is to be determined. Is the object and purpose of the Convention 
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rooted in the past and therefore static or are they abstract aims that could change and 
progress? In other words, should its aims be considered in the light of the past or the future? 
By adopting the living instrument doctrine, the Court has endorsed the position that there 
could be change and progress in the object and purpose of the Convention. Adopting a living 
instrument approach leads to a wide interpretation of the rights contained in the Convention. 
The result of this is a narrow consideration of restrictions that are put on those rights. This 
is where a connection arises with the margin of appreciation doctrine of the Court in which 
the Court affords room for manoeuvre to States before determining that a restriction on 
Convention rights breaches the obligation of the State. 
Whilst Chapter three had provided the first stage of grounding for dealing with RQ 
1 (relationship), RQ 2 (conflict) and (RQ 3 interpretive and theoretical approaches), Chapter 
four provided a further framework to consider the use of both doctrines by peeling back the 
layers, to the core issue of the relationship between rights and duties. It examined the 
relationship between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrine through the 
lens of the correlativity thesis. Hohfeld’s analysis of claim-rights provided the backdrop for 
the analysis of the relationship between rights and duties. Based on Hohfeld’s theory, for 
every right, there is a correlative duty, when one speaks of the existence of a right, it means 
a duty has been invaded.23 The Hohfeldian correlativity thesis did not however account for 
situations where a duty exists without a clear right attached to it. For example, duties of 
charity. There are also instances in which a duty is owed to the public in general rather than 
to a particular person therefore the identification of the specific duty bearer may not be 
possible in some cases. This posed problems for the correlativity thesis as under that theory, 
a right cannot be said to exist without identification of the duty and the duty bearer.  
Joseph Raz’s critic of the correlativity thesis is one of the best alternatives to that 
theory in the view of the researcher. According to Raz, a right is ‘A ground of a duty which 
if not counteracted by conflicting considerations justifies holding the other person to have 
the duty.’24 Four key elements were put forward by Raz which could be summarised as 
follows: (a) A right is a ground of a duty which is not dependent on the choice of the right 
holder, rather it is based on the interest to be protected. The duty would only be imposed if 
there was sufficient justification given and there were no counteracting factors. (b) There is 
no fixed list of the number of duties that are attached to a particular right. (d) Rights have a 
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dynamic nature and the duties that arise as a result of a particular right could change over 
time.25 Based on a combination of Hohfeld’s analysis and Raz’s critic, this research proposed 
a ‘dynamic restricted correlativity’ thesis. It takes the position that a right is a ground of 
duties which would only be imposed if there are no substantial competing arguments which 
prevent the imposition of the duty. It also recognises that a right can be the ground for more 
than more duty and the duties can change over time.  
This thesis has provided an original contribution to the literature by examining the 
way in which the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines can be explained 
using dynamic restricted correlativity. Essentially when the Court adjudicates a claim and 
finds a violation, it is assigning duties to the State. The inadequacy of Hohfeld’s formulation 
of the correlativity thesis is apparent when one considers the qualified rights such as those 
in Articles 8-11 ECHR. In those cases, a finding of an interference is not an automatic finding 
of violation. Reasons have to be given to justify the interference and if those reasons are 
sufficient, the State will not be deemed to have violated its obligations. In essence, the 
existence of the right would be affirmed, but no duty placed on the State even when it has 
interfered.  This sits very well with the role of the court in the substantive use of the margin 
of appreciation doctrine where the Court determines whether or not the State, although it has 
interfered with a certain right, is also in breach of their duty under the Convention (RQ 1 
relationship). Interference does not automatically mean a breach as the State can present 
reasons and if they are within their margin of appreciation, there will not be found to be in 
breach of the Convention’s guarantees.  
The living instrument doctrine accords with the conception of a right as a ground of 
more than one duty. Through the use of the living instrument doctrine, the ECtHR has 
referred to both positive and negative obligations in relation to articles such as Articles 2,26 
3,27 and 8.28 The scope of those duties are also susceptible to change and have evolved over 
time through the reliance on the living instrument doctrine.  The analysis of the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines through the lens of relationship between rights 
and duties raised the question of whether the ECtHR is expanding rights or increasing the 
duties on the States. If rights and duties are correlative, then whichever way it is considered 
they are one and the same thing. However, if rights are considered as grounds of duties, then 
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expanding a right does not necessarily correlate with allocating more duties. The case law 
analysis provided an underpinning for how this works in the Court in practice. 
This thesis has also provided an original contribution the body of knowledge in this 
area in the methodology applied to the systematic analysis of the case law in which both the 
margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines are present. The rigour of the study 
is evidenced in the sustained focus on legal scholarship throughout the thesis and in the 
detailed appendices to this work. Appendix A contains a detailed presentation of the 
methodology adopted in this thesis in terms of research design and structure and the method 
of selection of relevant case law. Appendix B reveals the coding criteria applied to the case 
law, whilst Appendix C contains a list of the cases that were analysed. The outcome of the 
case law analysis which was presented in chapters five and six of this study was based on 
case law from the Court from January 1979 – December 1976 in which both the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines (or any of its variants) were expressly referred 
to and relied on by the Court in its judgment.29 Through a systematic process of selection 
detailed in Appendix A to weed out duplicated cases and cases not relevant to the specified 
theme, the researcher arrived at a final selection of 75 cases for the case analysis in chapters 
five and six. The results presented in this study are however limited to the contents of the 
data studied. This study was unable to consider all cases that dealt with the margin of 
appreciation separately, and all cases that dealt with the living instrument separately. It was 
limited to just those cases where both doctrines were present. This was considered sufficient 
to deal with the research questions that were posed and justification for this is explained in 
Appendix A. This thesis has provided an original contribution to the literature by adopting a 
combination of the quantitative method of descriptive statistical analysis and the qualitative 
method of doctrinal analysis to the case law examined.  
Chapter five was the first phase of the case analysis which provided initial answers 
to RQ 1 (relationship), RQ 2 (conflict) and RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches). 
It examined the use of the margin of appreciation and living instrument arguments in 
determining the scope ratione materiae of the Convention at the admissibility stage. An 
analysis of this stage was important for two reasons: (a) One of the areas of criticism levelled 
against the living instrument doctrine has been that it has expanded the coverage of the 
Convention and in tandem restricted the margin of appreciation afforded to States; (b) A 
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distinction between the use of the doctrines at the applicability and merits stage is usually 
overlooked in the literature; and (c) The issue of compatibility ratione materiae goes to the 
jurisdiction of the Court to hear a matter. The combination of these three elements grounded 
the decision to conduct the analysis of the use of both doctrines at the admissibility phase.  
Two methods were adopted for the case analysis: quantitative method of descriptive 
statistical analysis and doctrinal analysis. The first phase was the descriptive statistical 
analysis. Four questions were posed in order to examine the nature of interaction between 
the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines (RQ 1 relationship) and also 
explore whether living instrument arguments were superseding margin of appreciation 
arguments at the applicability stage (RQ 2 conflict). The four questions were: 
 Is compatibility ratione materiae contested in the case?  
 Are the margin of appreciation or living instrument doctrine arguments 
referred to in addressing compatibility?  
 Which of the two arguments is used the most at the compatibility stage?  
 What is the outcome of compatibility arguments in cases in which there is a 
margin of appreciation or living instrument argument?  
 
The results showed that in 40% of the cases where compatibility ratione materiae 
was contested, either the living instrument doctrine or margin of appreciation doctrine, or 
both, were relied upon.30 The living instrument doctrine was used as the basis for arguments 
that a particular issue is covered by the Convention or that an issue covered by the 
Convention extends to the particular facts of the case presented. The margin of appreciation 
doctrine, on the other hand, was usually relied on to contest applicability of the Convention 
to the issue raised or to extension of duties of the State in particular area, to the facts of a 
case presented. In relation to question on which of the doctrines is used the most, the use of 
the living instrument doctrine was at a higher level than the use of margin of appreciation 
arguments.31  
The case law was further examined to provide an answer to question four about the 
outcome of the compatibility arguments. The answer to this question directly feeds into RQ 
2 (conflict), which queries whether living instrument arguments are superseding margin of 
appreciation arguments. The results showed that in an overwhelming majority of the cases, 
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79%, where the living instrument doctrine had been relied on to argue for compatibility 
ratione materiae, there had been a positive decision. On the other hand, a margin of 
appreciation argument as a counter to the living instrument doctrine had a poor success rate. 
It was successful in only 1 case where the Court found the issue to be incompatible ratione 
materiae with the Convention. However, there were only two cases in which both the margin 
of appreciation and living instrument doctrines were applied at the applicability stage and in 
those cases, it was a 50/50 outcome. This would therefore suggest that at the applicability 
stage, living instrument arguments were not necessarily superseding margin of appreciation 
arguments when both arguments were placed side by side. The success rate of living 
instrument arguments was higher (79%) when there was no conflicting margin of 
appreciation argument, than it was, when there was a conflicting margin of appreciation 
argument placed side by side (50%). This was an interesting discovery to add to the literature 
in this area as it suggests that the margin of appreciation is still playing a strong role in the 
determination of the scope ratione materiae of the Convention.  
It was noteworthy that by raising the living instrument argument in relation to 
compatibility ratione materiae, this created more areas in which there is also a need for a 
margin of appreciation argument. For this reason, it was necessary to examine the 
relationship between both doctrines and the final outcome of the case. To achieve this, the 
cases were analysed on the basis of the interaction between margin of appreciation and living 
instruments from the applicability to the merits stage. The results revealed four models:  
1. Living instrument doctrine applied to applicability argument, only margin of 
appreciation doctrine applied to compliance. (Model 1 LI applicability, MOA 
compliance). 
2. Living instrument doctrine applied to applicability argument, both living instrument 
and margin of appreciation doctrines applied to compliance. (Model 2 LI 
applicability, LI & MOA compliance). 
3. Living instrument and margin of appreciation doctrines applied to both the 
applicability argument and the compliance arguments. (Model 3 LI and MOA 
applicability and compliance). 
4. Margin of appreciation doctrine applied to applicability argument, only living 






Model 1 (LI applicability, MOA compliance) was the highest occurring 
relationship, accounting for 50% of the cases examined.32 This showed the strength of the 
use of the living instrument doctrine for applicability arguments. On the other end of the 
spectrum, Model 4 MOA (applicability, LI compliance) accounted for just 7% of the cases, 
showing the low use of the margin of appreciation doctrine at the applicability stage. 
Overall, the living instrument doctrine was used the most for the compatibility issues, in 
92% of the cases.33 This may be contrasted with the margin of appreciation doctrine that 
was only raised in 22% of the cases. At the compliance stage, the living instrument doctrine 
was used at a lower rate – 50% of the cases as opposed to the margin of appreciation which 
was used in 92% of the cases at the compliance stage. The differences in the way in which 
these two doctrines were used at the applicability and compliance stages indicated that the 
living instrument doctrine was mainly used to determine whether a right exists that was 
covered by the ECHR, whilst the margin of appreciation was used to determine whether the 
State has breached its duty under the Convention.  
 A further level of descriptive analysis was carried out to determine the outcome of 
the cases based on the four models discovered in the case law. The results showed that for 
Model 1 (LI applicability, MOA compliance), in 85% of the cases, there was a finding of at 
least one violation of the Convention. In Model 2 (LI applicability), the Court found a 
violation in 100% of the cases. In Model 3 (LI and MOA applicability and compliance) the 
Court did not find any violation in 100% of the cases whilst in Model 4 (MOA applicability, 
LI compliance) it found a violation in 100% of the cases. Overall, in 86% of the cases 
examined, the Court found at least one violation of the Convention.34 It was significant that 
the results showed that in all the cases where Model 3 (LI and MOA applicability and 
compliance) was applied, the State was not found to be in violation of its obligations. This 
was even more significant when the outcome of the compatibility question in the cases under 
Model 3 (LI and MOA applicability and compliance), was 50/50. Although the Court found 
in one case that the issue was compatible ratione materiae and the in the other that it was 
not, the outcome was still the same – the State was not in violation of its obligations. This 
indicates that the margin of appreciation still has a strong place in the Court’s jurisprudence 
even when the living instrument doctrine is applied.  
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 Although the descriptive statistical analysis provided some insights based on the 
numbers of cases within each category, it was limited as reliance on the results could not 
give an understanding of the reasons for the decision of the Court nor the interpretive 
approaches applied by the Court. The size of the sample also made it important to engage in 
doctrinal analysis of the text of the cases alongside the results that had been arrived at 
through the descriptive statistical analysis. The descriptive statistical analysis was however 
helpful in coming to a decision on which cases to examine further in the textual analysis as 
not all the cases could be analysed in depth due to the constraints of this research project.  
  The doctrinal textual analysis was structured around two themes that had emerged 
from the case law: ‘expansion’ and ‘restriction’, both themes relate to the issue of change, 
which had already been identified in chapter two as a linking factor between both the margin 
of appreciation and living instrument doctrines. It examined the interaction between the 
margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines from the perspective of expansion 
ratione materiae and restriction ratione materiae of the scope of the Convention. The issue 
of restriction ratione materiae is not usually captured in the literature, hence a focus on that 
area as a way of contributing to the codification of knowledge in this area. Restriction ratione 
materiae referred to those cases where there had been a living instrument argument urging 
the Court to find a particular issue to be compatible with the Convention, but the Court 
rejects the living instrument argument and finds that the issue is not compatible ratione 
materiae with the Convention. By rejecting the argument for compatibility, the Court 
restricts the scope of the ECHR. The analysis revealed two cases in which the Court had 
restricted ratione materiae the scope of the Convention by rejecting a living instrument 
argument.35 Whilst in Johnston and Others v Ireland, the Court adopted Model 2 (LI 
applicability, LI & MOA compliance), in VO v France, the Court adopted Model 3 (LI & 
MOA applicability and compliance). The model adopted did not therefore seem to have a 
significant impact on the outcome of compatibility. The case of VO was chosen for a more 
descriptive textual analysis as that was a case where both the margin of appreciation and 
living instrument doctrines were applied to the applicability and compliance stages therefore 
one in which the tension between both doctrines could be examined in order to answer RQ 
2 (conflict) and RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches).  
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In VO the Court had to determine whether Article 2 was applicable in a case where 
the applicant had suffered from an unsolicited termination of her pregnancy due to a case of 
mistaken identity. The analysis showed that rough an examination of the case, it was seen 
that the interpretive approach of the Court was in line with the rules of interpretation in the 
VCLT, using the textual interpretation as a starting point. The Court also considered 
subsequent practice amongst States, in line with Article 31(3) VCLT. VO was interesting 
because it pitched two types of consensus before the Court and only one choice could be 
made. Whilst the applicant raised the developments in science, hence expert consensus, the 
government drew attention to the lack of agreement amongst States as the basis for 
advocating for a wide margin of appreciation on the issue of when the right to life begins. 
The Court chose the margin of appreciation doctrine over the living instrument doctrine in 
this case based on the fact that it did not find there to be consensus within the member States 
on this issue nor in the international treaties. The margin of appreciation therefore trumped 
the living instrument doctrine in this case. The Court by putting together the compatibility 
question as well as the merits together, side stepped the opportunity to make a clear statement 
on when the right to life begins. This is considered as a missed opportunity here. The 
outcome of the case was that no right was found to exist here and therefore no duty ensued. 
 Moving on from considering where the scope of the Convention had been restricted 
ratione materiae, the second issue examined was the use of living instrument and margin of 
appreciation arguments to expand ratione materiae the scope of the Convention. Under this 
heading, the case analysis revealed that there were two possible outcomes: (a) Expansion 
ratione materiae of the scope of the Convention, no expansion of scope of duty (b) 
Expansion ratione materiae of the scope of the Convention, expansion of scope of duty. 
Expansion ratione materiae of the scope of the Convention with no expansion of the scope 
of duty refers to those cases where the Court finds the particular issue to be compatible with 
Convention but does not find that the State has breached its obligation in the particular case. 
Essentially, the State is not found to have breached its duty. In this area, there were only two 
cases identified where the Court expanded ratione materiae the scope of the Convention 
without an attendant finding of a breach of obligations of the State.36 The Court adopted two 
different models in those cases. Whilst in Leyla Sahin v Turkey, the Court adopted Model 1 
(LI applicability MOA compliance), in Schalk and Kopf v Austria, the Court adopted Model 
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3 (LI & MOA applicability and compliance). Notwithstanding the difference in models, the 
outcome of both cases was similar, the Court did not find a violation of the Convention, and 
hence no new duties were imposed on the State. Schalk and Kopf was discussed in further 
detail, since as in VO, it engaged both the margin of appreciation doctrine at the applicability 
stage and was therefore one of the ‘hard cases’ where the tension between both doctrines 
could be better displayed.  
In Schalk and Kopf the Court was faced with the question of whether the refusal by 
the Austrian authorities to allow a same-sex couple to get married was a violation of Article 
12 and Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. The Court had two applicability 
questions to deal with: first, whether Article 12 which provides for the right to marry was 
applicable to same sex couples and second, whether the lack of same sex marriage was 
discriminatory within the terms of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. The Court 
in a similar vein to VO, also adopted the interpretive approaches in the VCLT, beginning 
with the text of the Convention. However, it proceeded to consider the living instrument 
doctrine on the basis that this was the ground on which the applicant was relying on for their 
claim. In relation to Article 12, although the Court noted a lack of European consensus, the 
Court relied solely on Article 9 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (the Charter) to conclude that Article 12 should no longer be read as limited to 
marriage between two persons of the opposite sex. It concluded that Article 12 was 
applicable to the applicant’s case. The Court did not however find a violation of the 
Convention on the basis that the regulation of same sex marriage should be a matter for 
national authorities to decide. The reliance on Article 9 of the Charter alone was seen as a 
departure from the normal practice of the Court in this area and was subject to criticisms.37 
On the applicability question for Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, the living 
instrument doctrine trumped the margin of appreciation doctrine as the Court found that the 
facts of the case came within the notion of ‘private life’ as well as ‘family life’ within the 
ambit of Article 8. It did not however find a violation of the Convention. In dealing with that 
issue the Court relied on the rules of interpretation of the VCLT and the issue of consensus 
and evolving practice amongst the States.  
The outcome of the cases in this area when viewed from the perspective of dynamic 
correlativity of rights and duties, shows the conception of rights as grounds of duties. In both 
Sahin and Schalk and Kopf, although a right was seen to exist, no new duties were imposed. 
                                                 




If a right is considered a correlative of a duty, there should have been a finding of violation 
in both cases. However, when a right is considered a ground of a duty, it is possible to find 
that a right exists without identifying the duty that goes with that right at the material time. 
It could also lead to new duties being imposed over time. The finding in Schalk and Kopf 
that a duty did not exist on the State to provide access to marriage for same sex couples, 
could change over time. The developments that have been seen in the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), suggest 
there could be room for a different view of the Court in the future.38 
A further point that was considered was the expansion ratione materiae of the scope 
of the Convention and expansion of duty on the State. The results showed that this was the 
area where the most cases were found.39 However, none of the cases were based on Model 
3 (LI & MOA applicability and compliance). Model 1 (LI applicability, MOA compliance) 
had the highest number of cases,40 followed by Model 2 (LI applicability, LI and MOA 
compliance),41 then Model 4 (MOA applicability, LI compliance).42 The issues covered also 
ranged from areas of absolute rights such as the prohibition of torture,43 to qualified rights 
such as the right to freedom of religion.44  
The cases under this section were further analysed using the theme of consensus since 
it had already been shown from Chapter two that consensus was a linking factor between the 
margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines.45 The first section examined cases 
in which the living instrument doctrine was applied without a consensus factor. This referred 
to those cases where the Court made a reference to interpreting the Convention as a living 
instrument which takes into consideration present day conditions but did not go ahead to 
refer or consider either international consensus, European consensus, internal consensus or 
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39 9 out of 14 cases. 
40 6 out of 9 cases. 
41 2 out of 9 cases. 
42 1 out of 9 cases. 
43 Beganovic v Croatia App no 46423/06 (ECtHR, 25 June 2009). 
44 Bayatyan v Armenia App no 23459/03 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011). 
45 This was detailed in chapter two and the case of Tyrer (n 8) which espouses the living instrument doctrine 
and Handyside (n 7) which espouse the rationale for the margin of appreciation both contain reference to the 




expert consensus as a determining factor in the case. An example of this approach can be 
seen in the case of Matthews v United Kingdom where the Court decided that Article 3 of 
Protocol No 1 applied to elections to the European Parliament. The Court referred to the 
living instrument doctrine without any reference to a comparative study to determine any 
form of consensus. Similarly, in Berganovic v Croatia where the Court extended the 
obligation to protect against torture to horizontal relationships, (actions between 
individuals), there was no reference to a comparative approach to identify consensus or lack 
thereof.46 These cases suggest that contrary to the idea that the living instrument doctrine 
leads to an adoption of a majoritarian approach, there are cases to show that the living 
instrument doctrine is counter majoritarian in some cases with a focus on the nature of the 
right and the need for protection of the rights. This is an approach welcomed by this 
researcher. The cases under this section also resulted in the imposition of new duties on 
States, an outcome that was in line with the dynamic nature of rights under the dynamic 
restricted correlativity thesis which gives room for new duties to be imposed over time and 
space. 
The second section examined cases in which consensus was a determining factor. An 
example of this could be seen in Bayatyan v Armenia where the Court for the first time had 
to make a determination of whether the right to conscientious objection came within the 
scope of Article 9 which provides for the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion.47 In deciding whether or not to move away from this existing jurisprudence of the 
European Commission on Human Rights on this issue, the Court noted the potential for 
conflict between legal certainty and the relevance of the Convention to present day society. 
It referred to the need to interpret the Convention as a living instrument and referred to 
changes which showed consensus at the international,48 European49 and national level,50 to 
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(n 44), paras 105-7. 
49 At the time of the alleged interference in 2002-2003, there was already a consensus in all Council of Europe 
member States due to the fact that the overwhelming majority had already recognised the right to conscientious 
objection in their laws. Bayatyan (n 44), para 103. 
50 Armenia was a party to the ICCPR, and it had also, when joining the Council of Europe, pledged to recognise 




recognise conscientious objection as coming within the ambit of protection of freedom of 
religion. A similar reliance on consensus was also seen in Magyar Helsinki Bizottsag v 
Hungary where the Court decided that Article 10 included a right to freedom of access to 
State held information.51 These cases are more aligned to the view of the importance of 
consensus to the living instrument doctrine and the effect this has on the margin of 
appreciation of the State as in all the cases examined under this section, the State was found 
to be in violation of its obligations.  
Whilst Chapter five had provided some answers to RQ 1 (relationship), RQ 2 
(conflict) and RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches), it had done so in the context 
of applicability arguments on compatibility ratione materiae. There was therefore a need to 
conduct a second analysis which focused on the merits of the cases. This was the contribution 
provided by chapter six, the second case analysis chapter which focused on the use of the 
margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines to determine the scope and nature of 
duties on States. The first area examined was the issue of width of the margin of appreciation. 
This is an area that has occurred frequently in the discussion of the margin of appreciation 
and has been identified as the first thing the Court decides in a case where the margin of 
appreciation is applicable.52 The living instrument doctrine had also been pinpointed for 
narrowing the width of the margin of appreciation.53 As was highlighted in Chapter two, 
change in width was an area that this thesis was going to assess, hence chapter six began 
with an examination of the use of the living instrument doctrine to alter the width of the 
margin of appreciation.54 
The first stage of this analysis was the descriptive statistical analysis which focused 
on three questions: 
 What are the types of widths of margin of appreciation in the case law? 
 Is there any relationship between the width of the margin of appreciation and the 
finding of violation in the case?  
 Has the living instrument doctrine resulted in a narrowing of the width of the margin 
of appreciation? 
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The results showed that there were three possible widths of the margin of appreciation: 
wide, narrow and unspecified. The unspecified widths referred to cases where the Court used 
terms like ‘a margin of appreciation’ or ‘a certain margin of appreciation’ but did not identify 
the width. The unspecified width was seen in 41% of the cases55 whilst the narrow width 
was seen in just 8% of the cases.56 The wide width accounted for the most cases – 51% of 
the cases.57 These outcomes were limited to the width specified by the Court explicitly in 
the case as opposed to the arguments made by either the applicant or the Respondent State 
on what the width should be. 
The second question on the relationship between the width of the margin of appreciation 
and the outcome of the case involved two sub questions. Firstly, the analysis examined what 
the outcomes had been in the cases. It showed that in 72% of the cases examined, the Court 
had found at least one violation of the Convention.58 The cases were analysed again based 
on the width of the margin of appreciation and the overall outcome of the case. The results 
revealed that the Court found a violation in 100% of the cases where the width of the margin 
of appreciation was narrow. Nonetheless, with the narrow width accounting for just 8% of 
the cases, it gave an initial indication that there was more to the finding of violation than a 
narrow width.  In 60% of the cases where the margin of appreciation was designated to be 
‘wide’, the Court found a violation of the Convention.59  Interestingly, where the Court 
deemed the margin of appreciation afforded to the unspecified, using terms such as ‘certain’ 
or ‘a’ margin of appreciation, the Court found in 84% of those cases that there had been a 
violation of the Convention.60 This figure is even higher than when the margin of 
appreciation is deemed to be wide.  
To provide a more direct answer to RQ 2 (conflict), the question was asked whether 
the living instrument doctrine has resulted in a narrowing of the width of the margin of 
appreciation. The results revealed that there was only one case where the application of the 
living instrument doctrine led to a narrowing of the margin of appreciation. It was also a case 
where the width of the margin of appreciation was unspecified rather than wide. The results 
were restricted to the express words used by the Court in the case as opposed to any subjective 
interpretation of the text. This outcome seemed to contradict the view in the literature that 
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the living instrument doctrine had led to the narrowing of the width of the margin of 
appreciation, at least in relation to the cases examined, which were cases from January 1979 
to December 2016 in which both the margin of appreciation and the living instrument 
doctrines were present in the case.61 This highlighted the limitation of the descriptive 
statistical analysis as it appeared the ‘narrowing’ of the width of the margin of appreciation 
was a more nuanced issue than express statements made in the case law. It was therefore 
necessary to adopt a doctrinal approach with a textual analysis to discover the way in which 
both doctrines had interacted at the merits stage of the cases to determine the nature and scope 
of the rights and duties. 
 Taking into consideration the finding that the width of the margin of appreciation did 
not always have a direct link on the outcome and the fact that in 41% of the cases examined 
the width of the margin of appreciation was not specified, the doctrinal textual analysis was 
focused on the use of the living instrument doctrine to police the boundaries of the margin 
of appreciation. The analysis showed that the use of the living instrument doctrine to police 
the boundaries of the margin of appreciation can be traced back to the 1979 case of Marckx 
v Belgium.62 Marckx was decided just over a year after the 1978 case of Tyrer v United 
Kingdom in which the Court articulated the living instrument doctrine for the first time.63 
This showed that right from the early days of the explicit use of the living instrument 
doctrine, it had served a function to regulate the boundaries of the margin of appreciation 
afforded to States. Several principles were extracted from Marckx on how the living 
instrument doctrine was applied to police the boundaries of the margin of appreciation 
afforded to the State.  
 International and regional treaties were examined to determine what the trend 
was in relation to the issue of maternal affiliation. This included treaties to which 
Belgium itself was not a party. (international consensus) 
 The Court referred to the practice within European States. (European consensus) 
 The Court was also influenced by the changes that were taking place in the 
domestic arena of Belgium (internal consensus) – in this case it was in sync with 
the international and European consensus, but this is not always the case.64 
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A combination of these considerations influenced the Court in reaching its decision 
on the importance of the issue at stake and on the means that would be sufficient to achieve 
protection of the issue. This study showed that since Marckx, the use of the living instrument 
as a tool to police the boundaries of the margin of appreciation afforded to States has 
continued to develop in the Court’s case law and is applied not just to positive obligations, 
but also negative obligations.65  
Through the lens of the relationship between rights and duties, the use of the living 
instrument doctrine to police the boundaries of the margin of appreciation of States is 
effectively the use of the living instrument doctrine to determine when a State has breached 
its duty even when it had a margin of appreciation. The doctrinal analysis therefore focused 
on the boundaries of the margin of appreciation in the light of the duty on the State. Due to 
the constraints of the breadth of this research, two case studies were selected from the case 
law to demonstrate the use of the living instrument doctrine to determine the nature and scope 
of duty, and the use of the living instrument doctrine to determine the scope of the duty. 
The recognition of the post-operative identity of transsexuals was used as a case study 
to demonstrate the use of the living instrument to police the boundaries of the margin of 
appreciation doctrines in determining the nature and scope of duty. This area was chosen for 
a number of reasons: (a) Volume of cases in this area in the data analysed: 12% of the cases 
dealt with issues surrounding transgender rights;66 (b) Importance of the issue: gender 
identity is concerned with a very private area of life, therefore any regulation of that area or 
interference in that area by the State is worthy of consideration; and (c) Relevance: It 
provided a good example of a change in time within the same space, an issue that was 
identified in chapter 2 as one of the areas not reflected in the discussion by Brems on the 
relationship between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines.67   
The width of the margin of appreciation in these cases on the protection of rights of 
post-operative transexuals was either ‘wide’68 or ‘unspecified’.69 Overall, in the cases in this 
case study, the Court found a violation in 5 out of the 9 cases, some of which included ‘wide’ 
margins. This therefore reinforced the point made earlier that a designation of a wide margin 
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does not necessarily lead to an outcome that the State has not violated its obligations. The 
case study showed that from the 1986 case of Rees v United Kingdom70 where the Court did 
not find any positive obligation to recognise the post-operative gender of the applicants, to 
the 2002 case of Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom, the nature and scope of the duty on 
the State had changed.71 In Goodwin, the Court decided that the choice of whether or not to 
recognise the post-operative identity of transsexuals was no longer within the margin of 
appreciation of the State. The State’s margin of appreciation was now limited as a result of 
the application of the living instrument doctrine, to the methods to be applied to recognise 
the post-operative sexual identity. Even though there were differences in the practice of 
States, the Court did not accord great weight to this, rather focusing on the evidence of an 
‘international trend’ towards recognition of the post-operative status of transsexuals.72 The 
cases involved the same member State so were an example of not just change in time, but 
also change in space. From the duty to recognise the post-operative status of transsexuals, 
the living instrument doctrine has also been applied to police the boundaries of the margin of 
appreciation in relation to regulating the conditions for gender reassignment surgery. In L v 
Lithuania the positive obligation to recognise the post-operative status of a transsexual was 
extended to cover a situation in which the domestic law did not provide any regulation of 
gender reassignment surgery.73 On the other hand, in Y.Y v Turkey, the obligation was 
examined in the context of negative obligations. 74  It focused on access to gender 
reassignment surgery and the compatibility of the conditions that could be imposed prior to 
the surgery with the duty of the State under the Convention. The expansion of the scope of 
the duties on states in relation to recognition of the post-operative gender identity of 
transsexuals has however not been without limits, showing that the living instrument doctrine 
is not without control. In Hämäläinen the Court held that Article 8 cannot be interpreted as 
imposing a positive obligation on member States to grant same-sex couples access to 
marriage.75 The reliance on the living instrument doctrine was not sufficient to trump the 
margin of appreciation afforded to the State and no duty was imposed in this instance. 
The second case study focused on the use of the interaction between the living 
instrument and margin of appreciation doctrines in determining the scope of duty on the State. 
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The case study was on the protection of the rights of illegitimate children.76 This area was 
chosen for a number of reasons: (a) Volume of case law in data: 11 out of the 75 cases in the 
data were about illegitimate children77 and this shows that this is an issue of importance as it 
keeps reoccurring in the case law of the Court; (b) Importance of the issue: The ECHR is not 
expressly a child rights Convention unlike the Convention on the Rights of the Child which 
is expressly created to protect children’s rights.78 Consequently, it was interesting to examine 
the interaction between the living instrument and margin of appreciation doctrine in 
providing protection for a group of people that the Convention was not expressly created to 
address; and (c) Relevance: It was a good example of change in time within different spaces, 
as the case law was derived from different member States. 
The particular focus was on equality of inheritance rights of children born out of 
wedlock and it examined the case law of the Court which spanned a 35-year period. 
Significantly, in all the cases examined where the rights of illegitimate children to inherit was 
considered, the Court found a violation of the Convention. From the doctrinal textual 
analysis, this study showed that the early principles showing a positive obligation on States 
to ensure equality of inheritance rights to children born in and out of wedlock were 
established in Marckx.79 Inze v Austria became the first case in which the Court dealt with 
Article 1 of Protocol No 1 again in the context of a child born out of wedlock, with the living 
instrument doctrine applied to the borders of the margin of appreciation. In that case the 
Court, relying on the living instrument doctrine, expressly found a violation of Article 14 
taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No 1 where the applicant had been excluded 
from inheriting based on a domestic law that favoured the legitimate child over the 
illegitimate child.  Although the Court did not specify the width of the margin of appreciation 
in that case, the application of the living instrument doctrine led to the requirement of a high 
threshold of justification for the grounds of interference. Following Inze, the Court has 
applied similar principles to find a breach of the Convention where there has been difference 
of treatment of illegitimate children even when negative obligations are engaged.80 Through 
the application of the living instrument doctrine to police the borders of the margin of 
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appreciation, the scope of the duty on the State has been further extended to cover the area 
of dispositions made in the private domain.81 The consistency of the outcome of the Court’s 
decision in the area of protection of inheritance rights of illegitimate children can be 
contrasted with the Court’s case law on the rights of post-operative transsexuals considered 
in the first case study.   
 
7.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
This examination of the case law of the Court on the living instrument and margin of 
appreciation doctrines has highlighted some areas where more study can be done. The 
importance of the applicability stage and arguments concerning compatibility ratione 
materiae was highlighted in chapter five. From the results of the descriptive statistical 
analysis in that chapter on the use of the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines at the applicability stage, it showed that in the two cases where both doctrines were 
applied to both the applicability issue and compliance issue, the Court found that there had 
been no breach of the Convention. This suggests that the margin of appreciation has not been 
completely taken over by the living instrument doctrine. There is room for more analysis on 
the use of both doctrines as arguments made before the Court by the parties before the Court 
and the impact if any, it has on the direction of the Court takes in the case. There is room for 
more research on the applicability phase and the role of margin of appreciation arguments at 
that phase. This is because the case analysis showed very minimal use of the doctrine at that 
phase but where it was used, it had an impact on the Court’s decision. 
Another area where further research can be conducted is the understanding of the erga 
omnes character of the Convention and the Court’s decisions. The reoccurrence of similar 
cases in relation to the inheritance rights of children born out of wedlock in spite of the 
consistency of the Court’s jurisprudence in this area suggest that States are not considering 
the erga omnes effect of those judgments. Whilst a reading of Article 46 of the Convention 
would suggest that the Court’s judgments are only binding on the parties to the particular 
case, it is clear from the doctrinal analysis in both chapters five and six, that the Court requires 
other States to keep to the principles developed in its case law. This would mean that if the 
Contracting States take note of the Court’s judgment in cases before it whether or not they 
are parties to the case, they will be able to within reason, foresee the direction of the Court 
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and avoid violations within their States. They would also be able to ensure legal certainty by 
taking heed to judgments of the Court. The aspect of the erga omnes effect of the Convention 
and the perception of States in this area could therefore be an area for further research. 
Overall, this thesis has provided an original contribution to the literature on the 
margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrine in two ways.  First, through the 
methodology adopted which involved a combination of the quantitative method of 
descriptive statistical analysis of the case law of the Court in which both the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines were applied. Second, through the systematic 
analysis of the case law on the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines from 
January 1979 – December 2016 through the lens of the relationship between rights and 
duties.  It identified a distinction between the use of both doctrines at the admissibility stage 
and at the merits stage. This thesis has shown that there is no ‘one size fits all’ method that 
is applied by the Court in dealing with these cases where both doctrines are relevant. Whilst 
conceding that the common factor between both doctrines is flexibility, there is still room 
for the Court to clearly articulate its methodology in its case law in order for there to be 
better understanding by the domestic Courts and in turn better reception and application of 
its decisions. Better articulating the methodology of the Court could also assist States in their 
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Framework for Analysis of the Relationship between the Living Instrument and 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine Doctrines 
 
Introduction 
This appendix sets out the methodology that was applied in order to fulfil the research 
objectives of this thesis. The aim is to enable the reader to understand the process that was 
adopted in the research and the direction of the research analysis undertaken. It strives to 
ensure that the research process is transparent and can be replicated by other researchers. 
The research questions which have formed the basis of this research framework are: 
1. What is the nature of the interaction between margin of appreciation and living 
instrument arguments in cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights? 
(RQ1 relationship) 
2. To what extent are living instrument arguments superseding margin of appreciation 
arguments? (RQ2 conflict) 
3. Which interpretive and theoretical approaches are applied by the Court to decide the 
outcome of cases where the margin of appreciation and living instrument arguments 
conflict? (RQ 3 interpretive and theoretical approaches) 
4. What recommendations can be made for future research and policy developments? 
(RQ4 recommendations) 
In dealing with the four research questions, a combination of research methods was applied 
in this thesis. This is because no one method on its own was considered robust enough to 
properly answer the questions posed. Each of the research methods that were applied in this 
study will be considered below and their relevance to answering the research questions posed 
will also be considered. 
 
Research Design 
The overall research design has been structured around the exploratory and 
explanatory model. The first stage was exploration of the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR, the Court) and relevant literature on the margin of appreciation and 
living instrument doctrines. Through an examination of these cases, themes of inquiry were 




was focused on using the interpretive methods highlighted in Chapter 3 to examine the case 
law to determine key themes and patterns and whether there was consistency in the way the 
ECtHR applied the interpretive methods to cases where it had to balance out competing 
margin of appreciation and living instrument claims. This research design of exploratory and 
explanatory stages has influenced the research methods adopted within this work.  
 
Research Methods 
A combination of quantitative and qualitative tools was adopted.  The qualitative 
method of doctrinal research and the quantitative method of descriptive statistical analysis 
were adopted for the exploratory stage whilst the qualitative method of doctrinal research 
was adopted for the explanatory stage.  This mixed-methods approach – moving from 
qualitative, to quantitative, and back to qualitative – is intended to offer value-added at each 
stage towards answering the central research questions. 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
The first legal research method used in the analysis chapters is the quantitative 
method of descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics are tools used to organise and 
summarise data.1 In this work, the tools were applied to organise and summarise the data 
generated from the population of interest, which is the case law of the ECtHR in which both 
the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines are present from January 1979 to 
December 2016.2  In order to ensure the reliability and validity of the research, the data has 
to be collected in a systematic manner. 3 Consequently, the process that was adopted in 
generating the data to be analysed on this thesis will be considered later on in this chapter. 
Excel has been used initially to systematically categorise and classify the data. Descriptive 
statistics was applied to further classify the cases, identify patterns and key issues. This 
approach was used to enhance the rigour of the study, but also to help inform the subsequent 
doctrinal analysis so that this research would offer a more comprehensive analysis than other 
works in this field. 
The nominal scale is the scale of measurement that was applied to the data analysed 
through the use of descriptive statistics. The nominal level involves classification of data 
                                                 
1 Zealure C Holcomb, Fundamentals of Descriptive Statistics (Routledge 2017) 2. 
2 A separate section will explain the data source in more detail. 




with words rather than numbers.4  Percentages, bar charts and pie charts were used as 
descriptive statistical tools within this work. Percentages were used as they provide a way to 
compare groups of unequal size.5 Bar charts and pie charts were used to depict pictorially 
the results of the analysis of the case law as well. The use of bar charts and pie charts drew 
attention to the findings through the visual element. They were also useful tools because this 
research engages in univariate analysis, focusing on one variable at a time,6 therefore these 
tools of descriptive statistics were instructive tools to present the results. 
The use of descriptive statistical analysis was useful for providing answers to RQ 1 
(relationship) and RQ 2 (conflict). The data collected – the case law of the court, was useful 
for examining the descriptive statistics and inferences between the margin of appreciation 
and living instrument doctrines.  
 
Analytical Parameters 
The use of descriptive statistics was limited as it does not provide a qualitative 
analysis of the issues that may be raised from the results. Whilst it provided answers to RQ 
2 (conflict) which examines the extent to which living instrument arguments are superseding 
margin of appreciation arguments from a quantitative point of view, it did not provide any 
qualitative answers to the reason why this is the case. Descriptive statistical analysis was 
also not be sufficient in determining RQ 3 (interpretive and theoretical approaches). RQ 3 
required a qualitative analysis of the data to identify the approach of the Court and how it is 
underpinned.  
The design of the project limited the source of the data to judgments of the ECtHR 
in which there is a reference to the margin of appreciation and the living instrument doctrine. 
This means that the source of the data has not been created by the researcher but rather by a 
‘third party’ in this case, the Court. The limitation is relevant because there could be cases 
in which the Court gives deference to a State – essentially applying the margin of 
appreciation – without expressly referring to it. There could also be cases in which the 
ECtHR considers developments in society – thereby applying the essence of the living 
instrument doctrine but does not expressly mention the doctrine in the case. The results that 
were derived from this thesis are therefore limited in their generalisability beyond the case 
law being considered.  
                                                 
4 Holcomb (n 1) 4. 
5 Holcomb (n 1) 9. 





Doctrinal Research  
In the light of the limitations of the descriptive statistical analysis, the second 
research method applied in this thesis was doctrinal research. Doctrinal research may be 
described as ‘the process used to identify, analyse and synthesise the content of the law’.7 It 
is 'research which provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a particular legal 
category, analyses the relationship between rules, explains areas of difficulty and, perhaps, 
predicts future developments.'8 Hutchinson describes doctrinal research as a ‘two-part’ 
process as it involves first locating the source of the law and then secondly, interpreting and 
analysing the content of the law.9 It not only critically examines the relevant statute, case 
law and doctrine, but goes further to provide a synthesis of these different elements in order 
to ‘establish an arguably correct and complete statement of the law on the matter in hand’.10 
In adopting doctrinal research there should therefore be great attention given to process of 
locating the law as well as the way the law is analysed. 
In terms of locating the source of the law, doctrinal research relies on sources such 
as legal rules contained in statutes and case law.11 The legal doctrines that arise from the 
application of the legal rules in particular case contexts are also relevant materials for 
doctrinal research.12 The arguments generated as a result of doctrinal research are not only 
derived from primary legal sources13 such as case law and statute but may also arise from 
secondary legal sources such as scholarly publications in the area.14 This reliance on statute 
and case law in order to determine what the law is in a particular area, is why doctrinal 
research is also referred to as ‘black-letter law’.15 In this research, reliance was placed on 
                                                 
7 Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), 
Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013) 7, 9. 
8 Dennis Pearce, Enid Campbell and Don Harding ('Pearce Committee'), Australian Law 
Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1987) cited in Terry Hutchinson, Researching 
and Writing in Law (Reuters Thomson, 3rd ed, 2010) 7. 
9 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Research’ (2012) 17 
Deakin Law Review 83, 110. 
10 Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ (n 7) 9-10. 
11 Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research’ in Andrew Knight, Les Ruddock (eds) Advanced Research Methods in 
the Build Environment (Wiley Blackwell, 2008) 28, 29. 
12 Legal doctrines are systematic formulations of the law in particular scenarios. See Chynoweth (n 11) 28, 29. 
13 The sources of law are usually divided into ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ sources. Primary sources include 
statute/legislation, case law and judicial precedents. Secondary cover a wider remit and include articles by 
scholars in the area, text books and case comment (to mention a few). 
14 Rob van Gestel and Hans-W. Micklitz (2011) Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal Research in Europe: What about 
Methodology? (European University Institute Working Papers Law 2011/05) 26. 
15 Black-letter law refers to’ the law that is printed in books set in Gothic type, which is very bold and black’ 




primary sources such as the case law of the ECtHR and other international Courts. Secondary 
sources such as scholarly publications in the area were also utilised for the analysis. 
Interpreting and analysing the source of the law involves ‘rigorous analysis and 
creative synthesis, the making of connections between seemingly disparate doctrinal strands, 
and the challenge of extracting general principles from an inchoate mass of primary 
materials’.16 It is therefore not just a repeating of the content of the law but rather an attempt 
to draw some coherent conclusions from the volume of materials analysed. An additional 
aspect of the synthesis and analysis is to identify areas of difficulty in the application of the 
relevant legal rules and propose areas of reform in order to make the law work more 
effectively.17 Doctrinal research may also be utilised to predict future directions for the law 
in a particular area following the synthesis of existing rules.18 The analysis and synthesis 
aspect of doctrinal research is significant and important for legal research. 
In the context of this thesis, doctrinal research was applied throughout the work as it 
aided in providing answers to the four research questions in this thesis. In order to answer 
RQ1 (relationship) on the nature of the interaction between margin of appreciation and living 
instrument arguments in cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights, 
doctrinal research will be necessary. The aspect of doctrinal research that involves locating 
the source of the law was relevant in providing answers to the related questions: what is the 
margin of appreciation doctrine and what is the living instrument doctrine and how have 
they been applied by the Court? Through a systematic examination of the case law of the 
ECtHR which is the source of the law in this instance, doctrinal research enabled an 
understanding of whether a relationship exists between both doctrines and the ways in which 
these interactions are seen in the case law. The essential question to be answered was what 
is the law on the relationship between the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrine? Doctrinal analysis was also relevant to RQ2 (conflict) in considering whether 
living instrument arguments are superseding margin of appreciation arguments in the case 
law of the Court. Through an analysis and synthesis of the relevant case law, doctrinal 
research was applied to show whether the legal reasoning adopted by the Court in these cases 
shows any trends in the relationship between both doctrines. The use of analysis and 
                                                 
16 Council of Australian Law Deans, CALD Statement on the Nature of Research (May and 
October 2005), 3 
http://www.cald.asn.au/docs/cald%20statement%20on%20the%20nature%20of%20legal%20research%20-
%202005.pdf. 
17 Hutchinson (n 7) 7 at 23. 
18 D Pearce, E Campbell and D Harding, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the 




synthesis which are part of doctrinal research was applied in determining the way in which 
the Court has shown a link between both doctrines within its jurisprudence.  
Doctrinal research was also applied to answer RQ3 (interpretive and theoretical 
approaches) on the interpretive framework that is applied in cases where there is a conflict 
between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines. Here through analysis 
and synthesis of the relevant case law, consideration was given to how the Court has dealt 
with cases where there is a conflict to ascertain the framework used by the ECtHR. 
Secondary materials such as extra judicial writing of past and current judges of the Court in 
this area will also be relevant in understanding the framework to be applied by the ECtHR.  
This framework was then be measured against the yardstick of interpretation of treaties 
through the VCLT as well as adjudicating on the existence of duties where there are 
competing claims in relation to a particular right.  
The doctrinal research formed the foundation to deal with RQ4 (recommendations) 
which focuses on conclusions and recommendations, because an understanding of what the 
law is, is essential before one can make recommendations for change or future research. It 
has already been identified that an aspect of analysis and synthesis in doctrinal research is 
identifying any issues with the law as applied and also making recommendations for the 
future. To provide a framework, any issues with the current state of the law on the 
relationship between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines would need 
to be identified. Doctrinal research, therefore, was relevant to all aspects of this research and 
formed a main research method for the analysis of the case law in this thesis. 
 
Analytical Parameters 
Doctrinal research also has its limitations as it takes an ‘insider’s view of the law’.19 
This is because the arguments are generated from a synthesis of the law itself rather than 
from a study of external factors. It ‘takes as its starting point and its main focus of attention 
rules of law, without systematic or regular reference to the context of problems they are 
supposed to resolve, the purposes they were intended to serve or the effects they in fact 
have’.20 Due to the number of examples of case law to be considered in this research, 
doctrinal research itself was limited in the categorisation of the case law prior to analysis. 
This deficiency was nonetheless ameliorated through the use of the descriptive statistical 
                                                 
19 Hutchinson, (n 7) 7,15. 
20 W Twinning (1976) Taylor Lectures 1975 Academic Law and Legal Development, Lagos: University of 




analysis to first of all categorise and identify patterns which informed the choice on how to 
proceed with the doctrinal analysis.  
Another analytic parameter is that doctrinal research involves expert use of logical 
analysis and a ‘unique blend of deduction and induction’.21 This research relied primarily on 
the inductive approach in coming to conclusions from the case law on the margin of 
appreciation. The inductive approach is a recognised means of analysis of international 
law.22 It is however acknowledged that there are limits to induction. Within this particular 
work, not all case law of the Court was analysed, but rather only a selection of cases. The 
arguments and conclusions reached may therefore be assessed from the viewpoint of strong 
or weak arguments rather than valid or invalid arguments. The researcher acknowledges that 
any of the conclusions reached are strong/weak only to the extent that they are supported by 
the data analysed. Doctrinal research was therefore used in this work as a foundation to 
determine what the law is. 23 Following on from a determination of what the law is, and in 
tandem with the descriptive statistical analysis, doctrinal textual analysis as a method 
provided a more comprehensive answer to the research questions posed. 
 
Sources of Data 
It has already been identified that this research involved a combination of doctrinal 
research and descriptive statistical analysis. The central aim of this research was to examine 
the nature of the relationship (RQ1) between the margin of appreciation doctrine and the 
interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, the Convention), as a 
living instrument as revealed in the case law of the ECtHR. This central question was been 
broken down into the four research questions set out in the introduction to this appendix. In 
order to carry out this study which examined the nature of the relationship of the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrine and the resultant effect on the decision of the 
Court, relevant data had to be generated. The case law of the ECtHR was the source of this 
data which was analysed. The preliminary activity was locating the relevant case law and 
then coding or categorising them in order to create the data that is to be analysed. The main 
goal was to make inferences from the result of the study. In particular the focus was on 
textual analysis.  
                                                 
21 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr ‘The path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457.  
22 One of the prominent advocates for the inductive approach to international law was George 
Schwarzenberger, The Inductive Approach to International Law (Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1965), George 
Schwarzenberger, The Inductive Approach to International Law (1947) 60 Harvard Law Review 539. 




The primary source of data was the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
The case law of the Court was accessed through the Human Rights Documentation 
(HUDOC) database found in the official European Court of Human Rights website.24 The 
HUDOC data base was chosen as it provides full access to the case law of the Court.25 It is 
a part of the official ECtHR’s Portal, ‘a powerful, user-friendly information system’.26 It is 
therefore a reliable source of the Court’s case law. It provides access to the Court’s case law 
via a sophisticated, yet user-friendly screen which was launched in 2012.27 There is also a 
good organisation of the case law with helpful search criteria that can be used to identify the 
cases. The case law is also digitised and easily downloaded for analysis. HUDOC was 
therefore chosen as the best source for the case law of the Court.  
Prior to obtaining the data from this source, there were three questions that needed 
to be addressed: 
 Which Court’s judgments were relevant? 
 What search criteria should be used? 
 How would accuracy be ensured? 
These questions reflect key questions in research design: Identifying the target population, 
locating or generating data, deciding how much data to collect and avoiding selection bias.28 
These issues will be discussed below. The ways in which they were dealt with and the results 
that were obtained as a result of this approach will also be presented. 
 
Identifying the Relevant Court 
To ascertain which Court judgments were considered relevant to this study, it is 
necessary to begin with an understanding of the structure of the adjudicatory mechanism 
under the Convention. Prior to 1998, there was a two-tier system in place in which both the 
Commission29 and the Court30 supervised the implementation of the Convention.31 The 
Commission was the first tier. Under this system, complaints about violations of the 
                                                 
24 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng. 
25 HUDOC User Manual, 26 September 2016 1 available at < 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_Manual_2016_ENG.PDF> accessed 16 January 2017. 
26 HUDOC User Manual, 26 September 2016 1 available at < 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_Manual_2016_ENG.PDF> accessed 16 January 2017. 
27 HUDOC User Manual, 26 September 2016 1 available at < 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_Manual_2016_ENG.PDF> accessed 16 January 2017. 
28 Epstein & Martin (n 3) 63. 
29 The European Commission of Human Rights was established in 1954. 
30 The European Court of Human Rights became functional in 1959. 
31 This could be brought by contracting States, individuals, non-governmental organisations, or individuals 




Convention could be initially brought before the Commission.32 The jurisdiction of the 
Commission to hear individual petitions was optional as it was only applicable to States that 
had accepted its jurisdiction.33 Where a case had been referred to the Commission, it would 
attempt to resolve the issues by conciliation but where this failed, either the Commission or 
a member State could refer the issue to the Court. 34 The Commission had the authority to 
create a report and set out its views on whether there had been a violation in the particular 
instance.35 This report could be transmitted to the Court where the case is referred to the 
Court but in instances where the case is not referred to the Court, the report was to be 
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers to make a final decision on violation.36 In essence, 
the Commission’s report would form the basis of the decision as to whether there was a 
violation of the Convention. Reports of the Commission in cases that were not referred to 
the Court are therefore classified in this thesis as relevant data to be considered.  
The Court was the second tier and its role was to determine if there had been a 
violation in such cases as had been referred to it by a contracting State or the Commission.37 
It would then transmit its decision to the Committee of Ministers which had the role of 
enforcement of the judgments. The jurisdiction of the Court was optional just like the 
Commission. The Court could, therefore, only exercise jurisdiction in respect of those States 
that had expressly accepted its jurisdiction in individual petitions.38 Decisions of the Court 
prior to 1998 are considered relevant case law for the purpose of this thesis. 
Post 1998, Protocol No 11 made significant changes to the adjudicatory structure.39 
The Commission was abolished and a permanent full time Court with compulsory 
jurisdiction was established with jurisdiction to deal with all matters concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Convention and the related Protocols.40 The decision-
                                                 
32 Articles 25 and 26 of the 1950 ECHR. 
33 Article 25 of the 1950 ECHR. 
34 Articles 44 and 48 of the 1950 ECHR. Individuals did not have a right of direct access to the Court at the 
time. 
35 For a more in-depth examination of the role of the European Commission prior to 1998, see Erik Friberg and 
Mark E Villiger, ‘The European Commission of Human Rights’, in R St J Macdonald, F Matcher, H Petzold 
(eds), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Drodrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) 605-620; 
Pieter Van Dijk, Godefridus JH Van Hoof, AW Heringa, Theory & Practice of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 1998) 26-31. 
36 Articles 31 and 32 of the 1950 ECHR. 
37 Article 45 of the 1950 ECHR. 
38 Article 46 of the 1950 ECHR. 
39 ETS No 155, Protocol No 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established thereby. Opened for signature and ratification on 
11/05/1994, entered into force on 01/11/1998. 
40 Article 32 ECHR. For an examination of the structural amendments to the system of control as a result of 
Protocol No. 11 of 1998, see Ed Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights: From its 




making powers of the Committee of Ministers was also abolished. The right of individual 
petition was made an automatic part of the adjudicatory system.41 The permanent Court 
consists of one judge from each of the contracting States to the Convention.42 The new Court 
has both administrative and judicial roles to play. In relation to administrative work, the 
significant decisions are taken by the Plenary Court which is composed of all the Court 
judges.43  Judgments of the Plenary Court are not considered as relevant data for this thesis 
as they are judgments on administrative points which are not part of the core issues to be 
dealt with in this research. Those judgments are therefore excluded. 
When it comes to judicial work, the current system allows for four possible 
formations of the Court in deciding cases.44 The Court may sit in a single-judge formation, 
in committees of three judges, as a Chamber of seven judges or as a Grand Chamber of 
seventeen judges.45 Where the Court sits as a single-judge formation, the competence of the 
single judge is restricted to decisions on admissibility. They can declare an application 
inadmissible or strike it off the Court’s list of cases where no further examination is required 
for such a decision.46 Where the judge does not declare the case inadmissible, then they can 
forward it on to a committee or to a Chamber for further examination.47 The competence of 
the Committee is twofold. In a similar manner to the single judge, it can make final decisions 
on admissibility of a particular application.48  Where it declares an application to be 
admissible, the Committee can make a judgment on the merits in instances where the Court’s 
case law on a particular issue is well established.49 This is usually referred to as WECL 
cases.50 In all other matters where it deems the application to be admissible, the Committee 
has the role of referring the cases to the Chambers or the Grand Chambers. 
The Chambers usually sit in formation of seven judges and would make decisions on 
the merits in such cases that are referred to it by the Committee or single judge. The 
Chambers also have some jurisdiction to determine on admissibility where a decision has 
not been made by either the single judge or the Committee. They also make decisions on 
                                                 
41 Article 34 ECHR. 
42 Article 20 ECHR. 
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the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP, 2014) 111. 
44 For more on the different sections of the Court, see Harris et al (n 43) 111. 
45 Article 26 ECHR. 
46 Article 27(1) (2) ECHR. 
47 Article 27(3) ECHR. 
48 Article 28(1) ECHR. 
49 Article 28(2) ECHR. 




admissibility and merits of inter-State applications.51 Within three months from the date of 
its judgment, a decision of the Chamber can be referred to the Grand Chamber.52 Decisions 
of the Chamber on the merits of a case become final in three instances: 
 The parties state that they will not refer the case to the Grand Chamber; or 
 Three months after the date of the final decision where there has been no declaration 
to refer the case to the Grand Chamber; or 
 Where the case is referred to the Grand Chamber, but the Grand Chamber rejects the 
request.53 
The Chamber has the ability to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber 
at any time before it has given its judgment. This is restricted to instances where a case 
before the Chamber ‘raises a serious question affecting the interpretation of the Convention 
or the Protocols thereto’ or in instances where deciding a question that has been brought 
before the Chamber ‘might have a result inconsistent with a judgment previously delivered 
by the Court’.54 For the purposes of this thesis, the judgments of the Chamber are relevant. 
The particular judgments that are relevant are those that have become final under any of the 
above circumstances. Judgments of the Chamber that have become final have been included 
in the data sample because they are binding once they become final. The fact that the matter 
was not referred to the Grand Chamber for further consideration does not remove the weight 
of those decisions. The Chamber decisions have also been selected in order to provide 
comprehensiveness to the sample. Such judgments are therefore included when searching 
the HUDOC database. 
The Grand Chamber is the final decision-making stage. It is not an appeal body in 
the strict sense of the word but has the role of developing and ensuring consistency in the 
Court’s jurisprudence in interpreting the Convention and its protocols.55 It can decide on 
cases that have been relinquished by the Chamber in accordance with Article 30 or where a 
party refers a case to it following a final judgment of the Chamber.56 Cases that have been 
decided by the Grand Chamber cannot be taken any further. The decisions of the Grand 
Chamber are therefore important not only because they are final decisions following a 
referral, which would suggest the importance of the matter being contested, but also because 
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they could be cases in which the Chamber has relinquished its jurisdiction because it is of 
the view that the particular case is so important that it has to be dealt with by the Grand 
Chamber directly. The decisions of the Grand Chamber were therefore considered as very 
relevant data for this thesis. 
Following the examination of the nature of the adjudicatory structure for the ECHR 
pre- and post-1998, the relevant judgments that formed the data for analysis in this work 
were: (1) Pre 1998: Final decisions of the Commission in cases that were not referred to the 
Court, and all decisions of the Court; (2) Post-1998: Judgments of the Chamber that have 
become final and all decisions of the Grand Chamber.57 These selections were made to 
ensure comprehensiveness of the study and also validity due to the status of the cases being 
considered. The time period was January 1979 to December 2016. This cut-off date was 
chosen as this provided a natural end of year cut off taking into consideration that the case 
law was being analysed by the researcher in the first half of 2017. 
 
Identifying the Search Criteria 
Following an identification of the relevant Court, the next stage for this thesis was 
identifying the search criteria that would be appropriate to collating the case law. This thesis 
was an inquiry into the relationship between the margin of appreciation and living instrument 
doctrines in the case law of the Court. It was therefore logical to search for cases in which 
the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines were referred to. Choosing cases 
in which both doctrines were mentioned gave the opportunity to identify the relationship 
between them, understand how the Court has dealt with conflict between them and also 
identify relevant frameworks that could be applied to dealing with such cases of conflict.  
Second, as already revealed in chapter two, the Court does not always use the terms 
‘living instrument’ expressly but may sometimes use the phrase ‘present-day conditions’ 
when dealing with cases in a similar way to the living instrument doctrine.58 This 
understanding prompted an examination to determine other words/phrases used by the Court 
which have a similar connotation to the living instrument. The following words/phrases were 
identified: “current circumstances”, “evolving standards” and “evolving”. Consequently, the 
researcher deemed it appropriate to expand the search criteria to include cases in which the 
margin of appreciation any of these other terms were present: ‘margin of appreciation and 
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present-day conditions’, ‘margin of appreciation and current circumstances’, ‘margin of 
appreciation and evolving standards’ and ‘margin of appreciation and evolving’. This has 
been undertaken to ensure the accuracy and robustness of the research data.   
The next issue to determine was the type of information retrieval model to be applied 
in searching the Court’s case law. An information retrieval system may be defined as ‘a 
software programme that stores and manages information on documents, often textual 
documents but possibly multimedia’.59 The system ‘informs on the existence and location of 
documents that might contain the desired information’.60 Documents returned which satisfy 
the need of the searcher, are termed ‘relevant documents’.61 A perfect information retrieval 
system would return only relevant documents but such a system does not exist and the 
understanding of what is ‘relevant’ would usually vary depending on the particular 
individual looking through the results.62 Whilst there does not exist a perfect information 
retrieval system, a good one could be classed as one that retrieves relevant documents before 
irrelevant ones and a system that returns very few irrelevant documents.   
For the purpose of this thesis, information retrieval systems that managed 
information on textual documents were relevant. HUDOC has already been identified as the 
digitised database from which the case law of the Court would be retrieved. Accordingly, 
the search options available on HUDOC were the relevant information retrieval systems to 
consider. HUDOC offers two options for a text search: the ‘simple search field’ and ‘Boolean 
search screen’.63 The Boolean model is the first model of information retrieval and is 
arguably the most criticised model.64 It is one of the exact match models of information 
retrieval.65 ‘The model can be explained by thinking of a query term as an unambiguous 
definition of a set of documents’.66 A search with the query term ‘family’ for example would 
return results of all the documents in which the word ‘family’ appears.  
For this thesis the query terms were not just individual words, but rather phrases: for 
example, “margin of appreciation” AND “living instrument”. A simple search for margin of 
appreciation would therefore not suffice as it would return results of ‘margin’, ‘of’, 
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http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_Manual_2016_ENG.PDF> accessed 16 January 2017.  
64 For more on the Boolean model, see Hiemstra (n 59) 3-4. 
65 Other exact match information retrieval models are discussed in Hiemstra (n 59) 3-5. 




‘appreciation’ and probably ‘margin of appreciation’ as well. This would lead to too many 
results that would need to be sifted through. The purpose of the thesis was also not just to 
deal with the margin of appreciation on its own but the relationship between the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines. A search mechanism that would involve 
retrieving results of cases that had both phrases in them was therefore necessary. A Boolean 
search allowed for searching using phrases. A further advantage of the Boolean search was 
the ability to combine operators with query terms in order to produce new sets of documents. 
The Boolean search was therefore considered the relevant information retrieval model for 
this thesis. 
It was necessary to consider how the search could be done with the phrases and return 
the relevant results. George Boole had propounded three basic operators which could be 
combined with query terms and their returned documents in order to form new data sets: ‘the 
logical product called AND, the logical sum called OR and the logical difference called 
NOT’.67 The relevant operator for this thesis is ‘AND’ because combining the two query 
terms with AND reveals results that will be less than or equal to the ‘document sets of any 
of the single sets’.68 It would yield results that included both terms. The HUDOC User 
Manual also specifies a list of ‘HUDOC Portal Boolean Search Syntax’ in which it details 
that ‘AND’ means ‘finds documents containing both terms in any order – word AND word 
or phrase AND word, or phrase AND phrase, etc’.69  
  A Boolean search using the query terms “margin of appreciation” AND “living 
instrument” would therefore yield a result that includes sets of documents that are indexed 
with both the terms ‘margin of appreciation’ and ‘living instrument’, essentially an 
intersection of both  sets.70 A second Boolean search of “margin of appreciation” AND 
“present-day conditions” would yield a result that includes sets of documents that are 
indexed with both the terms ‘margin of appreciation’ and ‘present-day conditions’. The same 
would be the case with all the other combinations identified earlier.71 The basic operator 
‘OR’ was not seen as relevant as both terms were needed in the search result in order to 
compare their application in a particular case. The basic operator NOT was not considered 
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as relevant either as the aim of the search was to have documents that included not excluded 
the terms margin of appreciation and living instrument.   
The advantage of using an exact match model in the form of a Boolean search for 
this piece of research is that it would retrieve all the cases in which an exact match to the 
query terms were found. This was considered an important point for this research since the 
focus is on those specific interpretive tools of the Court, an exact match to those terms was 
important in gathering the data. The Boolean search was also advantageous for this research 
as the results retrieved can be controlled by inserting the exact phrase to be searched for and 
it would be clear why the particular results were retrieved. In this instance, those particular 
results would be retrieved because they contained the relevant query terms.  
Although the Boolean search has the advantages mentioned above, it also has some 
limitations. One of the key limitations of a Boolean search is that it does not provide a 
ranking of the materials that have been retrieved.72 In returning the data from the search of 
the case law, it would not automatically suggest which case was most important. Whilst 
ranking may be considered of the utmost importance in retrieval models,73 for this thesis this 
was not an insurmountable issue.  Ranking in this instance was relative to the focus of this 
thesis which is the relationship (RQ1) between the margin of appreciation and living 
instrument doctrines in the case law of the Court. The most relevant cases then would be 
those in which the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines AND, OR, the 
margin of appreciation doctrine and ‘present-day’ conditions were referred to by the Court 
in dealing with the case itself.74 HUDOC provides an ‘Advanced Search’ tool which is able 
to return results on specific search terms and pinpoint where this is found in the case law. 
This tool was used to further select the case law.  
Ranking is also linked to the Court that made the decision. Therefore, decisions from 
the Grand Chamber would be ranked higher than those from the Chamber. In this particular 
instance, in cases that had been referred from the Chamber to the Grand Chamber, the issue 
of ranking was addressed by excluding the Chamber decision as the Grand Chamber decision 
was now the final decision. Ranking does not, however, affect the substance of the 
information retrieved from final decisions of the Chamber as the Court does not operate a 
precedent system as may be found in common law jurisdictions, all final decisions are 
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therefore relevant in themselves. The issue of whether a case is important is also a debatable 
issue as the nature of the particular right being addressed could also influence the 
consideration of the ranking of the case even where it is a Chamber rather than a Grand 
Chamber decision.   
 
5.5 Generating the Data  
Four common approaches to generating data in empirical research exist and they are: 
experiments, surveys, observation and textual analysis.75 In this study, the method for 
generating the data is textual analysis.  This was chosen as the most appropriate method 
because the focus of the study is on the Court’s decision and how it shows the relationship 
between the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines. Experimental and non-
experimental social science methodologies were not necessarily relevant to this thesis. 
Whilst surveys might reflect people’s perception of the relationship between the margin of 
appreciation and living instrument doctrines, they were not ideal to use in this case as what 
was required was the Court’s actual use of these terms in practice rather than a perceived 
use.76 Observation would involve immersing oneself in the Court’s activities for a period of 
time. Observation can vary depending on the level of contact with the subject of study. This 
method was not been considered suitable to this piece of research due to the limitation of 
resources to achieve this. 
Textual analysis involves ‘extracting information from textual content that the 
researcher can use to draw inferences.77 Textual analysis is also referred to as content 
analysis.78 In this research the text came from the case law of the ECtHR as earlier 
highlighted.  The case law was therefore the source of data rather than the data itself as the 
data had to be extracted from the case law in order for it to be susceptible to systematic 
analysis.  
The first stage was to carry out some searches. Searching for the data was done at 
different stages of the thesis to test various approaches, with the final search done in the first 
quarter of 2017. The case law included in the sample was from January 1979 to December 
2016 and the final number included in the analysis was 75 cases. The first search for just 
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‘living instrument’ in the Court’s case law returned a total of 109 cases. This was then further 
weeded out to take out the cases that had been repeated as a result of them being referred to 
the Grand Chamber.79 After removing duplicated cases which included cases that were 
reported in both English and another foreign language, the final count on this list was 105 
cases. The first Boolean search for two phrases was for “margin of appreciation” AND 
“living instrument” and on the ‘document collections’ in the left-hand pane of the HUDOC 
data base, the relevant judgments selected were Grand Chamber, Chamber and Reports of 
the European Commission on Human Rights. This search returned a result of 68 cases which 
were made up of 40 Grand Chamber judgments, 22 Chamber judgments, and 6 reports of the 
Commission. The search was flipped to “living instrument” AND “margin of appreciation” 
to ensure accuracy. This search revealed exactly the same results with the same 68 cases. 
This initial search shows that the margin of appreciation doctrine appears in more than half 
of the cases in which we find the express use of the living instrument doctrine in its clear 
format. This shows that these two doctrines enjoy some kind of relationship (RQ 1) which 
needs to be explored.  
Flowing from the understanding in chapter two that the Court has other phrases 
which capture the living instrument principle in the case law, the second search was for 
“margin of appreciation” AND “present-day conditions”. It was also flipped to “present-day 
conditions” AND “margin of appreciation”. Both searches revealed 77 cases: 24 Grand 
Chamber judgments, 49 Chamber judgments and 4 reports from the Commission. 
Combining the first combined phrase search and this second combined phrase search gave a 
total of 145 cases. 
The next stage was a manual read through the list of cases to weed out any case 
names that had been duplicated as a result of the two searches, or cases that were not final 
decisions. A manual search was also undertaken to ensure that no case had been retrieved 
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from the search which did not contain the search terms. This was to ensure accuracy of the 
results retrieved.  Several cases had been duplicated. Some others were duplicated as they 
had both ‘living instrument’ and ‘present day conditions’ within the text, so they appeared 
on both lists. Such cases were then listed just once. Some of these were cases that had been 
referred from the Chamber to the Grand Chamber, the search had returned the results 
including both the Chamber and Grand Chamber decisions, and hence the cases were listed 
twice. The relevant cases were: Hatton and Others v United Kingdom80, Bayatyan v 
Armenia81 Fabris v France.82 Mouvement Raёlien Suisse v Switzerland83 was also listed 
twice with the Chamber decision referring to the margin of appreciation and living 
instrument doctrines whilst the Grand Chamber decision referred to the margin of 
appreciation and present-day conditions. In keeping with the ranking based on the Court, the 
Grand Chamber decision is included in the list.84 A similar decision was made in reference 
to Reports of the Commissions in instances where the cases were referred to the Court. 
Where the case had been referred to the Court and a decision had been made, the decision of 
the Commission was taken off the list and only the decision of the Court was retained.85  
Some other cases were removed from the list because although the Commission’s 
Reports referred to both the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines; or 
margin of appreciation and present-day conditions, these cases had subsequently been 
referred to the ECtHR and the Court’s decision only referred to the margin of appreciation. 
Hence those cases fell outside the criteria, of being final, and were excluded from the list for 
final analysis.86There was a final check through this to ensure that all the decisions that were 
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retained were final decisions. The final number after excluding cases that were not final 
decisions was 86. 
Three more Boolean searches were made to ensure comprehensiveness. A Boolean 
search was executed for the terms “margin of appreciation” AND “current circumstances”. 
This revealed a total of 15 cases. Following a manual reading of the list and weeding out of 
the cases that were duplicated87 or not found to be relevant, because the use of the phrase 
‘current circumstances’ was not related to the interpretation of the Convention as a living 
instrument,88 there were an additional three cases that were added to the list of cases.89 
Another Boolean search was conducted for “margin of appreciation” AND “evolving 
standards”. This brought a total of 2 cases. One of the cases had already been picked up in 
the search for “margin of appreciation” AND “living instrument”.90 There was therefore just 
one additional case added to the list of cases.91 The last Boolean search was made of “margin 
of appreciation” AND “evolving”. This revealed a total of 104 cases.92 Taking into 
consideration the cut off period of 31 December 2016, the result was 102 cases. These were 
then manually read through to exclude any irrelevant cases and any cases that were 
duplicated from the previous lists. After a manual look through, 8 more cases were added to 
the case list which brought the number to 98 cases. A further search was completed for 
“margin of appreciation” AND “current human rights standards” this revealed a result of 
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7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75 (Commission, Plenary 11 October 1980); The Court’s decision in Silver and others 
v The United Kingdom App no 5947/72;6205/73;7052/75;7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75 (ECtHR, 25 
March 1983) does not make mention of either the living instrument doctrine or the phrase ‘present-day 
conditions’ hence the Silver case did not make the final list of cases. 
87 X and Others v Austria App no 19010/07 (ECtHR, 19 February 2013); Sheffield and Horsham v The United 
Kingdom App nos 22985/93; 23390/94 (ECtHR, 30 July 1998); Cossey v. The United Kingdom App no 
10843/84 (ECtHR, 27 September 1990); (Commission decisions that were excluded because there were 
subsequent court decisions:  A.G.V.R. v. The Netherlands App no 20060/92 (Commission (Plenary), 17 October 
1995); Horsham v The United Kingdom App no 23390/94 (Commission (Plenary),21 January 1997); Sheffield 
v The United Kingdom App no 22985/93 (Commission (Plenary),21 January 1997). 
88 Bowman v The United Kingdom App no 24839/94 (ECtHR, 19 February 1998); Pini and others v Romania 
App nos  78028/01;78030/01 (ECtHR, 22 June 2004);  S.J. v. Belgium App no 70055/10 (ECtHR, 27 February 
2014);  Paposhvili v Belgium App no 41738/10 (ECtHR, 17 April 2014);  Radkov and Sabec v. Bulgaria App 
no 18938/07;36069/09 (ECtHR, 27 May 2014); Yabloko Russian United Democratic Party and others  v. 
Russia App no 18860/07 (ECtHR, 8 November 2016). 
89 S.H. and others v Austria App no 57813/00 (ECtHR, 3 November 2011); Chapman v. United Kingdom App 
no 27238/95 (ECtHR, 18 January 2001); Rees v United Kingdom App no 9532/81 (ECtHR, (Plenary) 17 
October 1986. 
90 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary App no 18030/11 (ECtHR, 18 November 2016).  
91 Öcalan v. Turkey (No. 2) App nos  24069/03;197/04;6201/06;10464/07 (ECtHR, 18 March 2014). 





three cases. Following a weeding out of any duplicated cases, one more case was added to 
the list making a total of 99 cases.93  
To ensure a systematic analysis of the case law under consideration, the pool of cases 
was divided into two sets. The first set comprised of all the cases in which the terms ‘margin 
of appreciation’ AND ‘living instrument’ or any of its variants appear within the section of 
the case report called ‘The Court’s Assessment’. This is the most important section as the 
Court’s decision is based on its assessment of the principles of law that are applicable and 
its view on how they are applicable in the particular case. These cases were categorised as 
‘Set 1’. ‘Set 2’ comprised those cases in which either of the query terms ‘margin of 
appreciation’ AND ‘living instrument’ and any of its variants appears within the text but not 
necessarily in the section of the Court’s assessment but is rather found either in the parties’ 
submissions or in the dissenting opinions.  The cases in Set 1 came to a total of 75 cases 
which form the core of the case law to be analysed within this work. Cases in which the 
margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines appear only in the dissenting 
judgment were retained as points of reference if there were relevant points to be drawn from 
them but did not form the main core of analysis in the work.  
 
Coding the Data 
Coding can be defined as ‘translating properties or attributes of the world (variables) 
into a form that is susceptible to systematic analysis.94 The process of coding involves ‘first 
developing a precise scheme to account for the values of each variable and second, 
methodically and physically assigning all units a value for each variable’.95 The coding 
scheme for this work was developed using a combination of deductive and inductive 
approaches. The deductive approach was first employed, and a scheme of variables was 
created first and applied to a sample. As the sample was studied, the coding scheme was 
further developed with new aspects added to be considered.  A sample of 23 cases from the 
list of cases in which the margin of appreciation and living instrument doctrines were 
reflected within the main court’s assessment. From an examination of this sample, the coding 
scheme was developed. 
                                                 
93 Firth and Others v United Kingdom App no 47784/09 (ECtHR, 12 August 2014). 
47784/09;47806/09;47812/09;47818/09;47829/09;49001/09;49007/09;49018/09;49033/09;49036/09 
(ECtHR, 17 August 2014); and Hirst v United Kingdom App no 74025/01 (ECtHR, 6 October 2005) had 
already been identified.  
94 Epstein & Andrew (n 3) 95. 




Some of the factors which were considered in the coding were questions such as: 
what article is in issue? Who raised the margin of appreciation doctrine first in the case? 
Who raised the living instrument doctrine first in the case? Was there any third-party 
intervention and what doctrine was supported? What was the outcome of the case? A detailed 
presentation of the coding scheme is contained in Appendix B to this thesis.  
 
Analysing the Data in Relation to the Research Questions - Data Analysis Process 
This section provides an indication of how the data was analysed. Phase I of the case 
law analysis which was done in chapter five, consisted of a quantitative and doctrinal textual 
analysis of the case law from the perspective of the use of margin of appreciation and living 
instrument arguments in the applicability stage to determine the compatibility ratione 
materiae of the Convention. It also examined the impact of the outcome of the compatibility 
decision on the outcome of the case. The data collected was first of all summarised using 
descriptive statistical analysis. The second stage was making inferences based upon 
descriptive statistics. Textual analysis was applied at this stage. Textual analysis involves 
‘extracting information from textual content that the researcher can use to draw inferences’.96 
In this instance it involved extracting content from the case law of the ECtHR on the margin 
of appreciation and living instrument doctrine which was then be subjected to analysis. The 
doctrinal method was applied to analyse the law and synthesis the findings in order to draw 
conclusions.  
Phase II of the analysis was done in the chapter six.  It involved both a quantitative 
and doctrinal textual analysis of the cases from the perspective of the impact of margin of 
appreciation and living instrument arguments in determining the scope of duties on States. 
The focus was on the merits stage of the case rather than the admissibility stage. In a similar 
fashion to chapter five, it began with a summary of the data through the use of descriptive 
statistical analysis and then inferences were drawn which formed the basis for the doctrinal 
textual analysis that follows. 
 
Conclusion 
This appendix has provided an explanation of the framework that was be applied in 
the analysis of the decisions of the Court. The limitations of the study have been highlighted 
and the measures to foster validity of the results has also been highlighted. In adopting a 
                                                 




mixture of doctrinal research and quantitative methods of descriptive statistical analysis, this 
research has filled a gap in the existing literature on the margin of appreciation doctrine and 
provided an original contribution to the literature in this area. It has provided for a systematic 
examination of the case law in a way that leads to results that can be replicated. It has shown 
how the decisions of the Court when they apply the margin of appreciation doctrine and 







Coding Scheme for Systematic Case Analysis 
 
List of Abbreviations:  
LI – Living Instrument doctrine 
MOA – Margin of appreciation doctrine 
NA – Not applicable 
NLS – No living instrument submission 
NMS – No margin of appreciation submission 
 
VARIABLE VALUE VALUE LABEL 
Name of Case Varies depending on 
the case title 
 
Date of decision Possible Range (1 
January 1955 – 31 
December 2016) 
This captures the date on which the 
decision of the Court was made in the 
particular case. The year 1955 was 
chosen as the start date as that was the 
year in which the first decision of the 
Commission was given as contained in 
the HUDOC database. 




































Article 2 was relied on by the applicant 
and the Court decided on this article in 
the case. 
 
Article 2 was not invoked, or it was 
raised by the applicant, but the Court 
decided that there was no need to 
consider the case under that article. 
Article 3 – Article 3 
Protocol No 1 
(Column E to column 
S) recurring as 
‘Article 2 invoked’ 
  
Doctrine supported by 








The third-party submission argues that 
the Court should consider changes in 
society and interpret the Convention in 
the light of those changes. The 
submission will be coded as supporting 

















LI is expressly mentioned within the 
submission. 
 
The third-party submission argues that 
the Court should consider the 
differences in individual States and give 
the State a discretion on the particular 
issues. The submission will be coded as 
supporting the MOA doctrine whether 
or not the term MOA is expressly 
mentioned within the submission. 
 
There is no third-party submission, or 
the third party submission does not 
make reference to the margin of 
appreciation or living instrument 
doctrines or argue for reliance on 
consensus or State discretion. 
First party to raise and 













The term is referred to expressly by the 
applicant in their argument or they refer 
to the need for the government to take 
into consideration changes in society 
when making their decision or 
developments within member States 
which is essentially the living 
instrument argument even if they have 
not expressly referred to the term. 
 
The term is raised for the first time by 
the Court itself in its adjudication of the 
case. 
First party to invoke 
and rely on the  
Respondent 
 
 The term is referred to by the 













they argue that the State should be given 
discretion in dealing with the particular 
issue, which is essentially the margin of 
appreciation argument. 
 
The term is raised for the first time by 
the Court in its analysis of the case. 
LI argument relied on 
successfully to make 
issue compatible 
ratione materiae with 




















The living instrument doctrine or any of 
its variants is relied on by the Court to 
bring the case within the ambit of the 
court’s jurisdiction or to bring the case 
within the ambit of a particular article of 
the Convention. 
 
Living instrument relied on to argue for 
compatibility ratione materiae but the 
argument was not accepted by the Court. 
 
There was a compatibility argument, but 
the living instrument doctrine was not 
used as a basis for the argument here. 
 
The compatibility ratione materiae of 
the Convention to the case was not 
contested. 
 
(Or there is no applicability issue within 
the case.)  
MOA successfully 








The margin of appreciation doctrine or 
any of its variants is relied on by the 
Court or Respondent to challenge the 

















Convention to the particular issue being 
raised. 
 
The margin of appreciation doctrine is 
used to challenge compatibility, but the 
argument is not accepted by the Court. 
 
There was a compatibility argument, but 
the margin of appreciation doctrine was 
not used as a basis for the argument 
here. 
 
The compatibility ratione materiae of 
the Convention to the case was not 
contested or there is no applicability 
issue within the case. 
Does dissenting 
judgement favour the 



















There is a dissenting judgment that 
favourably discusses the living 
instrument doctrine or its variants and 
argues that the court should have 
adopted that approach in reaching its 
decision in the case. 
 
The dissenting judgment refers to the 
living instrument doctrine or any of its 
variants but argues that the Court should 
not adopt an outcome in line with this 
doctrine or that the doctrine is not 
relevant to that case. 
 
There is no dissenting judgment, or the 




living instrument doctrine or its 
application to the case.  
Does dissenting 
judgment favour the 


















There is a dissenting judgment that 
favourably discusses the margin of 
appreciation doctrine and argues that the 
court should have adopted that approach 
in reaching its decision in the case. 
 
The dissenting judgment refers to the 
margin of appreciation doctrine but 
argues that the Court should not adopt 
an outcome in line with this doctrine or 
that the doctrine is not relevant to that 
case. 
 
There is no dissenting judgment, or the 
dissent does not specifically relate to the 
margin of appreciation doctrine or its 
application to the case. 
Is there a finding of 














The Court finds that the State had a 
positive obligation and also finds that (in 
relation to at least one of the articles 
raised in the case), the State had 
breached its positive obligation. 
 
The Court finds that the State had a 
positive obligation in the case but holds 
that the State was not in breach of that 
positive obligation. 
 
The issue of positive obligation does not 
arise, or the court rejects the argument 




obligation on the State. The court rather 
considers the case on the basis of the 
breach of a negative obligation of non-
interference. 
 










The Court finds that article 2 has been 
violated by the State. 
 
The Court finds that there has been no 
violation of article 2. 
 
Either article 2 was not raised at all in 
the case or the Court did not deem it fit 
to consider the case under that article 
therefore for the purposes of the coding, 
it is the same as the article not being 
raised at all within the case. 
Finding of violation of 
Article 3 – Article 3 
Protocol No 1 
(Column AK to AZ) 
recurring as finding of 










List of Cases for Data Analysis 
(Margin of Appreciation and Living Instrument Doctrines Present in the Case)  
January 1979 to December 2016 
 (Arranged in Chronological Order beginning from Earliest Decision by the Court) 
 
 Marckx v Belgium App No 6833/74 (ECtHR, 13 June 1979) 
 Rees v United Kingdom App no 9532/81 (ECtHR, 17 October 1986) 
 Johnston and others v Ireland App no 9697/82 (ECtHR, 18 December 1986) 
 Inze v Austria App no 8695/79 (ECtHR, 28 October 1987) 
 Cossey v United Kingdom App no 10843/84 (ECtHR, 27 September 1990) 
 Sigurður A. Sigurjónsson v Iceland App no 16130/90 (ECtHR, 30 June 1993) 
 Sheffield And Horsham v United Kingdom App nos 22985/93 and 23390/94 
(ECtHR, 30 July 1998) 
 Matthews v United Kingdom App no 24833/94 (ECtHR, 18 February 1999) 
 Mazurek v France App no 34406/97 (ECtHR, 1 February 2000) 
 Dikme v Turkey App no 20869/92 (ECtHR, 11 July 2000) 
 Annoni Di Gussola and others v France App nos 31819/96 and 33293/96 (ECtHR, 
14 November 2000) 
 Chapman v United Kingdom App no 27238/95 (ECtHR, 18 January 2001) 
 Frette v France App no 36515/97 (ECtHR, 26 February 2002) 
 S.A. Dangeville v France App no 36677/97 (ECtHR, 16 April 2002) 
 Stes Colas Est and others v France App no 37971/97 (ECtHR, 16 April 2002) 
 Pretty v United Kingdom App no 2346/02 (ECtHR, 29 April 2002) 
 Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom App no 28957/95 (ECtHR, 11 July 2002) 
 I v United Kingdom App no 25680/94 (ECtHR, 11 July 2002) 
 S.L v Austria App no 45330/99 (ECtHR, 9 January 2003) 
 L. and V. v Austria App nos 39392/98 and 39829/98 (ECtHR, 9 January 2003) 
 Sommerfeld v Germany App no 31871/96 (ECtHR, 8 July 2003) 
 M.C. v Bulgaria App no 39272/98 (ECtHR, 4 December 2003) 
 Gorraiz Lizarraga and others v Spain App no 62543/00 (ECtHR, 27 April 2004) 
 VO v France App no 53924/00 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004) 




 Siliadin v France App no 73316/01 (ECtHR, 26 July 2005) 
 Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 2) App no 74025/01 (ECtHR, 16 October 2005) 
 Leyla Sahin v Turkey App no 44774/98 (ECtHR, 10 November 2005) 
 Mizzi v Malta App no 26111/02 (ECtHR, 12 January 2006) 
 Grant v The United Kingdom App no 32570/03 (ECtHR, 23 May 2006) 
 Zarb Adami v Malta App no 17209/02 (ECtHR, 20 September 2006) 
 Wagner and J.M.W.L v Luxembourg App no 76240/01 (ECtHR, 28 June 2007) 
 L. v Lithuania App no 27527/03 (ECtHR, 11 September 2007) 
 Stoll v Switzerland App no 69698/01 (ECtHR, 10 December 2007) 
 Emonet and others v Switzerland App no 39051/03 (ECtHR, 13 December 2007) 
 E.B. v France App no 43546/02 (ECtHR, 22 January 2008) 
 Demir and Baykara v Turkey App no 34503/97 (12 November 2008) 
 K.U. v Finland App no 2872/02 (ECtHR, 2 December 2008) 
 Muñoz Díaz v Spain App no 49151/07 (ECtHR, 8 December 2009) 
 Glor v Switzerland App no 13444/04 (ECtHR, 30 April 2009) 
 Brauer v Germany App no 3545/04 (ECtHR, 28 May 2009) 
 Berganovic v Croatia App no 46423/06 (ECtHR, 25 June 2009) 
 Zaunegger v Germany App no 22028/04 (ECtHR, 3 December 2009) 
 Kozak v Poland App no 13102/02 (ECtHR, 2 March 2010) 
 Schwizgebel v Switzerland App no 25762/07 (ECtHR, 10 June 2010) 
 Schalk And Kopf v Austria App no 30141/04 (ECtHR, 24 June 2010) 
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